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Abstract 
 
Risk management in relation to information and communication technologies (ICT) has 
become an essential means of organisational governance. In spite of the development of 
ICT risk management methodologies that have been published as numerous techniques 
and tools aimed at assisting organisations to deal with ICT risks, questions remain about 
the success of its methodology.  
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) framework is 
representative of this kind of risk management approach to addressing ICT risk 
management. It takes a holistic view of the organisation (Lainhart 2001a) and focuses on 
a top-down strategy which is used to describe the business functions, processes and 
tasks to support senior management developing, implementing and maintaining ICT 
governance across the organisation (Robinson 2005; Solms 2005a). Adopting a top-down 
strategy to manage ICT risks in an organisation means that the organisation is concerned 
more with whole-of-business view than with technical solutions to ICT risk management. 
As a result the emphasis is on organisational structure and content (Solms 2005b). 
Existing research, however, shows that organisations appear to lack the required 
technical sophistication in their internal audit management when using this top-down 
approach (Viator & Curtis 1998; Hermanson et al. 2000). Clearly, delineate technical 
orientation and business orientation are part of the planning for effective ICT risk 
management.  
In order to address this issue, a bottom-up approach to ICT risk management has also 
been developed and its impact reported in the literature (Solms 2005a). One 
representative of this bottom-up approach is the ISO/IEC 17799 (renumbered ISO/IEC 
27002 in July 2007) standard for effective ICT risk management (Martinez et al 2010). 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard is an information security governance framework which 
focuses on a detailed technical or bottom-up approach (Saint-Germain 2005; Solms 
2005a). A bottom-up approach emphasises technical security and elaborates on all 
processes dealing with ICT risk in detail. It also provides an organisation with general 
guidelines on how the ISO/IEC 17799 standard can be utilised to control, prevent and 
mitigate ICT risks.  
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This research addressed the question ―What factors determine successful ICT risk 
management in a business organisations in the Thai business context?‖, and three 
subsidiary questions ―What are the current profiles of ICT risk management in Thai 
organisations?‖; ―How are ICT risk management concepts applied in those Thai business 
organisations?‖ and ―What are success factors can be identified for successful ICT risk 
management derived from the adoption the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard?‖. The COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard are used extensively 
to define organisational governance of business; and ICT and security functions, 
processes and tasks to help management develop and implement strategies and policies 
for effective ICT risk management. This research explores the understanding of ICT risk 
management in Thai business context.  
A mixed-method research approach was used to explore ICT risk management in a 
selection of Thai organisations. The findings from six case studies indicate that successful 
ICT risk management results from collaboration between management level activities 
and operational level activities. The adoption of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard in the case study companies revealed that success was dependent on six 
key factors: the creation of organisational policy, the management of people and their 
behaviour in organisations, the management of organisational ICT security, the 
management of ICT resources, the corporate level plan and the operational level plan. To 
confirm the outcomes of the case study research a survey was developed and 
administered to over 50 Thai organisations and across three types of industry (Banking, 
Technology and Insurance) listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The data was 
analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM). The findings of the analysis of the 
survey data showed that there were three main factors—the effective creation of 
organisational policy, the effective management of ICT resources, and the effective 
planning of enterprise information security that drive successful ICT risk management in 
the Thai organisations surveyed.  
This research sought to investigate the current profile of ICT risk management to identify 
and then model the success elements of ICT risk management in a sample of Thai 
business organisations. This research supported and confirmed previous research that 
argues that policy must be structured, first at the board of directors and then at the 
levels of senior management and operational management, who together must delineate 
the procedures and practices for dealing with ICT risk management. In dealing with ICT 
risks, several frameworks and standards have been introduced but ICT risks still persist, 
therefore, the implication of this research was that we can learn from the Thai 
organisations that organisations needed to consider the success factors when managing 
ICT risk. This research proposed that three main success factors affect ICT risk 
management in Thai organisations. Firstly, the effective organisational policy helped the 
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Thai organisations to plan the effective management of ICT resources and the effective 
planning of enterprise information security. Secondly, the effective management of ICT 
resources facilitated the planning of enterprise information security to achieve successful 
ICT risk management planning. In addition, the survey results have shown that effective 
organisational policy was the main influence on the management of ICT resources and 
the planning of enterprise information security. All three success factors complement 
each other and were significant together in terms of strategic development (i.e. policy) 
and strategic implementation (i.e. management direction). Lastly, the effective planning 
of enterprise information security was shown to be a critical factor that helped an 
organisation mitigate, prevent and avoid operational, technical and strategic risks related 
to ICT. All three success factors were initially drawn from both the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard and were found to positively contribute to successful ICT 
risk management. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is based on a study of the use of standards in ICT risk management in Thai 
business organisations. This chapter reports on the scope of this research, and the 
significance of and background to issues related to ICT risk management in these 
organisations. The rationale, objectives and research questions are introduced. Finally, 
this chapter outlines the thesis structure. 
 
1.1 Background 
This research highlights success factors based on the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard in organisations for planning ICT risk management. Siponen and Willison 
(2009) argue that there is little research that proposes how the two standards can fit 
together in the context of an integrated approach to ICT risk management. 
Successful ICT risk management in organisations has been a concern for businesses over 
the past 10 years. For example, a computer security institute research shows that $202 
million were lost in computer crime in 2003 (McAdams 2004). A report by the Audit 
Commission of the United Kingdom identifies increases in ICT abuses and frauds, 
regardless of whether organisations have concrete ICT governance arrangements in place 
(Audit Commission 2005). A government report in the USA shows that over 80 percent of 
ICT development projects have failed in whole or in part due to poor ICT risk 
management (Center for Technology in Government 2008). ICT risks have been 
identified for business. They are operational and associated technical and strategic risks. 
Firstly, operational risks can be resulted from the skills and abilities that human 
resources contribute have been shown to help organisations boost business performance 
in dealing with risk (Willcocks et al 2006). Human resources are imperative factor in 
organisations because their roles and responsibilities directly affect the processes of 
information flow and audit related to risk management (Willcocks et al 2006). Secondly, 
ICT risk management is defined in terms of its ICT and information security components 
to deal with technical or security risks (Smith & Eloff 2002). ICT component refers to the 
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scope of the ICT domain where ICT produces data through input, processing, output 
(IPO) processes and disseminates information to internal and external parties. In 
contrast, information security component is focused to ensure that data and information 
are protected through „identification and authentication, authorization, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation‟ (Smith & Eloff 2002, p. 268). From both components, 
technical or security risks can be resulted from any ICT infrastructure and security 
systems breaches. Therefore, management of ICT process and information security 
process is the focus in organisations to pay more attention on. Lastly, strategic risk can 
be derived from information system architecture (ISA) development that is difficult for 
users at the conceptual level (i.e. strategic plan), at the logical level (i.e. process and 
method of work) and/or at the physical structure level (i.e. the action plan or the 
operational plan) (Segars and Grover 1996). This implies that the setting of the strategic 
plan at the corporate level and the setting of the action plan at the operational level may 
not be clearly defined and communicated to users due to the inclusion of difficult or 
complex strategic terminology, and documentation may therefore be misinterpreted or 
difficult to interpret (Segars and Grover 1996). Therefore, the strategic plan and the 
operational plan are emphasised on dealing with ICT risk management. 
 
1.2 Research motivation 
To effectively minimise and control ICT risks, ICT risk management policies and 
strategies need to be developed and implemented in organisations. ICT risk management 
refers to the process aimed at aiding enterprises to achieve new business changes, future 
investment in information and information systems and ‗an increasing dependence on 
information and the systems that deliver this information‘ (Lainhart 2000, p. 5; Lainhart 
2001b; Jordan & Silcock 2005).  
Much research has been done to examine the issues around ICT risk management in 
organisations (Segars & Grover 1996; Teneyuca 2001; Coles & Moulton 2003; Solms 
2005b). Traditional ICT risk management is more concerned with protecting the 
information assets of an organisation based on the eight categories of ICT risk classified 
by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 1995) and the Institute of Internal 
Auditors‘ Professional Standards (IIA 1993). Lainhart (2001b) argues that ICT risk 
management should be a senior management concern, and that they must provide the 
processes, policies, procedures and strategies to deal with ICT risks. Such an approach 
facilitates a top-down methodology for identifying, evaluating, minimising and controlling 
potential ICT risks in organisations (Lientz & Larssen 2004), which focuses on control of 
an entire organisation through implementation of the ICT risk management process. 
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The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) framework is 
representative of this kind of risk management approach to addressing ICT risk 
management. The COBIT framework takes a holistic view of the organisation (Lainhart 
2001a) and focuses on a top-down strategy which is used to describe the business 
functions, processes and tasks to support senior management developing, implementing 
and maintaining ICT governance across the organisation (Robinson 2005; Solms 2005a). 
Adopting a top-down strategy to manage ICT risks in an organisation means that the 
organisation is concerned more with whole-of-business view than with technical solutions 
to ICT risk management. As a result the emphasis is on organisational structure and 
content (Solms 2005b). Existing research, however, shows that organisations appear to 
lack the required technical sophistication in their internal audit management when using 
this top-down approach (Viator & Curtis 1998; Hermanson et al. 2000). Clearly, delineate 
technical orientation and business orientation are part of the planning for effective ICT 
risk management.  
In order to address this issue, a bottom-up approach to ICT risk management has also 
been developed and its impact reported in the literature (Solms 2005a). One 
representative of this bottom-up approach is the ISO/IEC 17799 (renumbered ISO/IEC 
27002 in July 2007) standard for effective ICT risk management (Martinez et al 2010). 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard is an information security governance framework which 
focuses on a detailed technical or bottom-up approach (Saint-Germain 2005; Solms 
2005a). A bottom-up approach emphasises technical security and elaborates on all 
processes dealing with ICT risk in detail. It also provides an organisation with general 
guidelines on how the ISO/IEC 17799 standard can be utilised to control, prevent and 
mitigate ICT risks.  
This research investigates the current profile of ICT risk management used in Thai 
organisations to understand the social reality of this phenomenon, and to identify the 
success factors emerging from the adoption of either or both the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard for ICT risk management. The research will use the 
outcomes of that evaluation to develop a successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) 
model based on both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard.  
This research is particularly important for Thai businesses because the trend in the 
adoption of, and thus demand for, ICT in Thailand has increased every year since 1998 
(Satanasathaporn 2007), yet no research has been undertaken to evaluate its impact in 
relation to risk. Thai businesses have expanded their business transactions online and 
thus now communicate through cyberspace (Satanasathaporn 2007). As a result, the 
disadvantages of ICT adoption in Thailand have been exposed, and the weaknesses of 
ICT now need to be reduced due to an already recognised weakness in corporate 
governance in the country (Johnson et al 2000). The weakness in corporate governance 
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in Thailand reported during and since the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Mitton 
2002) affects all areas of organisational operation. Therefore, it is imperative that there 
is an investigation into the way Thai businesses handle risk. Moreover, Thai businesses 
have not encountered an ICT adoption crisis which would highlight the impact of any lack 
of advance ICT planning for dealing with ICT risks (Thuvasethakul & Koanantakool 2002).  
In relation to ICT, the National Electronics and Computer Technology Centre (NECTEC 
2003) of Thailand announced that four laws relating to data protection, national 
information infrastructure, computer crime and electronic funds transfer have been in 
place since 2001 to force Thai businesses to comply with improved standards of 
operations using ICT and to reduce the risks associated with ICT adoption. In complying 
with these laws, it is believed that ‗these laws should lay down sufficient legal framework 
for Thailand to enter the new economy with more confidence‘ (Koanantakool 2000, p. 9). 
However, all of these laws have not been sufficiently enforced to compel Thai 
organisations to report the impacts of ICT activities to the appropriate regulators. These 
regulators include the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of Thailand. Up until 2009 the only effective reporting related to 
corporate governance (SET 2009). It is therefore vital that the National ICT Policy in 
Thailand also consider the issue of corporate governance (NECTEC 2003).  
Corporate governance has been shown to be of significant concern when an organisation 
is dealing with ICT risk management (Farrar 2005). Regulated corporate governance was 
only introduced to the banking industry in Thailand following the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997. This regulation was adopted by the central bank, the Bank of Thailand 
(Vongvipanond 2004). Since then these same regulations have been adopted by all Thai 
organisations registered with the SET. In the corporate governance regulatory setting in 
Thailand, risk management has also been introduced as a means of helping an 
organisation respond to strategic risk through, for example, a ‗long-term strategic plan 
and short-term business plan‘, and respond to credit risks, for example, ‗Basic prudential 
rules as laid out in the Commercial Banking Act such as large exposure of loan and 
investment, concentration of loan to single group or borrowers, prohibition of connected 
lending to directors or bank executive and families persons or legal entity in which bank 
have equity share, continued to be strengthened after crisis‘ (Vongvipanond 2004, p. 6). 
Therefore, risk management has become critical for all Thai businesses. Yet there has 
been less concern with ICT risk and little evaluation of its effectiveness. 
ICT risk management has more recently, however, become a focus in risk management 
in Thailand because the Royal Thai Government was concerned about trends in computer 
crime. As a result the Royal Thai Government passed a new law on computer-related 
offences, as the Computer Crimes Act 2008 (AHRC 2007). In addition, banks in Thailand 
moved quickly in the area of risk management, especially ICT risk, as this was a prime 
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area of concern in terms of crime initiated using ICT (ZDNetAsia 2007). Symantec saw 
this is an opportunity to introduce the Symantec ICT Risk Management Report to the Thai 
banks as an outsourced security and security incident management system (ZDNetAsia 
2007). The Symantec ICT Risk Management Report includes recommendations on the 
effectiveness of both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard in dealing 
with ICT risks. The Director of Symantec in Thailand further added that its products were 
first introduced to the Thai banking and telecommunication sectors, before expanding to 
other business sectors in Thailand (ZDNetAsia 2007).  
This research is important for Thai businesses as it provides them with information and 
data to consider for the development of their own blueprints for handling ICT risk 
management. This research was undertaken to gain detailed knowledge of practices in 
ICT risk management in Thailand, particularly in regards to the use of either, or both, the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard for successful ICT risk management.  
 
1.3 Research objectives 
This research is aimed at investigating how structured approaches to ICT risk 
management are used successfully in practice in Thai businesses. The research will 
explore and explain how business and technical strategies are planned and conducted in 
Thai business organisations to achieve successful ICT risk management. More 
specifically, the research is focused on the development of a single management 
framework for dealing with ICT risk management in Thai business organisations. 
Moreover, in this regard the COBIT framework itself stipulates that its framework can 
complement other standards and frameworks (ITGI 2007), although there is no research 
that proposes how they can fit together in the context of a structured approach to ICT 
risk management (Tshinu et al. 2008; Siponen & Willison 2009). 
Therefore, the research objectives are: 
- To investigate the current profile of ICT risk management in organisational 
practices in a sample of Thai businesses,  
- To identify and then model the success elements of ICT risk management in Thai 
businesses. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
To achieve the objectives of the research, a number of research questions are developed.  
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The main research question is: 
- What factors determine successful ICT risk management in a business 
organisation in the Thai business context? 
Three subsidiary questions are developed to support this major question, as follows: 
- What are the current profiles of ICT risk management in Thai businesses? 
- How are ICT risk management concepts applied in those Thai businesses?  and, 
- What success factors can be identified for successful ICT risk management derived 
from the adoption of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard? 
The main research question is developed to assist the researcher to explore an 
understanding of ICT risk management. The three subsidiary questions are included to 
assist the researcher to explore in greater depth the phenomenon of ICT risk 
management. All of these questions are considered imperative to gathering the 
knowledge required to develop a model of successful ICT risk management for business 
organisations.   
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter provides a review of the literature related to ICT risk management in 
organisations from both the academic and practitioner perspectives. The chapter begins 
by discussing ICT risk management implemented and developed by organisations, 
including risk management processes, risk management control and risk management 
planning to dealing with ICT risks, including nonstandardised practices. Furthermore, 
standardised practices are discussed, based upon ICT governance (i.e. the COBIT 
framework) and information security (IS) governance (i.e. the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) 
which are used to deal with ICT risk management in organisations. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the dilemma created by structured approaches to ICT risk 
management which require further exploration.  
Chapter 3 Research methodology 
This chapter presents a discussion of the research methods, research design, and data 
collection and analysis techniques used in this research. The chapter begins with an 
explanation of the rationale behind the selection of research paradigm, research 
methodology and research design, including its basis in the literature. The chapter 
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concludes with a discussion of the data collection and analysis techniques used in both 
the qualitative and quantitative methods that were adopted in order to target the 
participants and sample appropriate to this research.  
Chapter 4 Case studies in Thai business adoption of ICT risk standards:  Cases A–C  
This chapter reports on the interviews undertaken in the first part of this research. The 
chapter explores and presents understandings of the phenomenon and practice of ICT 
risk management in different types of Thai businesses as gathered from the interviews. 
The analysis of the qualitative data uses thematic and content analyses to capture the 
main processes regarding ICT risk management in the multiple case studies. Key factors 
are identified that relate to ICT risk management in practice.  
Chapter 5 Case studies in Thai business adoption of ICT risk standards: Cases D–F  
A discussion of the findings of further interviews undertaken in Thai businesses is 
presented in this chapter to explore understandings of ICT risk management practice. All 
case studies in this chapter are international consulting firms. The practices of ICT risk 
management in this chapter are then discussed based on both organisational (i.e. case 
studies‘ practices) and consulting perspectives (i.e. their clients‘ practices). The analysis 
of this chapter also uses thematic and content analyses to capture the main process 
regarding ICT risk management. Key factors are also identified that relate to ICT risk 
management in practice.  
Chapter 6 Phase II: Survey development 
This chapter begins with a comparative analysis of case studies A, B, C, D, E and F by 
comparing themes derived from Chapters 4 and 5. The key conclusions from Chapters 4 
and 5 are revealed to facilitate the development of the model for dealing with ICT risk 
management in an organisational context. The last part of this chapter outlines the 
development of the survey instrument based on the findings from both the existing 
literature and from the analysis of the interviews reported in chapters 4, 5 and this 
chapter. The mapping of the constructs drawn from the interview findings with the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is discussed in order to generate a 
conceptual model, which are validated in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 Survey of Thai business adoption of ICT risk standards 
This chapter begins by describing the statistical analysis of the data screening, item 
parcelling, the response rate, demographic statistics and the reliability of the instrument. 
The chapter elaborates on the quantitative research undertaken via a mailed survey. The 
chapter explains and then confirms or disconfirms the constructs in the conceptual model 
of ICT risk management (presented in Chapter 6) used in Thai organisations by using 
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structural equation modelling (SEM). The report on the validation begins by describing 
the statistical validity tests used—content validity, construct validity, convergent validity, 
discriminant validity, measurement validity and nomological validity—to test the sense 
and meaning of the structural model. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
successful ICT risk management model (SICTRM) and the relationships among variables 
in the model. 
Chapter 8 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter revisits the research objectives and research questions in order to confirm 
whether they have respectively been achieved or answered in this research. Multiple case 
studies and the survey results are compared and summarised to propose the key success 
factors of ICT risk management as evidenced by Thai organisations. The chapter ends 
with a consideration of the limitations of the research, suggestions for future research 
and the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature to frame the main theory that underpins this 
research. The chapter is divided into five parts. Firstly, ICT risk management as an 
unstructured approach is discussed through a holistic consideration of its components. 
Secondly, the risks related to ICT are described as the main focus of this research. 
Thirdly, the success factors within an unstructured approach to ICT risk management are 
explored as the primary source of ICT risk management. Fourthly, a structured approach 
to ICT risk management using ICT governance (the COBIT framework as ‗the top-down 
approach‘) and IS governance (the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as ‗the bottom-up 
approach‘) is discussed. These standards are widely used to guide organisations that are 
dealing with ICT risks. Lastly, the merits of using structured approaches to ICT risk 
management are discussed in terms of the success factors for developing an ICT risk 
management plan that drives effective and efficient organisational performance. 
 
2.1 ICT risk management  
Several research papers have shown that ICT risk management must be practised in the 
organised way in order to avoid and/or prevent risks (Dhillon & Backhouse 1996; Viator 
& Curtis 1998; Carnaghan 2006). Badenhorst and Eloff (1994, p. 411) suggest that the 
scope of a risk management process should be focused on ‗risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk assessment (e.g. risk evaluation and risk allocation), risk resolution (e.g. 
risk decision, risk conclusion, risk financing, risk regulation and risk control) and risk 
monitoring (e.g. risk administration)‘ (p. 415). Cha et al. (2008) also agree that a risk 
management process must include risk identification, risk assessment, risk treatment, 
risk monitoring and risk reassessment. Whereas Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) highlight 
that the four major elements of ICT risk management process are risk identification, risk 
analysis, risk reduction measures and risk monitoring. According to them, all need to be 
applied to ‗the planning stage of system development and to continue throughout the 
development process‘ (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999, p. 438).   
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Risk identification must occur at ‗the application level, the organizational level and the 
inter-organizational level‘ (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999, p. 438). Identifying risk at the 
application level accounts for the technical risk or implementation failure of ICT 
applications, including ‗internal threats to ICT assets‘ such as ‗unauthorized physical 
access and system abuse‘, and external threats such as ‗natural disasters, acts of 
competitors, hackers and computer viruses‘. Risk identification at the organisational level 
needs to account for ‗the impact of ICT throughout all functional areas of the 
organization‘. This level focuses on strategic risks which might obstruct an organisation 
seeking to sustain a competitive advantage ‗from the deployment of ICT applications on a 
long-term basis‘ (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999, p. 439). Lastly, identifying risk at the 
inter-organisational level is primarily focused on external telecommunications, including 
electronic data interchange (EDI) when an organisation places transactions online with 
suppliers, customers and distributors. How this identification of risk takes place relates to 
risk analysis processes that are integral to risk management. McEvoy and Whitcombe 
(2002, pp. 91-92) further add that risk identification is dependent on understanding the 
ICT environment in order to ‗identify the information assets that the service must 
manage‘ and to ‗understand the physical architecture of the system within which this 
information is stored and manipulated‘. Moreover, it also helps assess information 
intensity in terms of the value chain (processes and systems) and products (information) 
and determine the staff roles and responsibilities in the organisational structure 
(McGaughey et al. 1994).  
On the other hand, Gerber and Solms (2005) argue that risk identification is an integral 
part of risk analysis which enables an organisation to quantify or estimate both the 
probability of a risk occurring and the magnitude of its consequences. However, risk 
analysis has been defined either as a quantitative methodology based on ‗expected value 
analysis related to ICT risks‘, or as a qualitative methodology based on ‗descriptive 
variables for analysing ICT risks‘, or a combination of the two, based on ‗estimated value 
of ICT assets as well as probability estimates for the realization of various threats‘ 
(Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999, p. 440). Gerber and Solms (2005) further add that the 
main purpose of risk analysis is to help an organisation identify sources of risk which 
derive from a combination of asset, threat and vulnerability.  
Risk-reducing measures are defined as helping an organisation prevent  the occurrence 
of losses as a result of either the internal environment (i.e. data security, computer 
viruses, strategic risks) or the external environment (i.e. natural disasters, computer 
viruses and legal risk) (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999). Badenhorst and Eloff (1994) argue 
that such measures rely on risk assessment (e.g. risk evaluation and risk allocation). 
Risk-reducing measures focus on investigating how ICT might help an organisation deal 
with potential risk and developing a plan based on risk identification and risk analysis 
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(McGaughey et al. 1994). Once risks are identified and assessed, the right risk 
minimisation strategy needs to be applied (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2008). Such 
strategies include avoiding, reducing, transferring and accepting (Stoneburner et al. 
2002). These four strategies are seen as minimising the risks after an organisation has 
performed a risk management process. Avoiding entails the elimination of the sources of 
risk, that is, the threats and attacks (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2008). The reducing 
strategy engages appropriate technology or tool implementation or appropriate security 
policy adoption to mitigate an asset‘s exposure to risk (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2008). 
Transferring is a strategy whereby an organisation partially shifts its responsibilities to 
outsourcing security agents who take action on the identified risks (Bojanc & Jerman-
Blažič 2008). With the accepting strategy, an organisation accepts the costs of risk 
retention embedded in the security measures, but still seeks to keep such risk under 
control (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič 2008).   
Risk monitoring is the last component which helps an organisation ensure that risks 
originating from potential countermeasures are controlled appropriately (Bandyopadhyay 
et al. 1999). It includes ‗a continuing audit function‘ that relates to ‗a number of audit 
tools such as Computer Assisted Audit Tools and Techniques (CAATT), and measurement 
tools for tracking website[s]‘ (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999, p. 443). Monitoring of risk has 
often led to the development of control measures.  
According to the literature discussed above, the ICT risk management process has been 
written in risk management standard which covers context establishment, risk 
identification, risk analysis, risk integration, risk evaluation, risk treatment and risk 
monitoring in the literature for the past decade (Baccarini et al. 2004; Moeller 2007). The 
investigation of the ICT risk management process is one component of ICT risk 
management. Other components (e.g. risk management control and risk management 
planning) of ICT risk management are delineated next. 
Badenhorst and Eloff (1994, p. 412) suggest that the scope of ICT risk control is focused 
on ‗ICT, information security (IS) and risk management‘ as defined in the Target 
Optimum Portfolio Management (TOPM) model. The scope of ICT can be categorised into 
object and subject groups. The object group refers to information, meta-information (e.g. 
a database), and the technology and facilities domains which are ICT resources 
(Badenhorst & Eloff 1994). Moreover, ICT risk control of technological processes is 
dependent upon internal systems which relate to both business and ICT processes 
(McGaughey et al. 1994; Coles & Moulton 2003). By aligning business process with ICT 
process, Calderon and Dishovska (2005, p. 21) argue, what is termed Business 
Continuity Management (BCM) can be used to allow an organisation to address ‗a wide 
variety of risks and views ICT as a business process enabler‘. In so doing, an 
organisation must document and demonstrate BCM processes across its business 
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operations in order to ensure that all business and ICT functions can continue with 
minimal disruption after an incident (Calderon & Dishovska 2005). Cha et al. (2008) 
assert that BCM processes are defined as initiation; requirements and strategy; 
implementation; and operations management. Initiation entails an organisation 
developing and setting its business continuity policy (its staff roles and responsibilities, 
the schedule of the policy, and other principles and guidelines) to provide the basis for 
BCM activities (Cha et al. 2008). The requirements and strategy process involves 
undertaking a business impact analysis which helps to identify the interruption of 
business processes and to assess the potential loss caused by an incident so that BCM 
strategies can be developed based upon the results of such assessment (Cha et al. 
2008). Implementation is dependent upon the BCM strategies an organisation adopts to 
‗develop and implement contingency plans (the incident response plan, the disaster 
recovery plan and the business continuity plan) to ensure the continuance of its critical 
business at an acceptable level‘ (Cha et al. 2008, p. 111). Lastly, operations 
management is aimed at ensuring that an organisation can maintain BCM processes as 
part of business as usual. By maintaining BCM processes, ‗appropriate awareness, 
education or training programs‘ are provided in order to update ‗BCM policies and plans‘, 
keeping up with ‗organization[al] changes and system enhancements‘ (Cha et al. 2008, 
p. 111).   
The subject group refers to decision-making related to human resources in an 
organisation such as organising, staffing, directing and controlling, in combination with 
the business functions and transaction domains (Badenhorst & Eloff 1994). Coles and 
Moulton (2003) argue that few companies properly implement ICT risk control in ICT risk 
management. This weakness derives from deficiencies in the processes and/or 
approaches as well as the tools used. These deficiencies include a lack of technical 
sophistication in internal audit management, a lack of attention to ICT management, a 
lack in the technical abilities of individual internal auditors and a lack of resources 
(Hermanson et al. 2000). Likewise, for many organisations, there are only internal 
auditors who are responsible for ICT control rather than specialised or skilled auditors 
(Hermanson et al. 2000). This implies that business process managers do not participate 
in the ICT aspects of risk management from the technical angle in the business planning 
of the organisation. Coles and Moulton (2003) therefore recommend that an organisation 
needs to follow the business process in combination with information risk management 
based on a value chain as two elements of Business Process Information Risk 
Management (BPIRM). A value chain in the BPIRM model is considered to be based upon 
initiating, defining, assessing, implementing, managing and confirming processes to 
ensure that: quality control, corporate policy, external laws and regulations are 
addressed (governance); the governance function is properly executed by business 
leadership (reassurance); ICT policies, guidance and compliance meet corporate 
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governance requirements (ICT process leadership); those people who direct ICT 
processes and application are properly allocated their roles and responsibilities (ICT 
people resources); transforming the process of data (input) to information (output) is 
controlled properly through data/sub-processes/applications/information, infrastructure 
and technology; and third parties (e.g. an external ICT auditor) and the suppliers of ICT 
are available when required (Coles & Moulton 2003).  
Lastly, the scope of IS security is the focus to prevent, recover and mitigate the threat, 
vulnerability and potential loss impacts of risks occurring in relation to human resources 
security, physical access security, or theft of an organisation‘s information and 
information resources (Badenhorst & Eloff 1994). Thus, this model focuses on ICT and IS 
by carrying out risk management processes as a ‗technological framework for an ICT risk 
management model‘ (Badenhorst & Eloff 1994, p. 412). Another example of risk 
management control in IS security is known as Structured Risk Analysis (SRA). McEvoy 
and Whitcombe (2002, p. 88) suggest that SRA is ‗a method to help an organization take 
rational steps to improve their information security‘. Furthermore, SRA also enables an 
organisation to deliver confidentiality, integrity and accountability (CIA) to information 
security. To achieve a successful SRA, an organisation needs to address: the business 
context (e.g. the decision-maker must justify their decisions in relation to information 
security resources); technical grounding (e.g. systems analysis and design must ensure 
that information services and the physical system are delivered intact to the appropriate 
users); separation of concerns (business and technical concerns need to be separated 
according to the relevant threats pertaining to them); support for quantitative analysis 
(the budget for information security should be quantified and allocated); turnable 
analysis (controlling the levels of the analysis, appropriate to particular corporate 
circumstances); evolution (evolving the methods of the change used to attack problems 
and perform countermeasures); maintainability (ensuring the risk analysis model is 
adequately flexible to allow for changes to operations and services); and openness (being 
open to changing standards in relation to software purchasing and licensing) (McEvoy & 
Whitcombe 2002).  
ICT risk management planning refers to the management of policies, technical means 
and active monitoring which all function to maintain control and reduce vulnerabilities or 
threats as risks related to ICT (McEvoy & Whitcombe 2002). McEvoy and Whitcombe 
(2002) further articulate that: policies ‗must be developed, [and] applied to define who 
can have what kind of access to which information and infrastructure components‘; 
procedures ‗must define the controls around such access‘; technical means ‗must be 
deployed to enforce policies and procedures‘; and active monitoring must ‗detect serious 
or systematic attempts to circumvent the policies and procedures‘ (McEvoy & Whitcombe 
2002, p. 89). This idea is based on the adoption of the structured risk analysis (SRA) 
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model to successfully manage information security risk. Nevertheless, the SRA model 
itself mainly focuses on information security; it is not able to provide a broad 
conceptualisation regarding ICT risk management planning.   
Drawn from the discussion above, a summary of the components of ICT risk 
management is presented in Table 2-1. As revealed in Table 2-1, risk management 
process, risk management control and risk management planning are three major areas 
within ICT risk management under study in this research. However, risk management 
planning remains ill defined. The next section discusses the sources of risk related to ICT 
in order to help the researcher conceptualise the entire pipeline of ICT risk management 
planning in an organisation.   
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Table 2-1: Summary of the components of ICT risk management 
ICT risk management 
Study Badenhorst and 
Eloff (1994) 
McGaughey et al. 
(1994) 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (1999) 
McEvoy and 
Whitcombe (2002) 
Coles and Moulton 
(2003) 
Gerber and Solms 
(2005) 
Cha et al. (2008) 
Model Target Optimum 
Portfolio 
Management 
(TOPM) 
Value Chain  Structured Risk 
Analysis (SRA) 
Business Process 
Information Risk 
Management 
(BPIRM) 
 Business Continuity 
Management 
(BCM) 
Concern - Technicality 
- Functionality 
  - Information 
security  
- Business perspective 
- Information 
technology  
 - Business 
functions 
- ICT functions 
Risk 
Management 
Control 
- Information 
communication 
and technology 
 ICT resources 
management 
- Information 
Security 
 Human 
resource 
management 
- External factors 
(threats) 
- Internal 
technological 
processes 
(vulnerabilities 
of assets) 
 - Information 
security 
resources 
 Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Accountability 
- Business process 
- Information 
communication and 
technology process 
 - Asset 
management 
- Relationship 
management 
- Incident 
management 
Risk 
Management 
Process 
- Risk identification 
- Risk analysis 
- Risk assessment 
- Risk solution 
- Risk monitoring 
- Risk planning 
 Strategic ICT 
planning 
- Risk control 
 Risk 
identification 
 Risk analysis 
 Risk 
assessment 
- Risk 
identification 
- Risk analysis  
- Risk reduction 
measures 
- Risk 
monitoring 
- Risk identification 
- Risk assessment 
- Initiating business 
process 
- Define business 
process, information 
and IT requirements 
- Assessing risk, 
creating risk profile 
for process and 
applications 
- Implementing control 
solutions 
- Managing operational 
control  
- Confirming and 
redefining adequacy 
of controls 
- Risk analysis 
 Risk 
identification 
 Risk estimation 
 Risk evaluation 
- Risk management 
 Controlling and 
monitoring risk 
analysis 
- Risk identification 
- Risk assessment 
- Risk treatment 
- Risk monitoring 
- Risk 
reassessment  
 
Risk 
Management 
Planning 
   - Policy 
- Procedures 
- Technical 
- Active monitoring 
 - Planning 
- Monitoring 
- Controlling 
- Business 
continuity policy 
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2.2 Risk related to ICT  
ICT-related risks result from uncertainty around several aspects of ICT operations, from 
the probability of business losses or failure, and from negative outcomes originating from 
both internal and external environments (Straub & Welke 1998; Teneyuca 2001; Levine 
2004; McAdams 2004; Shedden et al. 2006).  
In general, three major ICT-related risks have been identified for business: operational 
risks, technical risks, and strategic risks (Segars & Grover 1996; ITGI 2005; Shenkir & 
Walker 2006). Operational and associated technical risks result from improperly 
performing ICT operations such as: (a) loss of computer assets; (b) inaccurate record 
keeping; (c) increased risk of fraud; (d) loss or theft of data; (e) privacy violations; and 
(f) business disruption (Willcocks & Griffiths 1994; Straub & Welke 1998; Warren et al. 
1996; Gelinas et al. 2005; Hawkins et al. 2003; Ward 2005; Ciborra 2006; Hughes 
2006b; Pinder 2006; Ravenel 2006; Shenkir & Walker 2006). This risk implies that 
‗internal processes, people and system[s]‘ are controlled inadequately (Basel 2005, p. 
140).  
Hawkins et al. (2003) use the report of the US Department of Homeland Security to 
demonstrate that preventative actions are needed to protect information assets. 
Moreover, securing information assets must be a top priority in cases where the business 
transactions are carried out online (Hawkins et al. 2003). Hawkins et al. (2003, p. 23) 
found that ‗44.33 percent of the respondents‘ in a Computer Security Institute (CSI) 
security survey attested to ‗$455 million in financial losses due to computer breaches‘. 
Thus, security breaches have become a major threat requiring that organisations develop 
operational security to deal with operational risk related to information security (Hawkins 
et al. 2003). This implies that operational risk affects technical risk and vice versa, and 
that both risks can be managed simultaneously.   
Operational risks are derived from both external and internal processes (Willcocks & 
Griffiths 1994). With regard to internal processes, ICT risks are ‗a result of distinctive 
human and organisational practice and patterns of belief and action. This is because 
certain features are inherently more risky than others‘ (Willcocks & Griffiths 1994, p. 
225). Moreover, the skills and abilities that human resources contribute have been shown 
to help an organisation boost business performance in dealing with risk (Willcocks et al. 
2006). Straub and Welke (1998) assert that operational risk (e.g. systems risk) occurs 
when an organisation does not adequately protect its information and information 
systems against certain kinds of damage or loss. The reason for such inadequate 
protection or preventative planning perhaps lies in the fact that ‗information security 
continues to be ignored by top management, middle management and employees alike‘ 
(Straub & Welke 1998, p. 442). Ward (2005) also argues that people are an important 
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factor in an organisation because their roles and responsibilities directly affect the 
processes of information flow and audit related to risk management. Specifically in 
relation to ICT, the role of ICT staff is especially significant regarding technical matters 
(e.g. information security) and in determining ways to prevent computer abuses by staff 
or by improperly performed ICT operations (Ward 2005).  
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008, p. 216) state that ‗security risks are present in the 
organization‘s information system due to technical failure, system vulnerabilities, human 
failures, fraud or external events‘. This implies that information security systems are 
invested in and designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information assets.   
Strategic risk originates from the planning and implementation of ineffective ICT 
strategies, including or as a result of:  
(a) the potential likelihood of failure through a lack of strategy;  
(b) the risk consequence of a lack of strategy;  
(c) the lack of specific management of ICT risks;  
(d) the nature of management perceptions;  
(e) management processes inside the company;  
(f) the responsibility of ICT audit and control; and  
(g) the complexity of systems (Segars & Grover 1996; Baccarini et al. 2004). 
Baccarini et al. (2004) also suggest that project management, as the management 
strategy of risk reduction, can help organisations deal with strategic risks in IT projects. 
However, risk management strategy is then, they argue, project management that 
focuses more on project management processes than technical processes (e.g. technical 
risk) (Baccarini et al. 2004). 
Segars and Grover (1996) note that strategic risk can be derived from information 
system architecture (ISA) development that is difficult for users at the conceptual level 
(i.e. strategic plan), at the logical level (i.e. process and method of work) and/or at the 
physical structure level (i.e. the implementation plan). At the conceptual level the 
strategic direction of an organisation may not be clearly communicated to staff due to the 
inclusion of difficult or complex strategic terminology, and documentation may therefore 
be misinterpreted or difficult to interpret. This involves a ‗lack of [a] concrete or 
understandable strategic plan, no ongoing assessment of strategy, [a] lack of interest by 
top management in IS planning and [a] lack of skills or methodologies for constructing 
enterprise models‘ (Segars & Grover 1996, p. 387). In other cases, an organisation 
simply has no strategic plan or an unstructured or incomplete strategic plan. In the latter 
case, Segars and Grover (1996, p. 389) add that the information system planners seem 
overwhelmed by the scope and complexity of information created and used throughout 
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the enterprise, for example, ‗scope of requirements [is not] identified for data and 
processes, planning [is not] focused on supporting the status quo versus redesigning 
processes and methods of work, and [there is a] lack of skill or methodologies for 
constructing logical models‘ at the logical level. The scope and complexity of information 
created and used throughout the enterprise lead to ‗information system planner does not 
feel confident in their approach to logical design and therefore information system 
planner is not certain that architectural models contained the right information to guide 
development efforts‘ (Segars and Grover 1996, p. 390). Lastly, operations are affected 
by the strategic plan, processes and methods of work which relate to the ‗semantic 
gap[s] between logical and implementation plans‘. Therefore, the strategic plan 
influences the logical thinking behind designing processes and methods of work. This 
then impacts on the implementation plans at the operations level in cases where there is 
no strategic plan or only an unstructured or incomplete strategic plan. According to the 
discussion above, it can be seen that ICT risks can emerge from operational risk, 
technical risk and strategic risk as shown in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2: Summary of key factors based upon the sources of risk 
Type of risk Source of risk Key Factor 
Operational and 
associated  
technical risk 
- Loss of computer assets 
- Inaccurate record keeping 
- Increased risk of fraud 
- Loss or theft of data 
- Business disruption  
- Privacy violations 
- Computer breaches 
- Inadequate protection of information and 
information system 
- Unclear roles and responsibilities 
- Technical and human failures 
- System vulnerability 
- Fraud or external events 
- Asset management 
- Human resource management 
- Information security management 
- Information technology 
management 
Strategic risk - A lack of strategy 
- A lack of specific management of ICT 
risks 
- The nature of management perspectives 
- Management processes failure 
- The responsibility of ICT audit and control 
- The complexity of systems 
- Unclear strategic plan 
- Unclear operational plan 
- ICT project management failures 
- Organisational strategy 
- Organisational policy 
- Planning regarding strategic and 
operational plans 
 
The sources of ICT risk reflect the key factors which are discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3 Key factors in ICT risk management 
The best approach to ICT risk management in an organisation is to approach problems 
from various perspectives including consideration of both the internal and external 
environments (McGaughey et al. 1994). ICT risk management needs to be examined in 
the context of all organisational processes, including organisational structure; process 
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and control; and technical implementation of risk management strategies and policies 
(Benaroch et al. 2006). The following paragraphs discuss the key factors which are the 
bases for of ICT risk. These insights will assist organisations to improve organisational 
planning for dealing with ICT risk management.  
 
2.3.1 Human resource management 
Risk consequences based on risk management actions are embedded in institutional and 
organisational structure (Ciborra 2006). Organisational structure engages with risk 
management through human resource management and its associated security issues. 
Ciborra (2006, p. 1348) argues that the risk management process (e.g. risk assessment) 
poses a dilemma because the assessor (e.g. decision-maker) must face ‗the ramifications 
of a lack of knowledge, the role of biased data when assessing risk in organizations and 
the influence of internal politics‘. Moreover, decision-makers are required to set the 
policy to deal with different and/or multiple categories of identified risks (Hughes 2006a). 
This implies that risk management planning, as in planning organisational structure to 
incorporate risk management, must be undertaken. Organisational structural planning for 
risk management provides a roadmap of the ICT required to support and enhance the 
business direction of an organisation. It also identifies the human resources required to 
implement the plan (Figg 1999).  
Hughes (2006a) adds that an organisation must build the internal competence to manage 
ICT risks on its own. An organisation needs to develop the knowledge and processes 
required to manage its own ICT risks because most organisations have a poor awareness 
of their ICT exposure to risk. To develop the processes required to raise awareness of 
these issues, senior managers need to ‗develop an awareness of the nature of the 
different ICT risks to the business; quantify the impact to their business resulting from 
the loss of information or access to application; understand the range of tools available 
to manage ICT risks; align the costs of ICT risk management to the business values; and 
build systematic and corporate capability to manage security risk‘ (Hughes 2006a, p. 36). 
Levine (2004) also supports the view that ICT risk management must take into account 
people, process and systems, including organisational factors such as corporate culture 
and employees. Organisational factors are considered to include the roles and 
responsibilities of staff; risk awareness; and the access control for authorised employees 
in an organisation. Raising awareness among staff should focus on human resources, in 
particular regarding information security (e.g. unauthorised people), availability (e.g. 
human error, configuration changes, lack of redundancy in architecture), recoverability 
(e.g. disaster recovery plan embedded in business continuity plan), performance (e.g. 
distributed ICT architectures), scalability (e.g. balancing costs and benefits of ICT 
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investment), and compliance (e.g. regulatory requirements from both inside and outside 
an organisation) (Hughes 2006a).  
Straub and Welke (1998) argue that system risk is mainly in the area of information 
security matters, and that managerial guidelines on ICT risk in general are focused on 
human resource management and risk management processes. Human resource 
management is considered significant because an organisation needs senior management 
support in seeking to gain a thorough understanding of organisational vulnerability and of 
the resources required to secure organisational systems (Straub & Welke 1998). It is 
necessary that senior management understand the security actions and can thus 
integrate security planning into information security policy as organisational standards, 
and that users are trained and educated regarding security awareness so that 
organisational standards can be reviewed and updated as needed (Straub & Welke 
1998). Hughes (2006a) further claims that managing ICT risks must focus on a 
combination of process, people, technology and information. The ICT operational process 
helps an organisation design, execute and measure systematic approaches, standards 
and frameworks to determine the best practice for ICT operational processes—such as 
those based on the standards of the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO)—in order to mitigate ICT risks (Hughes 2006a). Staff at all levels can also help 
reduce risks. Therefore, training programs; clarification of roles and responsibilities; and 
the identification of specific authority for specific roles should be provided for all staff 
(Hughes 2006a).  
Longstaff et al. (2000, p. 44) define ICT risk management as associated with protecting 
information and information systems in both the ‗structural-based‘ and ‗human-based‘ 
dimensions. In particular, the human-based domain includes protecting institutions, 
organisations, culture and language which explicitly relate to operational functions 
(Longstaff et al. 2000). By protecting human-based domains, the operational element is 
required for dealing with risk assessment and risk management. On the other hand, the 
structural-based domain involves protecting hardware, structures and facilities (which 
explicitly relate to ICT management and IS management) (Longstaff et al. 2000). This is 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.3.2 ICT management and IS management 
Smith and Eloff (2002, p. 268) argue that ‗ICT risk management is defined in terms of 
its Information Communication and Technology (ICT) and Information Security (IS) 
components‘. The first component, information communication and technology (ICT), 
refers to the scope of the ICT domain where ICT produces data through input, processing 
and output (IPO) processes and disseminates information to internal and external parties 
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(Smith & Eloff 2002). This component controls the capacity of ICT used in IPO processes, 
specifically in relation to ICT risks (Smith & Eloff 2002). Therefore, ICT used in IPO 
processes is limited to controlling the input of data, processing data to information and 
storing information in a database, as well as disseminating information to stakeholders 
and stockholders (Smith & Eloff 2002). Moreover, ICT related to ICT architecture helps 
an organisation define ‗the strategy that drives, shapes and controls its architecture‘ 
when dealing with ICT risk management (Byrd et al. 1995, p. 39). Such strategy must 
allow computing, telecommunications, data and applications (ICT resources) to work 
together constructively (Byrd et al. 1995). ICT architecture is specified by what types of 
hardware and software are employed; where personnel, equipment, data and facilities 
are located; the levels of applications, data and procedural compatibility that exist across 
locations (e.g. department to department, business unit to business unit); and how 
locations are connected, coordinated, and controlled (e.g. telecommunications 
networking) (Byrd et al. 1995).  
Both the physical security systems and the information communication and technology 
environment must be considered at both the higher employee levels (e.g. senior 
management) and the lower level (e.g. operations) to ensure the control of risk is 
effective (Schultz 2007). Schultz (2007) also provides guidance on how to mitigate ICT 
risks regarding physical security systems (e.g. devices, process control systems and ICT 
infrastructure). Firstly, he asserts that it is necessary to gather knowledge to understand 
the configuration of networks, systems and ICT infrastructure in order to respond 
appropriately to the problem (Schultz 2007). Secondly, conducting risk analysis is 
required to identify any vulnerability of assets that may be exploited for incorrect 
purposes, which might then lead to threats (Schultz 2007). Therefore, vulnerabilities, 
threats and the likelihood of each occurring must be identified. Moreover, risk 
assessment should also be conducted using penetration tests in order to target physical 
security systems around organisational networking. Thirdly, the problem must be 
reported to the management and audit functions. Senior management needs to 
understand and support the provision of resources necessary to protect against such 
problems. The internal auditor also needs to be informed to cover the particularities of 
the problem within the auditing area (Schultz 2007). Fourthly, senior management needs 
to develop organisational information security policies (e.g. an annual plan) to define the 
requirements regarding security issues for managers, technical staff and users. Fifthly, 
an action plan (e.g. outlining technical means) needs to be developed, implemented and 
tested to measure the level of appropriate security in an organisation. Sixthly, an 
organisation needs to integrate physical (e.g. ICT devices) and logical security (e.g. 
information security functions) because many of the risks to the logical system are also 
physical and vice versa. In terms of integration, an organisation needs to develop the 
relationships that allow physical security and information security functions to work 
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together. However, ‗many senior managers are unaware that ICT security in their 
organizations is inadequate [or] what the consequences of vulnerability may be‘ (Byrd & 
et al. 1995, p. 41).  
Thus, the second component, information security, must be focused on, ensuring that 
data and information are protected through ‗identification and authentication, 
authorization, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation‘ (Smith & Eloff 2002, p. 268). 
This helps protect organisations‘ information relating to business processes and business 
transactions. By engaging with business processes and business transactions, an 
organisation can therefore secure data and information in both the ICT used and security 
services in order to manage ICT risks. Generally, risk management analysis involves the 
implementation of information security controls whereby a security officer targets users 
in order to perform a risk assessment (Straub et al. 2008). In doing so, unacceptable risk 
can be identified in order to determine possible countermeasures and options for dealing 
with such risk (Straub et al. 2008). Thus, decisions are made to determine a 
countermeasures procedure and appropriate security measures by teams of security 
experts and targeted users.  
In the implementation of information security control in ICT risk management, knowledge 
of system requirements is essential to prevent threats and reduce risks created by the 
vulnerability of assets via human interference (Księżopolski & Kotulski 2007). Moreover, 
information security control helps an organisation protect information assets at every 
staff level from both internal and external threats (Anderson & Choobineh 2008). 
Through this process an organisation estimates the probability and impact of the 
potential risk based on ‗the result of an information security incident caused by a threat 
affecting assets‘ (Księżopolski & Kotulski 2007, p. 254). System requirements include 
safeguard measures such as practices, procedures or mechanisms that prevent threats; 
reduce potential risk originating from the abuse of asset vulnerability; and mitigate the 
probability and impact of the potential risk (Księżopolski & Kotulski 2007).  
By doing so, the operationalisation of information security control is focused on providing 
enterprise information security. Enterprise information security is classified into three 
main areas. Firstly, at the asset level, an organisation focuses on ‗the incident(s), its 
characterization, and the threat-vulnerability combinations that can lead to potential 
losses‘ (Anderson & Choobineh 2008, p. 23). This implies that an organisation 
operationalises security tools and methods to detect and prevent potential damage at the 
technical level. For example, data management as an information asset is considered 
because in the process of the collection and archiving of historical data there is both 
expected loss and actual loss, and these processes must be maintained in order to 
prevent the same incident reoccurring in future (Levine 2004). Therefore, data quality 
derived from data management is a major challenge for an organisation because risk 
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managers need to make decisions in a timely manner based on accurate data. Therefore, 
an organisation needs to learn from the past in order to adapt its risk management 
processes in order to maintain the quality and accuracy of its data (Levine 2004).   
At the operational level an organisation must codify best practices, ‗technical solution[s], 
operational solution[s], information security awareness, threats identification and 
security requirement specification‘ in order to reduce ICT risks (Anderson & Choobineh 
2008, p. 23). The aim of risk management is to achieve access control mechanisms and 
proactive threat assessment techniques as technical or operational solutions (Hayat et al. 
2007). To preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, for 
example, it is recommended that context-based access control and compromised threat 
analysis be included in the information security risk management technology (Hayat et 
al. 2007). Context-based access control is used to protect a network from external 
environmental influences to prevent the threats posed by unauthorised external access 
(Hayat et al. 2007). This proactive method implies that information security management 
(e.g. access control) has to be considered by an organisation when undertaking ICT risk 
management. Furthermore, Milenkovic (2008) argues that access control is part of 
information security in relation to governance, risk management and compliance (GRC). 
In achieving GRC, roles and responsibilities (e.g. information security awareness) must 
be assigned certain levels of access in order to clearly define the main drivers in 
operational functions within an organisation (Milenkovic 2008). Milenkovic (2008) argues 
that role-based access control must be defined for all business participants (e.g. users, 
administrators, ICT persons and internal auditors) to comprehensively monitor the 
business processes around access control. 
Lastly, at the strategic level an organisation has to provide ‗an enterprise-wide 
perspective‘ which combines horizontal and vertical management approaches to protect 
against ‗threats, vulnerability, [and] organizational impacts‘ across the organisation 
(Anderson & Choobineh 2008, p. 23). The following section discusses successful ICT risk 
management control.   
 
2.3.3 Successful ICT risk management control  
Finne (2000) asserts that ICT risk management is about ICT control which is embedded 
in business process. ICT control and business control are adopted to ensure that the 
design of policies, procedures, practices and organisational structures meets the business 
objectives and functions to prevent, detect and correct ICT risks effectively (Finne 2000). 
This implies that dealing with ICT risk successfully is dependent upon the control and 
management of overall risks in an organisation. Flowerday and Solms (2005, p. 604) 
argue that ICT risk management must include a system of internal control related to ICT 
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which is ‗paramount to ensure the information‘s integrity‘. A system of internal control 
particularly in ICT helps an organisation ‗limit uncertainty and mitigate the risks to an 
acceptable level‘ (Flowerday & Solms 2005, p. 604). Managing information risks is part of 
organisational internal control that safeguards the accuracy of organisational internal 
information (Flowerday & Solms 2005).  
Holzmann and Jorgensen (2001) assert that risk management control consists of 
prevention, mitigation and coping strategies in social risk management. Such strategies 
have previously been highlighted in relation to dealing with risks in terms of the social 
protection of labour markets, pensions and social assistance in a World Bank report. 
However, as Gallegos et al. point out they can also be adopted for use in ICT because 
risk management is a broad area which can be applied across disciplines (2004). In this 
regard, a prevention strategy is used to hedge the probability of adverse risk or negative 
occurrence by planning policy actions for risk prevention (Gallegos et al. 2004). A 
mitigation strategy is aimed at mitigating the impact of the risk by providing instruments 
for risk mitigation (Gallegos et al. 2004). A coping strategy is a means of minimising 
harm caused by a negative occurrence through the provision of a scheme of 
arrangements (Gallegos et al. 2004).  
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), ‗risk 
management is the process that allows IT managers to balance the operational and 
economic costs of protective measures and achieve gains in mission capability by 
protecting the IT systems and data that support their organizations‘ missions‘ 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002, p. 4). This implies that risk management is a methodology that 
an organisation uses to balance its return on investment (ROI) of ICT (e.g. cost and 
benefit) and to protect its ICT systems and data from attack from threats in either the 
internal or external environments. Moreover, Stoneburner et al. (2002) assert that risk 
management entails processes around assessing risks, mitigating risks, and risk 
evaluation and assessment. It has also been implied that ICT risk management helps an 
organisation not only prevent but also mitigate and avoid risks occurring. Therefore, the 
objective of ICT risk management can be achieved through strategic application aimed at 
the mitigation, prevention and avoidance of risks (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999). Success 
factors lead to the development of ICT risk management planning in an organisation. The 
following section discusses ICT risk management planning as a structured approach.  
 
2.4 ICT risk management as a structured approach 
In this research, a structured approach to ICT risk management refers to the use of a 
standard or framework for ICT risk management planning. The structured approach is 
based on a standard that lays out the business direction. The business direction is more 
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concerned with corporate governance and enterprise risk management when dealing with 
business risks. On the other hand, ICT does not concentrate on corporate governance to 
deal with ICT organisational risk. Berry et al. (2009, p. 11) argue that the rate of 
development of ICT has increased dramatically to support organisational processes over 
the past two decades, but ‗the relationships between management control and new ICT 
remain underdeveloped both theoretically and practically‘ in terms of dealing with ICT 
risk. To effectively manage ICT risk in an organisation, corporate governance of ICT, ICT 
governance and IS governance are explored in the research to provide effective action 
planning for organisations (Sarens & Beelde 2006; Gotterbarn 2009). However, since the 
ISO/IEC 38500 is a new standard (published in 2008 while this research was being 
carried out), there has as yet been no research on the impact of its implementation 
(ISO/IEC 2008). Thus, this research focuses upon the available standards and 
frameworks by focusing on ICT governance and information security (IS) governance, 
which are discussed next.  
 
2.4.1 ICT governance 
ICT governance is a set of processes, procedures and policies that are the responsibility 
of senior management and the Board of Directors (ITGI 2007). Organisations use ICT 
governance to guide and control ICT in order to attain business goals and objectives 
while balancing ICT risks with return on ICT investment (Ridley et al. 2004; Smith & 
McKeen 2006). ICT governance is also used in organisations to reduce information 
systems diasters (Gotterbarn 2009). The IT Governance Institute (ITGI) states 
that effective ICT governance helps organisations ensure that their ICT can support 
business goals, maximise business investment in IT, and appropriately manage ICT-
related risks and opportunities (ISACA 2007; Weill & Ross 2004a, 2004b). 
Van Grembergen and De Haes (2008) assert that ICT governance is an integral part of 
corporate governance and is the responsibility of the governing body at a strategic level 
(e.g. the Board of Directors), management level (e.g. senior managers) and operational 
level (e.g. operational managers). On this account, at the strategic level, the 
responsibility of the board is to provide strategic alignment between business and ICT. At 
the management level, the responsibility of senior managers is to provide structures 
involving ‗the organisation, and location of the ICT function, the existence of clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities and [a] diversity of ICT and business committees‘ (Van 
Grembergen & De Haes 2008, p. 24). At the operational level, control and monitoring 
processes for information systems need to be defined. Moreover, it is necessary that all 
three levels collaborate by establishing relational mechanisms such as ‗business and ICT 
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participation, strategic dialogue, training, shared learning and proper communication‘ 
(Van Grembergen & De Haes 2008, p. 24).  
Elieson (2006) argues that governance structure, defining responsibilities for managing 
risk, methodology, risk/process taxonomy, risk assessment, controls, transparency and 
business alignment are the key elements of an ICT risk framework. This implies that an 
ICT risk framework should be embedded in an organisation‘s ICT governance. Elieson 
(2006) adds that the risk framework should be mapped to ICT governance using a 
framework such as the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
(COBIT) framework. Because ICT governance provides guidance for the governing body 
to be responsible for ICT processes, those processes must be controlled and tested in an 
organisation‘s operational processes. In this regard, Posthumusa and Solms (2005, p. 
12) claim that ‗ICT governance is a continuous process, requiring ongoing review and 
adjustment and involves several concepts, including risk management, security, business 
continuity, change management, and regulatory compliance amongst several others‘. 
Moreover, Tarantino (2008) asserts that strategic and operational risk can be managed 
by performing governance of risk management, which implies that ICT governance can 
occupy the role of ICT risk management within an organisation.  
Korac-Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001) argue that ICT governance focuses on the 
alignment of ICT objectives with business objectives in order to attain optimal business 
goals. In their view, ICT governance is a broad concept which consists of ‗(a) assessing 
the impact and nature of ICT, (b) the development of the IS/IT skill bases, (c) 
consideration of business, (d) legal and other IS/IT related issues, (e) the responsibility 
to safeguard the prime interests of all concerned—internal and external stakeholders, 
[and] (f) consideration of the structure and quality of the relationship among IS/IT 
stakeholders‘ (Korac-Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2001). 
Two primary aspects of ICT governance are ‗the value IT delivers to an organization and 
the control and mitigation of IT-related risks‘ (Hardy 2006, p. 56; Clementi & Carvalho 
2007, p. 190). Hardy (2006) also notes that ICT governance should be a concern of 
organisational agendas and addressed by senior management in collaboration with the 
ICT department. According to Hardy, ICT governance encompasses five domains: (a) 
strategic alignment, (b) value delivery, (c) risk management, (d) resource management, 
and (e) performance measurement, where the first two are outcomes and the last three 
are drivers.  
On the basis of the five areas of ICT governance outlined above, it can be argued that 
ICT governance in an organisation can streamline internal control processes and help an 
organisation achieve: 
- ICT governance enhancement,  
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- improvement in understanding of ICT among executives,  
- better decision-making with respect to quality and time frame allowed, 
- alignment of ICT projects with business requirements, 
- prevention of uncertainty around asset loss and systems breaches, 
- compliance with regulatory requirements, 
- competitive advantage through more efficient and effective operations, 
- optimisation of operational processes with an integral part of security, availability, 
and information integrity, and 
- enhancement of ICT risk management competencies and prioritisation of 
organisational ICT projects (Damianides 2005, pp. 81-82). 
In relation to the benefits of adopting the ICT governance approach outlined above, Van 
Grembergen et al. (2004) argue that it can help an organisation define effective internal 
control processes regarding ICT governance structures and processes, roles and 
responsibilities, the ICT strategy committee, ICT steering committees, the ICT 
organisation structure, and strategic information systems planning. Clementi and 
Carvalho (2007) add that ICT governance covers two main criteria which organisations 
should consider: (a) strategic alignment that creates business value; and (b) risk 
management that maintains business value.  
It can therefore be argued that ICT governance is the primary responsibility of executive 
management in terms of providing strategic direction on how to achieve business goals 
and objectives (Lainhart 2001b; Korac-Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2001; Bodnar 2003; 
Buckby et al. 2005); and one clear responsibility of executive management in ICT 
governance is risk management which is the main focus area of this research (Trites 
2000, 2004; Buckby et al. 2005). 
To simplify the ICT governance strategy, most organisations use an internationally 
recognised standard as a tool for creating and maintaining business value, such as the 
COBIT framework, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard or the Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL) framework. However, this research focuses on ICT risk 
management planning by using the Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT) framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard because both are 
widely recognised and more concentrated on the internal organisational environment. 
One approach represents a top-down method while the other is essentially a bottom-up 
approach. Furthermore, the COBIT framework can help the researcher to define ICT 
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policy and ICT management processes for dealing with ICT risk management planning in 
an organisation. On the other hand, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard can supplement ICT 
risk management planning in terms of assisting with Information security policy, human 
resource management and information security management. Whether or not success 
factors based on the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard affect the 
planning at both the corporate level and the operational level to establish this research 
outcome (i.e. successful ICT risk management) will be explored. The following section 
discusses the bottom-up approach.  
 
2.4.2 Information security governance 
The IT Governance Institute (2006b, p. 8) states that ‗Information security governance is 
not only a technical issue, but [also] a business and governance challenge that involves 
adequate risk management, reporting and accountability‘. The Institute also highlights 
that information security governance allocates the technical expertise for information 
security management to the ICT department (Solms 2005b). Information security 
governance is an integral part of corporate governance and must be aligned with the ICT 
governance framework and integrated into strategy, concept, design, implementation 
and operation in order to achieve effective corporate governance (Solms 2001). 
The IT Governance Institute (2006b, p. 8) argues that the responsibility of executive 
management is to provide an overall information security strategy which includes: 
- understanding of the information and information security that are critical to the 
organisation; 
- reviewing investment in information security to ensure alignment of the 
organisation‘s strategy and risk profile; and 
- endorsing the development and implementation of a comprehensive information 
security program. 
Leadership, and organisational structures and processes, are the focus in information 
security governance, with the aim of helping the organisation develop relevant and 
effective processes to safeguard information (Solms 2001; ITGI 2006b). The IT 
Governance Institute (2006b, p. 13) states that the significant benefits of information 
security governance include: 
- increased predictability and reduced uncertainty of business operations by 
lowering information security–related risk to a definable and acceptable level; 
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- assurance of effective information security policy and policy compliance; and 
- a firm foundation for efficient and effective risk management, process 
improvement, and rapid incident response related to securing information. 
Solms and Solms (2005, p. 272), and Solms (2006a, p. 166), argue that information 
security governance is a risk management or risk mitigation discipline. This is also 
argued in the following statement taken from Information Security Governance: 
Guidance for the Board of Directors and Executive Management: ‗Information security 
programme is a risk mitigation method like other control and governance actions and 
should therefore clearly fit into overall enterprise governance‘. Through a proper 
information security governance plan, the organisation must direct and control processes 
through the direction of the senior management, middle management and operational 
management levels.  
Solms and Solms (2005, 2006) further argue that organisations must focus on directing 
and controlling processes to effectively manage ICT risk. Control processes are crucial at 
the strategic, tactical and operational levels responsible for ICT risks in an organisation. 
At the strategic level, senior management is responsible for providing the directives 
regarding both external factors (i.e. legal and regulatory prescriptions) and internal 
factors (i.e. the strategic vision, the role of ICT, alignment of ICT with company strategy 
and competitiveness). Likewise, senior management needs to ensure control compliance 
with the relevant directives. At a tactical level, middle management must follow the 
directives of senior management to expand sets of information security policies and 
ensure that the company‘s standards compliance and procedures are met. Furthermore, 
middle management should measure and monitor compliance with the requirements of 
the relevant policies, procedures and standards, and check their findings against their 
plan and that of senior management. At an operational level, the operational managers 
must ensure compliance with relevant administrative guidelines and procedures which 
reflect the prescribed operating procedures at all levels of the organisation. Operational 
management then controls a wide range of administrative guidelines and procedures 
including files about operating systems, databases, firewalls and other forms of utilities 
and specialised software sources. A summary of these management controls is presented 
in Table 2-3. 
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Table 2-3: A summary of the three different levels of management control 
Level Direct Control 
Strategic 
Level 
- External factors 
- Internal factors 
- The report reflecting compliance 
with relevant directives.  
- The report reflecting the relevant 
risk situations regarding information 
security. 
Tactical Level - Sets of relevant information security 
policies.  
- Sets of company standards and 
procedures. 
- Measure and monitor the 
requirements at the strategic 
level.  
- Report on tactical level and report 
back to strategic level. 
Operational 
Level 
- Sets of relevant tactical documents 
are expanded by providing sets of 
administrative guidelines and 
administrative procedures to be 
followed at all levels. 
- Log files of operating systems 
- Databases 
- Firewalls 
- Other forms of utility and 
specialised software sources. 
Source: Adapted from Solms & Solms (2006) 
In order to ensure that all relevant elements of information security governance are 
addressed in an organisational information security strategy, several security standards 
have been developed to provide guidance and ensure comprehensiveness. The most 
commonly and internationally used standard is the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as 
Information Security (IS) Governance (ITGI 2006b). The next section discusses the 
success factors of the COBIT framework. 
 
2.5 Key factors in the COBIT framework: A top-down approach 
2.5.1 Organisational policy 
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is acknowledged 
internationally as the ICT governance standard. The COBIT framework is also recognised 
as a top-down or high-level framework for governance, security and control over ICT 
(Khan 2006; Smith & McKeen 2006). The COBIT framework helps organisations align 
business processes with ICT processes as well as manage ICT-associated risks (Lainhart 
2001a). The COBIT framework provides good practice across a domain and process 
framework and presents activities in a manageable and logical structure. 
Business control and technological control programs are the focus in the COBIT 
framework (Bae et al. 2003). ICT control is an integral part of the internal control of an 
organisation, which is a tool of corporate governance. The COBIT framework describes 
the information process requirements that match the broader classes of ICT control used 
by an organisation to achieve its objectives and goals. Internal control is viewed as a 
process in the COBIT framework which includes policies, procedures, practices and 
organisational structure that support the organisation achieving its goals and objectives 
(Colbert & Bowen 1996). 
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Robinson (2005) asserts that the COBIT framework stipulates that ICT processes and 
control should be aligned with business processes or aims. ICT processes and the control 
framework are derived from the attitudes, abilities, awareness and actions of the Board 
of Directors in relation to controls within an organisation. The COBIT framework was 
established as an ICT security and control practices standard to help senior management 
direct its responsibilities with regard to an organisation‘s assets by aligning the 
requirements in terms of business risk, control needs and technical issues (Bodnar 
2006). 
Moreover, the COBIT framework is used as high-level, detailed guidelines specifically in 
relation to information security (Solms 2005a). It has also been used as a primary 
standard to develop an Information Technology Risk Management System (ITRMS) at the 
University of Johannesburg (Solms 2006b). In this case, as Solm demonstrates, ICT risk 
governance is an integral part of corporate governance which is focused in some part on 
using the COBIT framework for ICT risk analysis. 
The main purpose of the COBIT framework is to clarify business-focused, process-
oriented, control-based and measurement-driven objectives and requirements by 
developing business processes and ICT systems in an organisation (ITGI 2007). In 
addition, as Solms (2005a), the ISM3 Consortium (2007) and Tshinu et al. (2008) all 
argue, the COBIT framework is an information security and management standard that 
classifies ICT processes and the control processes of what they do. However, Solms 
(2005a, p. 101) also claims that the COBIT framework is lacking in the area of 
information security control orientation, and does not detail ‗how‘ information security 
control can be undertaken. 
As illustrated in COBIT 4.1, the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) (2007), the business focus 
is business orientation which helps an organisation manage and control ICT resources. 
Moreover, a structured set of processes as outlined in the COBIT framework enables an 
organisation to ensure alignment to business requirements: ‗Business requirements drive 
the investment in ICT resources that are used by ICT processes to deliver enterprise 
information which responds to business requirements‘ (ITGI 2007, p. 10). 
 
2.5.2 ICT management 
The process-oriented approach is presented in the COBIT framework as a reference 
process model that provides process details for everyone in an organisation to adopt in 
order to manage ICT activities and ICT risks. The COBIT framework includes four 
domains: ‗(1) Plan and Organize (PO)—Provides direction to solution delivery (AI) and 
service delivery (DS), (2) Acquire and Implement (AI)—Provides the solution and passes 
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them to be tuned into services, (3) Deliver and Support (DS)—Receives the solution and 
makes them usable for end users, (4) Monitor and Evaluate (ME)—Monitors all processes 
to ensure that the direction provided is followed.‘ The IT Governance Institute (2007, p. 
12) model is shown in Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1: The four interrelated domains of the COBIT framework  
Source: ITGI (2007, p. 12) 
The four domains of the COBIT framework focus on the governing body and ICT 
management (Figure 2-1). This framework assists an organisation to build ICT processes 
and controls which are appropriate for implementing and developing ICT governance and 
management (Smith & McKeen 2006). The four domains consist of 34 processes and 210 
control objectives that help an organisation define and follow its own approach to the 
management of ICT risks (ITGI 2007).  
The plan and organise domain (PO): This domain provides ICT strategy and tactics that 
help ICT achieve the optimal contribution to the business objectives (ITGI 2007). The 
ITGI (2007) classifies this domain into 10 processes in combination with 74 control 
objectives that provide guidance on structuring an organisation. The ten processes are 
defined to ensure that business strategy, policies, procedures, processes and roles and 
responsibilities are determined by high-level management (ITGI 2007). In other words, 
people, process and organisational structure are all considered when planning how to 
deal with ICT risk.  
The acquire and implement domain (AI): This domain allows for the realisation of ICT 
strategy based on the outcomes of the plan and organise domain to ensure that ‗ICT 
solutions are identified, developed, acquired, implemented and integrated into the 
business processes‘, in turn to achieve business objectives (ITGI 2007, p. 13). The ITGI 
(2007) classifies this domain into seven processes in conjunction with 40 control 
objectives that provide guidance on maintaining and adapting existing organisational ICT 
systems. Seven processes are defined to assist in managing change, and whether the 
Plan and Organise 
Monitor and Evaluate 
Acquire and 
Implement 
Deliver and 
Support 
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existing system or a new system could best deliver ICT solutions to meet business 
objectives (ITGI 2007). The control objectives for this domain are aimed at ensuring that 
all ICT investment or new ICT projects are acquired to meet the needs of current 
business operations (ITGI 2007). In other words, the planning of ICT infrastructure and 
systems is considered necessary for dealing with ICT risks.     
The deliver and support domain (DS): This domain enables the realisation of service 
activities such as the delivery of required services; security management and continuity; 
service support for users; data management and operational facilities in order to meet 
the requirements of day-to-day ICT operations (ITGI 2007). The ITGI (2007) defines this 
domain according to 13 processes along with 71 control objectives to ensure that ICT 
service activities serve ICT operations to meet business objectives. This domain implies 
that an organisation needs to consider which service activities best support ICT 
operations and control ICT processes to meet overall business operations. 
The monitor and evaluate domain (ME): This domain raises awareness of ICT quality 
assurance required by an organisation to address performance management, monitoring 
of internal controls, regulations and governance (ITGI 2007). The ITGI (2007) 
categorises this domain into four processes along with 25 control objectives to ensure 
that: ICT performance is measured to detect problems before they occur; internal 
controls are effective and efficient; ICT performance can be linked back to business goals 
and can maintain confidentiality; and integrity and availability controls are considered in 
terms of information security.  
Although there is a range of ICT control standards, frameworks and documents, the 
COBIT framework, as a model for ICT governance, is internationally recognised and 
applied widely in industry and commerce (Ridley et al. 2004; Buckby et al 2009). Elieson 
(2006) states that the COBIT framework is used as a baseline in ICT risk management to 
be mapped with other standards and frameworks to build a single, integrated body of 
work. The COBIT framework also includes a range of guidelines relevant to different 
areas of a framework including management guidelines, business function, control 
objectives, ICT governance implementation guidelines, control practices and ICT 
assurance guidelines (Lainhart 2001a; Ridley et al. 2004; ITGI 2007). 
In terms of risk management, ICT processes and controls taken from the COBIT 
framework are focused on gaining control over risks. Therefore, all control objectives 
need to be discussed to determine which one is more applicable when dealing with 
specific ICT risks in an organisation. The high-level control objectives have been 
examined more in the practitioner research literature than in the academic research 
literature in relation to ICT control (Ridley et al. 2004; Liu & Ridley 2005; Gerke & Ridley 
2006). According to studies by Guldentops et al. (2002), Huissoud (2005), Liu and Ridley 
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(2005), and Gerke and Ridley (2006), the most important control objective processes 
based on the COBIT framework (3rd and 4th versions) are the plan and organise; acquire 
and implement; and deliver and support domains. These findings are shown in Table 
2-4.  
Table 2-4: A comparison of the most important control objective processes within previous studies 
ICT processes defined within the four domains 
based on the COBIT 3rd and 4th edition 
Guldentop
s et al. 
2002 
Huissoud 
2005 
Liu and 
Ridley 
2005 
Gerke and 
Ridley 2006 
Plan and organise domain     
PO1 Define a strategic IT plan X X X X 
PO2 Define the information architecture  O   
PO3 Determine technological direction X O X  
PO4 Define the IT processes, organisation and 
relationships 
   X 
PO5 Manage the IT investment X  X X 
PO6 Communicate management aims and direction    X 
PO7 Manage human resources     
PO8 Ensure compliance with external requirements    X 
PO9 Assess risks X O X X 
PO10 Manage projects X O   
PO11 Manage quality   X  
Acquire and implement domain     
AI1 Identify automated solutions X O X  
AI2 Acquire and maintain application software X O X X 
AI3 Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure  X  X 
AI4 Develop and maintain procedures  O   
AI5 Install and accredit systems X  X X 
AI6 Manage changes X X X X 
Deliver and support domain     
DS1 Define and manage service levels X  X  
DS2 Manage third-party services     
DS3 Manage performance and capacity     
DS4 Ensure continuous services X X X X 
DS5 Ensure system security X X X X 
DS6 Identify and allocate costs     
DS7 Educate and train users  X   
DS8 Assist and advise customers    X 
DS9 Manage the configuration    X 
DS10 Manage problems and incidents X X X X 
DS11 Manage data X O X X 
DS12 Manage facilities    X 
DS13 Manage operations     
Monitor domain     
M1 Monitor the processes X X X  
M2 Assess internal control adequacy     
M3 Obtain independent assurance     
M4 Provide for independent audit     
Legend       X = Most important           O = Also important 
Source: Adapted from the studies of Guldentops et al. (2002); Huissoud (2005); Liu & Ridley (2005); Gerke & 
Ridley (2006)  
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Previously researchers have identified that the most important control objective 
processes are in the PO, AI, and DS domains for ICT control. The least important domain 
is the monitor domain because the research indicates that organisations are concerned 
with only M1 (‗monitor the processes‘) in the monitor domain. However, prioritising the 
control objective process in organisations does not differ depending on a change in ICT 
situation or type of industry or sector (Guldentops et al. 2002; Ridley et al. 2004; Liu & 
Ridley 2005; Gerke & Ridley 2006). Furthermore, these four studies have concluded that 
PO1 (Define a strategic ICT plan), AI6 (Manage change), DS4 (Ensure continuous 
service), DS5 (Ensure system security) and DS10 (Manage problems and incidents) 
appear to be the most important elements to be considered in an organisation. This 
implies that ICT strategies, change management, business continuity planning, and 
security and risk management have been found in these studies to be the most critical to 
be defined in order to prevent, mitigate and avoid ICT risk. However, as the COBIT 
framework has some limitations, it is more concerned with ICT governance and 
management than information security (IS) governance and management. It can 
therefore be seen that IS governance and management can fill this gap by providing the 
controls for IS strategies, business continuity, change management, and risk 
management in security planning (ITGI 2006b; ISO/IEC 2005). The next section 
discusses the success factors of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
 
2.6 Key factors in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard: A bottom-up 
approach 
2.6.1 Organisational policy 
The major aim of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is to emphasise internal control through 
policies, procedures and risk assessment (Capuder 2004). This differs from the COBIT 
framework in that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard provides the details of organisational 
information security practices rather than focusing on ICT controls. Moreover, the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard is used more as a low-level guideline that details the specifics of 
‗how‘ information security should be done (Solms 2005a). Solms (2005a) also mentions 
that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard focuses on technological orientation in terms of 
providing guidance on precisely ‗how‘ control objectives can be achieved. On the other 
hand, the COBIT framework focuses on business orientation which describes the control 
objectives at the higher level, by describing ‗what‘ control objectives need to be 
considered.  
Therefore, this study argues for selecting the merits of both the framework and the 
standard to create a single management framework for dealing with ICT risk 
management planning in an organisation. Moreover, in this regard the COBIT framework 
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itself stipulates that its framework can complement other standards and frameworks 
(ITGI 2007), although there is no research that proposes how they can fit together in the 
context of a structured approach to ICT risk management (Tshinu et al. 2008; Siponen & 
Willison 2009). 
 
2.6.2 Information security management and human resource 
management 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard defines information security as a crucial area that all 
employees of an organisation must master in order to ensure business continuity, 
mitigate business risk and maximise returns on investment and business opportunities 
(Groves 2003). Myler and Broadbent (2006) and Groves (2003) assert that the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard is a detailed security standard which is organised into several 
information security management practices, including: 
- creating an information security policy guideline; 
- assigning information security roles and responsibilities; 
- providing consistent asset management; 
- establishing human and physical security mechanisms; 
- reporting security incidents and business continuity management; 
- determining access control and associated systems; 
- documenting communication and operational procedures; and 
- complying with legal requirements and audit controls. 
Myler and Broadbent (2006) also state that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is a framework 
for establishing risk assessment methods including policies, control, countermeasures 
and program documentation. Moreover, a basic requirement of the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard is security risk analysis which is referenced throughout the standard, and 
various resources are available to assist with this (ISO/IEC 17799 Compliance Associates 
2002). The relationship between risk analysis and compliance with ISO/IEC 17799 is very 
close. It is therefore important to ensure that the methodology adopted is fully consistent 
with the demands of the standard. Haworth and Pietron (2006) articulate that ISO/IEC 
17799 can be used as an ICT control and audit framework. 
Eloff and Eloff (2003) point out that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is used to act as an 
information security management system to allow an organisation to initially concentrate 
on specific security sections. This standard also expands ICT orientation to address both 
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ICT and security orientations when dealing with ICT risk management in an organisation 
(Eloff & Eloff 2003). 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard provides the most comprehensive approach to information 
security management which can streamline ICT governance of the technical aspects of 
information security (Saint-Germain 2005). It also helps execute a cost-effective plan 
which includes appropriate security controls in order to mitigate risks and protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets in an organisation (Saint-
Germain 2005; Theoharidou et al. 2005). Moreover, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard defines 
that information security management is part of ICT risk management as a process of 
identifying, controlling, and minimising or eliminating security risks that may affect 
information systems, at an acceptable cost (ISO/IEC 2005). 
Two main aspects of information asset protection in ISO/IEC 17799 emphasise 
information security and information system security (Theoharidou et al. 2005). 
Information security refers to the safeguarding of information integrity—that is, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Information system security refers to the 
protection of all information system elements such as hardware, software, peopleware, 
information and processes. Theoharidou et al. (2005) reveal that most organisations 
select appropriate control objectives to deal with insider threats which are based on 
implementation of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. In dealing with insider threats, the 
personal security category is selected to determine the management of job descriptions 
of security staff; personnel screening; confidentiality agreements; security responsibility 
in the terms and condition of employment; and information security and training 
(Theoharidou et al. 2005).  
The ISO/IEC 17799 provides the specific guidance needed for an organisation to establish 
information security management (Sweren 2006). This specific guidance consists of 
information security process; information security roles and responsibilities; and any 
relevant regulations. The ISO/IEC 17799 standard has been renamed according to the 
new numbering scheme in 2007 as the ISO/IEC27000 series (Broderick 2006; Sweren 
2006); however, the content is identical in the two standards. 
A study conducted by Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006) utilising a quantitative method 
for the ISO/IEC 17799 standard gap analysis involved measuring 133 control objectives 
grouped into 11 domains of the ISO/IEC 17799 in order to gain accurate compliance 
results. The number of questions aligned with the 133 control objectives regarding 
information security management. However, the number of questions can be less than or 
equal to the number of control objectives in the standard depending on the 
organisational structures and processes within the organisation. The results of their 
research indicated which domains are more compliant to the standard. More compliance 
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in the standard is concerned with the areas of organisational rules and regulations; 
security policy; human resources security; and information security acquisition, 
development and maintenance. Furthermore, each domain is concerned with different 
staff level perspectives. For example, senior management is concerned with some 
domains in the standards such as security policy, the organisation of information 
security, human resources security, business continuity management and compliance. 
A study by Gordon et al. (2006) investigated the voluntary disclosure of information 
security activities in US corporations as reported to the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) between 2000 and 2004 (five years of the annual filing data). Their 
report illustrated that 24 key words (refer to Table 2-5) commonly appeared in 27,253 
annual reports of US corporations which are repeatedly reported to the SEC (Gordon et 
al. 2006).   
Table 2-5: Listing of key words used for disclosure search 
Key word Number of 
instances 
Categories of disclosure 
Security measure 2,211 
1 
Authentication 1,823 
Encryption 1,411 
Disaster recovery 1,182 
Information security 937 
Access control 595 
Business continuity 406 
Security management 224 
Security monitoring 188 
Cyber security 26 
Infosec 7 
Security expenditure 7 
Computer system security 3 
Cyber security 3 
(Network or computer) join (1) security  906 
2 
Hacker 204 
Denial of service 158 
Cyber attack 19 
Computer virus 1,277 
3 
Security breach 1,209 
Intrusion 573 
Security incident 16 
Computer breach 2 
Computer intrusion 1 
Total instances 13,388  
Categories: (1) disclosure of proactive steps toward improving information security, (2) disclosure of 
information security vulnerabilities, and (3) disclosure of information security breaches.  
Source: Adapted from Gordon et al. (2006) 
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In US corporations, information security management involves proactive steps toward 
improving information security. Moreover, the findings in Gordon et al.‘s (2006) research 
suggest that information security management must be planned in advance in order to 
prevent, avoid and mitigate information security vulnerabilities and information security 
breaches. Gordon et al. (2006) also conclude that securing the information environment 
appears to be gaining increased attention in organisations. It is imperative that the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard is taken into account because all these concerns are covered in 
the detailed processes of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as opposed to the COBIT 
framework. However, considering the ISO/IEC 17799 standard alone is not adequate 
because its approach to ICT management does not cover ICT resources or governance of 
ICT organisational structure, policies and strategies. Therefore, the two-way approach 
works well as the COBIT framework lays the foundation for ICT governance and 
management (e.g. the top-down approach) to risk management, while the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard focuses on IS governance and management (e.g. the bottom-up 
approach) to risk management. 
 
2.7 The management level plan vs. the operational level plan in 
ICT risk management 
The COBIT framework provides general management guidelines for assisting 
organisations to manipulate ICT assets and facilitate ICT processes to ensure effective 
ICT risk management (Bodnar 2006). It categorises critical success factors that can be 
applied in an organisation‘s processes such as ‗processes and policies description, clear 
duty and task, management commitment, appropriate communication to concerned 
internal and external persons and consistent measurement practices‘ (Hawkins et al. 
2003). It is widely recognised as one of the most effective tools in ICT governance for 
ICT risk management (Khan 2006). 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard consists of 124 control objectives categorised into 10 ICT 
audit and control areas based on ISO/IEC 17799. However, the new version of the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard, revised in 2005, includes 133 controls in 11 different domains. 
It addresses 11 areas: ‗security policy, organization of information security, asset 
management, human resources security, physical and environmental security, 
communications and operations management, access control, information systems 
acquisition, development and maintenance, information security incident management, 
business continuity management and compliance‘ (Broderick 2006, p. 27; Karabacak & 
Sogukpinar 2006, p. 416; Sweren 2006). To propose aligning this standard with the 
COBIT framework, these 11 domains are summarised in conjunction with the four 
domains of the COBIT framework in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2: Mapping the ISO/IEC 17799 standard with the COBIT framework 
Source: Adapted from ITGI/OGC (2005), ITGI (2006a), ISO/IEC (2005) and Broderick (2006) 
The mapping in Figure 2-2 reveals that the COBIT framework is used to align with 
business orientation. In contrast, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is used to align with ICT 
orientation. Therefore, integrating the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard into one single management framework for ICT risk management will enable a 
focus on alignment of business, ICT and security orientations simultaneously. The 
mapping above shows that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard supplements the COBIT 
framework in each part of each domain in security-related matters, which can effectively 
strengthen ICT strategy through IS strategy to meet business objectives when dealing 
with ICT risks.  
A number of research projects have been carried out with respect to the effectiveness of 
the COBIT framework in ICT risk management. For example, Solms (2005a) shows that 
the COBIT framework is a high-level control objective framework which is a superior ICT 
governance framework. It provides detailed instructions on ‗what‘ must be done in an 
organisation with respect to ICT risk management. Lainhart (2001b) demonstrates that 
the COBIT framework occupies the primary role in overall business control. 
The COBIT framework, however, is less detailed on the technical side of ‗how‘ this should 
be undertaken (Solms 2005a). To address this issue the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is 
The COBIT framework 
ICT governance and management 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
IS governance and management 
Plan and organise domain 
 ICT strategy, policies, objectives 
and structure 
 Roles and responsibilities 
 Security policy 
 Organisation of information 
security 
 Asset management 
Focusing on what controls need to be 
considered at the higher levels. 
Focusing on how controls need to be 
done in the process. 
Acquire and implement 
 ICT investment 
 Change management 
 ICT project 
 Information systems acquisition, 
development and maintenance 
 Communications and operations 
management 
Deliver and support 
 Problems and incidents 
management 
 Continuous services  
 Human resources security 
 Physical and environmental 
security 
 Access control 
 Information security incident 
management 
 Business continuity 
Monitor and evaluate 
 ICT performance 
 Compliance 
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presented to complement the COBIT framework. The ISO/IEC 17799 standard ensures 
that a technical perspective is taken into account at the management level in order to 
streamline management processes and procedures as outlined in annual planning (Eloff & 
Eloff 2003). It is aimed at providing organisations with a holistic technical approach 
which includes technical specifications such as network systems security, personnel 
security and organisational security (Kenning 2001; Theoharidou et al. 2005). 
Buchanan and Gibb (2007) assert that the role and scope of the information audit used in 
an organisation are often neglected or forgotten in our understanding of processes and 
practice. There are three main problems related to the information audit: ‗Firstly, the 
top-down approach itself still has a lack of clear top-down strategic direction. Secondly, 
there is less practical guidance on the scope of the information audit. Thirdly, there is no 
standard, agreed methodological approach to information audit‘ (Buchanan & Gibb 2007, 
p. 3). It can thus be argued that the information audit and control lack clarity in terms of 
their scope and roles with regard to ICT risk management. 
Much research has been conducted on the use of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard for 
effective ICT risk management. For example, Groves (2003) demonstrates that the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard provides more technical orientation in relation to ICT risk 
management, such as generating a document of information security policy; assigning 
responsibility for information security; training and educating about information security; 
reporting security incidents; and establishing a plan of business continuity management. 
Moreover, the process of protecting information entails a collaborative effort among all 
employees in an organisation. Capuder (2004) concludes that all levels of an organisation 
must commit to the processes which deal with information security. The ISO/IEC 17799 
standard includes direction for technical staff such as auditors or security professionals, 
requiring them to deal with information security. Theoharidou et al. (2005) show that 
using the ISO/IEC 17799 helps organisations handle computer abuse from insider 
threats—that is, threats derived from employees who have authority access to IS and 
misuse its objective—by focusing on personnel security. 
Both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard recognise two aspects of 
information security in ICT governance when dealing with ICT risk management: 
business orientation and technical orientation. To better understand these two 
frameworks, a comparative analysis of their differences in terms of business orientation 
and technical orientation is clearly desirable. Table 2-6 presents the results of this 
comparison (Lientz & Larssen 2004, 2006). 
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Table 2-6: A comparison between business, information and communication technology and information 
security orientations in ICT risk management 
Focus Business 
Information and 
Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
Information Security (IS) 
Governance - Corporate 
governance 
- ICT governance 
and management 
- IS governance and 
management 
Nature of work - Business transactions - ICT transactions - Security transactions 
Concentration - Business objectives 
- Business strategies 
- Business policies 
- Business goals 
- Business processes 
- ICT objectives 
- ICT strategies 
- ICT policies 
- ICT goals  
- ICT processes 
- IS objectives 
- IS strategies 
- IS policies 
- IS goals  
- IS processes 
Activity - Business control and 
audit 
- ICT control and 
audit 
- IS control and audit 
Approach - Top-down 
- Bottom-up 
- Two-way 
- Top-down (the 
main 
responsibilities lie 
with high-level 
management) 
- Bottom-up (the main 
concern is on 
processes) 
Alignment - ICT and IS - Business - ICT and business 
Management - Business risks 
regarding strategies, 
policies and 
operations 
- ICT risks regarding 
ICT strategies, ICT 
policies and ICT 
operations 
- Security risks 
regarding IS 
strategies, IS 
policies and IS 
operations 
Adapted from Lientz & Larssen (2006) 
From the data outlined in Table 2-6, it can be concluded that governance in an 
organisation should focus on ICT and IS aligning with business when dealing with ICT risk 
management. When only one perspective is the focus, the relevance of ICT control and 
audit may not be found when dealing with ICT risks. It is recommended that ICT and IS 
perspectives be considered such that they supplement each other to align with the 
business perspective (ITGI 2007). In this regard, this research takes this opportunity to 
empirically explore and explain the phenomenon by using both perspectives to deal with 
ICT risk management.  
Jordan and Silcock (2005) suggest that ICT risk management should adopt both top-
down and bottom-up approaches. Such an integration of the COBIT framework and the 
ISO/IEC 17799 framework can be used to streamline business needs by focusing on four 
key elements in organisational ICT risk management: strategy and policy; roles and 
responsibilities; processes and approach; and people and performance (Jordan & Silcock 
2005; Robinson 2005). Mena (2002) demonstrates that the close cooperation between 
senior management and the operational team can lead an organisation to attain the 
optimal goals in ICT risk management. Table 2-6 reveals that the common goals of an 
organisation are to plan and organise ICT risk management from business, ICT and IS 
perspectives based on internal control regarding corporate governance, ICT governance 
and IS governance. 
Focusing solely on an ICT perspective may lead to a reduced emphasis within corporate 
governance on risk management, especially related to ICT. ICT governance is the 
responsibility of senior management to provide strategic direction for technological 
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operations in order to achieve business goals and objectives (Bodnar 2003; Buckby et al. 
2005; ISACA 2007; ITGI 2007; Korac-Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2001; Lainhart 2001a; 
Ridley et al. 2004; Smith & McKeen 2006). One clear responsibility of executive 
management in ICT governance is ICT risk management (Buckby et al. 2005; Trites 
2000; 2004). IS governance is specifically used to align with the ICT governance 
framework as an integrated strategy in order to achieve effective corporate governance 
(Solms 2001). Information security (IS) governance focuses on leadership, organisational 
structures, and processes to help the organisation provide relevant and effective 
processes to safeguard information (Solms 2001). Significantly, its benefits lead to ‗(a) 
increased predictability and reduced uncertainty of business operation by lowering 
information security–related risk to a definable and acceptable level, (b) assurance of 
effective information security policy and policy compliance, and (c) a firm foundation for 
efficient and effective risk management, process improvement, and rapid incident 
response related to securing information‘ (ITGI 2006b, p. 14).  
 
2.8 Key factors for ICT risk management success 
The research literature has shown that ICT risk management focuses on three main 
components: ICT risk management process, ICT risk management control and ICT risk 
management planning. ICT risk management process and control are considered to 
manage ICT risks in the area of human resource management, ICT management and IS 
management. By doing so, an organisation can successfully avoid, mitigate and prevent 
ICT risks. However, the nature of ICT risk management planning varies or is ill-defined 
because there is little common understanding, or agreed upon formula, for academics 
and practitioners to follow. Therefore, this research uses a structured approach to 
conceptualise the guidance for ICT risk management; and this structured approach is 
based on integration of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
According to the above discussion on the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard, this chapter has highlighted the success factors for ICT risk management. Five 
key factors (information and communication technology policy, information security 
policy, ICT management, information security management and human resource 
management) derived from the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard affect 
planning at the management level and the operational level around successful ICT risk 
management. Each key factor is discussed below.  
Firstly, information and communication technology policy focuses on ICT strategy that 
relates to the direction of ICT control and audit. With the direction of ICT control and 
audit, an organisation must pay attention to the alignment of ICT processes with 
[44] 
 
 
business orientation. Moreover, an organisation must clarify what kind of ICT process and 
control can help achieve organisational goals and objectives for dealing with ICT risks. 
Secondly, information security policy focuses on information security (IS) strategy 
relating to the direction of IS control and audit. With this direction, an organisation seeks 
to control ICT infrastructure and systems by using information security processes to align 
with ICT processes. In addition, Information security policy supports IS processes to 
attain greater sophistication in technical areas. This policy also helps determine how 
control objectives can develop the right technical orientation for securing information and 
information assets.  
Thirdly, ICT management is another key factor that an organisation seeks to provide the 
view of management in ICT activities. ICT activities penetrate the organisational 
structure and business transactions of modern businesses. Therefore, ICT management 
helps an organisation manage ICT infrastructure in both ICT implementation and 
development. 
Fourthly, information security management is used to manage security incidents in ICT 
systems. It is also used to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information assets in modern organisations. Information security management mainly 
focuses on the protection of all information system elements such as hardware, software, 
information and processes.  
Fifthly, human resource management is also considered in terms of the protection of 
people and their behaviour in an organisation that is relevant to all ICT systems. In a 
modern organisation, human resources are the key organisational asset involved in the 
setting of organisational policy, the control of ICT processes and the management of 
information assets. Therefore, all staff levels are required to be managed and controlled 
in a proper manner in order to achieve all organisational requirements.  
These five key factors have the main impact on planning at both the management and 
operational levels. In general, the manager is the key person to set the overview plan 
(i.e. the management plan or the corporate plan) for ICT risk management. The overview 
plan initially defines what ICT processes need to be adopted to prevent, avoid and 
mitigate ICT risk. From there, the plan is implemented at the operations level in order to 
help individual departments set their own plans (i.e. the operational plan or the action 
plan) for dealing with ICT risk. 
Both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard are followed to help an 
organisation facilitate the setting of ICT risk management planning. The COBIT 
framework assists with the development of ICT policy and management which impact on 
planning around ICT risk management at the corporate level. On the other hand, the 
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ISO/IEC 17799 standard helps with the setting of Information security policy, IS 
management and human resource management which affect planning around ICT risk 
management at the operational level. In terms of successful ICT risk management, 
academics and practitioners argue that ICT risk must be mitigated, avoided and 
prevented in order to ensure that the business goals and objectives can be met.  
Table 2-7: A summary of key factors of successful ICT risk management in previous research, in the COBIT 
framework and in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
Research Literature 
The COBIT framework (focused on 
at the highest appropriate 
organisational level) 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
(focused on at the operational level) 
Relevant policy in place 
(Benaroch et al 2006; Buckby 
et al. 2009; Capuder 2004; 
Cha et al. 2008; Colbert & 
Bowen 1996; Fletcher 2006; 
Gallegos et al. 2004; Khan 
2006; MyEvoy & Whitcombe 
2002; Segars & Grover 1996; 
Smith & McKeen 2006; Solms 
2005a)  
Creating ICT policy to define a 
strategic ICT plan and to determine 
technological direction 
Creating information security policy 
to document information security 
policy and to review of the 
information security policy. 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to protect ICT resources 
such as information assets, 
ICT infrastructures and ICT 
architecture 
(Benaroach et al 2006; 
Bodnar 2006; Buckby et al. 
2009; Byrd et al. 1995; 
Fletcher 2006; Longstaff et al. 
2000; Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Stoneburner et al. 2002; 
Straub & Welke 1998)  
Effective ICT resource management 
with regard to ICT infrastructure, 
ICT performance, ICT project,   
Not clearly defined 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage human 
resources and defining roles 
and responsibilities 
(Badenhorst & Eloff 1994; 
Ciborra 2006; Figg 1999; 
Hughes 2006a; Moulton 2003; 
Van Grembergen & De Haes 
2008; Willcocks & Griffiths 
1994; Willcocks et al. 2006)  
Constant management of human 
resource including training and 
educating programs.  
Constant human resource security 
for employees during employment 
and termination or change of 
employment 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage access 
control in physical and logical 
systems 
(Badenhorst & Eloff 1994; 
Hayat et al 2007; Levine 
2004; Milenkovic 2008; 
Schultz 2007)  
Creating a process for managing 
the physical environment  
Creating a process for secure areas, 
equipment security, user access 
management, user responsibilities, 
network access control, operating 
system access control and 
application and information access 
control. 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage business 
continuity planning 
(Cha et al. 2008; Groves 
Creating a continuous services plan Creating business continuity 
management and information 
security incident planning and 
management 
[46] 
 
 
2003; ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI 
2007; Posthumusa & Solms 
2005)  
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to secure 
information, information 
systems and assets 
(Bodnar 2006; Byrd et al. 
1995; Karabacak & 
Sogukpinar 2006; Lainhart 
2001a; Longstaff et al. 2000; 
Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Stoneburner et al 2002)  
Implementation of an ICT plan 
(e.g. defining ICT processes) 
regarding the ICT infrastructure 
and for developing of a security 
culture 
Implementation of the organisation 
of information security and asset 
management to create an ICT 
security plan (e.g. defining 
information security processes) 
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to protect 
information integrity such as 
input, processing and output 
(IPO) processes 
(Bojanc & Jerman-Blazic 
2008; Coles & Moulton 2003; 
Flowerday & Solms 2005; 
Hermanson et al 2000; 
Moeller 2005; Saint-Germain 
2005; Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Theoharidou et al. 2005) 
Implementation of ICT processes, 
technology infrastructure, and data 
management  
Implementation of information 
systems development and 
maintenance 
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to protect threats 
and vulnerabilities of assets 
(Anderson & Choobineh 2008; 
Hawkins et al. 2003; 
Karabacak & Sogukpinar 
2006; Ksiezopoliski & Kotulski 
2007; Smith & Eloff 2002)  
Not clearly defined Implementation of organisation of 
information security; internal 
organisation focusing on vulnerability 
of assets and external environment 
focusing on threats. 
Operationalisation of ICT 
management control 
(Elieson 2006; Eloff & Eloff 
2003; Finne 2000; Flowerday 
& Solms 2005; Gerke & Ridley 
2006; Khan 2006; Liu & 
Ridley 2005; Ridley et al. 
2004; Robinson 2005; Smith 
& Eloff 2002; Smith & McKeen 
2006; Van Grembergen et al. 
2004)  
Implementation of ICT processes to 
control ICT management  
Not clearly defined 
Operationalisation of 
information security control 
(Capuder 2004; Eloff & Eloff 
2003; Fletcher 2006; 
Flowerday & Solms 2005; 
Hayat et al. 2007; Kenning 
2001; Khan 2006; Robinson 
2005; Smith & McKeen 2006; 
Solms & Solms 2005, 2006; 
Solms 2005a; Straub et al. 
2008)  
Not clearly defined Implementation of information 
security processes to control 
information security management 
 
The results of a comparison between the research literature on the COBIT framework and 
on the ISO/IEC 17799 standard are shown in Table 2-7. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
ICT risk management is primarily the remit of senior management. Nonetheless, some 
researchers argue that senior management often avoids concerning itself with ICT 
security (Byrd et al. 1995), which may lead to a lack of technical planning in ICT risk 
management. This research uses the COBIT framework and the 17799 standard to bridge 
this gap. As a result, this study argues for selecting the merits from both the framework 
and the standard to create a single management framework for dealing with ICT risk 
management planning in an organisation. The analysis in this chapter is used in the initial 
part of this research to understand the phenomenon of ICT risk management planning in 
Thai organisations. By doing so, this research firstly investigates the current ICT risk 
management practices in Thai organisations, and then, secondly, identifies the success 
factors for effective ICT risk management. The aim is to develop a single management 
framework for successful ICT risk management planning by building a research 
framework for testing. The next chapter discusses the research method and research 
design used to build and test success factors of ICT risk management. 
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Chapter 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter discusses the research methods employed in this study. The chapter is 
structured as follows: the first section highlights the research paradigm; section two 
discusses the research methods; section three outlines the data collection and data 
analysis methods; and the last section covers the research design, summary and 
conclusion.  
 
3.1 Research paradigm  
A research paradigm is an underlying philosophical approach taken to research. This 
section describes the meanings of the two research methods used in this research and 
concludes with a discussion of the pragmatist approach selected for the current study. 
According to Neuman (2006, pp. 81-82), ‗modern positivism founded by Auguste Comte 
(1798–1857) adopts an essentialist orientation to reality: Reality is real; it exists ―out 
there‖ and is waiting to be discovered‘. This implies that the positivist approach allows 
the researcher to verify the theoretical interest (i.e. opinions, ideas and conceptual 
model) to be validated as a true model or concept (Lee 1991). In contrast, Lee (1991, p. 
347) argues that ‗passing an empirical test can never verify conclusively that the theory 
of interest is true‘. This argument is augmented by the view that ‗it should be noted that 
a positive decision can only temporarily support the theory, for subsequent negative 
decisions may always overthrow it [Popper 1968, p. 33]‘ (Lee 1991, p. 347). In this 
regard, one imperative approach, the interpretive approach (founded by Max Weber 
1864–1920), has been proposed to resolve the problem outlined above (Lee 1991; 
Neuman 2006). An interpretive approach allows the researcher to understand ‗social 
construction and meaning rather than only social structure and social facts [King 1996]‘ 
(Silverman 1998, p. 5).  
With a view to taking advantage of both the positivist and interpretivist approaches, this 
research uses a mixed-methods approach that incorporates the intention to shape the 
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theoretical knowledge of ICT risk management in an organisation. Qualitative research is 
seen as helping the researcher to explore the practice of ICT risk management in an 
organisation. On the other hand, the quantitative research method enables the 
researcher to explore the relationships between success factors in the phenomenon of 
ICT risk management in an organisation in practice. This research was guided by the 
work of Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), Lee (1991), Neuman (2006), Silverman (1998) 
and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) with the aim of synchronising and utilising both the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to investigate ICT risk management through the 
lens of pragmatism (Peirce [1839–1914], James [1842–1910], Dewey [1859–1952], and 
Mead [1863–1931]) (Baert 2005). Pragmatism allows the researcher to use mixed-
methods research such as paradigm pluralism (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007; Tashakkori 
& Teddlie 2003) and thereby to answer the research questions through a series of 
research methods.  
 
3.2 Research method 
Mixed-methods research is powerful and elucidates ‗quantitative and qualitative research 
methods focused on the philosophical assumption and methods of inquiry‘ (Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2007, p. 5). Neuman (2006) argues that quantitative and qualitative 
research methods supplement each other, although they are different in terms of 
research design, data collection and data analysis.  
Todd et al. (2004, p.1) argue that quantitative and qualitative research methods compete 
with each other in regard to ‗philosophical and theoretical issues‘. However, they are 
suitable for different rationales and thus researchers could feasibly ignore these 
particular issues in taking advantage of both approaches (Todd et al. 2004). Research 
methods based on quantitative and qualitative research can be understood in terms of 
the involvement of the researcher in the research, which Todd et al. (2004, p. 4) have 
described as ‗reflexivity‘.  
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) [cited in Erzberger & Prein 1997] argue that the 
quantitative research method cannot be carried out in the initial phases of social research 
as exploratory research is different from the qualitative research method. This implies 
that the quantitative research method is restricted in terms of its use in social research.  
The difference between quantitative and qualitative research depends upon the direction 
and procedure of data collection and analysis (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007; Neuman 
2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003). 
For example, with quantitative research the action of the researcher in the process of 
data collection is detached from the research being investigated as ‗object (the 
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investigated)‘ (Neuman 2006; Todd et al. 2004, p. 4). In contrast, qualitative research 
involves the researcher getting involved in the data collection to construct the project as 
‗subject (investigator)‘ (Neuman 2006; Todd et al. 2004, p. 4).  
Mixed-methods research is characterised by the collection of both qualitative and 
quantitative data and analysed sequentially or concurrently in one research project 
(Creswell & Plano Clark 2007); thus one research project provides sequential or 
concurrent data collection and then also conducts two different data analysis methods. 
Furthermore, each research method can enrich the findings of the other (Hanson et al. 
2005; Brewer & Hunter 1989; Tashsakkori & Teddlie 2003). For example, one method is 
used to collect qualitative data to explore and understand the central phenomenon 
represented in the qualitative results (Gable 1994). The findings from that research are 
then used to shape the instrument used in the quantitative data collection in order to 
confirm and validate the original research findings through the quantitative analysis 
(Gable 1994). 
Hanson et al. (2005, p. 226), Mertens (2003) and Punch (1998) suggest that ‗mixed 
methods investigations may be used to (a) better understand a research problem by 
converging numeric trends from quantitative data and specific details from qualitative 
data; (b) identify variables/constructs that may be measured subsequently through the 
use of existing instruments or the development of new ones; (c) obtain statistical, 
quantitative data and results from a sample of a population and use them to identify 
individuals who may expand on the results through qualitative data and results; and (d) 
convey the needs of individuals or groups of individuals who are marginalized or 
underrepresented‘. Thus, the key benefit of mixed-method research is that both the 
qualitative and quantitative method can be used to elaborate on the results from one 
part of the research, to help the researcher develop the other part (Hanson et al. 2005). 
Plano Clark et al. (2008, p. 1546) argue that ‗broadly speaking, mixed methods research 
refers to the combination of quantitative research and qualitative research [Greene et al. 
1989] and its basic premise is that the combination provides a better understanding of 
research problems than either approach by itself [Creswell 2005]‘. In addition, 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 15) claim that ‗mixed methods research enables the 
researcher to simultaneously answer confirmatory and exploratory questions, and 
therefore verify and generate theory in the same study‘. Consequently, this research 
uses a mixed-methods approach as the most effective means to explore, understand and 
confirm success factors of ICT risk management in Thai organisations.  
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3.2.1 Quantitative research method 
The quantitative research method is largely based on the positivist paradigm used within 
social science (Neuman 2006). It is applied to define a set of relationships, variables 
and/or hypotheses for validating and confirming the quantitative findings (Neuman 
2006). Furthermore, the quantitative research method is associated with ‗(a) inferential 
statistics; (b) hypothesis testing; (c) mathematical analysis; (d) and experimental and 
quasi-experimental design‘ (Lee 1991, p. 342; Kaplan & Duchon 1988).  
This method is also used to generate and verify existing research and theory (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie 2003). Quantitative data collection is relevant to dealing with a large sample 
size in order to generalise the findings to formulate ideas, concepts, frameworks and 
theory. Quantitative data analysis typically uses statistics and statistical analysis to test 
hypotheses (Kaplan & Duchon 1988).  
The quantitative research method primarily helps the researcher to test continual 
hypotheses rather than to build theory, according to Kaplan and Duchon (1988) citing 
Glaser and Strauss (1967). This is important as the main purpose of this research is to 
build theory on the subject of ICT risk management in organisations. According to Kaplan 
and Duchon (1988), using the quantitative research method alone does not enable 
researchers to construct theory. Therefore, it is imperative to take the qualitative 
research method into consideration also.  
 
3.2.2 Qualitative research method 
The qualitative research method relies on the interpretivist paradigm within social science 
(Neuman 2006). It is normally used to ‗understand and explain social phenomena‘ 
(Myers 1997, p. 1). Walsham (2006, p. 320) argues that the interpretive research 
method includes ‗the domain of human action, [which] is a social construction by human 
actors‘. This implies that through this method a researcher attempts to understand, 
conceptualise and construe the meaning of the phenomenon of a particular subject or 
circumstance (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). Furthermore, interpretation of human action is 
related to ‗ethnography, hermeneutics, phenomenology and case studies‘ (Lee 1991, p. 
342). 
The nature of the interpretive research method is to focus on ‗human thought and action 
in the social and organizational context‘ (Klein & Myers 1999, p. 67) by using different 
data collection and analysis methods taken from the quantitative approach. Qualitative 
data collection focuses on in-depth information based on interviews, case studies or 
observation with the aim of generating hypotheses or building theory (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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The difference between the two research methods is that the qualitative research method 
‗provides less explanation of variance in statistical terms than the quantitative research 
method‘ as outlined by Kaplan and Duchon (1988, p. 573). In this regard, the qualitative 
research method can yield rich explanations of the outcome to be further developed 
during the building theory stage (Eisenhardt 1989). 
There are arguments that the positivist paradigm and the interpretivist paradigm cannot 
be combined to form ‗a mixed paradigm‘ (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007, p. 15). However, 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007, p. 173) also claim that an alternative perspective, 
pragmatism, ‗focuses on the research problems and allows multiple methods to address 
research problems‘. It was deemed that this latter approach could allow the researcher to 
explore the phenomenon of ICT risk management through the qualitative method and 
then to refine and explain the qualitative results using quantitative research to resolve 
the research problem. Thus, pragmatism has been adopted in this research. Based on the 
research methods outlined above, each one relies on research reasoning which is 
described in three parts below.  
 
3.2.3 Deductive reasoning 
Bryman (2008, p. 9) suggests that deductive reasoning is based on ‗the commonest view 
of the nature of the relationships between theory and social research‘. Deductive 
reasoning starts by generating the hypotheses; then these hypotheses are validated to 
draw conclusions based on the findings (Bryman 2008). In other words, knowledge is 
based on concrete empirical evidence as accepted truth which is then validated via the 
hypotheses through the procedures of quantitative research, rather than through 
observation as in qualitative research (Bryman 2008; Neuman 2000, 2006; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 2003).  
 
3.2.4 Inductive reasoning  
Inductive reasoning, in contrast, is based on the premise that knowledge originates from 
observation of ‗the empirical world‘ through qualitative research (Neuman 2006, p. 60), 
which is then encapsulated in concrete empirical evidence as theory (Bryman 2008). 
Furthermore, inductive reasoning is the process whereby the researcher infers probable 
previous circumstances based on theory developed from observing multiple subsequent 
circumstances in order to gain an understanding of particular circumstances (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie 2003). Inductive reasoning provides the direction for the researcher to develop 
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or confirm a theory generated from the abstract regarding ‗concepts and theoretical 
relationships‘ (Neuman 2006, p. 60).  
 
3.2.5 Abductive reasoning 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 481), Josephson (1996, p. 5) argue that abductive 
reasoning (founded by Charles Sanders Peirce, 1839–1914) is ‗a form of inference that 
goes from data describing something to a hypothesis that best explains or accounts for 
the data‘ as part of mixed methods research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 481) add 
that ‗if the simultaneous application of quantitative and qualitative methods leads to 
inconsistent or divergent findings representing counter-evidence for previous theoretical 
assumptions, then a second form of hypothetical reasoning comes into play that Peirce 
has called abduction or abductive inference‘. It can then be argued that quantitative and 
qualitative findings can sometimes go against previous theoretical concepts; this then 
can lead the researcher to a view that those particular findings have been discovered to 
be new and still unknown concepts or rules (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003). Therefore, this 
logic allows the researcher to believe that qualitative research and quantitative research 
can be mixed into a single research method due to the flexibility of this approach. The 
next section outlines the research purpose, which serves to underline the empirical logic 
of this research.  
 
3.3 Research purpose 
This research aims to investigate how structured approaches to ICT risk management are 
used successfully in practice in Thai businesses. The research aims to explore and explain 
how business and technical strategies are planned and conducted in Thai business 
organisations to achieve successful ICT risk management. More specifically, the research 
focuses on the development of a single management framework for dealing with ICT risk 
management in Thai business organisations. Moreover, in this regard the COBIT 
framework itself stipulates that its framework can complement other standards and 
frameworks (ITGI 2007), although there is as yet no research that proposes how they 
can fit together in the context of a structured approach to ICT risk management (Tshinu 
et al. 2008; Siponen & Willison 2009). 
The research objectives are: 
- To investigate the current profile of ICT risk management in organisational 
practices in a sample of Thai business organisations, and 
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- To identify and then model the success elements of ICT risk management in Thai 
business organisations. 
It is imperative that both exploratory and explanatory research methods are conducted in 
this research to explore the phenomenon of ICT risk management based on the research 
objectives. Exploratory research is used to conduct an investigation to identify the 
practices of ICT risk management in Thai business organisations. Explanatory research is 
used to confirm the success factors affecting the successful application of ICT risk 
management planning. 
 
3.3.1 Exploratory research 
Neuman (2006) argues that exploratory research needs to be the first stage of research 
to allow the researcher to explore a particular phenomenon or circumstance (such as ICT 
risk management in organisations) in order to provide sufficient information to design, 
develop and execute the next research steps. Neuman (2006, p. 34) further suggests 
that ‗exploratory research addresses the ―what‖ question: ―What is the social activity 
really about?‖ It is difficult to conduct because there are few guidelines to follow‘. This 
implies that, in this research, the purpose of exploratory research is to enable the 
researcher to understand the circumstances of ICT risk management in organisations in 
the context of social reality. It also implies that the purpose of this exploratory research 
should be to identify the real social activity that needs to be explored through framework 
and standard (e.g. the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) that deal with 
ICT risk management in organisations. However, in this area of study there are few 
guidelines to help practitioners or researchers; indeed, successful ICT risk management 
in organisations has been a challenge requiring further attention for over a decade (Coles 
& Moulton 2003; Segars & Grover 1996; Teneyuca 2001).  
 
3.3.2 Explanatory research 
Explanatory research is another research method. As Neuman (2006) suggests, the 
purpose of explanatory research is to describe the particular phenomenon or 
circumstance, in this case ICT risk management, in the organisational context. Neuman 
(2006) also notes that explanatory research is built from exploratory research in order to 
discover the reasons why something occurs after analysing the qualitative data. 
Explanatory research is generally focused on ‗why‘ questions in order to provide empirical 
evidence to either support or deny the exploratory research findings (Neuman 2006; 
Osborne 2008). Furthermore, it helps the researcher to extend the explanations in 
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relation to an issue from those identified through previous research or research methods 
in a single study (Neuman 2006). In the context of ICT risk management, it can also 
allow the researcher to validate new issues with different types of samples by conducting 
surveys as part of the quantitative method, in order to strengthen their generalizability 
as an explanation of ‗empirical evidence to support it [the qualitative findings] or against 
it [the qualitative findings]‘ (Neuman 2006, p. 35). 
In light of the above discussion, the purpose of this research is to undertake exploratory 
sequential design which will be used to develop a research instrument in order to validate 
and explain new issues using explanatory research to strengthen their generalizability. In 
this research, exploratory research was conducted through case studies to allow the 
researcher to obtain accurate and in-depth information regarding ICT risk management 
in organisations. In contrast, explanatory research helped the researcher to deal with a 
large sample size by conducting a survey in order to test the conclusions of the 
exploratory research. The sequential research design between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is aimed at the ‗triangulation of method‘ (Neuman 2000, p. 125). 
The following section outlines the case study design used as the basis of the exploratory 
research.  
 
3.4 Case study design 
Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 369) suggest that ‗case research strategy is appropriate for 
certain types of research problems: those in which research and theory are at their early, 
formative stages‘ [Roethlisberger 1977], and ‗sticky, practice-based problems where the 
experiences of the actors are important and the context of action is critical [Bonama 
1983]‘.  
This implies that case study design is appropriate to building theory when the particular 
phenomenon is at a formative stage. Therefore, a case study helps the researcher to 
scrutinise the phenomenon in ‗its natural setting, employing multiple methods of data 
collection to gather information from one or a few entities [people, groups or 
organizations]‘ (Benbasat et al. 1987, p. 370). The advantage of the case study is that it 
helps the researcher to obtain in-depth or rich information based on its natural context 
(Benbasat et al. 1987). Either single or multiple cases can be utilised as part of the case 
study design (Yin 2003; Benbasat et al. 1987; Darke et al. 1998).   
 
[56] 
 
 
3.4.1 Single case study design 
Yin (2003, pp. 39–42) asserts that ‗there are several circumstances and five rationales to 
be represented in a single-case design‘. Firstly, the critical factor in testing a well-
formulated theory is that the propositions are clearly defined to test as being either true 
or false in order to confirm, challenge or extend the theory (Yin 2003). Secondly, 
extreme or unique cases need to be identified as those that occur in very unusual 
circumstances (Yin 2003). The third rationale is completely different from the second in 
that it involves a single case study that is used to report an ordinary situation (Yin 2003). 
Fourthly, the revelatory case entails circumstances when the researcher has an 
opportunity to observe and analyse a normally inaccessible phenomenon (Yin 2003). 
Lastly, a longitudinal case involves circumstances when the researcher is allowed to 
observe two or more different times among which the conditions affecting the 
phenomenon may change (Yin 2003). Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 373) argue that a single-
case study is used ‗before theory generation and after theory testing; and it is used to 
test the boundaries of well-formed theory‘.      
                                                                                        
3.4.2 Multiple case studies design 
Multiple case studies design is commonly defined as including more than one occasion of 
data collection and analysis of a single case study (Yin 2003). This design is normally 
used to generate and confirm hypotheses (Benbasat et al. 1987) and to build theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Multiple case studies design allows the researcher to cross-analyse 
the qualitative data among the cases in order to triangulate the qualitative findings 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Benbasat et al. (1987), Gable (1994) and Yin (2003) also state that 
multiple case studies design is desirable when the objectives of the research are 
description, theory building and/or theory testing. Lee (1991) adds that multiple case 
studies design enables the researcher to formulate verbal propositions on the basis of the 
qualitative findings for validation during the stage of quantitative research. These verbal 
propositions then are validated, confirmed or disconfirmed according to the rules of 
mathematics (Lee 1991). The multiple case study approach was used in this research. 
This research used techniques to cross-analyse the data from the cases in order to 
generate a number of propositions or hypotheses to provide a basis, through a survey, 
for validating, confirming or disconfirming the case study findings.  
 
3.5 Research design 
An exploratory research method was adopted in this research. The research was divided 
into three phases, as represented in Figure 3-1. The first phase of the research involved 
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a multiple case studies design embedded in exploratory research aimed at assisting the 
researcher to understand the phenomenon of ICT risk management in organisations. The 
multiple case studies design phase began with the data collection from semi-structured 
interviews conducted (Eisenhardt 1989) in six Thai businesses. Content and thematic 
analyses were used to scrutinise the qualitative data drawn from across the cases in 
order to come up with reliable and valid qualitative findings (Luborsky 1994; Grinnell 
1985).  
 
Figure 3-1: Sequential data analysis procedures in embedded exploratory and explanatory designs 
Source: Adapted for this research from Creswell & Plano Clark (2007, p. 76) 
In the second phase, the issues identified in the case study findings were used to 
synthesise generalisations and form hypotheses, also using the conclusions drawn from 
the literature review on ICT risk management. The last step involved using the outcomes 
of both the survey research and the case studies to validate the propositions, to 
strengthen definitions of the issues identified, and to establish a successful ICT risk 
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management (SICTRM) model. The quantitative data were analysed utilising the Social 
Package for Social Science (SPPS V 16) to validate their reliability. Furthermore, the 
reliability and validity were scrutinised again using structural equation modelling (SEM) in 
AMOS V 16 and V 18 in order to validate, confirm or disconfirm propositions, constructs 
and to propose the new model. Details of each phase in the research design process are 
outlined below. On the other hand, explanatory research was also used to confirm the 
variance of circumstance in relation to ICT risk management in an organisation. 
 
3.5.1 The first phase: qualitative study 
This phase helps the researcher to ‗investigate the current profile of ICT risk 
management in organisational practices in a sample of Thai business organisations‘ (refer 
to the research objective Chapter 3, p. 54). Therefore, this research initially employed 
the exploratory case study method (Shanks et al. 1993; Yin 1994; Cavaye 1996) as the 
first stage to explore ICT risk management in organisations.  
The case study method was used to investigate the perceptions of senior management 
regarding ICT risk management processes by focusing on decision-making in this area 
(Eisenhardt 1989). It also helped the researcher to generate a conceptual framework and 
hypotheses for later testing (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, case study research allowed 
the researcher to use a combination of data collection methods such as qualitative data 
(semi-structured interview) and quantitative data (questionnaire) (Eisenhardt 1989). The 
case study method suits many situations in social science research, such as:  
- policy, political science, and public administration research; and 
- organisational and management studies (Yin 1994, p. 1). 
The main thrust of case study research according to Yin (1994, p. 12) is to examine the 
following topics: ‗decisions, individual, organisation, processes, programs, 
neighbourhoods, institutions and events‘. These topics were applied in this research to 
understand the decision-making processes of senior management in planning to deal 
with ICT risk management in their organisation.  
Therefore, case study research is useful when a phenomenon is broad and complex, 
when in-depth investigation of a holistic nature is needed, or when a phenomenon cannot 
be studied outside the context in which it occurs (Benbasat et al. 1987; Yin 1994). The 
case study method is more broadly used for exploration and hypothesis generation, but 
can also be used for providing explanations and for testing hypotheses (Benbasat et al. 
1987). This research used multiple case studies to help the researcher generate 
hypotheses to later confirm using a survey (Benbasat et al. 1987).  
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Exploratory research was adopted as an approach in this study to explore and seek 
detailed understanding of the application of existing theory to what is happening in the 
real world of Thai businesses with respect to ICT risk management (Scapens 1990). Such 
research is appropriate when there is little knowledge in the area or when there is no 
available information on similar empirical studies or problems (Cavana et al. 2001).  
To explore and understand the phenomenon of ICT risk management in an organisation 
in the context of exploratory research, multiple case studies were used to draw a holistic 
picture of the phenomenon (Figure 3-2). The researcher needed to understand the real 
activity and organisational context of ICT risk management planning in practice (Klein & 
Myers 1999) in order to synthesise all of the necessary factors impacting the particular 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the researcher explored not only the ‗how‘ of ICT risk 
management planning but also the reasons behind such planning.  
 
 
Figure 3-2: Qualitative data analysis 
Sampling method and unit of analysis 
A purposive sampling method was utilised to select the right participants in each case. 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) argue that the purposive sampling method helps the 
researcher to intentionally seek and select the required information concerning the 
primary phenomenon under study, such as ICT risk management planning.  
Members of senior management and the operational managers were the appropriate 
persons for selection in this case, as they make the decisions related to organisational 
planning (Morris & Pushkin 1995; Groves 2003; Gordon et al. 2006; Myler & Broadbent 
2006). Furthermore, senior management comprised the unit of analysis in this research 
(Benbasat et al. 1987). The senior management level of an organisation is necessarily 
involved in the major types of organisational planning (such as ICT risk management 
planning) which are conducted as part of the top-down approach to organisational ICT 
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helps an organisation reflect the operational plan to supplement the corporate plan 
(Gordon et al. 2006; Groves 2003; Myler & Broadbent 2006). 
Sample 
The sample in this research was purposively selected because the researcher believed 
that the experience of the participants is imperative, and that in this way the researcher 
would obtain rich information about ICT risk management in the case study organisations 
(Neuman 2000; Creswell & Clark 2007). Senior management was selected for the 
reasons outlined in the previous studies mentioned, as these individuals were able to 
offer insight into perceptions of the top-down approach in each case because they had 
the ability to enrich and take charge of ICT risk management in the context of a range of 
processes regarding ICT governance (Sohal & Fitzpatrick 2002; Schwarz & Hirschheim 
2003; Poore 2005; ITGI 2007). Operational staff were also used in the multiple case 
studies to enrich the information obtained on management perceptions in relation to the 
bottom-up approach regarding information security governance (Solms 2005a; ISO/IEC 
2005). 
Site selection 
Six case studies embedded in four types of business—banking, telecommunication, 
software development, and international consulting firms—were conducted to investigate 
perceptions and experiences of ICT risk management. These cases were selected 
because the business transactions and operational processes for each of these fields 
explicitly relate to internal control, information and communication technology (ICT) 
management and information security (IS) management regarding ICT risk management 
Moreover, case studies D, E and F elaborated the consulting role in ICT risk management 
to their client on the way of consultation perspective. For example, the business 
transactions and processes in these case study organisations are enabled through ICT 
infrastructure, and all of these businesses control ICT infrastructure through ICT 
management and IS management. This is important for this research because the COBIT 
framework, as suggested by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ITGI 
2006a), provides a framework that enables an organisation to control business and ICT 
transactions. In contrast, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, originally published by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electro-
Technical Commission (IEC) (ISO/IEC 2005), provides a framework for an organisation to 
control information security, which is more technically oriented.  
Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted using open-ended questions during the 
period of June to September 2007. All interview questions are presented in Appendix A2, 
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and these interview questions were constructed based on both the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard regarding key concepts of ICT risk management. 
The open-ended questions enabled the researcher to gain an insight into which ICT 
strategies were deployed through ICT risk management processes in each organisation, 
what members of senior management thought about the business, and what technical 
approaches were adopted as part of annual organisational planning; the interviews also 
sought to determine whether the action plans were seen to be effective in preventing, 
mitigating and avoiding ICT risks.  
The researcher also collected critical information about whether both staff levels were 
aware of the ICT risks in handling the complexity of ICT systems. The researcher firstly 
sent an invitation letter, including the researcher‘s contact details, to the selected sample 
(e.g. senior management such as President, Vice-President and Manager  and operational 
managers) inviting them to participate in the study (reproduced in Appendix A1). The 
responses were sent back to the researcher by email. Then the researcher arranged a 
suitable time with participants to conduct the interview session. Furthermore, email 
communication between the researcher and the interviewees was maintained for the 
purposes of validating the findings of the research.  
Semi-structured interviews were deemed to be an appropriate method in this study. The 
use of multiple case studies meant that the researcher in this study was able to gather 
in-depth information regarding ICT risk management planning in an organisation (Yin 
2003; Eisenhardt 1989). Furthermore, the researcher was able to build the theory and 
generate propositions to be tested in the next stage.   
Each interview session lasted approximately one hour. The interview topics included ICT 
risk management processes and the success of ICT risk management in the participants‘ 
organisations using the COBIT framework and ISO/IEC 17799 standard. The interviews 
were digitally recorded, after the participants‘ consent was obtained, to ensure accuracy.  
The interviews were terminated once the data obtained was seen to be sufficient (Glaser 
1967; 1977). In cases where some of the issues regarding the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
and the COBIT framework could not properly be translated into Thai, English was used 
instead. There were no problems regarding English comprehension in the case of senior 
management staff, as they generally possess higher education backgrounds and are 
bilingual (in English and Thai). However, when some participants did not understand any 
particular question the researcher explained the question in Thai.  
Ethics and privacy 
An invitation letter was sent requesting participants‘ consent (refer to Appendix A1) prior 
to the interview process starting. The data collected from the interviews were collated so 
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that individuals could not be identified. Participants were able to withdraw partially, 
completely and/or refuse to answer any questions at any time. The privacy and 
confidentiality of the information provided by subjects, and their anonymity, were strictly 
maintained. Digital files and transcripts have been securely held in a locked cabinet and a 
password-protected computer used by the researcher. Strict confidentiality has been and 
maintained at every stage of the research. All digital copies and transcripts of the 
interviews are securely stored and must be for at least five years from 2010 when the 
investigator has completed the doctoral thesis. The identity of participants is disclosed in 
this research project only when there is the participant‘s consent. Information is 
presented in a manner such that no participant‘s identity can be determined or inferred 
from the text. 
Data analysis 
The recorded interviews were transcribed by the investigator in Thai. All transcribed 
interviews were then carefully translated from Thai into English. During the translation, 
the researcher repeated the translation several times in order to maintain the accuracy of 
transcriptions. Transcriptions were then checked by another bilingual researcher to 
ensure accuracy. 
After transcribing from Thai to English, the researcher examined all of the data in order 
to gain a general understanding of the dataset (Creswell & Plano Clark 2007). 
Furthermore, the researcher maintained objectivity during content analysis of the 
reasons elicited from the ‗how‘, ‗what‘, ‗why‘ and ‗which‘ open-ended questions (refer to 
Appendix A2), in order to ensure the data collected was represented accurately 
(Krippendorff 2004).  
The second part of the qualitative analysis entailed thematic analysis, which helped the 
researcher to focus on repetitive statements (Braun & Clarke 2006; Luborsky 1994; 
Weitzman & Levkoff 2000). Luborsky (1994, p. 189) suggests that this analysis involves 
the ‗simple chore of reading through notes and transcripts to identify recurrent 
statements‘. Furthermore, recurrent statements provided the researcher with insight into 
the perceptions of senior management and operational managers in relation to planning 
ICT risk management.  
After the qualitative data were analysed, the findings of the case studies were used to 
identify the successful dimensions (the terms ‗dimension‘ and ‗construct‘ are used 
interchangeably in this research) for the application of both the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard in ICT risk management in the organisations studied. The 
qualitative findings led to the development of hypotheses for successful ICT risk 
management to be validated during stage three. The survey construction for that part of 
the research is discussed in the next section. 
[63] 
 
 
3.5.2 The second phase: survey development 
The survey was used to help the researcher to ‗identify the success elements of ICT risk 
management in Thai businesses organisations‘ (refer to the research objectives in 
Chapter 3, p. 55). This phase of the research began with mapping the qualitative findings 
with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard by using the following 
guidelines:  
- Aligning COBIT®, ITIL® and ISO/IEC 17799 for Business Benefit: Management 
Summary (ITGI/OGC 2005);  
- Aligning COBIT® 4.1, ITIL® V3 and ISO/IEC 27002 for Business Benefit: A 
Management Briefing From ITGI and OGC (ITGI/OGC 2008); 
- COBIT MAPPING: Mapping of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 with COBIT® 4.0 (2006) (ITGI 
2006); 
- COBIT® 4.1 (ITGI 2007); and 
- Information technology – security techniques – code of practice for information 
security management 2nd ed. © (ISO/IEC 2005). 
These guidelines were published by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI), the Office of 
Government Commerce (OGC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The guidelines, in conjunction 
with the related research literature regarding the COBIT framework, the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard and ICT risk management, were mapped with the qualitative findings to 
construct the survey. Based on the theoretical concepts above, the survey was 
constructed with a clear direction and theoretically driven instrument according to 
measurement theory (refer to Chapter 6).  
The survey construct (outlined in Chapter 6) was based on the qualitative findings 
mapped with the guidelines and the findings drawn from the relevant literature. The 
mapping of the findings, guidelines and related literature was then scrutinised to propose 
the propositions and constructs that formed the conceptual model, derived from the 
themes identified in stage one, in order to validate, confirm or disconfirm their 
relationships in stage three.  
A seven-point Likert scale was used in this research (Symonds 1924; Miller 1956; Finn 
1972; Cox III 1980; Cicchetti et al. 1985; Oaster 1989). This tool allowed participants to 
indicate their level of agreement with the particular statement or any kind of subjective 
or objective evaluation of the statement (refer to Appendices B5 and B6). This scale was 
divided as follows: (1) strongly disagree, (2) moderately disagree, (3) slightly disagree, 
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(4) neutral, (5) slightly agree, (6) moderately agree, and (7) strongly agree (Harris 
2007). After constructing the survey, the questionnaire was sent to the sample, leading 
to the third stage of the research.        
 
3.5.3 The third phase: quantitative study 
This phase was undertaken to help the researcher to ‗model the success elements of ICT 
risk management in Thai businesses organisations‘ (refer to the research objectives in 
Chapter 3, p. 55). The survey research investigated the success dimensions that arose 
from the interview transcripts, which was then used to reconfirm or disconfirm the 
particular dimensions. The survey asked about success in ICT risk management from the 
perspective of members of staff from two position levels (the management level and the 
operational level) within an organisation, by focusing on discussion of both the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard.  
Population 
The population for the sample used in this research was comprised of organisations listed 
on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). The choice of sample was based on an 
examination of the organisational structure, processes and operational transactions of 
the organisations relating to business, information and communication technology (ICT), 
and/or information security (IS) processes. Based on the results of this examination, the 
researcher was confident that the organisations listed in the sample drawn from the SET 
use both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, because using of both 
standards was declared in an annual report of each organisation. The sampling method is 
further considered below. 
Sampling frame 
The sampling frame focused on participants who are specifically familiar with ICT risk 
management planning. Therefore, in this study the sampling frame was stratified from 
the total population (i.e. all listed organisations in the SET) into a subpopulation based 
on the (a) banking, (b) technology, and (c) insurance sectors (Neuman 2000). Each 
sector was identified by the organisational characteristics outlined below.   
Position level: several researchers have identified that the position levels which influence 
the planning of ICT risk management include the management level (Bodnar 2006; 
Damianides 2005; ITGI/OGC 2005; ITGI 2005, 2006a, 2007; Khan 2006; Lainhart 2000, 
2001a, 2001b; Smith & McKeen 2006) and the operational level (Gordon et al. 2006; 
Groves 2003; Myler & Broadbent 2006). This means that the planning of ICT risk 
management in organisations involves staff members from these two position levels. 
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Department: ICT risk management mainly relates to ICT control and audit, which involve 
the accounting, internal audits, information technology, information security and risk 
management departments (Leung et al. 2003; IIA 2005; Pickett 2005; Hardy 2006). 
In conclusion, three indicators—type of business, position level, and department—were 
factors in the researcher‘s choice of sample for the survey. The organisational 
characteristics are also based on the assumption that these groups of people are 
representative of practitioners who are familiar with ICT risk management in an 
organisational context. Therefore, 11 banking, 25 technology and 17 insurance 
organisations comprised the sample in this research.  
Sampling method 
Stratified random sampling based on the sampling frame was adopted because ICT risk 
management in organisations is normally related to a specific function (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 2003). Proportional stratified random sampling was identified by type of 
business, position level and department in each organisation under study (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie 2003). This technique helped the researcher to avoid sampling errors and to 
obtain the right representative sample (Neuman 2006). Therefore, this technique limits 
the number of samples (Neuman 2006). This technique allows the researcher to divide 
the population into subpopulations (strata) and the sample into each subpopulation 
(Neuman 2006). The sample is further discussed below.  
Subpopulation  
The subpopulations in this research were determined by type of business, position level 
and department based on the selection of companies from the SET website (SET 2008). 
This included 11 banking organisations, each consisting of five departments, and each 
department comprising three management and three operational levels (SET 2008). 
Secondly, there were 25 technology organisations, 18 of which had three departments, 
while the remaining seven organisations had four departments; each department had 
three management levels and three operational levels. Lastly, 17 insurance organisations 
were included, each consisting of three departments, each with three management levels 
and three operational levels.  
The rationale for defining three samples in the management level and three samples in 
the operational level is that fixed samples would have the same chance of being chosen 
for the stratified random sampling by the researcher (Neuman 2006). Therefore, a group 
of management level staff was chosen to represent the position above assistant head of 
the department in each organisation; and a group of operational level staff representing 
the operational staff of each department in each organisation was selected. 
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Table 3-1: The subpopulation stratified from the population 
Type of    
Business 
Number of 
Organisations 
Number of 
Departments 
Number of People in Each 
Position Level 
Total 
Management 
Level 
Operational 
Level 
Banking 11 5 3 3 330 
Technology 
18 3 3 3 324 
7 4 3 3 168 
Insurance 17 3 3 3 306 
Total 53  1,128 
Sample size 
According to stratified random sampling, the population was divided into subpopulations 
(refer to Table 3-1). Israel (2003, p. 1) and Miaoulis and Michener (1976) suggest that 
sample size criteria need to determine ‗the appropriate sample size: (a) the level of 
precision, (b) the level of confidence or risk, and (c) the degree of variability in the 
attributes being measured‘. Therefore, the formula suggested by Yamane (1973) was 
used to calculate the appropriate sample size for this research. This simple formula is as 
follows: 
 
 
where n is the appropriate sample size, N is the population size (which this research 
refers to as subpopulation), and e is the level of precision which is a 95% confidence 
level and P = .05. Thus, n is equal to  
2)05.0(11281
1128
  295


 
According to the above result, this study requires at least 295 valid respondents in order 
to allow the research findings to be generalised for a larger population. The number of 
achieved useable responses received was 302 (refer to further discussion in Chapter 7). 
Response rate 
Neuman (2006) and Saunders et al. (2003, 2007) recommend that the formula for the 
response rate be calculated according to the following: 
sample ineligible-samplein number  total
responses ofnumber  total
rate response total 
 
2)(1 eN
N
n


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In the above formula, the total number of responses is the number of questionnaires 
completed by participants. The total number in the sample is the number of invited 
participants. The ineligible sample is the number of inexperienced practitioners, defined 
as those who lack experience of ICT risk management in an organisational context. The 
resulting total response rate is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Pilot test 
Prior to launching the survey, the questionnaire was pilot-tested to validate the content 
and this was generated first as an English version and then in Thai. Content validity and 
reliability were considered during the pilot-test phase. Two bilingual researchers were 
used to validate the items representing sense and meaning. Ten experts were then 
engaged to validate understanding of each question in the questionnaire. It was then 
suggested that the researcher make a minor change to the expression ‗same pattern file‘ 
(in the Thai version) in question 50 because the meaning was not clear. This question 
was revised to ‗the data and information was treated using SAP software; may not be 
treated using other software‘. After validating the questionnaire, the surveys were sent 
out by mail to the stratified subpopulation.  
Thai translation 
The data collection took place in Thailand. To avoid errors and biases in the data, the 
researcher needed to ensure content validity of the questionnaire as English (Appendix 
B5) is not an official language of Thailand. It was imperative that translation of the 
questionnaire from English to Thai accurate retain the precise sense and meaning of the 
responses. Thus, translation of the questionnaire was conducted. The invitation letter, 
the plain language statement (Appendices B1, B2, B3 and B4), the description of the 
process of distribution and collection, and the survey instructions were also translated 
(Appendices B5 and B6). Five native Thai speakers familiar with both Thai and English 
grammar translated and then cross-checked these documents. The complexities of both 
Thai and English grammar were carefully considered during this stage to ensure 
consistency of meaning between the Thai and English versions of the questionnaire.  
Data collection 
The survey construct is presented in Chapter 6, and this research used ‗the tailored 
design method‘ suggested by Dillman (2007) to collect the data. Dillman (2007, p. 29) 
claims that the ‗Tailored design method is a set of procedures for conducting successful 
self-administered surveys that produce both high quality information and high response 
rates‘. This set of procedures includes writing the questions, constructing the 
questionnaire, survey implementation and reducing survey errors (Dillman 2007). This 
implies that this survey not only improved the quality of the questionnaire but also that 
the questionnaire could reduce and avoid the sources of survey error which cover:  
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- sampling error: the result of surveying only some and not all participants; 
- coverage error: the result of not allowing all members of the survey population to 
have an equal or known chance of being sampled for participation in the survey; 
- measurement error: the result of poor question wording or questions being 
presented in such a way that inaccurate or uninterpretable answers are obtained; 
and 
- non-response error: the result of people who respond to a survey being different 
from sampled individuals who did not respond, in a way that is relevant to the 
study (Dillman 2007, p. 11). 
The mailed survey stage was conducted during the period of May to August 2008. The 
surveys, with a running number recorded on each questionnaire, were sent to the 
relevant departments in each organisation.  
The survey instruments were randomly distributed among the management level and 
operational level staff who were willing to participate. Mail was sent to the departments 
without addressing any specific person or position. This correspondence included: (1) an 
outline of the required number of samples; (2) the invitation letter; (3) a plain language 
statement of the research project; (4) an outline of the process of distribution and 
collection; and (5) the survey instructions (Appendices B1, B2, B3, B4, B5 and B6). The 
invitation letter was addressed as ‗To whom it may concern‘, so that the sample was 
randomly selected once the mail was opened. Moreover, this research assumed that the 
respondents would be sourced from either the management or the operational levels 
because question number 2 asked for the position level of the respondents (refer to 
Appendices B5 and B6). 
Data analysis 
In the second phase, the questionnaire was constructed based on the theoretical 
concepts of measurement theory. The qualitative findings enabled the dimension to be 
explored for the conceptual model to then be validated. Exploring the dimensions during 
the second phase did not necessitate validation of the constructs using exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) (Hair et al. 2006; Myers & Oetzel 2003). Myers and Oetzel (2003) 
conducted their research using qualitative design initially, followed by quantitative 
design. On the basis of their qualitative findings, they proposed the dimensions 
represented in their conceptual model, and then validated this with confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) rather than EFA. Hair et al. (2006) also suggest that EFA is not needed 
when the construct is conceptualised according to the theoretical concepts of 
measurement theory. Byrne (2001, p. 5) adds that EFA is designed for situations where 
links between the observed (the measures or items) and latent variables (the constructs) 
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are unknown or uncertain. In contrast, CFA is appropriate when the researcher has some 
knowledge of the underlying latent variable structure (Byrne 2001).  
Therefore, the analysis of constructs and of the conceptual model was begun with a 
reliability test of the instrument using SPSS V 16 (see Chapter 7). The reliability and 
validity tests were used again to validate the constructs and the conceptual model using 
structural equation modelling (SEM) (see Chapter 7). The reliability test is used to assess 
the degree of consistency between multiple measurements (items or measures) of a 
variable (construct and dimension) (Hair et al. 2006). It is also used to test the internal 
consistency among measures underlying one construct or dimension (Hair et al. 2006). It 
implies that the individual items or indicators of the scale should not only measure the 
same construct but also be highly intercorrelated (Hair et al. 2006). 
Cronbach‘s Alpha and coefficient H are reliability tests which were used to validate the 
consistency of measurements in this research (Hair et al. 2006). Cronbach‘s Alpha should 
be greater than 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient (Nunnally 1967, 1978). The 
coefficient H should also be greater than 0.7 to be acceptable (Nunnally & Bernstein 
1994).  
According to Hair et al. (2006, p. 137), the validity test must ensure that ‗a scale (a) 
conforms to its conceptual definition, (b) is unidimensional, and (c) meets the necessary 
levels of reliability, [and] the research must make one final assessment: scale validity‘. 
The validity test is used to represent the degree of accuracy between a set of measures 
and the concept being studied (Hair et al. 2006).  
In terms of SEM, this research utilised CFA to conduct the validity test (Hair et al. 2006).  
„CFA is a special type of factor analysis and is the first part of a complete 
test of a structural model. Unlike EFA, the researcher must be able to 
tell the SEM program which variables belong with which factors before 
an analysis can be conducted. The CFA not only must provide acceptable 
fit but also must show evidence of construct validity. When a CFA model 
fits and displays construct validity, the measurement theory is 
supported‟. (Hair et al. 2006 p. 779)  
According to Hair et al. (2006), CFA is the greatest advantage to be gained from SEM 
because it allows the researcher to assess both the validity test and measurement 
theory. Construct validity occurs when the measure is a good representation of the 
variable that the researcher intends to measure (Holmes-Smith 2007). To establish 
construct validity, convergent, discriminant (Campbell & Fiske 1959; Hair et al. 2006) 
and nomological validations are required (Hair et al. 2006).  
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Convergent validation is used to assess the degree to which two or more items of the 
same concept or construct are correlated (Hair et al. 2006). In other words, a high 
degree of correlation among measures, items or indicators reveals that ‗the scale is 
measuring its intended concept‘ (Hair et al. 2006, p. 137). This is a measure of the scale 
of the direct structural relationship between an observed variable (item) and a latent 
variable (construct). Convergent validity is met when standardised loading estimates are 
greater than 0.7 and correspond approximately to the score of reliability of items being 
greater than 0.50 (Hair et al. 2006).  
Discriminant validity is used to assess the degree to which two conceptually similar 
concepts are distinct (Hair et al. 2006), and thus reflects the extent to which the 
constructs in a model are different. This implies that two constructs should be 
interrelated but any significant correlations between them should be less than 0.90 or 
0.85 (Hair et al. 2006; Kline 1998, 2005). 
Lastly, Hair et al. (2006, p. 778) argue that ‗the processes for testing face validity and 
nomological validity are the same whether using CFA or EFA‘. Nomological validity is 
checked to ensure that the correlation among the constructs in a measurement theory 
makes sense (Hair et al. 2006). Hair et al. (2006) also suggest that face validity must be 
ensured before any theoretical testing is conducted when using CFA (refer to Chapter 7 
for further detail). 
Once the reliability and validity of the items, the instrument, the constructs and the 
conceptual model are ensured, the goodness of fit (GOF) measures can be considered. 
The GOF is normally used to assess the degree of fit between the construct, the 
measurement model and the structural model (Hair et al. 2006). This research used two 
types of GOF: absolute fit and incremental fit indices. 
Firstly, the absolute fit index is a group of direct measures that ‗show how well the model 
specified by the researcher reproduces the observed data‘ (Hair et al. 2006, p. 746; 
Hooper et al. 2008). This group of indices primarily allows the assessment of how well a 
researcher‘s theory fits the sample data (Hair et al. 2006). In other words, the 
covariance matrix of the specified model is statistically insignificantly different from the 
covariance matrix of sample data. Therefore, absolute fit indices were used to assess 
how well the theory of the researcher fit the sample data.  
Secondly, the incremental fit index is a group of measures that show ‗how well a 
specified model fits relative to some alternative baseline model‘ (Hair et al. 2006, p. 749; 
Hooper et al. 2008). This means that these measures help the researcher to assess the 
specified model (the model based on the researcher‘s theory) when compared with the 
null model (the model based on the observed uncorrelated variables) (Hair et al. 2006). 
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Therefore, incremental fit indices were used to assess whether the specified model of the 
researcher was better than the baseline model. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the rationale for the choice of the qualitative and quantitative 
research methods selected to collect and analyse data in this research. The chapter has 
highlighted the existing research philosophies and introduced the position of this research 
as pragmatism, on which the approaches to the research questions and the research 
purposes were based. The researcher utilises a qualitative approach in the first phase to 
explore the phenomenon of ICT risk management in organisations. The second phase 
aims to conceptualise the constructs or dimensions that reflect successful ICT risk 
management in Thai organisations. The researcher then develops a number of 
hypotheses for validation using a survey and statistical analysis. The third stage adopts a 
quantitative approach to reconfirm and validate the key factors of ICT risk management 
in Thai organisations and then to identify the success factors of ICT risk management. 
The outcomes of Phase 1 of the research are described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
CASE STUDIES IN THAI BUSINESS  
ADOPTION OF ICT RISK STANDARDS:  
CASES A-C 
 
This chapter reports on three case studies of ICT risk management in Thai organisations. 
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews. The chapter begins with an 
outline of all six case studies, yet only reports on and discusses the results of case 
studies A, B and C. The findings of case studies D, E and F are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Case studies A, B and C explore ICT risk management based on the organisational 
perspective. In contrast, case studies D, E and F illuminate the practice in terms of both 
organisational and consulting perspectives. 
 
4.1 Data classification 
Initially an analysis of ICT risk management in each organisation was conducted. After 
examining the data, a thematic analysis of organisational elements related to ICT risk 
management was undertaken.  
There were two types of qualitative data in this research. Firstly, three cases (A, B and C) 
were investigated in relation to what had been done in the area of ICT risk management 
in their organisations. Another three cases (D, E and F) were examined in terms of what 
they had done in their own organisations and with consultation in their clients‘ 
organisations about ICT risk management (this process was explained in Chapter 3, p. 
61). Therefore, the researcher needed to determine the scope of these case studies and 
to identify the main actors in each from which participants were selected, the details of 
which are outlined in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Case studies details 
Case 
Study 
Type of Business 
Number of 
Employees 
Participant 
Number 
Participant Position 
A 
Tele-
communications 
5,154 2 - Assistant Vice-President (ICT Audit) 
- Operations Manager 
B Banking 570 3 
- Assistant Vice-President 
- Division Director (ICT) 
- Division Director (Internal Audit) 
C 
Software 
Development 
520 3 
- Technical Director 
- Software Development Manager 
- Information Security (IS) Manager 
D 
International 
Consulting  
1,700 2 
- Chief Information Officer and Chief Finance 
Officer (CIO/CFO) 
- Executive Director (ICT Advisory)  
E 
International 
Consulting  
700 1 - Executive Director (Risk Advisory)and Chief 
Information Officer (RAD/CIO)  
F 
International 
Consulting  
700 1 - Senior Consultant 
The next section discusses ICT risk management practice in the case studies. 
 
4.2 Case study A 
4.2.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation is a well-known telecommunications organisation in Thailand listed on 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). This organisation is responsible for several types 
of business segments related to wireless communications such as network engineering; 
network planning; equipment procurement and installation; network maintenance; and 
service commercialisation. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are 
widely used for management and organisational processes throughout this organisation 
and its subsidiaries.  
 
4.2.2 Organisational structure 
Roles and responsibilities 
This organisation has three structured committees related to ICT risk management (an 
audit committee, a risk management committee and an enterprise-wide security 
committee). These committees are among them responsible for ensuring the control of 
internal management and audit; the protection of business ICT and ICT security 
processes; and the prevention of risks relating to business ICT or ICT security (Figure 
4-1). The Assistant Vice-President explained that: 
“My organisation assigns the management level to be responsible for 
different operational areas such as business (e.g. business risks) and 
ICT (e.g. ICT risks including general ICT and ICT security).”   
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The audit committee is responsible for all ICT and non-ICT processes regarding audit 
planning and methodology. The risk management committee is accountable for all types 
of risk within all of the eight units and/or departments in the organisation, such as ICT 
risks, HR risks or engineering risks. The enterprise-wide security committee focuses on 
handling all types of ICT security risks across all departments in the organisation.  
 
Figure 4-1: Roles and responsibilities: Case study A  
ICT risk management is based within two levels of this organisation: the corporate level 
and the operational level. Furthermore, ICT risk management is treated by the internal 
audit department as its main responsibility. The internal audit department divides its 
responsibilities into two areas: non-ICT and ICT processes. Non-ICT processes relate to 
audit function of documentation, in contrast, ICT processes relate to audit function of 
computerised systems. 
ICT risk management treatment 
This organisation conducts ICT risk management at two levels. Firstly, senior 
management focuses on the corporate level which provides overall information based on 
the application of the COBIT framework. Secondly, the operations level focuses on 
specific information related to dealing with ICT risk using the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as 
a guideline. Once the auditors determine the area of control and audit, they then follow 
the ICT audit plan. For example, the audit plan in this organisation is based on the audit 
plan of the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), which specifies 
the directions related to the control and audit of data in operating systems such as 
Oracle, UNIX or SAP. However, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is used by all units and 
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departments in this organisation as a baseline for planning prior to the audit and control 
phases. An ICT, or business audit, is delivered by senior management to operational staff 
as part of a top-down approach to ensure that all staff perform consistently. As the 
Assistant Vice-President described: 
“My organisation mainly focuses on the top-down approach to control 
business processes and ICT processes.” 
 
While the Operations Manager explained: 
“I think the top-down approach is important but it may not cover the 
operational matters such as ICT security. I think ICT risk management 
is monitored at both the management and the operational levels.” 
Components of ICT risk management 
Focusing on only ICT processes, there are two main roles for internal control and audit 
regarding ICT risk management in this organisation: both general ICT and ICT security 
are controlled by the internal audit department (Figure 4-2). As the Assistant Vice-
President stated: 
“I think … in order to deal with ICT risk management, we classify ICT 
into two directions: general ICT and ICT security that can help me to 
deal with risk appropriately.” 
 
The Operations Manager supported this: 
“I think to deal with ICT risk management, general ICT and ICT security 
are focused on.” 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Components of ICT risk management: Case study A 
General ICT ICT Security 
Internal Control 
and Audit 
Specifically ICT 
processes 
- Software 
- IP or Licensing 
- OS 
- Security policy 
- Security awareness 
- Networks 
- Access control 
- Physical security control 
- IT processes 
- Compliance 
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The general ICT function includes responsibility for all applications and relates to 
software, intellectual property and operating systems, as well as related risk 
management. The ICT security function is accountable for security activity and technical 
matters related to security. The ICT security function mainly focuses on ICT security, 
such as ICT security policy, security awareness, networks, access control, physical 
security control, compliance and ICT processes. 
 
4.2.3 Organisational process 
ICT risk management instrument 
Interviewees from this organisation believe that the effective management of general ICT 
and ICT security functions is imperative in order to identify, assess, respond to and 
monitor ICT risks. This is illustrated in Figure 4-3 below. When applying ICT risk 
management policy, the organisation must determine the person or persons who must 
assume responsibility for managing ICT risks. ICT risks will then be identified and 
assessed according to the degree of impact and probability of occurring as high, medium 
or low. ICT risks identified and assessed will then be reported directly to a respondent so 
that he or she can take action to mitigate and closely monitor such risks. After managing 
the risk, the respondent will present an ICT risk management report to the audit 
committee to demonstrate how they have dealt with those risks and whether or not they 
can mitigate the degree of impact and ensure the risk will be maintained at an acceptable 
level. Subsequently, the audit committee will provide feedback to the respondent. In this 
regard, the Assistant Vice-President stated: 
“We have the instrument to deal with ICT risk management; we follow 
the guideline from the ICT risk management standard. However, we 
adapt it instead of follow it exactly.” 
 
  
Figure 4-3: ICT risk management instrument: Case study A 
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ICT risk management plan  
This organisation follows the enterprise risk management (ERM)1 framework as the main 
control process when dealing with ICT risk management. ERM represents corporate 
governance regarding business risk management which helps the organisation prevent, 
avoid and mitigate business and ICT risks. The Assistant Vice-President noted that: 
“We use the ERM framework as a main process, and then use other 
frameworks and standards to deal with different directions. For example, 
if we are looking at ICT risk, we use ICT governance to help us plan ICT 
process and information security management (ISM) to deal with risks 
occurring from ICT and information security.”  
The Operations Manager added:  
“In my opinion, I think ICT governance and ISM will help my 
organisation to deal with ICT risk.”   
In terms of the ICT perspective alone, ICT governance in this organisation is based on a 
main set of guidelines for dealing with ICT risk management. In practice, this 
organisation has ICT control and audit processes outlined in the corporate plan. The 
interviewees from organisation A explained that the corporate level plan is divided into 
three parts: engineering, business and ICT. They also mentioned two specific aspects of 
management within each of these areas: ICT control and audit; and business control and 
audit. Specifically, ICT risk management in the corporate plan (i.e. the corporate plan) is 
focused on ICT risk identification and assessment in order to determine which ICT 
processes contain a high probability of risk, as well as on an assessment of the degree of 
impact of this risk. The balanced score card (BSC2) technique is used to measure the 
critical process or processes among all internal processes. The BSC is measured by using 
a key performance indicator (KPI) to evaluate which critical process is perceived as a 
                                                   
1 ERM is a process affected by an entity‘s Board of Directors, management and other personnel, applied in a 
strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, to 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, and to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives (COSO 2004, p. 2). However, ERM focuses only on business process instead of information 
technology and/or information security processes. 
 
2 BSC is a management system that can create breakthrough improvements in such critical areas as product, 
process, customer, and market development (Kaplan & Norton 1993, p. 134).  The scorecard allows managers 
to ‗link long-term strategic objectives with short-term actions‘ relying on four new management processes 
(Kaplan & Norton 2007, p. 3).  These four new management processes include: 
- Translating the vision: helping managers to build a consensus around the organisational vision and 
strategy. 
- Communicating and linking: helping managers to communicate their strategy up and down the 
organisation and to link it to departmental and individual objectives. 
- Business planning: enabling an organisation to integrate business and financial plans. 
- Feedback and learning: giving an organisation the capacity of existing feedback and review process 
called strategic learning. (Kaplan & Norton 2007, p. 3) 
 
Van Grembergen (2000) suggests that business process and IT process are different thereby the measurement 
and follow-up. Therefore, the business balanced scorecard is needed to adjust IT processes, and these are 
called IT balanced scorecards for assuring ICT governance.  
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weakness in terms of being an obstacle to achieving successful business objectives. The 
BSC measure is clearly defined according to three types of core business objectives—
engineering, business and ICT—and concentrates on human resources, business process, 
technology and systems. The BSC is also defined within the organisation‘s mission, to 
meet the targets of the organisation relating to mitigation of ICT risks. ICT processes are 
monitored as a whole and are associated with organisational internal control and audit. 
ICT risk management processes in this organisation include risk identification, risk 
response and risk monitoring. In particular, all types of risk in this organisation are 
explained in terms of the probability of each type of risk occurring, and its likely impact, 
in all departments. The risks are rated as high, medium or low in terms of probability and 
impact by departments and/or units. The process entails a training program, education 
program and risk statement that facilitates further action. 
Each ICT risk management process is framed in the corporate plan by senior 
management. Each department must then generate a detailed operational plan, to 
complement senior management‘s plan, which fits with the primary goals of the 
organisation. This process is illustrated in Figure 4-4.  
 
Figure 4-4: ICT risk management plan: Case study A 
The details of the main ICT risk management plan of each department are then 
presented to management for review and further recommendations regarding revision or 
implementation are offered as needed.  
 
4.2.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
Awareness of ICT security is used in this organisation to make risk issues apparent to 
staff. This program communicates ICT security policy and regulations to all staff, and 
consists of a delineation of how to manage ICT processes in a secure way, what to do 
and what not to do, and the penalties for breach of the policy and regulations. All staff 
are trained in how to use computers appropriately. For example, no staff are allowed to 
share files, folders or even data with any other staff. E-learning is also provided to 
educate staff about ICT security awareness. To ensure that employees understand these 
IT plan generated by 
senior management 
Adding details to fit the 
corporate plan  
Senior Management Department 
2. Presented to 
1. Sent to   
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regulations, an examination is conducted by the internal audit department. The Assistant 
Vice-President explained:  
“Employees are very important to be controlled because they are the 
key persons who may make risks occur intentionally and 
unintentionally.” 
Control process 
To manage ICT security properly, the enterprise-wide security committee has established 
an ICT security framework for the entire organisation. The framework has also been 
established in the organisation‘s subsidiary companies to ensure that their staff are also 
compliant. Currently, ICT risk management consists of two main approaches to 
guarantee the quality of ICT control and audit processes (Figure 4-5). Firstly, the 
organisation focuses on quality assurance to appropriately support staff who handle ICT 
risk. This means that senior management fully supports staff to manage ICT security 
closely by incorporating an ICT control and audit mission within the overall business plan. 
Secondly, an audit-based approach is used to maintain suitable standards of ICT risk 
management in the organisation. For example, when an ICT risk appears, senior 
management consults with the respondent or the department over the best means to 
deal with the risks. The internal audit department takes direct responsibility for following 
and revising the audit plan, program and/or methodology in responding to the presence 
of risk. 
 
Figure 4-5: Control process of ICT risk management: Case study A 
The Assistant Vice-President stated that: 
“Internal control and audit processes are vital for dealing with risk 
management.” 
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The Operations Manager asserted that: 
“ICT risk management is controlled by focusing on ICT management and 
ICT security.” 
Technology and systems 
Thus, ICT risk management in this organisation relates to ICT control and audit. ICT 
control and audit are focused primarily on two areas: ICT applications, and ICT security 
given the current circumstances of the organisation. ICT control and audit are concerned 
with areas such as applications and software; licensing; intellectual property; and 
software maintenance. ICT security control and audit are major concerns for the 
organisation, as evidenced by management‘s recent decision that the enterprise-wide 
security committee should also monitor these areas. ICT security control and audit cover 
extensive management of the following: databases, servers, operating systems, 
networking, other setting configurations, and even penetration tests. To ensure ICT 
security, this organisation also uses a security scanning tool to inspect and identify any 
weakness in networks, web servers and other ports, in order to remove any fragile 
elements.  
The Operations Manager revealed that: 
“My organisation has tools to prevent ICT risk such as the penetration 
test and security scanning in order to check ICT abuses and ICT 
disruption.” 
 
4.2.5 Organisational ICT strategy  
The organisational ICT strategy in this organisation is based on a top-down rather than a 
bottom-up approach to ICT risk management (Figure 4-6). As a top-down approach in 
this organisation, ICT risk policy is directed and controlled by senior management or the 
Board of Directors. In addition, ICT strategy based on ICT risk policy is delivered to 
operational staff to follow and implement. While the organisation strongly believes that a 
top-down approach is best suited to its needs, a bottom-up approach is also used to 
review the business and operational (i.e. the action plan) plans through the provision of a 
report from operational staff to the Board of Directors, especially in the security 
operations area. 
 
Figure 4-6: Organisational ICT strategy: Case study A 
Board of Directors 
Operational Staff 
Directly report to 
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The corporate (or annual) plan or business plan related to ICT is generated every year in 
order to guide the business direction of the organisation, specifically the direction of ICT. 
The corporate plan describes the scope or overview of the ICT plan for each year. The 
ICT plan is developed in detail to cover general ICT management; the ICT security plan; 
ICT control and audit; and ICT security control and audit. This will then be matched with 
the action plans of each department (e.g. the internal audit, ICT, accounting or 
information security departments).  
Practically, the operational (or action) plan in this company is derived from using the 
COBIT framework as the main scope of ICT management and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard as the technical guideline for dealing with ICT risk management through 
internal control and audit in the organisation (Figure 4-7). Firstly, the COBIT framework 
is used as the basis for the control objectives to match with both ICT control and audit 
objectives and business objectives. The control objectives of each domain drawn from 
the COBIT framework cannot be used immediately as ICT control processes because the 
control processes need to be adapted to fit with organisational ICT processes. 
 
Figure 4-7: Organisational ICT processes: Case study A 
Application of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard in this organisation is used to set the 
technical control of specific technical details in line with the control objectives adopted 
from the COBIT framework. In contrast, using the COBIT framework or the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard alone, according to the respondents, cannot cover the overall control and 
audit plan they want in place. They argue that the COBIT framework is primarily 
appropriate for management to generate extensive framework for ICT governance 
related to ICT risk management. The ISO/IEC 17799 standard, on the other hand, is 
used to set the focus on the details of technical matters. Although the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard differ in this way, they can complement each other 
within the overall ICT risk management plan in this organisation.  
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4.2.6 Summary 
In this organisation, the key factors addressed by, and which were the focus of, ICT risk 
management were: 
- policy;  
- management of ICT resources; 
- human resource management and planning or the management of people and 
their behaviour in the organisation; 
- information security (IS) management; and  
- ICT risk management plan.  
Policy for ICT risk management in this organisation is considered to be the key factor 
driving the business direction. This organisation divides its policy into business, ICT and 
IS policies for dealing with business and ICT risks. In relation to ICT risks, the 
interviewees particularly emphasised that ICT and IS policies can help achieve the 
prevention and avoidance of ICT risk, and the mitigation of ICT risk at an acceptable 
level. 
The management of ICT resources is another concern in this organisation. This key factor 
primarily involves the management of software applications, networking connections (i.e. 
internet protocol, or IP), software licensing and operations systems under the umbrella of 
general ICT control.  
Human resource management and planning is also a concern for this organisation. The 
main foci of this key factor are on raising awareness of human resources, delivering 
training programs and on staff roles and responsibilities along with ICT risk management 
planning. This area is also concerned with the strict control of compliance with rules and 
regulations in the organisation. All staff are required follow organisational policy, rules 
and regulations. 
Information security (IS) management is considered to be the key factor for dealing with 
ICT risk management planning in this organisation. IS management focuses on the 
security of ICT systems, through the use of tools such as the penetration test and the 
security scanning tool. This organisation pays attention to raising security awareness, 
networking security, access control, physical security control and security in ICT 
processes in order to achieve the aims of the information security policy. 
Lastly, linking this organisation‘s practice to the research purposes, this organisation 
drives ICT risk management planning at two levels: the corporate level and the 
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operational level plan. However, the main concern of the ICT risk management plan is to 
implement change through a top-down approach. In other words, the senior 
management has set organisational policy, management of ICT resources, IS 
management and human resource management at the corporate level, which indirectly 
affects the operational planning which is delivered via a bottom-up approach. 
 
4.3 Case study B 
4.3.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation is a banking institution listed on the SET. This organisation divides its 
two business segments (the financial segment and internal operations segment) into 
eight categories: housing loan group; lending group; treasury group; commercial 
banking group; human resources and administration group; system and technology 
group; risk management group; and bank operations group. This organisation has 
invested in ICTs to help facilitating both stockholders and stakeholders. ICT processes 
are monitored and reviewed by both the internal audit section and the systems and 
technology section as part of the internal operations segment.  
 
4.3.2 Organisational structure 
Roles and responsibilities 
The responsibility for ICT risk management lies with the audit committee in this 
organisation. The audit committee is responsible for both types of business process—
non-ICT processes (business risks) and ICT processes (ICT risks)—which relate to the 
purpose of the general and the ICT audits (Figure 4-8). The audit committee formulates 
internal control and audit objectives which control data reliability; effective and efficient 
performance; and compliance and regulatory. This implies that the audit committee is 
responsible for the control of both non-ICT and ICT processes. The functions of control 
and audit have their own separate plans. 
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Figure 4-8: Roles and responsibilities: Case study B 
The Assistant Vice-President said: 
“My organisation at the moment has only audit committee to deal with 
both business and ICT risks which I think it is not enough. However, in 
the next few years, I think there will be several committees to be 
responsible for all types of risk.” 
The Division Director (internal audit) confirmed that: 
“The audit committee is responsible for both non-ICT and ICT 
processes.”  
ICT risk management treatment 
ICT risk management in this organisation is conducted primarily as a bottom-up process 
rather than a top-down process in so far as operational management specifies the 
technical details of general ICT (i.e. ICT infrastructure and ICT risk management) and 
ICT applications (i.e. software regarding applications, operating systems and networking 
systems) more clearly than could senior management (Figure 4-9). Operational 
managers specify the details of technical processes and report to senior management to 
discuss proposed plans for review and/or implementation by operational staff. In this 
regard, the Assistant Vice-President explained: 
“We are in the initial stage of ICT risk management plan; we then focus 
mainly on the business process first and the ICT process in the next 
step. We think that the operational level plan approved by the 
management level can help my organisation deal with ICT risk.” 
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Figure 4-9: ICT risk management treatment: Case study B 
Nevertheless, a top-down process is also considered important by senior management in 
this organisation B. A top-down process is used to revise ICT risk management plans and 
to translate the corporate plan from the corporate level to the operational level. 
Therefore, the ICT risk management plan is considered at both the corporate level and 
the operational level, such that both plans must initially be separated, with a consensus 
agreement required between both levels on the final organisational plan. Therefore, the 
top-down approach entails direction from senior management to the operational level 
regarding its perspective on ICT risk management based on the revision of the 
operational plan. This approach, the interviewees noted, can also help senior 
management understand ICT security, ICT security endorsement (i.e. senior 
management buy-ins) and ICT security advice offered to the Board of Directors (BOD).  
Components of ICT risk management 
In terms of ICT control and audit, general control (the management of ICT infrastructure 
and processes) and application control (the management of information security) are the 
foci in this organisation (Figure 4-10).  
 
Figure 4-10: Components of ICT risk management: Case study B 
This organisation is concerned with the control of networks, configuration and virus 
patterns as aspects of general control. Another element of general control is ICT risk 
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management which relies on computer systems management (e.g. ICT management) to 
manage the risks and ensures the organisation runs effectively through the provision of 
hardware, software, people-ware and back-up plans.  
The second aspect of ICT control and audit is application control, which focuses on roles 
and responsibilities; access control; data authorisation; compliance; and regulations. In 
relation to this, the Division Director (ICT) said: 
“…. my organisation elaborates the control of general ICT and ICT 
application.” 
 
The Division Director (internal audit) added: 
“General ICT is about ICT management and ICT application is about all 
types of software used in the organisation.”  
 
4.3.3 Organisational process 
ICT risk management instrument 
The ICT risk management instrument used in this organisation consists of five main 
processes: defining objectives, risk identification, risk assessment, risk control and risk 
monitoring. The formulation of the objectives of ICT risk management occurs at the 
corporate level which provides a clear statement for the whole organisation. The 
organisation further identifies any weaknesses among the business and ICT processes. 
The weak points in the ICT process among general ICT and ICT applications are identified 
to be dealt with by individual departments in the organisation. The organisation utilises 
the COBIT framework to fix weak ICT processes. For example, if the ICT planning process 
is found to be a weak area, the planning and organising domain within the COBIT 
framework is used to select the appropriate control objectives to suit the problem in that 
particular area. As the Division Director (Internal Audit) explained: 
“I personally apply the ERM framework based on my experience to deal 
with ICT risk management. The ERM framework helps me to define what 
the objectives, risk identification, risk assessment, risk control and risk 
monitoring are considered for dealing with ICT risks, although it mainly 
focuses on business context but I adopt it for ICT context.”  
ICT risk management process 
The framework created by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) is used by this organisation to plan its corporate governance in 
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order to control the business processes as non-ICT processes at the corporate level 
(Figure 4-11).  
 
Figure 4-11: The corporate level of non-ICT processes and ICT processes: Case study B 
ERM is a mechanism for corporate governance used in this organisation to deal with 
business risk management. In contrast, the COBIT framework has been adopted for ICT 
governance to deal with ICT risk management in this organisation. The COBIT framework 
guides the organisation to define the main scope of ICT control and audit at both the 
corporate and the operational levels to review ICT systems, applications, operating 
systems, and networks. However, both of these standards were used to supplement the 
corporate and the operational plan. The Division Director (Internal Audit) mentioned: 
“Based on the audit committee, we use the ERM as the baseline to deal 
with risks; however, we also use the COBIT framework to supplement 
ICT processes in the business control plan.”  
 
4.3.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
According to senior management, employees in this organisation must understand the 
ICT risk management process, acknowledge that there are ICT risks in their functions 
and departments, make decisions on whether it is necessary to mitigate ICT risks, and 
report the occurrence of ICT risk to all relevant departments, as it is not only one 
department, they argue, that can prevent and mitigate ICT risks.  
Senior management in this organisation believe that education and training are also 
essential, not only for operational staff, but also for management, because all employees 
must understand their roles and responsibilities as defined by human resources 
authorisation in order to effectively deal with ICT risk management. The Assistant Vice-
President, supported by both Division Directors, agreed with this view: 
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“Our staff are performing well otherwise the risk may occur. Therefore, 
we provide training for and educating them about ICT awareness and 
ICT security; although we are just starting to plan information security 
management.”  
Control process 
Senior management in this organisation believe that they must ensure that all ICT 
processes are undertaken properly in each department. There are three main steps 
involved in the review of ICT risk management processes in this organisation: (a) self-
compliance, (b) risk reporting, and (c) risk monitoring from both internal and external 
auditors (for example, the Bank of Thailand (BOT), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Thailand (SEC), and the Certified Public Accountants of Thailand (CPAs)).  
In the view of senior management in this company, ICT risk management relates to ICT 
control and audit. They argue that effective ICT control and audit regarding risk 
management needs to include: (a) a general audit manual, (b) an audit program, and (c) 
a detailed audit methodology.  
Audit methodology in relation to ICT risk management is generated from both the COSO-
ERM framework and the COBIT framework. Audit methodology is also known by other 
names, such as audit guidelines, audit program or internal control questionnaire (ICQ). 
In practice, the COBIT framework is used in this organisation as the main framework to 
define ICT control objectives and the processes that require attention each year. 
The Division Director (Internal Audit) mentioned: 
“The way to deal with ICT risk, I think we have a clear auditable area to 
deal with one particular thing. For example, we are focusing on ICT risk; 
so we provide the plan for ICT area including ICT management and ICT 
security to control and audit ICT risk properly.” 
The COBIT framework is applied in this organisation to guide the overall ICT control and 
audit but it does not provide much detail on technical terms (Figure 4-12). In this regard, 
the Division Director (Internal Audit) asserted that another standard or framework is 
used to handle these technical matters; this might include, for example, some 
frameworks or standards such as Microsoft Pattern, AS400 and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard. These frameworks are used to solve technical issues depending upon the 
nature of the auditable area. At the strategic level of planning, it is more important to 
have detailed guidelines related to information security management. Senior 
management believes that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as an exemplar can be used to 
manage information security (IS). In contrast, the COBIT framework is used in this 
organisation to cover the scope of internal control and audit to ensure good ICT 
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governance. Therefore, both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, the 
respondents claimed, can supplement each other in guiding the ICT risk management 
planning in this organisation.  
 
Figure 4-12: Control process: Case study B 
Technology and systems 
The interviewees noted that this organisation requires an appropriate risk management 
plan for dealing with the particular circumstances around an ICT problem. Risk 
assessment is important to identify uncertain events or risks before they happen. They 
argued that it is useful for unforeseen circumstances to be assessed when related to 
weaknesses in networks or data transmission. The probability and impact of this 
weakness is then evaluated as high, medium or low in order to prevent and mitigate such 
risk. In practice in this organisation, information security standards and policy must be 
planned in advance and implemented by updating usernames and passwords (i.e. access 
control), databases, software, back-up plans and back-up sites.  
Generally, risks regarding organisational operations are classified as operational risk, 
credit risk or marketing risk within a banking institution, as noted by the Internal Audit 
Director. The respondents believe that risks related to ICT primarily are operational risks 
which must be prevented, mitigated or maintained at an acceptable level. Operational 
risk is associated with data accuracy, data reliability and data availability required to 
effectively serve customers of this organisation. For example, as mentioned by the 
Assistant Vice-President, data stored during the night shift must be appropriately handled 
and prepared for customer service the next day. If any events occur during the night, the 
organisation must be able to recover the data from this batch in readiness to serve 
customers. This implies that such circumstances are concerned not only with operational 
risk regarding ICT but also with ICT risk management processes and business continuity 
plan. Therefore, the ICT department focuses largely on access control of data, setting 
parameters for each operation system, routers and even firewalls. ICT control and audit 
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are then used to function as ICT risk management in this organisation. In this regard, the 
Division Director (ICT) revealed: 
“I think … dealing with ICT risk, we define the origin of ICT risk in ICT 
and technical terms such as security in order to prevent the opportunity 
and to mitigate the impact of ICT risks by focusing on the setting 
configurations of hardware and software, ICT management and security 
management.” 
  
4.3.5 Organisational ICT strategy 
This organisation was in the process of detailed ICT risk management planning when the 
interviews were conducted. The Assistant Vice-President noted that at the initial stage it 
is necessary to define and develop a clear plan for ICT risk management. He believed 
that to provide a clear plan, senior management is responsible for three main areas: (a) 
defining policy, (b) defining processes, and (c) defining the technical approach (Figure 
4-13). Although the technical approach might appear to be less the responsibility of 
senior management in so far as senior management is not familiar with the technical 
aspects of security ICT, it still needs to be covered in the corporate plan. This is 
imperative, the respondents argued, because this organisation needs to communicate 
with its customers, vendors and even competitors (i.e. third parties) via the internet or 
World Wide Web (WWW), and technical risk or security risk may emerge during such 
communications. As a result, the technical approach to security ICT must be the concern 
also of the corporate level and not the operational level alone.  
 
Figure 4-13: Roles and responsibilities of senior management: Case study B 
The main responsibility of the ICT function regarding risk management lies with a 
technical approach towards information security management (ISM) in this organisation. 
The Assistant Vice-President added that ISM must cover business continuity management 
(BCM) and information security policy. BCM is focused on how to rapidly recover ICT 
systems and data from external and internal environmental impact. As a result, a 
disaster recovery plan (DRP) has been developed as part of the operational (action) plan 
for the business continuity plan (BCP) in BCM. The BCP is used to describe the details of 
how to recover the system when ICT risk from either an external or internal 
Senior Management 
Policies Processes Technical 
Approach 
[91] 
 
 
environmental impact has interfered with organisational systems or data. The best 
practice standard for dealing with such a situation, The interviewees believe, is the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard. This organisation plans to follow this standard to define BCM 
relating to ICT risk management.  
Information security policy does not yet cover ICT risk management at the corporate 
level of this organisation. In contrast, ICT risk management is embedded in the 
operational (action) plan for each activity in the organisation. ICT risk management will 
be raised in the organisational policy area at the corporate level plan in the next few 
years because it has become an imperative issue for Thailand‘s business community. The 
organisation plans to define its ICT strategy by focusing on compliance as the first step. 
Compliance leads to ICT policy and is driven by the ICT security department through 
entire functions and/or departments in the organisation. Each function or department 
must now review its own processes against the regulatory and compliance tenets of the 
organisation. In so doing, each function and department must now assess its own risks 
as part of an ICT self-assessment process. This organisation considers that ICT risk 
management is relevant to general ICT, ICT application, and ICT security simultaneously.  
  
4.3.6 Summary 
The key factors addressed by, and which were the focus of, ICT risk management in this 
organisation were: 
- policy; 
- management of ICT resources; 
- human resource management and planning or the management of people and 
their behaviour in the organisation; 
- information security management; and  
- ICT risk management planning. 
Policy for ICT risk management is focused on three main areas (business, ICT and IS) in 
this organisation. This organisation defines business policy in alignment with ICT process. 
Creating ICT policy is focused on the BCP to rapidly recover ICT systems once they are 
down. A BCP is a major focus because it is vital that the services of a banking institution 
are up-to-date and real-time activities. While this organisation was not yet concerned 
with setting Information security policy at the time of the interviews, the interviewees 
mentioned that the organisation is intending to develop Information security policy at the 
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next stage of ICT risk management planning. The organisation has a risk statement 
which is representative of its policy approach to dealing with risk management. 
Management of ICT resources is also the main focus in this organisation. Management of 
ICT resources is defined as general control in this organisation. General control includes 
the management of ICT infrastructure such as the software in ICT applications, networks, 
and operating systems.  
Human resource management and planning is taken for granted as a key factor behind 
planning ICT risk management in this organisation. This organisation believes that 
education and training programs are essential, not only for operational staff but also for 
senior management. These programs help declare clear roles and responsibilities for all 
staff in relation to dealing with ICT risks. Moreover, education and training programs 
relate to the topic of the human resources authorisation process; compliance; and rules 
and regulations that all staff must follow. 
Information security management is seen as another key factor in this organisation for 
dealing with ICT risk management planning. However, the interviewees did not clearly 
define their understanding of information security, but did mention that it is relevant to a 
technical approach such as the configuring of ICT infrastructure and systems or setting 
parameters for operation systems, routers and firewalls.  
Lastly, linking practice in this organisation to the research purposes, a bottom-up process 
is the main method for driving operational activities around ICT risk management. In 
other words, ICT risk management planning is defined at the operational level first. Then 
the operational plan is communicated to the senior management level for revising, and to 
gain a consensus agreement on ICT risk management planning. From this point of view, 
the key factors in this organisation directly affect operational level planning and indirectly 
affect the corporate level plan to establish successful ICT risk management.  
  
4.4 Case study C 
4.4.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation is the Thai branch of one of the world‘s largest international multimedia 
news agencies. Its services derive from financial services business through the internet. 
The Thai branch is a hub of software development. The core business strengths of the 
Thai branch lie in providing the content, analytics, trading and messaging capabilities 
required by financial professionals. In regard to digital communication, this branch has a 
wide range of ICT facilities to provide valuable information to its customers. With 
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substantial investment in ICT, this organisation views ICT risk management in terms of 
dealing with several types of ICT risk.  
 
4.4.2 Organisational structure 
Roles and responsibilities 
The Technical Director revealed that the Thai branch is the headquarters of software 
development within Asia in the area of product services such as financial information and 
market data. The Technical Director added that ICT risk management in software 
development normally relates to risk management of particular projects rather than risk 
management as a whole across an organisation (Figure 4-14). In this organisation, two 
types of ICT risk management have been defined: one at the organisational level and one 
at the project management level. ICT risk management is planned by the holding 
company, at the corporate level, in the United Kingdom (UK). The ICT risk management 
plan is then delivered to all hubs around the world, to which they all must comply. 
Therefore, the hub in Thailand focuses on only the project management level of ICT risk 
management. Moreover, this hub plans its own risk management methodology regarding 
project management. 
 
Figure 4-14: Roles and responsibilities: Case study C 
According to this software development organisation, ICT risk management is an 
operational activity which requires a separate action plan from service lines such as 
business function, service function, ICT function and security function. Generally, risk 
management related to ICT has a well-defined plan at both the organisational level and 
the functional level, but this branch only focuses on the functional level.  
The functional level of ICT risk management is understood in this organisation as 
information security risk management. Information security risk management covers 
information security, security operations and risk management. Information security and 
security operations are performed in Thailand but the risk management operations are 
only carried out in the UK. The risk management operations can be revised in response 
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to the management perspective—for example, at the time the interviews took place the 
focus was on governance. However, risk management penetrates all the functions of 
information security and security operations at the functional level or the operational 
level. Moreover, ICT risk management is also treated in the internal audit department of 
the umbrella organisation in the UK. Internal control and audit in Thailand is conducted 
once a year by focusing on all types of risk including human, operational, processes and 
ICT security.  
The Technical Director explained: 
“My organisation here in Thailand doesn‟t have a committee to be 
responsible for such ICT risk but we do have ICT risk management in 
each project.”  
 
The Software Development Manager added: 
“My organisation has ICT risk management in the software program 
itself; once we create software there are several criteria that we need to 
put into the system in order to protect, prevent and mitigate the risk.”  
 
This organisation manages ICT risk management as a process of cooperation among the 
regions. The reason is that each region is responsible for different issue around the 
world, so that every rules and regulations are settled at the regions and then are forced 
to other branches in the region to follow. For example, it deals with ICT risk, especially 
securities, by cooperating with China, Singapore and Thailand (Figure 4-15). 
 
Figure 4-15: Information security process of cooperation among the regions: Case study C 
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For this organisation, the factors that lead to successful ICT risk management consist of 
endorsement by senior management and effective communication and development of 
risk statements. Endorsement by senior management is a major factor that can be seen 
as a consensus plan among the regions regarding security in ICT risk management. 
Communication entails two-way communication—thus both a top-down and bottom-up 
approach to ICT risk management—that draws on the intentions of both senior 
management and operational staff to incorporate information security into the corporate 
plan of this organisation. Lastly, the risk statement is included in the corporate plan in 
order to direct employees to work according to sound ICT risk management guidelines 
throughout the organisation. By doing so, this Thai branch uses the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard to guide information security in ICT risk management.  
ICT risk management treatment 
ICT risk management is normally treated in any real detail at the functional level in this 
organisation. The functional level divides ICT risk management into two primary 
responsibilities (Figure 4-16).  
 
Figure 4-16: ICT risk management treatment in functionality: Case study C 
Firstly, project risk management related to ICT aims to monitor the delivery of the 
project and the responsibility of the project developer. Secondly, software project risk 
management relates to how best to set particular functions and features in each software 
product in line with customer requirements.  
According to project risk management, the project team seeks the agreement of 
stakeholders or clients/customers in order to set priorities for the risk management 
processes for the ICT project (Figure 4-17).  
 
Figure 4-17: Software project risk management: Case study C 
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The Technical Director stated that: 
“My work is all about creating software to serve our customers; 
therefore, we treat ICT risk management as project-by-project or job-
by-job or job-order instead of as a whole organisation. Therefore, we 
focus on only clients‟ needs and requirements.”  
 
4.4.3 Organisational process 
ICT risk management instrument 
The ICT risk management instrument used in this organisation includes risk assessment 
processes and risk management. The risk assessment process consists of a review of the 
security design, a review of security implementation and an assessment of operational 
security. Each process is written in a risk statement to guide staff to perform their roles 
accurately.  
Risk management methodology covers escalation, tracking, reporting and exception 
handling as shown in the risk statement of this organisation. Moreover, this organisation 
has outlined clear responsibilities for its staff to manage risks at each stage of the 
lifecycle (Figure 4-18). The Information Security Manager explained: 
“We deal with ICT risk by using software to capture and prevent the 
risk; we mainly focus on the ISO/IEC 17799 standard embedded in the 
software creation.”  
 
Figure 4-18: Risk management methodology embedded in software development: Case study C 
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This organisation uses its instrument, software risk management, to manage ICT risk. 
There are two components to software risk management: risk assessment and risk 
management. Firstly, risk assessment starts with risk identification. Risk identification is 
performed by each group of software developers. Whenever a problem occurs (e.g. error 
coding), a group of software developers or a software developer assesses the impact and 
the likelihood of each occurrence by checking the particular problem against current 
records in the database. The identified problem or issue is recorded in the database, 
which can then match the problem with former similar problems in the data. If there is 
little impact on the development process, the result will be shown as no risk found, and 
the problem or issue can then be rejected. In contrast, if the impact of a particular 
problem is found to be significant, it is stored in the database for the purposes of 
improving the process of software development in future. After that, the new problematic 
issue is tracked by IT security department where move the problematic issue to the risk 
management stage.  
Secondly, risk management begins within the IT security department in this organisation. 
The IT security department retrieves the problem or issue from the database to report it 
to the IT department. The IT department then evaluates the problem in four stages:  
- The escalation stage is to assess the level of risk occurrence for each problem or 
issue including whether or not it might occur repeatedly; 
- The tracking step aims to identify the severity of risk impact for a particular 
problem or issue, and to provide recommendations to ensure staff are aware of 
the potential impact; 
- The reporting step is to provide planned actions to mitigate the particular risk 
regarding the problem or issue and also to stipulate ‗who‘ is responsible for this 
risk; and 
- The exception and handling step is to take action in the IT security department on 
the risk regarding the problem or issue.  
ICT risk management process 
The ICT risk management process in this organisation is embedded in each project. Each 
project is controlled and audited by using software as a form of ICT risk management to 
record all the operation system processes in the organisation. 
Firstly, the organisation conducts a review of security design which focuses on design and 
compliance with security standards, especially the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, and provides 
a checklist for security policy in order to maintain the integrity of information and prevent 
risk occurring as a result of incorrect ICT usage or ICT abuse.  
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Secondly, this organisation conducts reviews of security implementation which include 
checklists of non-design matters related to information security, such as penetration 
testing and initial system set-up, to ensure that particular functions or projects are 
secure.  
Lastly, the assessment of operational security in this organisation focuses on 
identification of vulnerability, and thus the management of the potential for new risks to 
occur. After following the three steps of the risk assessment process, all risks are 
captured in each step and described using common terminology. Then all risks are 
recorded in the security risk database which is part of the organisational system that 
forms part of the risk management methodology.  
The Technical Director explained: 
“Our organisation provides the ICT risk management process in a risk 
statement that all staff levels can easily follow. A risk statement consists 
of the review of security design, the review of security implementation 
and the assessment of operational security.” 
The Information Security Manager added: 
“Our statement has a clear plan of what we must do step-by-step.”  
 
4.4.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
The primary focus of organisational control in organisation C is human risk, as the first 
priority of the organisation which strongly affects business function rather than service 
and security functions, because one third of software development staff are located in 
Thailand. At the time of writing, the organisation is facing a high rate of staff turnover. 
To control and prevent this, the organisation is offering incentives to encourage staff to 
work in a more positive environment and a training program to allow staff to rotate their 
position to assume different responsibilities, and thereby learn new skills. In this regard, 
the Technical Director stated: 
“I think human resources are important for us due to we are software 
development; therefore, they are the first priority that we need to focus 
on.” 
The Information Security Manager said: 
“Staff is main person that may let the risk happening in the 
organisation; so they have to be controlled first.”  
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Control Process 
Risk management control in this organisation is not concerned solely with the security 
perspective but also with business function, service function and security function (Figure 
4-19). These functions are controlled from different perspectives. However, the main aim 
of each function is to meet the business objectives and goals. These organisational 
objectives and goals are to serve both internal and external environments. Therefore, the 
participants believed that it is imperative that each function is controlled properly. 
The Technical Director asserted: 
“According to software development, we have to focus on the business 
direction and internal direction; business direction is about business 
itself and services, internal direction is about security function or ICT 
function.”   
The business function in this organisation is controlled by focusing on the management 
program which views human resources as having the main impact on business function. 
Furthermore, the service function is controlled by a focus on the operations program, 
which includes communication links as the main business process that serves customers 
and clients. Lastly, the security function is controlled by focusing on risk security project 
management which is included in software production on a job-by-job or job-order basis. 
 
Figure 4-19: Risk management control: Case study C 
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consequences of the earthquake that occurred in Southeast Asia in December 2006. 
Thus, the organisation has set this as the first priority for service function.  
The Technical Director claimed that: 
“Technology and system is very important because we are dealing with 
digital communication to feed our information to our customers; 
therefore, we are concerned about our communication link.” 
Risk security management is also a major focus with the aim of protecting source code 
assets of the organisation‘s software, software licensing and intellectual property.  
 
4.4.5 Organisational ICT strategy 
The organisation includes an ICT risk management plan in its corporate (or annual) plan 
because the main business process focuses on project management (Figure 4-20). 
Therefore, ICT risk management constitutes the main section in the corporate plan that 
deals with ICT risks. Moreover, the organisation establishes ICT risk management plans 
at both the organisational and operational levels. The organisational level lies with the 
management plan, which includes organisational activities and personnel management. 
The operational level involves specific functions like project management and security 
project management. The Technical Director explained: 
“We are not focusing on the organisational level plan regarding ICT risk 
management because our main process is dealing with job-order or job-
by-job. However, I think the optimal ICT risk management plan must be 
at both the organisational level and the operational level.” 
 
 
Figure 4-20: Requirements of ICT risk management plan: Case study C 
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perspective) (Figure 4-21). The ICT department and ICT security function must have 
clearly defined and different responsibilities to each other. The ICT department is 
responsible for ICT operations such as ICT infrastructure, software, operating systems 
and networks. ICT security function should include security functions such as security 
policy, network security, security compliance and physical security. 
 
Figure 4-21: Separation of the roles and responsibilities of ICT and ICT security: Case study C 
 
The Information Security Manager stated: 
“I think ICT strategy should be reconsidered and the effective way of 
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Human resource management and planning are of major concern because staff in this 
organisation are creating software for its clients. This key factor is based on the delivery 
of training programs, human resources protection and human resources security.  
A central focus of information security management in this organisation is that this 
function is embedded in the software created. IS management includes asset 
management which covers software and the protection of source code assets.  
Lastly, linking this organisation‘s practice to the research objectives, ICT risk 
management planning occurs at the operational level. The operational level plan is 
relevant to operational activities with regard to developing software in this Thai branch. 
As a result, a bottom-up approach is used to control the operations by managing 
software risk in project management. Therefore, this organisation is concerned with 
information security policy, human resource management and IS management and their 
effect on the operational plan which in turn impacts on successful ICT risk management 
planning.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the current profile of ICT risk management in 
organisational practice for the case study organisations A, B and C. It is evident from the 
respondents‘ views that ICT risk management is conducted in relation to the areas of 
organisational structure, process, control, and strategy. Each of these elements of ICT 
risk management is discussed separately below. 
Organisational structure  
Firstly, ICT risk management is governed by a separate committee which is responsible 
for different tasks in the organisation relating to ICT risk management.  Case study 
organisation A has the clear responsibility of setting the ICT risk management strategy 
by monitoring and directing internal processes in the organisation. The audit committee 
mostly directs and monitors the internal operational transactions. The risk management 
committee is mainly concerned with several types of risk including business and ICT. 
Risks that occur as a result of information security problems are governed across the 
entire organisation by an enterprise-wide security committee. In this organisation several 
types of risk—including operational risk, business risk, ICT risk and IS risk—can be 
mitigated against, avoided and prevented simultaneously. By contrast, the organisations 
in case studies B and C were concerned less with allocating the responsibility for dealing 
with ICT risk management.  
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Secondly, the position level of ICT risk management is considered in all three case 
studies, but in each case from a different perspective. The organisations in case studies A 
and B control and audit ICT risk at both the corporate level and the operational level 
appropriately because ICT risk management covers the origin of risk and the risk impact. 
This helps the department report back to the Board of Directors who will then outline the 
process of risk treatment for the other departments. The organisation in case study C is 
different from organisations A and B because it is a software hub. The major tasks of its 
operations lie in computer programming or software development; as a result the 
process of risk treatment is in the application software embedded in each project 
produced.    
Thirdly, the component of ICT risk management comprises ICT control and audit as well 
as information security control and audit. According to organisations A and B, ICT risk 
management relates to ICT activities and information security activities when dealing 
with ICT risk. Both organisations brief about the term of ICT activities in ICT policy and 
the term of information security activities in Information security policy. This means that 
the staff understand their roles and responsibilities when facing any type of ICT risk 
incident and that they must report such occurrences to the board. In contrast, 
organisation C focuses only on the IS part because the work of its staff is entirely 
dependent upon software development. Therefore, the staff in this organisation always 
react to a risk by using the application software to fix the problem and mitigate against 
the negative impact.  
Organisational process  
Firstly, the risk statement is seen from a different perspective according to the position 
level. However, the details included in the risk statement cover the process for both the 
entire organisation and the specified functions in the organisation. In organisations A and 
B, the risk statement is viewed as an ICT risk management instrument for the staff to 
follow at the corporate level and at the operational level. With regards to the meaning of 
the risk statement at both levels, ICT risk management is used to clarify the risk 
methodology in the corporate and operational plans. For example, in the corporate plan 
senior management in the organisation sets the overall scope of ICT risk management. 
Furthermore, in the operational plan, the organisation outlines the details of ICT risk 
management processes aligned with the corporate plan. This is a clear process statement 
for dealing with ICT risk in the organisation. Conversely, organisation C mainly focuses 
on the specific function of each project, which means that the organisation is concerned 
more with the operational level than the corporate level.   
Secondly, in order to specify the processes in the organisation, organisations A, B and C 
all follow the guidelines from the internationally accepted framework and standard of 
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COBIT, of ISO/IEC 17799 and of enterprise risk management (ERM). Organisation A 
complies with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard to specify the 
appropriate processes for ICT management for both the corporate top-down approach 
and the operational bottom-up approach. On the other hand, organisation B is concerned 
also with aligning COBIT with ERM, as the methodology for business risk management in 
the organisation which is implemented from a business angle to direct, control and 
monitor ICT. This organisation mainly focuses on a top-down approach as the main 
approach taken at the corporate level, whose directives are communicated to the 
operational level. Organisation C considers only information security to be part of a 
bottom-up approach to ICT risk which it sees is the natural concern of the software 
development side.  
Organisational control  
A common concern among all three case study organisations is the effective control of 
people, process, technology and systems. The three organisations concentrate on the 
control of business, service, ICT and IS functions simultaneously, although they 
emphasise these four functions from different perspectives. Because they are different 
types of organisation, each controls and monitors the transactions generated from 
internal sections and external sections in different ways. For example, in organisations A 
and B, the entire transaction process relates to the operational process from working 
routine and billing actions with customers. Thus business, service, ICT and IS functions 
are monitored concurrently. On the other hand, organisation C operates each software 
development project on a job-order or job-by-job basis which leads to ICT risk 
management being carried out also on this basis, and focusing on application security 
management. Hence, the framework and the standards are considered in isolation with 
each project to achieve ICT risk management in this organisation. However, service 
functions, including those involved with both internal and external parties, remain 
unaddressed in organisation C. Furthermore, service function is not mentioned in detail in 
this research because it relates to another standard of ICT service management called 
the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL).   
Organisational ICT strategy  
Consideration of the organisational ICT strategies of the three case studies illustrates 
that they focus on ICT risk management in different ways. However, the case studies 
highlighted some common issues (i.e. top-down and bottom-up risk management 
approach) that an organisation should consider in relation to ICT strategy. Furthermore, 
both top-down and bottom-up approaches are considered relevant depending on the type 
of business, and this can be clarified when an organisation commences ICT risk 
management planning. An organisation should consider risk planning at the corporate 
[105] 
 
 
level within an overall ICT plan, which then translates into the operational plan by 
covering both ICT management and IS management. ICT risk management is considered 
at both the corporate and operational levels as ICT risk management and ICT project risk 
management respectively. Moreover, different management levels in the organisations 
under study were concerned that the plan should be revised at both levels to reach 
consensus agreement on the final plan. This means that ICT risk management is planned 
at the corporate level as the scope of ICT risk management which then drives the 
operational level to plan ICT project risk management in detail within each relevant 
department. However, both ICT risk management and ICT project risk management 
should be planned in the same direction as part of an entire organisational ICT risk 
management plan. As a result, successful ICT risk management planning focuses on 
collaboration between management level activities and operational level activities in 
order to deal with ICT risks successfully. 
According to the four components, the key factors that determine successful ICT risk 
management in each organisation emerged in the interviews. The key factors in case 
studies A and B are policy; management of ICT resources; human resource management 
and planning; information security management; the corporate level plan; and the 
operational level plan. Similarly, case study C considers that policy; human resource 
management and planning; information security management; and the operational level 
plan are the key factors.  
As a result, ICT risk management in case study organisations A, B and C is focused at 
both the corporate and operational levels. The corporate level sets the overall ICT risk 
management plan, while the operational level sets the specific technical security plan for 
ICT. Furthermore, respondents from both the corporate and operational levels in the 
three organisations revealed that policy; human resource management and planning; 
information security management; and management of ICT resources are the key factors 
to consider when dealing with successful ICT risk management. The next chapter 
presents the other three case studies D, E and F, and considers the operations of ICT risk 
management in both their own organisations and that of their clients.  
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Chapter 5  
CASE STUDIES IN THAI BUSINESS  
ADOPTION OF ICT RISK STANDARDS:  
CASES D-F  
 
This chapter reports on the practice of ICT risk management in Thai organisations from 
both the organisational and consulting perspectives. The chapter begins with a discussion 
of the ICT risk management profile of the case study organisations D, E and F. The 
qualitative findings of the case studies D, E and F are then presented next. The 
conclusion of all case studies A, B, C, D, E and F are then presented in the next chapter.  
 
5.1 Case study D 
5.1.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation is an international consulting organisation which provides consulting 
services such as auditing advice, risk advice and corporate governance. This organisation 
is internationally and nationally recognised for its advisory services in the areas of 
business and ICT processes. ICT risk management was discussed in the interviews with 
the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) who is also the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the 
ICT Advisory Director. The CFO/CIO explain ICT risk management in his organisation, 
while the ICT Advisory Director discusses ICT risk management based on his consulting 
experience with his clients. 
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5.1.2 Organisational structure   
Roles and responsibilities 
The ICT Advisory Director explained his view that setting the framework for risk 
management should include business risk and ICT risk, which are generally the 
responsibility of senior management. He added that senior management is not familiar 
with ICT risk management. He further explained that among his clients the larger 
organisations usually establish a risk management committee to take responsibility for 
setting a framework for business and ICT risk management (Figure 5-1).  
The Chief Finance Officer and Chief Information Officer (CFO/CIO) supported the 
perspective of the ICT Advisory Director on the client organisations, adding that their 
organisation defines the main responsibilities of a risk management committee which 
include setting a risk management framework that addresses policy, responsibility, 
definitions of risk and acceptable risk levels. The CFO/CIO also stated that a framework 
for risk management that consists of both business and ICT perspectives is defined as 
enterprise risk management (ERM).  
 
Figure 5-1: Roles and responsibilities: Case study D 
 
Based on his consulting experience, the ICT Advisory Director pointed out that 
departments in his client organisations normally understand that risk management is the 
sole responsibility of the risk management unit or department. He added that risk 
management is performed in all of his clients‘ organisations in order to prevent, mitigate 
and avoid risks in both business and ICT. He further noted that in these client 
organisations, the roles and responsibilities of staff are classified into three types: doer, 
facilitator and reviewer. The doer is simply the management or staff employee who 
performs their normal functions. A facilitator is a person who monitors staff performance 
to ensure it abides by the organisation‘s framework. A reviewer is an independent role 
chosen from among the doers or facilitators who reviews all processes in a framework 
such as the way in which ICT risk management acts to define objectives, identify risk, 
assess risk or respond to risk. The ICT Advisory Director suggested that: 
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“Risk management is a responsibility of staff that is classified in terms of 
doer, facilitator and reviewer in my clients‟ organisations.”  
ICT risk management treatment 
From the consulting perspective of the ICT Advisory Director, before dealing with ICT risk 
management, his clients‘ organisations must formulate an ICT risk management 
framework to provide the necessary guidance. Such guidance is offered by the main 
framework of enterprise risk management (ERM) which outlines the methodology for 
dealing with risk management, including business risk and ICT risk. For example, without 
a framework, departments in his clients‘ organisations may not identify or define ICT risk 
and risk management in the same way due to divergent interpretations and perceptions. 
Consequently, his clients‘ organisations require a framework to deal with ICT risk 
management that is consistent across all departments in his clients‘ organisations to 
target the same goals and objectives. A framework is formed through consensus among 
all management levels.  
The CFO/CIO compared the practices of client organisations with his own organisation 
that this organisation has a framework called the ‗baseline‘ which is normally set every 
year at a regional level called ‗a global plan‘ (e.g. in the region of Asia), which delineates 
the responsibilities of branches in each country. The baseline in this organisation is 
controlled by the ICT security group who not only monitors and complies with the 
operational and security functions but also defines business policy and security policy.  
Components of ICT risk management 
The ICT Advisory Director noted that his clients‘ organisations separate the responsibility 
of ICT function into ICT application and ICT security; staff can then manage ICT risk 
appropriately and successfully. In essence, the ICT Advisory Director mentioned that ICT 
application and ICT security are imperative for coping with ICT risk management, yet 
they are managed independently. In this regard, he stated that: 
“My opinion is that we should well clarify what ICT means and consists 
of because this will help us clearly control it or them appropriately. From 
my point of view, ICT function includes ICT application and ICT 
security.” 
 
5.1.3 Organisational process 
The ICT Advisory Director revealed that in his clients‘ organisations ICT risk mostly 
relates to operational risk which penetrates into all areas of operational process. 
Therefore, he describes the main components of ICT risk management in these 
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organisations as incorporating and defining: (1) the ICT risk management process; (2) 
the ICT structure; (3) the roles and responsibilities of each department in dealing with 
ICT risk management; and (4) how to monitor ICT risk management as noted by ICT 
Advisory Director.  
The ICT Advisory Director further suggested that the ICT risk management process in his 
clients‘ organisations is classified into three types: advanced, semi-advanced and normal 
plans. From his point of view, advanced is defined as a well-organised plan; semi-
advanced refers to a plan that is beyond a standard but has not been perfected; and 
normal is a plan that is equivalent to a risk management standard.  
The ICT Advisory Director stated that, in the advanced performance plan, the ICT risk 
management process is embedded into organisational objectives (Figure 5-2). The ICT 
Advisory Director added that his clients‘ organisations classify: (1) which risks related to 
ICT will impact on business and ICT objectives; and (2) what impacts will be an obstacle 
to achieving business and ICT objectives. Both must be outlined in the business and ICT 
strategy in the corporate plan, as well as what actions can be adopted to prevent, avoid 
and mitigate business and ICT risks. The corporate plan will outline the processes in 
detail for long-term implementation over the next one to three years.  
 
Figure 5-2: The advanced performance plan for ICT risk management: Case study D 
 
The ICT Advisory Director further stated that, in the semi-advanced performance plan, 
his clients‘ organisations conduct a risk assessment, and then identify the control needed 
to ‗fix‘ the risks identified. If ICT risk is found in the form of system hacking, control 
objectives will be found to resolve that particular problem (Figure 5-3). This event will be 
documented in order to determine how to deal with it as part of the operational plan but 
it will not be included in the business strategy within the corporate plan. 
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Figure 5-3: The semi-advanced performance plan for ICT risk management: Case study D 
The ICT Advisory Director also explained that, in the normal performance plan, his 
clients‘ organisations manage their risks on a point-by-point basis, namely as functional 
risk management (Figure 5-4). This process is focused on the details of specific functions 
or departments; and each department manages its own risks in its own way and thus 
there is no organisational consensus. For example, security risk management of security 
systems is handled by the IT department only. This matter can be understood as ICT risk 
management on a project basis such that it is carried out project by project, as revealed 
by the ICT Advisory Director. 
 
Figure 5-4: The normal performance plan for ICT risk management: Case study D 
 
Nevertheless, the ICT Advisory Director believed that performing in the context of 
organisational consensus is the best way to deal with ICT risk management. In fact, risk 
management is the responsibility of all the departments and staff of his clients‘ 
organisations, to be monitored, treated, and reported on in relation to the impact on 
business and ICT processes. Thus, ICT risk management focuses on three elements in 
the context of an organisational consensus: people; process; and technology and system. 
It is also embedded within a strategic plan that forms part of the corporate plan 
developed through consensus among all management levels. After that, ICT risk 
management will be developed to cover both business function and ICT function. The 
results derived from the corporate plan can then be monitored and reported to the Board 
of Directors (BOD), in order to revise the methodology of the corporate plan to deal more 
successfully with ICT risk management. The Executive Director (ICT advisory) revealed 
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“From my long experience I saw several types of ICT risk management 
process (advanced, semi-advanced and normal plans) and I think that 
each of them is well suited with the type of business and direction.” 
 
5.1.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
The CFO/CIO discussed ICT risk management in his organisation from an organisational 
perspective. The CFO/CIO said that the area of human resources is not managed 
properly in Thailand because of a lack of personnel privacy. Where the privacy of 
personnel in Western countries is strictly maintained as a priority, the nature of Thai 
culture does not necessitate this. According to the CFO/CIO, in Thai culture the concept 
of privacy means that something is private among close friends or family, rather than 
implying the protection of individual privacy. In this organisation, there are many 
nationalities who demonstrate no concern over this matter. The CFO/CIO further added 
that it can be difficult to control the confidentiality of information within human 
resources. In the context of Thai culture, therefore, privacy is not really a major concern 
but it is considered before developing organisational policy, particularly in an 
international company such as this one. Such consideration may help the organisation 
apply security policies more smoothly and easily.  
The CFO/CIO further explained that the other area of concern in human resources is the 
potential for information leaks, where internal information may be taken out of the 
organisation without proper controls. Therefore, this organisation requires strict controls 
in relation to securing data by establishing security policy to monitor all types of 
organisational data and information.  
The CFO/CIO added that ICT security awareness is another ICT security issue that may 
be influenced by Thai culture. Although Thai staff members understand the rules of 
security awareness, in general they do not think it is very important for them. In contrast 
to Western culture, based on the CFO/CIO‘s opinion, Thai staff members often ignore this 
issue and do what they want, unlike Western people who often seem to be concerned 
about pirated software, software licensing or intellectual property. Thus, in the Thai 
context these attitudes and behaviours may lead to the occurrence of ICT risk from ICT 
abuse and lack of awareness. With regard to ICT security policy, this organisation utilises 
software detection to monitor all types of software installed in the organisation‘s 
computers. Moreover, the organisation trains all staff about the potential risks from ICT 
abuses and displays its ICT security awareness program on sign boards around the office.  
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Control process 
Based on his consulting experience, the ICT Advisory Director pointed out that the 
organisational control process adopted by his clients starts with defining the control 
objectives. His clients‘ organisations must define their business objectives by recognising 
the rationale for using ICT, what is required from ICT and what purpose is served by ICT. 
The business objective therefore is the crucial element for an organisation to consider. In 
this regard, the COBIT framework is used to set business objectives that align with ICT 
objectives. The ICT Advisory Director further revealed that the COBIT framework clearly 
defines the alignment of business goals to ICT goals in order to achieve the ICT criteria 
stipulated in COBIT: effectiveness, efficiency, confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
compliance and reliability.  
The ICT Advisory Director stated that If ICT cannot make a business function efficiently 
and effectively, ICT risk will occur. Most ICT risks come from operations such as security 
risk, technical risk, financial risk and strategic risk. Thus, the ICT Advisory Director 
believed that his clients‘ organisations are concerned with the effectiveness of people, 
process, technology and system elements because this reflects the efficiency and 
effectiveness of ICT risk management.  
The ICT Advisory Director additionally claimed that security related to human resources 
is linked to security awareness of staff in his clients‘ organisations. Security in relation to 
process is associated with adequate performance of the ICT risk management process. 
Security related to technology involves an appropriate security system in application 
and/or in ICT infrastructure. In light of the above, his clients‘ organisations must 
recognise the sources of ICT risk such as people risk, process risk and technology and 
system risk. In this way, his clients‘ organisations can find effective ways to cope with 
ICT risk through the adoption of useful frameworks or standards.  
Comparing these practices with the practice in his own organisation, the CIO/CFO stated 
that the control objectives relating to the frameworks or standards in his organisation are 
focused on five main processes: a process of information systems management; a 
process of defining strategy; a process of security systems; a process of systems 
development and changes; and a process of business continuity management. The 
CIO/CFO noted that these five main processes are outlined in the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. The COBIT framework engages with the overall ICT control 
framework of an organisation. Other standards and frameworks such as the Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) are also considered in the organisational plan as 
ICT service management. The CIO/CFO revealed that: 
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“I think the main aim of an organisation is to utilise ICT enabling 
business process and ICT process efficiently and effectively; therefore, 
an organisation should focus on the heart of business and ICT elements 
which are internal and external environments: internal environment is 
data and information, people, and technology and system; external 
environment is services to customers.”  
Technology and systems 
The CIO/CFO said that organisational control regarding technology and system elements 
in this organisation is presently focused on data retention, which includes the 
management of information security and data. For example, this relates to how the 
organisation retains its data when a computer has been replaced or how the organisation 
manages the destruction of data. These are the critical ways for dealing with data 
retention regarding ICT risk management in this organisation.  
 
5.1.5 Organisational ICT strategy 
The CFO/CIO recommends that organisational ICT strategy not be the concern of only 
the senior management level but also of operational staff. The CFO/CIO added that using 
the COBIT framework alone is not sufficient for dealing with ICT risk management. The 
ICT Advisory Director similarly claimed that the nature of the COBIT framework is to 
provide guidance for the organisation to follow overall ICT control (i.e. technology) but 
that it does not provide detailed direction like the standard. The ICT Advisory Director 
concluded that the COBIT framework should be used together with other standards or 
frameworks, such as the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, to cover overall ICT control and 
specific security control (Figure 5-5).  
 
Figure 5-5: Suggestion for the selection of control objectives from the COBIT framework and the ISO standard: 
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To apply both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, the ICT Advisory 
Director suggests that his clients‘ organisations can select the most successful factors 
from each to deal effectively with ICT risk management. He revealed that COBIT is the 
framework that fits four criteria—people, process, technology and system—reflecting the 
real ICT risks. The ICT Advisory Director therefore concluded that the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard ought to be of primary concern in ICT risk 
management. The ICT Advisory Director further noted that the COBIT framework is 
responsible for ICT operation and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is responsible for ICT 
security. He explained that ICT operation includes planning and organising; acquisition 
and implementation; delivery and support; monitoring; asset management; access 
control; communication and operation management; and business continuity 
management. In contrast, ICT security covers security policy (e.g. technical security, 
human resources security, and physical security) and monitoring as explained by the ICT 
Advisory Director. Therefore, both ICT and ICT security operations are managed to put 
ICT risk under control, as described by the ICT Advisory Director. 
 
5.1.6 Summary 
The key factors addressed by, and which were the focus of, ICT risk management in this 
organisation and the clients‘ organisations, were: 
- policy; 
- management of ICT resources; 
- human resource management and planning or the management of people and 
their behaviour in the organisation; 
- information security management; and 
- ICT risk management planning. 
Policy for ICT risk management is defined in this organisation under the business, ICT 
and IS policies that are viewed from an organisational perspective in this organisation 
and from a consulting perspective in the clients‘ organisations. From the interviewees‘ 
point of view, ICT and IS policies are recognised to be the key factor to be considered 
when dealing with ICT risk management. Business continuity management is another 
element that is of significant concern in this organisation and in the clients‘ organisations.    
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The management of ICT resources is a key factor recognised by the interviewees in this 
organisation. The management of ICT resources is mainly based on the adequate 
provision of ICT application, software and ICT infrastructure to all staff levels.  
Human resource management and planning includes protection and security of human 
resources that can be impacted by human error, and the provision of appropriate skills 
and training for staff.  
The participants also highlighted that information security management is a major 
concern in terms of both technical risk and operational risk. This key factor is classified in 
terms of information security awareness and system security (e.g. data retention using 
software detection).  
Lastly, linking these practice based on the organisational and consulting perspectives to 
the research purposes, it is evident that senior management and the operational 
managers must plan ICT risk management at both the corporate and the operational 
levels. Organisational policy; management of ICT resources; human resources protection 
and security; and IS management all directly affect both the corporate level and the 
operational level planning around ICT risk management.  
 
5.2 Case study E 
5.2.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation provides a wide range of quality services such as audit, tax, financial 
and risk advisory services. The organisation helps firm clients improve their operational 
performance, mitigate risk and enhance value for both shareholders and stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the advisory services cover assisting firm clients to manage enterprise-wide 
risk management for corporate governance; restructuring of people management; and 
cross-border transactions to leverage ICT and intellectual assets. The Risk Advisory 
Services (RAS) group forms a major part of this service, which covers the following 
areas: governance, risk management and internal controls; environmental and social 
performance and reporting; and intellectual property and information systems. Moreover, 
these services are not only provided to clients but also constitute a major focus for this 
organisation internally. 
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5.2.2 Organisational structure 
Roles and responsibilities 
The Risk Advisory Director (RAD), who is also the Chief Information Officer (CIO), said 
that this organisation has assigned a risk management partner to be responsible for 
organisational risk management in the areas of business and ICT (Figure 5-6). The 
RAD/CIO further explained that organisational risk management is classified into two 
levels in the region (Asia-Pacific), covered by global and local risk management policy.  
 
Figure 5-6: Roles and responsibilities within global policy: Case study E 
Global policy is dictated by the holding organisation and implemented in all the regional 
branches around the world. Any change in global policy is normally precipitated by new 
incidents that impact on the organisation worldwide. In contrast, the main responsibility 
for local policy lies with senior management. Risk management is one critical part of this 
organisation which is handled by the risk management partner. The main role and 
responsibility of the risk management partner is to determine those people in the 
organisation who are responsible for dividing the risk management concerns (Figure 
5-7). For example, this organisation has divided the responsibility for risk management 
between the management committee board and the audit committee.   
 
Figure 5-7: Roles and responsibilities within local policy: Case study E 
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responsibilities for its staff to take responsibility for ICT risks. In this regard, the 
RAD/CIO explained: 
“I think every organisation should define „who‟, „which group‟, „which 
process‟, „when‟ and „how‟ to deal with risk technology.”  
Components of ICT risk management 
ICT risk management in this organisation covers two main areas: ICT operation and 
information security. ICT operation is identified by hardware, software and networks. In 
contrast, information security is related to user management, user account management, 
user authority, user rights, and security plans (i.e. personal firewall, filter spam and 
access control). ICT operation and information security in this organisation have to be set 
as organisational standards in order to prevent ICT risks cause by external impacts. For 
example, the organisation only provides a network port for its own computers; if any 
staff members bring their own computers (referred to as an ‗unstandardised pattern‘) to 
work, the system will automatically lock and clean up that particular network port.  
 
5.2.3 Organisational process 
ICT risk management instrument 
The RAD/CIO mentioned that ICT risk treatment is established at the corporate level 
every year. ICT risk treatment is known as security assessment in this organisation, 
which acts as the ICT risk management methodology that it uses to assess itself (Figure 
5-8). This assessment generates a ‗score‘, the details of which are provided to the global 
ICT security officer in the organisation. In so doing, the organisation gains an 
understanding of the weak and strong points in its systems and technology.  
 
Figure 5-8: ICT risk treatment: Case study E 
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After rating itself through the risk assessment and sending this score to the global team, 
the global team comes to reassess this performance and to provide guidelines on dealing 
with the weak points to improve local plans and policy. From this point of view, the 
RAD/CIO mentioned that risk assessment (once a year) and risk response (about four 
months each year) regarding ICT risk management are more important than risk 
monitoring because they enable the organisation to increase or reduce the actions for 
dealing with ICT risk. However, the RAD/CIO also stated that the organisation still needs 
to improve its monitoring of risk in order to better manage ICT risk. 
 
5.2.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
The primary concern of this organisation is focused on the control of staff who lack 
awareness about the potential for unintentional breaches of the system. This organisation 
attempts to avoid operational risk by forcing its staff to sign an agreement regarding 
information security policy. This agreement acts to control human risk or operational risk, 
which can be difficult to control and protect. The RAD/CIO revealed that: 
 “My organisation has the policy to control human action in both positive 
and negative ways; every staff member needs to sign the agreement 
that can help my organisation protect technology, process and people.” 
Control process  
The RAD/CIO explained that the ICT risk management process in this organisation is 
classified into three main areas:  
- Prioritising risk impact and the rating of risk potential as low, medium or high;  
- Using risk management software to evaluate the risks; and  
- Conducting an ICT security assessment using a balanced security score card 
based on the control objectives of the COBIT framework, the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard and the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
framework3.  
                                                   
3 The ITIL framework is a set of concepts and practices of Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) 
embedded in IT development and IT operations (OGC 2009). The main purpose of this framework is to help an 
organisation to deal with services in ICT process in order to improve customer services in both the internal and 
external environment (ITGI/OGC 2008).  
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In this organisation, most of the criteria related to the above come from the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard, while some derive from the COBIT and the ITIL frameworks in relation 
to the balance security score card. 
Technology and systems 
The RAD/CIO pointed out that recently the organisation had been focusing more on 
governance in relation to ICT and IS because these areas have become more critical to 
Thai business. The RAD/CIO added that the importance of ICT and IS governance has 
emerged from the introduction of a new Act in Thailand—the Computer Crime Act (CCA) 
2008—which mainly focuses on human resources. ICT has only recently become vital for 
organisations in Thailand, and now this new act is forcing organisations to comply with 
this law as a baseline, as noted by the RAD/CIO. 
 
5.2.5 Organisational ICT strategy 
The RAD/CIO mentioned that this organisation intends to improve ICT risk management 
and to mitigate ICT risk by focusing on four categories: governance, operations, 
development and compliance, which all relate to the COBIT and ITIL frameworks (Figure 
5-9). The RAD/CIO further stated that the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is the main focus of 
its ICT security risk management, while the COBIT and the ITIL frameworks supplement 
the ICT risk management planning, as shown in diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 5-9: ICT risk management goals and planning: Case study E 
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development and compliance as ICT risk management planning to supplement ICT 
security risk management. From there, these four areas help the organisation to define 
information security policy by using the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
 
5.2.6 Summary 
The key factors addressed by, and which were the focus of, ICT risk management in this 
organisation were: 
- policy; 
- management of ICT resources; 
- human resource management and planning or the management of people and 
their behaviour in the organisation; 
- information security management; and 
- ICT risk management planning. 
Policy for ICT risk management is set as both global and local policy to provide 
organisational guidelines for staff to follow. In this regard, local policy is divided into ICT 
policy and Information security policy for dealing with ICT risk management. ICT and IS 
policies are a major focus because, as the interviewees explained, they are the two key 
areas which are imperative for dealing ICT risk management in this organisation.  
ICT resource management is another success factor that this organisation uses to control 
ICT operation. ICT operation involves hardware, software and networks that penetrate 
the normal duties and functions of staff members. Therefore, this ICT operation is 
controlled in terms of providing appropriate and adequate ICT resources. Moreover, this 
organisation considers that ICT operation not only covers its own internal ICT processes 
but also relates to the service function for its clients.  
Human resource management and planning is another key factor for this organisation in 
terms of controlling human error, and human resources protection and security. This 
factor is raised to control human risk and/or operational risk which can be difficult to 
control and protect. The setting of roles and responsibilities for staff members is part of 
this key factor in this organisation.  
Information security management is a key factor to which this organisation pays 
attention because it helps control user management, user account management, user 
authority, user rights and security plans (i.e. personal firewall, filter spam and access 
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control). By doing so, this organisation can maintain its own systems using scanning tool 
software. Moreover, this organisation can also monitor any network port and only provide 
the network port for its own computers in order to mitigate, avoid and prevent any type 
of risk related to ICT. 
Lastly, reflecting on these practices in relation to the research purposes, this organisation 
establishes ICT risk management at the corporate level, which equates to a top-down 
process. The corporate level plan is then communicated to the operations level to 
develop its own operational plan. Therefore, in this organisation the key factors for ICT 
risk management planning include policy; ICT resource management; IS management; 
and human resource management and planning, which all directly affect the corporate 
level plan and indirectly affect the operational level plan in maintaining successful ICT 
risk management. 
 
5.3 Case study F 
5.3.1 Organisational profile 
This organisation delivers two types of business service—auditing and consulting—which 
cover a wide range of services. The risk management process is a critically important 
area of this organisation. The organisation assists firm clients to control and assess 
business risk by identifying and quantifying risk exposure and implementing systematic 
processes to manage risk. Their staff assist businesses to take advantage of 
opportunities derived from an improved understanding of risk, and ensure that 
management of risk is an explicit and integral part of everyday business. Its services 
regarding ICT risk management fall into the realms of corporate governance, risk 
management, internal audit, control assurance, application security, infrastructure 
security, information security management and business continuity planning. 
 
5.3.2 Organisational structure 
Roles and responsibilities 
This organisation has a global audit committee which is responsible for business and ICT 
risk management within the organisation (Figure 5-10). The Senior Consultant explained 
that the audit committee is responsible for the core business processes. In contrast, the 
ICT risk management plan in this organisation is the responsibility of the risk 
management committee which allocates duties to staff in relation to dealing with ICT 
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risks. The risk management committee in this organisation is where the ICT risk 
management plan is developed and directed, as shown in Figure 5-10 below.  
 
Figure 5-10: Roles and responsibilities: Case study F 
 
The Senior Consultant explained: 
“As we are an international consulting organisation, we need to follow 
the main office to conform to regulations and rules from the global audit 
committee. Focusing on ICT risk, the risk management committee is 
responsible for this.”   
ICT risk management treatment 
In terms of consultation, the Senior Consultant mentioned that his clients‘ organisations 
provide a framework for dealing with ICT risk for coordination at the corporate level. A 
framework based on organisational policy is best formulated at the corporate level 
(Figure 5-11). Such a framework will help an organisation to define an ICT risk 
management plan in order to prevent, avoid and mitigate ICT risks. In this regard, the 
Senior Consultant mentioned that defining the ICT risk management plan covers 
governance strategy, risk management policy and an action plan. Once the scope of the 
ICT risk management plan is established, his clients‘ organisations can establish their 
own methodology for dealing with ICT risks.   
     
Figure 5-11: A framework for ICT risk management treatment: Case study F 
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Components of ICT risk management 
According to the consultation perspective, the Senior Consultant noted that ICT control 
and audit in Thailand is still not well established because Thai organisations do not clearly 
separate the roles and responsibilities related to internal audit (business concern) and 
ICT audit (ICT concern) in his clients‘ organisations. Most Thai businesses, especially his 
clients, use an internal auditor as their ICT auditor, yet the Senior Consultant argued that 
this approach is not appropriate because it leads to a lack of sophistication and thus an 
inability to handle the complexity of ICT matters. Therefore, the Senior Consultant 
concluded that ICT control and audit must take into account information technology and 
information security.    
 
5.3.3 Organisational process 
ICT risk management instrument 
In practice, the ICT risk management process in this organisation is identified by six 
processes that the organisation considers when dealing with ICT risks (Figure 5-12). 
These six processes are used to help the organisation to understand:  
- what types of risk (identify and classify risks) the organisation encounters;  
- the probability that a risk may occur, and its impact;  
- what type of strategy needs to be provided to deal with risk;  
- how the strategy provided is deployed;  
- the effectiveness of ICT risk management; and  
- what risk assessment program needs to be adopted and whether ICT risks are 
mitigated to an acceptable level.  
 
Figure 5-12: ICT risk management instrument: Case study F 
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The potential risks include both internal and external risks. Internal risks relate to 
organisational strategy, operations and management programs, specifically how well 
these three areas are implemented in an organisation and which processes within them 
are poorly conducted.  
Secondly, estimating the probability and impact of identified risk from the first step is 
undertaken to ensure that the potential risks from both the internal and external 
environment do not threaten business strategies, objectives and goals. However, if there 
is a high probability that these potential risks will occur, or if they are likely to be 
significant, then the next step is required.  
Thirdly, defining the mitigation strategy is undertaken to address the core challenges of 
the risks and define the most effective and least costly or time-consuming ways to 
reduce both the impact and probability of the potential risks. By doing so, the 
organisation translates the core business transaction into business operations, training 
and services so that it can focus on only those areas threatened by a high risk impact 
and high risk probability. From there, the organisation can develop a mitigation strategy 
tailored to the risks in a specific area. Once the mitigation strategy is defined, it is taken 
to the next step. 
Fourthly, the mitigation strategy is implemented which involves measuring how effective 
the strategy is for the specific area and who is responsible for the strategy. By doing this, 
this organisation can eliminate potential risks, ensure that risks are mitigated, accept 
where there is potential risk and manage those potential risks appropriately.  
Fifthly, managing risk is used to evaluate the potential risk and the magnitude of ICT 
risk. The effectiveness of ICT risk management is revealed by how well it mitigates, avoid 
and prevent potential risk, so that it is maintained at an acceptable level. Lastly, 
evaluating risk is undertaken simultaneously with managing risk because the outcome of 
these two steps is to evaluate the potential probability and impact.   
 
5.3.4 Organisational control 
Human resources 
This organisation regulates human resources through a three-stage process. Starting 
from the input process, all new staff must sign the employment agreement of this 
organisation that delineates their obligations in relation to compliance to the 
organisation‘s guidelines on ICT risk. This aspect of the agreement is aimed at preventing 
the occurrence of ICT risks that result from misunderstandings about information 
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disclosure and confidentiality. This organisation thus ensures that all staff are trained and 
educated on these matters. The output process concerns the end of an employment 
contract or transferring an employee, requiring that the organisation remove the 
previous roles and responsibilities of an employee who resigns, and replace or change 
the relevant personal access codes or passwords, as outlined by the Senior Consultant.  
Control process 
In this organisation, the ICT risk management process is embedded in internal control 
and audit. Internal control and audit mainly focuses on enterprise risk management 
(ERM) which covers business risk and ICT risk management (Figure 5-13). The Senior 
Consultant described how, with regard to ICT, most control processes derive from the 
COBIT framework, which provides guidelines to senior management in this organisation. 
This organisation then uses this to plan its organisational strategy (the strategic 
components of ICT governance), operations (the operational components of ICT 
governance), and transformation (project change management and human resource 
management processes) in order to mitigate strategic risks, operational risks and 
financial risks respectively. 
 
Figure 5-13: Control process: Case study F 
Technology and systems 
In terms of consultation, the Senior Consultant argued that clients‘ organisations 
separate technology and systems into two types of ICT and system control. The internal 
environment is the first area of ICT and system control which is defined by control of ICT 
application and information security, as explained by the Senior Consultant. He further 
outlined that ICT application is controlled by focusing on general ICT which is relevant to 
ICT management. In contrast, information security is controlled by focusing on 
information security policy including password updates, policy maintenance and system 
control. The second type of ICT and system control is relevant to the external 
environment, which is identified by outsource vendors (ICT outsourcing) regarding the 
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service level agreement (SLA) between a vendor and the client organisation, as noted by 
the Senior Consultant. 
 
5.3.5 Organisational ICT strategy 
The Senior Consultant revealed that organisational ICT strategy in this organisation is 
mainly focused on the COBIT framework to set the organisational strategy, operation and 
transformation (Figure 5-14). The ISO/IEC 17799 standard is supplementary, informing 
the technical aspects of this organisation‘s operations. 
 
Figure 5-14: Control objectives for organisational ICT strategy: Case study F 
The Senior Consultant added that the strategy in this organisation is generated from the 
COBIT framework by selecting from its control objectives, as shown in Figure 5-14. He 
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also explained the organisational operations are activities that his organisation pays more 
attention to undertake ICT process. The operational activities in this organisation are also 
controlled by using the control objectives from the COBIT framework, as shown in Figure 
5-14. Next, the transformation is to help this organisation to rotate the roles and 
responsibilities of staff to perform in different duties in their department, and is used to 
manage and control the roles and responsibilities of human resources in this 
organisation. The transformation is drawn from the control objectives in the COBIT 
framework as shown in Figure 5-14. Lastly, information security management is used to 
supplement the security of all business transactions in this organisation by reference to 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, as represented in Figure 5-14. 
 
5.3.6 Summary 
The key factors addressed by, and which were the focus of, ICT risk management in this 
organisation were: 
- policy: 
- management of ICT resources; 
- human resource management and planning or the management of people and 
their behaviour in the organisation; 
- information security management; and 
- ICT risk management planning. 
Policy for ICT risk management is the first key factor that is used to guide the direction of 
this organisation. This factor covers business and ICT, including ICT and IS policies. 
According to the direction of the audit committee in this organisation, organisational 
strategy is divided to deal with ICT risk management in two directions (i.e. business and 
ICT). Therefore, business policy defines the business process, and ICT policy defines the 
ICT and IS process in this organisation.  
ICT resource management is considered a key factor in this organisation. This factor is 
the focus for determining how ICT resources are managed and provided to staff 
members. This key factor relates to ICT application in this organisation  
Another key factor in this organisation is information security management, which relates 
to system control including password updates, policy maintenance and information 
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security in ICT application. The main focus of this key factor lies with technical matters, 
specifically managing the complexity of ICT matters.  
Human resource management and planning is a major concern in terms of the roles and 
responsibilities of staff members in this organisation. Human resource management and 
planning includes the protection of staff members through a three-stage process: 
employment agreement, during employment and termination of employment.  
Lastly, aligning this organisational practice with the research purposes, ICT risk 
management is treated by the risk management committee where senior management 
develops and directs ICT risk management planning. This implies that this organisation 
performs and plans ICT risk management at the corporate level. The corporate level plan 
will then lead to the development of the operational level plan for dealing with ICT risk 
management. Moreover, organisational policy; ICT resource management; IS security; 
and human resource management and planning are critical factors in this organisation 
which are used to achieve successful ICT risk management, as revealed from the 
interviewees‘ accounts. Each success factor is explained in the following.   
    
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the current profile of ICT risk management in 
organisational practice for the case studies D, E and F. Based on the participants‘ views, 
ICT risk management is undertaken in relation to organisational structure, process, 
control and strategy. Each element of ICT risk management is discussed in turn next, 
with reference to the literature.  
Organisational structure  
Firstly, ICT risk management is governed by a separate committee which is responsible 
for different tasks in case studies E and F relating to ICT risk management.  Case study D 
did not have a committee to take responsibility for the ICT risk. However, case study D 
described the roles and responsibilities related to ICT risk management in terms of the 
consultation experience of the interviewees, specifically referring to how the company‘s 
client organisations managed ICT risk. Case study organisation D determined that ICT 
risk management is the main responsibility of senior management, embedded in 
organisational strategy. Case study organisation E has a risk management partner to 
take responsibility for risk management, including business, ICT and IS risks. The risk 
management partner in case study E assigns the audit committee to take charge of risk 
management. The audit committee in this organisation directs and monitors all types of 
risk including business, ICT and IS, regardless of the technical sophistication or 
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knowledge of the internal auditors when dealing with ICT and IS risks. In contrast, case 
study organisation F has an audit committee and a risk management committee which 
are responsible for risk management. In relation to ICT risk, the risk management 
committee in this organisation pays particular attention to providing an ICT risk 
management plan for its staff to follow. 
Secondly, the position level appropriate for ICT risk management treatment is considered 
important only by case study organisations D and F, but in each case from a different 
perspective. Based on their consulting experience, one of the interviewees from case 
study D suggested that ICT risk must be controlled and audited at both the corporate 
level and the operational level in order to help the organisation cover the treatment at 
both the origin of risk and at the risk impact. However, the other interviewee from case 
study D did not agree with this view, believing instead that ICT risk management should 
only be undertaken at the corporate level. In fact, organisation D provides ICT risk 
management treatment only at the corporate level. However, the operational level then 
follows the corporate plan when treating ICT risks. Similarly, case study organisation F 
also initiates ICT risk management treatment at the corporate level, for the operational 
level to follow.  
Thirdly, the components of ICT risk management include ICT control and audit as well as 
information security control and audit. According to organisations D and E and F, ICT risk 
management relates to ICT activities and information security activities when dealing 
with ICT risk. All organisations have set the terms for ICT activities within ICT policy, and 
information security activities within Information security policy. This means that the 
staff understand their roles and responsibilities when facing any type of risk from ICT, 
and that they report such incidents to the board.  
Organisational process  
Firstly, the risk statement is seen from a different perspective according to the position 
level. However, the details in the risk statement cover the process for the both the entire 
organisation and for specific functions in the organisation. From the perspective of the 
interviewees from organisation D, the risk statement is viewed as an ICT risk 
management instrument for the staff to follow at both the corporate level and the 
operational level. With regards to the meaning of the risk statement at both levels, ICT 
risk management is used to clarify the risk methodology in corporate and operational 
plans. For example, in the corporate plan regarding ICT risk management, the 
organisation sets the overall scope of ICT risk management. Furthermore, in the 
operational plan, the organisation sets the details of ICT risk management processes in 
line with the corporate plan. This establishes a clear process statement for dealing with 
ICT risk in its client organisations. Conversely, organisations E and F mainly focus on 
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providing the overall process of ICT risk management to all staff levels in the 
organisation.   
Secondly, in order to define the processes in the organisation, organisation F follows the 
guidelines from the internationally accepted framework of COBIT (ICT management), and 
the standard of ISO/IEC 17799 (information security management), as well as from 
enterprise risk management (business risk management) and ITIL (ICT services 
management). Case study organisation F is concerned with the appropriate processes 
from the COBIT framework, the ITIL framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard aligning 
with the ERM. These four standards can help organisation F to develop a methodology for 
business risk management, and ICT risk management including ICT resources, ICT 
services and information security. Case study organisation F mainly focuses on a top-
down approach driven by the corporate level, thus communicating its policy direction to 
the operational level. On the other hand, organisations D and E follow the COBIT 
framework, the ITIL framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard in order to specify the 
appropriate processes for ICT management, ICT services and information security 
perspectives through a corporate-level top-down process, which is then transferred to 
the operational for delivery through a bottom-up process.  
Organisational control  
The common concerns across all case study organisations are over the control of people, 
process, technology and systems. Because they are similar consulting organisations, 
organisations D, E and F concentrate on the control of business, service, ICT and IS 
functions simultaneously. By doing so, human resource management is emphasised 
because organisations D, E and F believe that staff are the main trigger of ICT risk, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally. The delivery of training and education programs 
is a method used by all three organisations. Participants from all three companies 
believed that this method can help their organisation to raise awareness of human 
resources regarding the control of human risk or operational risk, which can be difficult to 
control and protect. Case study organisations D, E and F also believe that through 
education and training staff members can better understand the direction of control in 
terms of technology and security. In this regard, organisations D, E and F formulate their 
control objectives to direct organisational processes regarding business, services, 
technology and security processes. Case study organisation D participants explained that 
its control objectives are focused on a process of information systems management; a 
process of defining strategy; a process of security system; a process of systems 
development and change; and a process of business continuity management. In doing 
so, organisation F concluded that these control processes help mitigate strategic, 
operational and financial risks. 
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Organisational ICT strategy  
Organisational ICT strategy as revealed through these three case studies illustrates that 
these organisations focus on ICT risk management in different ways. However, the 
interviews raised common issues and concerns in relation to ICT strategy. Furthermore, 
both top-down and bottom-up processes are considered valuable by similar types of 
business, which type of approach is best clarified when an organisation first begins 
planning around ICT risk management.  Case study organisations E and F established risk 
management planning at the corporate level within the overall ICT plan, which then 
directs the operational plan by covering both ICT management and IS management. In 
contrast, a perspective revealed in case study D was that ICT risk management should 
be considered and planned at both the corporate and operational levels, as ICT risk 
management and ICT project risk management respectively. Moreover, different 
management levels (senior and operational managers) in the case study organisations 
were concerned that the ICT risk management plan might be divided between 
departments, meaning there is no consensus agreement at both levels. This means that 
ICT risk management is planned at the corporate level to cover the overall scope of ICT 
risk management, while the operational level plans ICT project risk management in detail 
within each relevant department. However, in this case both ICT risk management and 
ICT project risk management can be planned in the same direction according to the 
overall organisational ICT risk management plan. In this regard, it can be seen that 
successful ICT risk management planning focuses on collaboration between the 
management level activities and the operational level activities in order to deal with ICT 
risks effectively. 
According to four themes, certain key factors emerged from the interviews which are 
seen to determine successful ICT risk management in each organisation. The key factors 
in case study organisations D, E and F are policy; management of ICT resources; human 
resource management and planning; information security management; the corporate 
level plan; and the operational level plan. In case studies D, E and F it was revealed that 
ICT risk management is focused at both the corporate and operational levels. The 
corporate level sets the overall ICT risk management plan, while the operational level 
establishes the specific technical security plan for ICT. Furthermore, for both the 
corporate and operational levels in the three organisations it was revealed that policy; 
human resource management and planning; information security management; and 
management of ICT resources are the key factors to consider when dealing with ICT risk 
management. The next chapter discusses the cross-case analysis (among case studies A, 
B, C, D, E and F) and the survey development based on the qualitative findings from 
Chapter 4 and this chapter.  
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Chapter 6  
PHASE II: SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter reports on the cross-case analysis among all six case studies, and the 
survey development based on the key conclusions of Chapters 4 and 5. The key 
conclusions from Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that policy, human resource management and 
planning, management of ICT resources and organisational information security 
management affect both the corporate level and operational level plan when maintaining 
successful ICT risk management. This chapter begins with a comparative analysis of case 
studies A, B, C, D, E and F by comparing themes derived from Chapters 4 and 5. The 
cross-case analysis concludes the qualitative findings in comparison with the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. This chapter then develops indicators for 
each construct and constructs. The chapter concludes with an outline of the development 
of both the survey questionnaire and the conceptual model, which are validated in 
Chapter 7. 
 
6.1 The cross-case analysis of the six case studies 
Four different kinds of business (banking, telecommunications, software development 
and international consulting) are represented in the six case studies reported in Chapters 
4 and 5. Each case study represents an exemplar of an effective way of dealing with ICT 
risk management. However, certain key points are highlighted, which demonstrate both 
similar and opposing perspectives. The common standards and frameworks, like the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, are used and recommended in the 
six cases for the control and management of ICT risk to an acceptable level. The key 
organisational elements for dealing with ICT risk management can be categorised into 
four main perspectives: organisational structure, organisational process, organisational 
control and organisational technical strategy.  
On the basis of the case study findings, a thematic analysis of organisational elements 
related to ICT risk management was undertaken, out of which emerged the following: 
1. Organisational perspective, which composed of: 
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a. Roles and responsibilities, which were categorised according to: 
i. Audit committee (business process) 
ii. ICT committee (information and communication technology—ICT 
process) 
iii. IS committee (information security—IS process) 
b. ICT risk treatment, which was concerned at: 
i. The corporate level  
ii. The operational level 
c. Components of ICT risk management, which were classified by: 
i. ICT control and audit 
ii. IS control and audit 
2. Organisational process, which was referred to: 
a. Instrument (risk statement), which was focused upon: 
i. ICT risk management methodology 
ii. ICT risk project management methodology 
3. Organisational control, which was categorised by: 
a. People 
b. Process  
c. Technology and systems 
4. Organisational Technological Strategy can be explained by either: 
a. a top-down approach, or  
b. a bottom-up approach 
5. Other issues related to ICT risk management in organisations. 
ICT risk management in the six case studies is embedded in the internal control and 
audit function. Internal control and audit in these organisations assume the main 
responsibility of risk management. All six organisations confirmed that their organisation 
reviews and defines its own internal control and audit policy to control both business 
risks and ICT risks. ICT governance has been shown in the COBIT framework to assist 
Thai organisations to provide strategic direction for technology in order to achieve 
business goals and objectives and to deal with ICT risks (ITGI 2007). ICT governance in 
the case studies has been focused on two main perspectives: ICT operations and ICT 
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security. ICT operations are managed at the corporate level in these organisations, and 
are defined clearly in the corporate plan in order to deal with ICT risk appropriately. ICT 
security is clarified at the operational level (the term ‗the operational plan‘ and ‗the 
action plan‘ are used interchangeably in this research), whose action plan or the 
operational plan is then provided to senior management for review and revision to ensure 
compliance across the entire organisation. The themes of the qualitative analysis arose 
from the case studies are discussed next. 
 
6.1.1 Organisational perspective 
Organisational structure was highlighted in the six case studies as requiring review 
before planning ICT risk management in these organisations (Table 6-1). The case study 
organisations were all concerned with the appropriate allocation of responsibility to 
employees with regard to risk management. This role allocation is initiated not only from 
the top to be delivered down, but also takes place at the bottom and is communicated to 
the upper levels in order to reach a consensus plan for the whole organisation. A 
consensus plan also provides the details of ICT risk components which must be assigned 
to roles of relevant staff in the organisation. A consensus plan covers the responsibilities 
of staff dealing with ICT risk; the roles and tasks involved in controlling ICT risks; ICT 
risk management procedures; and controlling the main components of ICT which the 
risks might threaten.  
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 Table 6-1: A summary of the cross-case comparison of organisational perspective 
Main process Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Similarities Differences Findings 
Define roles 
and 
responsibilities 
for ICT risk 
management  
Define 
- Audit 
committee1 
- Risk 
management 
committee2 
- Enterprise-
wide security 
committee3 
Define 
- Audit committee 
- Not specified - Not specified Define 
- Audit 
committee 
Define 
- Global audit 
committee 
- Audit committee 
- Risk management 
committee 
Define 
- Roles and 
responsibilities 
for business 
direction                                                                                 
Define 
- Roles and 
responsibilities 
for ICT and 
Security
directions 
Focus on roles and 
responsibilities of  
- Business 
- ICT 
- Security 
Define ICT risk 
management 
treatment 
Treat at 
- The 
corporate 
level 
- The 
operational 
level 
Treat at 
- The corporate 
level 
- The operational 
level 
Treat at 
- The project 
management 
which acts as the 
operational level 
Treat at 
- The global level 
- The corporate 
level 
- The operational 
level 
Treat at 
- The global level 
- The local level 
 
Treat at 
- The global level 
- The local level 
 The corporate 
level 
 The operational 
level 
Treat at 
- Top-down 
approach  
- Bottom-up 
approach 
Treat at 
- The project 
approach 
Focus on 
- Management 
view 
- Operational 
view 
- Project view 
 
Define 
components of 
ICT risk 
management  
Define 
- ICT 
resources 
- ICT security 
Define 
- ICT resources 
- ICT security 
Define 
- ICT security 
Define 
- ICT resources 
- ICT security 
Define 
- ICT resources 
- Information 
security (IS) 
Define 
- ICT management 
- Information 
security 
Define 
- ICT resources 
- Information 
security 
management 
- Concern with 
- ICT function  
- IS function 
Define 
components of 
ICT control and 
audit as 
general IT 
Define  
- ICT 
applications 
- Risk 
assessment 
Define  
- Applications 
- Operating 
system 
- Networks  
- Other ICT 
systems 
- Not specified Define  
- ICT operation 
Define 
- Hardware 
- Software  
- Networks 
Define 
- ICT resources 
 
Define  
- ICT resources 
- Associated with 
- Management of 
ICT resources 
Define 
components of 
ICT security or 
security ICT 
Define  
- ICT security 
in security 
policy 
Develop  
- ICT security in 
security policy  
Define  
- ICT security in 
project 
management 
Define  
- ICT security 
Define  
- ICT security 
management 
Define  
- ICT security 
management 
Define 
- Information 
security 
management 
- Associated with 
- Information 
security 
management 
Define a risk 
statement 
Define  
- A risk 
statement as 
an entire 
organisation
al plan 
Define  
- A risk statement 
as an entire 
organisational 
plan 
Define  
- A risk statement 
as a project 
management 
plan 
Define  
- A risk statement 
as an entire 
organisational plan 
- A risk statement 
as a specified 
functional plan 
  
Define 
- A risk 
statement as 
an entire 
organisational 
plan 
Defined  
- A risk statement 
as an entire 
organisational 
plan 
Define  
- A risk 
statement as 
an entire 
organisational 
plan 
Define  
- A risk 
statement as a 
specific plan 
(project 
management)  
Declare a risk 
statement at 
- The corporate 
level 
- The operational 
level as a 
project 
1. Audit committee is in charge of business risk.    
2. Risk management committee is in charge of all types of risk.  
3. Enterprise-wide security committee is in charge of ICT security risk in particular.
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Firstly, in all of these case studies setting up a committee determines those responsible 
for directly controlling a particular area of ICT risk management. This classifies the tasks 
for dealing with ICT risk into three areas: business direction, technological direction and 
security direction. Each direction is supported by the Board of Directors or the 
management committee. These approaches help the organisations to define 
responsibility for specific matters in particular areas, in turn to achieve business goals 
and objectives. Moreover, these approaches help organisations to define business and 
ICT processes, and organisational relationships. For example, case study organisation A 
divides the main tasks of the management committee into three areas in order for each 
objective to be managed separately. This illustrates that business objectives, ICT 
objectives and security objectives are taken into account at the same time that this 
business is growing. Moreover, each committee has the ability to define its own 
processes and to understand the circumstances surrounding the business in order to 
achieve the organisation‘s goals and objectives.  
In terms of a systematic plan, it can be seen that these case studies reveal well-defined 
business processes, ICT processes, organisational relationships and management of 
information security. This reflects the usage of the control objectives of the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard in planning, organising and management of 
information security.  
Secondly, ICT risk management treatment is a focus at both the corporate and the 
operational levels. Each level is responsible for different tasks related to defining the 
business direction, technological direction and information security direction. The 
corporate level determines the corporate plan in respect to ICT risk management as an 
entire organisational plan. In contrast, the operational level must determine the action 
plan with specific technical details to serve the corporate plan of the organisation. After 
development, the action plan is then fed back to the corporate level for review, to ensure 
it fits the business, technology and technical criteria for a particular function.  
Both the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach are implemented as part of a 
consensus agreement on how to deal with ICT risk management. The COBIT framework 
is used at the corporate level to set the corporate plan for dealing with ICT risk 
management as an entire organisational plan, as evidenced in all case studies. This falls 
within the domain of planning and organising around determining technological direction 
and managing projects. Conversely, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is used at the 
operational level to set the specific action plan for dealing with ICT risk management. It 
is mapped with security policy and the management of information security. 
Thirdly, ICT risk management includes the components general ICT control and audit, 
and ICT security control and audit. General ICT control and audit must ensure that all 
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general ICT matters are controlled and audited properly by focusing on ICT risk 
management methodology. In essence, in all of the case studies except for case study C 
management utilises the COBIT framework to align ICT strategy with business strategy. 
Case study C, conversely, is concerned only with the information security component 
rather than ICT management because this organisation deals in software development. 
The major tasks of software development involve computer programming; as a result the 
process of ICT risk management focuses only on the technical perspective. However, 
most case study organisations were of the opinion that the COBIT framework should be 
used to set the overall ICT strategy as part of the overall organisational plan. On the 
other hand, the ISO/IEC 17799 framework is used to set the specific technical details on 
information security, as shown in case study C. It is mapped with the operational level 
rather than the corporate level. In order to effectively plan ICT risk management, these 
organisations consider using both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
to generate specific plans at different levels. In this regard, the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard supplement each other in ICT risk management planning, as 
shown by case studies A, B, D, E and F.  
Fourthly, in regard to ICT control and audit (i.e. general ICT), it has been illustrated in 
these case studies that people, process, technology and systems are controlled and 
monitored by focusing on ICT applications, operating systems, networks and other ICT 
systems (i.e. ICT management). Thus, it is important that general ICT is managed 
properly. People, process, technology and systems are represented in the COBIT 
framework in the control objectives of information architecture, technology resources and 
information technology process. Moreover, the COBIT framework stipulates that these 
four processes be monitored in the planning and organising domain.  
Fifthly, it has been shown that, as a component of ICT security control and audit (i.e. ICT 
security), all types of information security techniques are performed in association with 
the security transaction embedded in business and ICT processes. It is evident that the 
six case study organisations pay more attention to security policy in dealing with ICT 
security risk by using the information security management standard of the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard. On the other hand, the COBIT framework does not clearly specify ICT 
security techniques because it is a framework for setting ICT governance at the highest 
level, according to the interviewees. Thus, ICT security control and audit follow the 
standard of information security management (i.e. the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) by 
focusing on security management. 
Lastly, a risk statement is used in these organisations to define ICT risk methodology. 
The methodology of the risk statement provides a brief outline of ICT risk management 
as an overall plan. From there, this plan is transferred to the operational level to be 
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applied to a specific technical area in order to fit with a particular function. This risk 
statement is provided by both the corporate level and the operational level. However, a 
risk statement at the corporate level is a vital part of an operational risk statement 
because it is relevant to a corporate risk statement. It is discussed next. 
 
6.1.2 Organisational process 
The ICT risk management instrument is vital for determining the ICT risk management 
process at both the corporate and operational levels (Table 6-2). Moreover, an ICT risk 
management instrument serves an entire organisation as an overall plan in association 
with business objectives, technological objectives and technical security objective. In this 
regard, the case study organisations separate their ICT risk management instruments 
into one at the corporate level and one at the operational level. Nevertheless, the 
corporate risk management instrument provides an overall ICT risk management 
processes, in contrast, the operational risk management instrument further details 
technical matter regarding information security systems. Both of these then instruments 
supplement each other to help their organisations follow a common direction. Moreover, 
the ICT risk management instrument is outlined by the COBIT framework in planning and 
organising domain, and by the ISO/IEC 17799 in the area of communication and 
operation management.  
A risk statement is an example of an ICT risk management instrument which the six case 
study ICT risk management used to explain the main roles of ICT risk management at 
both the corporate level and the operational level. A risk statement outlines the 
responsibilities entailed in risk management, risk management methodology, risk control 
and auditable areas. A risk statement is used to determine the responsibilities of 
management and operational staff in regard to directing, operating, monitoring and 
treating risk. The methodology of a risk statement is explained in the setting of risk 
objectives, risk identification, risk assessment, risk response and risk monitoring as 
presented in the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. Risk management 
methodology is performed by management and operational staff simultaneously. 
Mapping with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, the control of the 
risk statement and its auditable areas is presented in the section on assessing and 
managing ICT risks and managing projects in the COBIT framework. In contrast, the risk 
statement and its auditable areas are covered in the section on communications and 
operations management in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
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Table 6-2: A summary of the cross-case comparison of organisational process 
Main process Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Similarities Differences Finding 
Define 
ICT risk 
management 
instrument 
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the senior 
management 
level  
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the senior 
management 
level 
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the 
operational 
level 
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the senior 
management 
level 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the operational 
level 
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the senior 
management 
level 
Define 
- ICT risk 
instrument at 
the senior 
management 
level 
ICT risk 
instrument is 
defined at the 
senior 
management 
level 
ICT risk 
instrument is 
defined at the 
operational level  
Provide ICT risk 
instrument for 
both  
- The corporate 
function  
- The operational 
function 
Define 
A risk 
statement as 
instrument 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk methodology 
in 
- The corporate 
level plan 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk 
methodology in 
- The corporate 
level plan 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk 
methodology at  
- The 
operational as 
a project risk 
management 
plan 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk methodology 
in  
- The corporate 
level plan 
- The operational 
level plan as a 
function 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk methodology 
in  
- The corporate 
level plan 
Define the 
statement of ICT 
risk methodology 
in 
- The corporate 
level plan 
Risk statement 
is defined as the 
ICT risk 
methodology in 
the corporate 
level plan 
Risk statement 
is defined as the 
ICT risk 
methodology in 
the operational 
level plan 
ICT risk 
management 
methodology is 
defined in the 
corporate level 
and the 
operational level 
plans. 
Define 
ICT risk 
management 
process 
Implement  
- COBIT  
- ISO/IEC 17799  
Implement 
- ERM  
- COBIT  
Implement 
- ISO/IEC 
17799  
Implement 
- COBIT  
- ISO/IEC 17799  
Implement 
- COBIT  
- ISO/IEC 17799  
- ITIL  
Implement 
- ERM  
- COBIT  
- ISO/IEC 17799  
Implement 
- COBIT 
Implement 
- ERM 
- ISO/IEC 
17799 
- ITIL 
Clarify details of 
ICT risk 
management 
process in terms 
of 
- ICT risk 
assessment and 
management 
- ICT risk project 
assessment and 
management 
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The next section discusses the analysis of another theme which is organisational control.  
 
6.1.3 Organisational control 
Organisational control is divided into the areas of human resources, process, technology, 
and systems in the case study organisations (Table 6-3). The control of human resources 
is focused on human resources protection and security simultaneously because 
employees influence organisational management regarding business, ICT, security and 
service functions. Business function is controlled by directing the awareness of employees 
in relation to ICT in turn to avoid any obstacles to the business objectives. ICT function 
relates to employees in terms of the control of computer abuse such as sharing 
confidential data, files or databases. Security function is concerned with whether 
employees access, perform and treat digital data, files and information appropriately. In 
this regard, the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard are used to manage 
such issues by focusing on the control objectives of managing IT human resources; 
educating and training users; access control; and human resources protection and 
security. 
The control process focuses on the ‗input‘, ‗processing‘ and ‗output‘ (IPO) processes of 
technological activities in order to monitor data through organisational processes (e.g. 
starting from generating data to disseminating information processes). It is imperative 
that the control process defines procedures that serve the business, ICT, security and 
service functions correctly and accurately. Thus, these four main functions must be 
served by proper procedures that define, manage and ensure the effectiveness of the 
business strategy, the ICT strategy and the security strategy.  
Business function is relevant to employee performance in terms of providing the service 
function by using the ICT function and the ICT security function correctly and accurately. 
The case study organisations all define and manage business process to ensure it meets 
business objectives. Furthermore, defining business function is conducted not only at the 
corporate level but also at the operational level. At the corporate level these 
organisations provide the control objectives for managing problems, managing the 
physical environment and managing operations based on the COBIT framework. Whereas 
at the operational level these organisations provide the control objectives for information 
security incident management based on the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
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Table 6-3: A summary of the cross-case comparison of organisational control 
Main process Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Similarities Differences Finding 
Control 
Human 
resources 
Plan to control 
- ICT security 
awareness 
- Computer 
abuses  
- Educating and 
training 
program 
- Rules and 
regulations 
- Human 
resources 
security 
 
Plan to control 
- Access control 
- Roles and  
responsibilities 
Plan to control 
- Human 
resources 
protection 
and security 
Plan to control 
- Information 
privacy 
- ICT security 
awareness 
- Educating and 
training 
program 
Plan to control 
- ICT 
awareness 
- Agreement of 
information 
security 
policy 
 
Plan to control 
- The 
employment 
agreement 
prior to 
employment, 
during 
employment 
and ending 
employment 
or transferring 
position 
 
Plan to control 
- ICT and security 
awareness 
- Human resources 
protection and 
security 
 
Plan to control 
- Roles and 
responsibilities as 
outlined in the 
employment 
agreement  
- Educating and 
training program 
- Rules and 
regulations as 
compliance 
Plan to control  
- Business 
impact 
- ICT impact 
- Security 
impact 
Control 
Process 
Control the 
process of  
- Internal 
control 
- Information 
management 
- Security 
treatment  
- Setting the 
configuration 
- Penetration 
test 
- Security 
scanning tool 
- Auditable area 
Control the 
process of 
- Internal control 
- Information 
management 
- Auditable area 
- Security 
management 
- Setting the 
configuration 
- Data 
authentication 
Control the 
process of 
- Security in 
software 
development 
as project 
management 
Control the 
process of 
- Organisation of 
information 
systems 
- Security 
systems 
- System 
development 
and changes 
- Business 
continuity 
management 
Control the 
process of  
- Risk 
management 
software 
- Risk 
assessment in 
balance 
security score 
card 
Control the 
process of  
- Internal 
control 
- Information 
management 
- Information 
security 
management 
Control the process of  
- Information 
security 
management 
o Setting the 
configuration 
o Data 
authentication 
o Security 
scanning tool 
o Penetration 
test  
o Business 
continuity 
management 
Control the process 
of 
- Internal control1 
o Auditable 
area 
- ICT management 
o Organisation 
of information 
systems 
o System 
development 
and changes 
o Business 
continuity 
management 
Plan to control 
- Business 
process 
- ICT process 
- Security 
process 
Control 
Technology 
and systems 
Plan to control 
- ICT application 
- ICT security  
Plan to control 
- General control 
- Application 
control  
Plan to control 
- Communication 
infrastructure2 
Plan to control 
- Data 
- Information 
 
Plan to control 
- ICT 
application 
- ICT security 
Plan to control 
- ICT 
application 
- Information 
security 
Plan to control 
- ICT management 
- ICT security 
management 
Plan to control 
- Service 
management 
Plan to control  
- Service 
function 
- ICT function  
- Security 
function 
1. Internal control is a major task of business process.  
2. Communication infrastructure is controlled to provide the quality of organisational services for customers.  
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Service function is connected to internal and external services such that the case study 
organisations define and manage service process to ensure it meets service objectives. 
Service function is focused on defining and managing service levels; ensuring continuous 
service; and managing the service desk and incidents, as outlined in the COBIT 
framework. It is also focused on maintaining business continuity management based on 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, in order to achieve the competitiveness of business service 
in a timely manner in both internal and external operations. However, service function, 
including both the involvement of internal and external parties, remains unaddressed in 
this study. Furthermore, it is not mentioned in detail at this level because it relates to 
another standard of ICT service management called the Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL). 
ICT function also needs to be controlled to meet ICT objectives. The case study 
organisations all define and manage ICT function to ensure that it meets ICT objectives. 
ICT function penetrates not only the corporate level regarding managing performance 
and capacity, managing the configuration and managing data based on the COBIT 
framework, but also the operational level in connection to data and information integrity 
management based on the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
It is necessary that security function also be controlled. These organisations all define 
and manage the security function process to ensure that it meets information security 
objectives. Security function not only penetrates the corporate level to ensure system 
security based on the COBIT framework, but also the operational level to provide physical 
and environment security and information security incident management based on the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
Technology and systems are controlled by concentrating on ICT function at the corporate 
level and information security function at the operational level. ICT function is general 
ICT which includes overall ICT planning for matters such as networking, data 
management and infrastructure. ICT function is controlled by managing performance and 
capacity; managing the configuration; managing problems; managing data; managing 
operations; monitoring and evaluating IT performance; monitoring and evaluating 
internal control; ensuring compliance with external requirements; and providing ICT 
governance, as illustrated in the COBIT framework. Concurrently, ICT security is a 
specific technical area that requires management at both the corporate level, by ensuring 
systems security based on the COBIT framework, and the operational level, regarding 
communications and operations, and compliance based on the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. 
The next section discusses the analysis of the last theme which is organisational ICT 
strategy. 
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6.1.4 Organisational ICT strategy 
Organisational technical strategy mainly focuses on ICT strategy regarding ICT risk 
management planning and the revision of ICT departmental structure, as communicated 
by the interviewees (Table 6-4). ICT strategy is generally based on a top-down approach, 
which is similar to the direction stipulated in the COBIT framework. The COBIT 
framework asserts that overall ICT strategy planning is based at the highest level (i.e. 
senior management or the Board of Directors). Overall ICT strategy is then delivered to 
operational staff for implementation. Adopting this one-way approach (i.e. top-down 
approach) controls only one perspective; for example, the overall ICT plan is generated 
from the managerial perspective which leads to a singular focus on general ICT. 
Conversely, ICT security is not treated in this way. Thus, the interviewees revealed that a 
bottom-up approach as stipulated by the ISO/IEC 17799 standard can be used to develop 
organisational technical strategy by focusing on two directions when dealing with ICT risk 
management. 
Generally, the COBIT framework is used to generate an ICT risk management plan at the 
management level in the case study organisations. It could therefore be claimed that ICT 
risk management planning is primarily influenced by management perceptions. Moreover, 
from the interviewees‘ perspectives the COBIT framework itself encourages management 
to plan ICT risk management as an overall ICT strategy without reference to specific 
technical areas. This approach is not able to deal with general ICT risks and specific ICT 
security risks simultaneously. Therefore, the operational level becomes vital to enrich the 
perceptions of ICT risk management by focusing on multiple perspectives regarding 
general IT and specific ICT security. It is therefore suggested, by the participants, that 
both the corporate and the operational levels plan ICT risk management together by 
reaching a consensus agreement on the plan. Lastly, the ICT department needs to review 
organisational structure in terms of managing the different roles and responsibilities 
related to general ICT function and ICT security function. However, general ICT function 
and ICT security function must be managed through a collaborative process. Thus, the 
question has been raised around why general ICT and ICT security functions are 
performed in different departments or areas. In fact, each function has its own roles and 
responsibilities for developing ICT risk management planning, yet organisation C still has 
only one department that is responsible for the two tasks (i.e. ICT management and ICT 
security). Therefore, this issue arose in the interviews with organisation C, and requires 
further consideration. 
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Table 6-4: A summary of the cross-case comparison of organisational ICT strategy  
Main process Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Similarities Differences Finding 
Define 
Strategies 
Defined from 
- The managerial 
perspective 
Defined from 
- The 
operational 
perspective 
Defined from 
- The operational 
perspective 
Defined from 
- The managerial 
perspective 
- The operational 
perspective 
Defined from 
- The managerial 
perspective 
- The operational 
perspective  
Defined from 
- The managerial 
perspective 
- The operational 
perspective 
Strategies are 
defined from the 
managerial 
perspective 
Strategies are 
defined from the 
operational level 
perspective 
Define 
organisational 
strategies as 
- Overall IT plan  
- Specific IT 
security 
details  
Define 
ICT risk 
management 
plan 
Include the plan in 
- The corporate 
plan 
- The operational 
plan 
Include the plan 
in 
- The 
corporate 
plan 
- The 
operational 
plan 
Include the plan in 
- The operational 
plan 
 
Include the plan in 
- The corporate 
plan 
- The operational 
plan 
Include the plan in 
- The corporate 
plan 
- The operational 
plan 
Include the plan in 
- The corporate 
plan 
- The operational 
plan 
ICT risk 
management plan 
is clarified in both 
the corporate plan 
and the operational 
plan 
-  Define the plan 
as 
- Consensus 
plan at the 
corporate plan 
- Individual plan 
at the 
operational 
plan 
Recommend 
Revision of IT 
department 
structure 
- Not specified - Not specified - IT department 
- IT security 
function 
- Not specified - Not specified - Not specified -  Recommend to 
revise the role 
and responsibility 
of ICT function 
and ICT security 
function 
 
Concern with 
- Direction of 
reporting to 
management 
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From the analysis of the comparison tables above and from the literature review in 
Chapter 2, the 14 key processes have been illustrated in relation to organisational 
structure, organisational control, organisational process and organisational technical 
strategy. Each key processes leads to different findings which represent the various 
perceptions of successful ICT risk management revealed in the case studies. The 14 key 
processes consisted of: 
- defining role and responsibility for ICT risk management, 
- defining ICT risk management treatment, 
- defining components of ICT risk management, 
- defining components of ICT control and audit as general ICT, 
- defining components of ICT security or security ICT, 
- defining a document of policy (i.e. a risk statement), 
- defining ICT risk management instrument, 
- defining ICT risk management process, 
- controlling human resources, 
- controlling ICT processes, 
- controlling technology and systems, 
- defining organisational ICT strategy, 
- defining ICT risk management at the corporate level (i.e. a corporate plan),  
- defining ICT risk management at the operational level (i.e. a operational plan), 
and 
The 14 key processes embedded in the four themes (organisational structure, 
organisational control, organisational process and organisational technical strategy) are 
compared with the control objectives in the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
before developing the survey in detail in the next section. The 14 key processes in the 
perception of the respondents in the case studies (reported in Chapter 4, 5 and this 
chapter) highlighted separate and sometime overlapping key factors as follows: 
- defining organisational ICT strategy and defining a document of policy reflected 
the setting of policy in the case studies, 
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- defining components of ICT risk management, controlling ICT processes, defining 
components of both ICT control and audit reflected the management of ICT 
resources, 
- defining components of ICT risk management, defining components of ICT 
security or security and controlling technology and system ICT reflected the 
management of information security, 
- defining role and responsibility for ICT risk management and controlling human 
resources reflected the management of people and their behaviour in the case 
studies,  
- defining ICT risk management treatment, defining components of ICT control and 
audit as general ICT and defining ICT risk management process at the corporate 
level reflected the planning of a corporate plan, and 
- defining ICT risk management treatment, defining components of ICT security or 
security ICT and defining ICT risk management process at the operational level 
reflected the planning of an operational plan. 
These processes then encapsulated the six key factors (policy, the management of ICT 
resources, the management of information security, the management of human 
resources, a corporate plan and an operational plan) that were discussed along with the 
comparison of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. The foci of the six 
key factors are relevant to the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as 
outlined in the following section.  
 
6.2 Comparing practices with the COBIT framework and the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard  
Six key factors (policy, the management of ICT resources, the management of 
information security, the management of human resources, a corporate plan and an 
operational plan) have been highlighted and recommended in the case studies. Each key 
factor can then be mapped with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
in order to reconfirm or reject them in the survey. The researcher used the control 
objectives from both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard to compare 
with ICT risk management practices in Thai organisations in order to develop the survey 
questions. Although the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard cover 
different areas, this recommendation can help the researcher to explore success factor 
for the planning of ICT risk management by including policy, ICT applications (i.e. 
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technology management), ICT security (i.e. information security management) and 
employees and their behaviour in an organisation (i.e. human resource management and 
planning) and aligning the corporate plan with the operational plan. When considering 
both the corporate and operational plans, ICT governance context can help the 
researcher understand the direction of ICT risk management which can be referred to as: 
‗The set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and 
executive management with the goal of providing strategic direction, 
ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed 
appropriately and verifying that the enterprise‘s resources are used 
responsibly‘ (ITGI 2006b, p. 11). 
This recommendation also assists with the contextualisation of ICT risk management 
practice in Thai organisations as discussed in the remainder of this chapter. The control 
objectives are discussed in the following section based on the key factors identified from 
the case studies. The key factors and the relationship among them derived from the case 
studies were placed in the Successful ICT Risk Management (SICTRM), which has been 
followed by the researcher throughout this study. 
 
6.2.1 Policy 
Organisational policy can be defined based upon the control objectives of the COBIT 
framework, and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard which: 
 
‗provides strategic direction, ensures that objectives are achieved, [and] 
manages risks appropriately‘ (ITGI 2006b, p. 18). 
 
This research identifies the necessary control objectives of policy to capture success 
factor of the SICTRM model. 
 
The COBIT framework consists of:  
- Defining a strategic ICT plan (PO1)4 
- Determining technological direction (PO3) 
- Ensuring continuous service (DS4) 
 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard consists of: 
- Security policy 
                                                   
4 From this point, the codes in the brackets are referred to as the control objectives in the COBIT framework. 
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- Organisation of information security 
- Communication and operations management 
- Business continuity management 
 
In relation to organisational policy, both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard were considered when determining the control objectives above. The next 
section identifies important control objective concerning the management of ICT 
resources. 
 
6.2.2 Management of ICT resources 
ICT resource management can be defined based on the control objectives of the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. This area is aimed at: 
 „verifying that the enterprise‘s resources are used responsibly‘ (ITGI 2006b, 
p. 11). 
 
This research outlines the control objectives required of management ICT resources to 
capture success factor of the SICTRM model. 
 
In this regard, the COBIT framework includes: 
- Procuring ICT resources (AI5) 
 
In terms of the management of ICT resources, the COBIT framework is referred to in 
identifying the control objective above. The next section identifies important control 
objectives related to the HR management and planning to successful ICT risk 
management in Thai organisations. 
 
6.2.3 Human resource management and planning, information 
security management, the corporate level plan and the operational 
level plan 
Human resource management and planning, information security management, the 
corporate level and the operational level plans can be defined based on the control 
objectives outlined in the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. This focus 
of this area is as follows: 
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‗Information security addresses the protection of information confidentiality, 
availability and integrity throughout the life cycle of the information and its 
use within the organization‘ (ITGI 2006b, p. 15). 
 
This research stipulates the necessary control objectives of human resource management 
and planning, information security management, the corporate level and the operational 
level plans to capture success factor of the SICTRM model. 
The COBIT framework consists of: 
- Defining the information architecture (PO2) 
- Defining ICT organisation and relationships (PO4) 
- Managing human resources (PO7) 
- Managing performance and capacity (DS3) 
- Ensuring systems security (DS5) 
- Educating and training users (DS7) 
- Managing the configuration (DS9) 
- Managing problems (DS10) 
- Managing data (DS11) 
- Managing the physical environment (DS12) 
- Managing operations (DS13) 
- Monitoring and evaluating ICT performance (ME1) 
- Monitoring and evaluating internal control (ME2) 
 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard consists of: 
- Organisation of information security 
- Asset management 
- Human resources security 
- Physical and environmental security 
- Communications and operations management 
- Access control 
- Information security acquisition, development and maintenance 
- Information security incident management 
- Compliance 
 
Both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard were referred to when 
identifying the control objectives above. The Thai business organisations consider ICT 
risk management by covering the four major areas of organisational policy; management 
of ICT resources; information security management; and human resource management 
and planning. These four major areas affect the planning at both the corporate level and 
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the operational level when seeking to establish successful ICT risk management. The 
next section discusses the comparison of ICT risk management practices from the case 
studies with literature, the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard to develop 
the survey questionnaire. 
 
6.3 Instrument development 
Based on the findings of the qualitative analysis of the four sections in a theme 
(organisational structure, organisational process, organisational control and 
organisational technical strategy), the six key factors (policy, the management of ICT 
resources, the management of information security, the management of human 
resources, a corporate plan and an operational plan) derived from ICT risk management 
practices in the case studies. These six key factors are also the concern in the control 
processes of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. The researcher then 
compared the practices with the control processes in both the framework and the 
standard to identify the items which indicate each key factor. Each key factor then was 
conceptualized in the model in order to reconfirm or reject to represent success factor for 
ICT risk management. Each key factor is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
6.3.1 Dimension one: Organisational policy (POLICY)  
Based on the analysis of participants in the case studies, it was recommended that 
organisations established a committee that is responsible for:  
- ICT risk management (ICT and IS);  
- ICT risk management instruments (a document of organisational policy);  
- components of ICT risk management (consisting of ICT control and audit, and ICT 
security control and audit); and  
- organisational ICT strategies (organisational policy).  
Such a committee sets strategic direction, ‗ensures that objectives are achieved, [and] 
manages risks appropriately‘ (ITGI 2006b, p. 18). Strategic direction on risk is often 
developed from the principles embedded in either the COBIT framework or the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard, or both, because ‗an organisation needs to define a strategic ICT plan 
and to determine technological direction and Information security policy in order to 
satisfy the business requirement and make possible the business strategy‘ (ITGI/OGC 
2005, p. 23). Moreover, the document of organisational policy was referred in the case 
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studies to the risk statement that is a brief explanation of policy, of risk definition, of 
type of risk focused in the organization and risk management methodology. The 
document of organisational policy and business continuity management were also 
recommended, as confirmed by the interviewees, to determine technological direction 
and ensure continuous service of the COBIT framework and security policy of the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard (Broderick 2006; ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI/OGC 2005, 2008; ITGI 
2006a, 2006b and 2007). IT policy, Information security policy, a document of 
organizational policy and business continuity management reflected that the case studies 
considered organisational policy to be a key factor when dealing with ICT risk 
management, a view that is supported by Broderick (2006), ITGI (2006b), Karabacak 
and Sogukpinar (2006), McEvoy and Whitcombe (2002), Solms (2001), and Westby and 
Allen (2007).  
The COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard were used to help the researcher 
define the indicators for organisational policy factor. Four main indicators were found to 
represent this key factor. Firstly, ICT policy was considered to evaluate how an 
organisation defines its ICT objectives around ICT direction when dealing with ICT risk 
management. Secondly, security policy was looked at to assess the way in which an 
organisation defines its IS objectives around information security when dealing with ICT 
risk management. Thirdly, the risk statement was included to evaluate how an 
organisation declares a statement of risk management in its corporate plan when dealing 
with ICT risk management. Lastly, business continuity management was examined to 
assess whether an organisation includes a brief explanation of continuous business 
management in its organisational policy when dealing with ICT risk management.  
ICT policy, security policy, risk statements and business continuity management all 
enabled an organisation to plan at both the corporate level and the operational level to 
establish the conditions for successful ICT risk management (Table 6-5); and as such 
they were included in the summary to test the factors that affect ICT risk management in 
organisations. 
Table 6-5: Policy dimension   
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
POLICY 
- IT policy (Q7) 
- Security policy (Q8)  
- Risk statement (Q9) 
- Business continuity management (Q10) 
 
- policy1 
- policy2 
- policy3 
- policy4 
 
- Define a strategic ICT plan  
- Determine technological direction  
- Define information security policy 
- Define business continuity plan 
 
Policy dimension referred to questions no. 7–10 in the questionnaire, listed below: 
Q7. The organisation defines technological direction in the organisational policy. 
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Q8. The organisation defines security direction in the organisational policy. 
Q9. The organisation establishes the risk context to define a brief explanation of ICT 
risks, of types of risk in the organisation and of risk management methodology. 
Q10. The organisation has a business continuity plan to deal with the uncertain 
circumstances around the loss of information assets. 
 
6.3.2 Dimension two: Human resource management and planning 
(HRMP) 
Organisational control of people and their behavior in organisations was one of the key 
factors that arose from the case studies, one which organisations needed to take into 
account when planning ICT risk management. From the qualitative analysis, ICT risk 
from internal processes originates mainly with an insider, a finding that is supported by 
Ciborra (2006), Hermanson et al. (2000), Pinder (2006), Smith and McKeen (2006), 
Theoharidou et al. (2005), and Willcock and Griffiths (1994).  
To gather rich information regarding human resource management and planning, the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard were commonly recommended 
because both standards define the details of control objectives regarding human resource 
management and planning. Managing human resources; educating and training users; 
and monitoring and evaluating ICT performance using the COBIT framework were aimed 
at contributing to the indicators for human resource management and planning 
dimension (Broderick 2006; ITGI/OGC 2005, 2008; ITGI 2006b, 2007). Furthermore, 
human resources security as delineated in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard was also 
considered to highlight the indicators for the security of human resources (Broderick 
2006; ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI/OGC 2005, 2008). Adopting the four control objectives 
(managing human resources; educating and training users; monitoring and evaluating 
ICT performance; and human resources security) of both standards, paying attention to 
the human resource management and planning factor can help an organisation to 
achieve effective control of human resources in order to mitigate, prevent and avoid ICT 
risks occurring from human error or ICT abuses (ITGI 2007; ISO/IEC 2005). Thus, it was 
essential that an organisation considered human resource management and planning 
derived from the the case studies when dealing with ICT risk management. A focus on 
human resource management planning was supported by Ciborra (2006), Hermanson et 
al. (2000), Pinder (2006), Smith and McKeen (2006), Theoharidou et al. (2005), and 
Willcock and Griffiths (1994). 
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To elaborate on human resource management and planning factor, both standards were 
used to define four indicators. Firstly, roles and responsibilities were examined to assess 
how an organisation manages human resources (referred to in the ‗prior to employment‘ 
section in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) when dealing with ICT risk management. 
Secondly, human resources protection was considered to evaluate whether an 
organisation includes terms and conditions of employment regarding confidentiality of 
information and disclosure of the organisation‘s important information (referred to in the 
‗prior to employment‘ section in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) with the aim of dealing 
with ICT risk management planning. Thirdly, training and education was included to 
evaluate to what extent an organisation provides ICT and ICT security awareness training 
to its staff (referred to in the ‗during employment‘ section in the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard) when dealing with ICT risk management planning. Lastly, human resources 
security was looked at to evaluate how an organisation manages changing or removing 
the access rights of employees upon change or termination of employment (referred to in 
the ‗termination or change of employment‘ section in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) when 
dealing with ICT risk management. 
Roles and responsibilities; human resources protection; training and education; and 
human resources security all helped an organisation at both the corporate and 
operational levels to plan and establish successful ICT risk management (Table 6-6); and 
as such they were included in the summary to test the factors that affect ICT risk 
management in organisations.  
Table 6-6: Human resource management and planning dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
HRMP 
- Roles and responsibilities (Q13-Q16) 
- Human resources protection   (Q17-Q18) 
- Training and education (Q19-Q20) 
- Human resources security (Q21-Q22) 
 
- hrmp1 
- hrmp2 
- hrmp3 
- hrmp4 
 
- Organisational control of people 
- HR access control and protection 
- Educating and training users 
- Human resources security 
 
Human resource management and planning dimension referred to questions no. 13–22 in 
the questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q13. The organisation defines employees‘ roles regarding information governance policy.  
Q14. The organisation defines employees‘ responsibilities regarding information 
governance policy. 
Q15. The organisation defines employees‘ roles regarding information security 
governance policy. 
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Q16. The organisation defines employees‘ responsibilities regarding information security 
governance policy. 
Q17. The organisation declares the terms and conditions of employment regarding 
confidentiality of information. 
Q18. The organisation informs employees that they must not disclose the organisation‘s 
important information. 
Q19. The organisation provides a training program to improve staff‘s IT awareness. 
Q20. The organisation provides a training program to improve staff‘s IT security 
awareness. 
Q21. The organisation changes the access rights of employees upon change of 
employment. 
Q22. The organisation removes the access rights of employees upon termination of 
employment. 
 
6.3.3 Dimension three: Organisational information security (OS) 
Organisational control processes (system configuration; access control policy; data and 
information integrity management; security compliance; and data protection and privacy) 
as discussed in the case studies emerged as organisational information security factor in 
this research. For example, case study C highlighted that organisational control 
processes constitute a technical matter related to organisational security that needs to be 
controlled and monitored. Coles and Moulton (2003), IIA (2005), ISO/IEC (2005), and 
Solms (2005a, 2006b) also assert that organisational security must be considered when 
planning for ICT risk management in an organisation.   
The COBIT framework elucidates security control processes. The COBIT framework 
defines the elements of security control processes as: defining information architecture; 
defining IT organisation and relationships; managing performance and capacity; ensuring 
systems security; managing the configuration; managing problems; managing data; 
managing the physical environment; managing operations; monitoring and evaluating IT 
performance; and monitoring and evaluating internal control (ITGI/OGC 2005, 2008; 
ITGI 2007; Broderick 2006). Furthermore, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard also outlines the 
requirements of organisational security to ensure information security; physical and 
environmental security; and access control (Broderick 2006; ISO/IEC 2005). Therefore, 
concern with organisational information security factor can help an organisation to 
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achieve organisational security when dealing with ICT risk management. Ladan et al. 
(2006), Haworth and Pietron (2006), Myler and Broadbent (2006), Groves (2003), 
Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2006), Smith and McKeen (2006), Solms and Solms (2006), 
Solms (2005a), Westby and Allen (2007), and Byrd et al. (1995) all concur that 
organisational information security needs to be planned to meet information security 
objectives, in turn to deal effectively with ICT risk management. 
Organisational information security in the case studies was referred to in both the COBIT 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 which outline the five indicators that measure its impact in 
organisations. The first indicator was examined to assess to how an organisation 
manages systems configuration when dealing with ICT risk management. Systems 
configuration concentrates on the setting of operating systems, networking operating 
systems, business software and hardware. The second indicator was included to evaluate 
how an organisation manages its access control policy when dealing with ICT risk 
management. Managing access control focuses on physical and environmental 
protection; system access; network service access; computer access; and password 
management systems. The third indicator was looked at to assess how an organisation 
handles data and information integrity management when dealing with ICT risk 
management. Managing data and information integrity focuses on validating data and 
information during input, processing and output (IPO) processes. The fourth indicator 
was examined to evaluate how an organisation manages security compliance when 
dealing with ICT risk management. Managing security compliance concentrates on 
ensuring security both outside (legal requirements) and inside an organisation through 
the implementation of rules and regulations. The fifth indicator was included to assess 
the extent to which an organisation monitors data protection and privacy to prevent risk 
when dealing with ICT risk management planning. The last indicator was looked at to 
assess how an organisation manages physical and environmental protection when dealing 
with ICT risk management.  
Systems configuration; access control policy; data and information integrity 
management; security compliance; and data protection and privacy (six indicators) all 
assisted an organisation to develop an annual plan (at the corporate level) and an action 
plan (at the operational level) to establish successful ICT risk management (Table 6-7); 
thus these six indicators needed to be tested for their impact on ICT risk management in 
organisations. 
Table 6-7: Organisational information security dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
OS 
- System configuration (Q23-Q26) 
- Access control policy (Q27-Q31) 
- Data and information integrity management (Q32-Q41) 
 
- os1 
- os2 
- os3 
 
- Organisation of information security 
- Access control 
- Security compliance 
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- Security compliance (Q42-Q44) 
- Data protection and privacy (Q45-46) 
- Physical and environmental protection (Q47) 
- os4 
- os5 
- os6 
- Communications  
- Operations management 
- Physical and environmental 
protection 
Organisational information security management dimension referred to questions no. 23–
47 in the questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q23. The organisation correctly configures its operating systems (e.g. Windows, Linux 
and Unix). 
Q24. The organisation correctly configures its networking operating systems (e.g. 
NetWare and Cisco). 
Q25. The organisation correctly configures its business software (e.g. SAP and business 
solution). 
Q26. The organisation correctly configures its hardware (e.g. AS 400, hubs, switches, 
routers). 
Q27. The organisation documents access control following the business requirements for 
system access. 
Q28. The organisation allows only authorised persons to access network services. 
Q29. The organisation strictly limits access to computer use by user allocation. 
Q30. The organisation strictly limits access to computers by using a password 
management system. 
Q31. The organisation monitors log files to prevent unauthorised access. 
Q32. The organisation monitors computer use to prevent computer abuse. 
Q33. The organisation monitors computer use in order to prevent any type of damage to 
information assets. 
Q34. The organisation validates input data from applications systems for its correctness 
before inserting data into the input process. 
Q35. The organisation validates input data from applications systems for its 
appropriateness before inserting data into the input process. 
Q36. The organisation has validation check applications to detect any corruption of 
information through processing errors.  
Q37.  The organisation has validation check applications to detect any corruption of 
information through deliberate acts. 
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Q38. The organisation validates output data from applications systems for its correctness 
before being distributed. 
Q39. The organisation validates output data from applications systems for its 
appropriateness before being distributed. 
Q40. The organisation controls application system files in a secure manner (control of 
operational software). 
Q41. The organisation controls application system files in a secure manner (protection of 
system test). 
Q42. The organisation regularly checks IT facilities for compliance with security 
implementation standards. 
Q43. All departments within the organisation have regular review plans to ensure 
compliance with security policy and standards.                   
Q44. The organisation identifies compliance with legal requirements (e.g. Thailand‘s 
Computer Crime Act 2008). 
Q45. The organisation monitors data protection and privacy. 
Q46. The organisation prevents data protection and privacy. 
Q47. The organisation prevents unauthorised physical access, damage and interference 
to the organisation‘s premises and information systems. 
 
6.3.4 Dimension four: Management of ICT resources (IT) 
The area of organisational control relating to information and communication technology 
(ICT) and systems was raised in the six case studies. All case studies recommended that 
ICT and systems be reflected in the method used to manage ICT resources. In other 
words, ICT resources were managed through ICT management (Hinton 2006). 
Furthermore, the COBIT framework stipulates that ICT resources help an organisation ‗to 
run automated business applications while leveraging business information‘ (ITGI 2007, 
p. 12). ICT resources were identified in terms of ‗technology and facilities (i.e. hardware, 
operating system, database management system, networking, multimedia, and the 
environment that houses and supports them) that enable the processing of the 
applications‘ (ITGI 2007, p. 12). This view was supported by Luftman et al. (1993), 
McLeod and Schell (2007), McNurlin and Sprague (2006), O‘Brien and Marakas (2009), 
and Whitman and Mattord (2009). Therefore, technology and facilities were considered 
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important in that they provided ICT resources in the form of networking, personal 
computers, software or applications, and data and information patterns.   
In seeking rich information related to management of ICT resources, the COBIT 
framework can only be used to define the control objectives for managing ICT resources 
because the ISO/IEC 17799 standard is concerned more with ICT security, whereas the 
COBIT framework is concerned with procuring ICT resources. In relation to procuring ICT 
resources, it seems that all the case studies need to consider investing in new ICT 
resources. However, this was unlikely to occur for these organisations because they fell 
they have already made enough financial investments in this area; therefore, this control 
objective was transformed somewhat to include more of a focus on ICT resource 
provision instead. 
There were four indicators that relate to the provision of ICT resources in an 
organisation. The first indicator was used to assess the extent to which an organisation 
provides an adequate network connection to its employees. The second indicator was 
included to evaluate whether an organisation provides sufficient personal access to 
computers for its employees. The third indicator was examined to assess how an 
organisation manages several types of operating software in order to generate data and 
information in the same file pattern. The last indicator was considered to evaluate 
whether an organisation provides applications with licensing.  
The provision of adequate networking connections; sufficient personal access to 
computers; data and information patterns; and applications with licensing all assisted an 
organisation to plan at both the corporate level and the operational level to establish 
successful ICT risk management (Table 6-8); and these were therefore included for 
measurement in the survey.  
Table 6-8: Management of ICT resources dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator Main concern in the COBIT framework 
IT 
- Networking (Q48) 
- PC (Q49) 
- Data and information pattern (Q50) 
- Software (Q51) 
-  
- it1 
- it2 
- it3 
- it4 
 
- Management of ICT resources  
 
Management of ICT resources dimension referred to questions no. 48–51 in the 
questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q48. The organisation provides an adequate networking connection to its employees. 
Q49. The organisation provides sufficient personal access to computers for its employees. 
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Q50. The organisation manages several types of operating software in order to generate 
data and information in the same file pattern. 
Q51. The organisation provides all applications with the required licensing. 
 
6.3.5 Dimension five: The corporate level plan (CLP) 
Planning simultaneously at both levels reflects the suggestion of Solms (2005, p. 101) 
to: ‗Use COBIT as a ―high‖ level reference framework in which information security 
governance is well positioned, and the ―what‖ is quite clear, and use the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard as a ―lower‖ leveled guideline specifically for information security in which the 
―how‖ is more detailed‘. Solms‘s (2005a) proposal for this ‗strategic planning level‘ 
(McLeod & Schell 2007, pp. 14-15) and organisation theory (Christensen et al. 2007, p. 
27) in relation to the corporate level plan of ICT risk management treatment. ICT risk 
management treatment arose from the case studies.  
According to planning approach, ICT risk management was performed at both the 
corporate and operational levels in the case studies. The corporate level plan is 
elaborated in the treatment methodology as the scope of ICT risk management, which is 
then extended and translated into the operational level planning. Moreover, the analysis 
of case studies revealed that different management level staff are concerned that the 
planning stage is separated in this way, arguing instead that the overall plan must be 
developed through consensus agreement.  
In order to link this dual-level planning, this study proposed four indicators to explain the 
corporate level planning factor. The first indicator was used to evaluate the extent to 
which an organisation conducts ICT risk management based on the direction and control 
from the management level through a top-down approach. The second indicator was 
included to evaluate the extent to which an organisation establishes ICT control and audit 
in its annual plan to meet organisational objectives. The third indicator was considered to 
evaluate whether an organisation provides an overview of ICT applications and 
information security in its ICT plan. The last indicator was included to assess whether an 
organisation provides an overview of its ICT risk management methodology.  
Management direction and control (a top-down approach); establishing ICT control and 
an ICT audit plan in the corporate plan; providing an overview of ICT application and 
information security in the ICT plan; and providing an overview of ICT risk management 
methodology can all assist an organisation to supplement its operational plan to establish 
successful ICT risk management (Table 6-9); thus these were included for measurement 
in the survey. 
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Table 6-9: The corporate level plan dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
CLP 
- Top-down approach (Q11) 
- ICT control and audit (the corporate plan) 
(Q52) 
- IT plan (Q53) 
- ICT risk management methodology (Q54) 
 
- clp1 
- clp2 
- clp3 
- clp4 
 
- The corporate level plan  
- Strategy direction (top-down)  
- IT governance (ICT processes) 
 
The corporate level plan dimension referred to questions no. 11 and 52–54 in the 
questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q11. The organisational strategies in ICT risk management are generated by 
management. 
Q52. The organisation has established IT control and audit in the corporate plan to reflect 
the organisation objectives. 
Q53. The organisation provides an overview of IT applications and IT security in its IT 
plan. 
Q54. The organisation provides an overview of its ICT risk management methodology. 
 
6.3.6 Dimension six: The operational level plan (OLP) 
The operational level plan reflects the recommendations of Solms (2005a) regarding ‗the 
strategic planning level‘ (McLeod & Schell 2007, pp. 14-15). The operational level plan 
also relates to ICT risk management treatment as discussed in the case studies. The 
overall ICT plan at the corporate level is communicated down to, and directs, the 
operational plan. This operational level plan focuses on a bottom-up approach to ICT risk 
management which elucidates the details of ICT project risk management specific to each 
department within an organisation. This plan is vital for operations in terms of providing 
and covering the details of internal information that a corporate level plan is not able to 
incorporate (McLeod & Schell 2007). The connection between the operational level plan 
and the corporate level plan lies in the collaborative planning between both levels to 
reach an organisation-wide ICT risk management plan. 
In order to align the operational level plan with the corporate level plan, this research 
identified four indicators that contribute to an understanding of how the bottom-up 
approach aligns with the top-down approach to represent both as an enterprise-level 
plan. The first indicator was included to assess how an organisation directs and controls 
ICT risk management through the operational level or a bottom-up approach. The second 
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indicator was examined to assess the extent to which an organisation establishes 
information security control and audit in its action plan for specific departments. The 
third indicator was looked at to assess whether an organisation defines information 
security in its operational plan. The last indicator was included to estimate whether an 
organisation outlines ICT project risk management methodology for a specific project. 
Operation direction and control (a bottom-up approach); establishing information 
security control and information security audit; defining information security in its 
security plan; and providing ICT risk project management methodology for a specific 
project all enable an organisation to supplement its corporate level plan in order to 
establish successful ICT risk management (Table 6-10); thus these four indicators need 
to be tested in the survey. 
Table 6-10: The operational level plan dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
OLP 
- Bottom-up approach (Q12) 
- Information security control and information 
security audit (the action plan) (Q55) 
- IT security plan (Q56) 
- ICT project risk management methodology 
(Q57) 
 
- olp1 
- olp2 
 
- olp3 
- olp4 
 
- The operational level plan  
- Strategy direction (bottom-up) 
- IS governance (IS processes) 
 
The operational level plan dimension referred to questions no. 12 and 52–54 in the 
questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q12. The organisational strategies in ICT risk management are generated at the 
operational level. 
Q55. The organisation has established information security control and audit in its action 
plan for specific departments. 
Q56. The organisation provides information security in security direction. 
Q57. The organisation provides IT project risk management methodology for specific 
projects. 
 
6.3.7 Dimension seven: Successful ICT risk management 
(SICTRM) 
The objective of ICT risk management is to mitigate, prevent and avoid ICT risks, and 
their negative impact and potential for loss (refer to Chapter 2, p. 23 and Table 6-11 
below).
[162] 
 
  
Table 6-11: Successful ICT risk management dimension 
Proposed dimension based on 
the qualitative analysis 
Indicator Main concern based on the literature 
SICTRM 
- Mitigate ICT risks to an acceptable level (Q58) 
- Prevent ICT risks (Q59) 
- Avoid ICT risks (Q60) 
 
- sictrm1 
- sictrm2 
- sictrm3 
 
- Successful ICT risk management 
(refer to the objective of ICT risk 
management in Chapter 2) 
 
Successful ICT risk management dimension referred to questions no. 58–60 in the 
questionnaire, listed as follows: 
Q58. Successful ICT risk management helps the organisation mitigate ICT risks to risk 
appetites (acceptable level). 
Q59. Successful ICT risk management helps the organisation prevent ICT risks 
appropriately. 
Q60. Successful ICT risk management helps the organisation avoid ICT risks 
appropriately. 
After all constructs were generated, the conceptual model was developed, which is 
outlined next. 
 
6.3.8 The conceptual model 
In order to confirm the findings, a conceptual model was generated in this chapter and 
was then tested in the quantitative data analysis (refer to Chapter 7). The qualitative 
study proposed that organisational policy; human resource management and planning; 
organisational security; and management of ICT resources positively affect planning at 
both the corporate level and the operational level when establishing successful ICT risk 
management (Figure 6-1). The conceptual model, based on this tenet, derived from the 
case study research and existing literature, was then hypothesised, that ‗the conceptual 
model of successful ICT risk management positively influences success factors of ICT risk 
management in Thai businesses‘ (Wright 1923). Wright (1923, p. 241) states that 
‗finding the logical consequences of a hypothesis in regard to the causal relationships 
does not depend on any prior assumption that the hypothesis is correct. Neither does it 
imply that the theory of path coefficients by itself gives a method of proving such a 
hypothesis. It does, of course, follow that if one of the logical consequences of a 
hypothesis is absurd the hypothesis is untenable and must be modified; on the other 
hand, if the logical consequences can be shown to agree with independently obtained 
results it contributes to the demonstration of the truth of the hypothesis in the only 
sense which can be ascribed to the truth of a natural law‘. Each path presents causal 
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relations to a system (i.e. the conceptual model) regardless of ‗whatever knowledge may 
be possessed or whatever hypothesis it is desired to test as to causal relations‘ (Wright 
1922, p. 255). Therefore, this research hypothesised only the model which presents a 
system of successful ICT risk management.  
The hypothesis concerned the whole model, rather than only parts of it, because this 
model represented the whole system of successful ICT risk management (each key factor 
affects successful ICT risk management) rather than individual paths or relationships in 
the model.  
 
Figure 6-1: The conceptual model of successful ICT risk management  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
ICT risk management in these six case studies of Thai businesses was focused at both 
the corporate and operational levels. The corporate level set the overall ICT risk 
management plan. The operational level covered the specific technical security plan for 
ICT, defined as ICT project risk management. Furthermore, both the corporate and the 
operational levels in the six organisations revealed that organisational policy; human 
resource management and planning; organisational information security management; 
and management of ICT resources were the main factors to be considered when dealing 
with successful ICT risk management.  
In order to successfully achieve ICT risk management, the six case studies revealed that 
these organisations concentrate on general ICT and ICT security simultaneously. The six 
companies recommended that the two approaches be linked to form a complete pipeline 
(a two-way approach) in seeking to attain effective ICT risk management. The two-way 
approach worked well as the COBIT framework laid the foundation for a top-down 
approach to risk management, while the ISO/IEC 17799 standard focused on the bottom-
up approach to risk management. Furthermore, the discussion indicates that 
organisational structure, organisational control, organisational process and organisational 
POLICY 
HRMP 
OS 
IT 
CLP 
OLP 
SICTRM 
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ICT strategy evaluated in these six case studies reflected use of both the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, and it was reported that the organisations 
perceive them both to be effective and efficient in keeping risks under control. 
The next chapter discusses further how ICT risk management can be applied in an 
organisation. The effective key factors (revealed by the qualitative analysis) for ICT risk 
management are compared with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
in order to propose success factors for inclusion in successful ICT risk management, to 
test the relationships and confirm the qualitative findings through quantitative analysis.  
[165] 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7  
SURVEY ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data derived from the survey of ICT risk 
management in Thai organisations. The data collection method used is based on the 
propositions and dimensions developed from the findings of the qualitative study of ICT 
risk management in six Thai businesses (refer to Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Through 
structural equation modelling (SEM), the conclusions derived from Chapter 6 are tested, 
validated and confirmed in this chapter in order to propose a model of successful ICT risk 
management (SICTRM). The chapter begins with screening data followed by a discussion 
of the validity and reliability of the instrument. The chapter concludes by proposing 
success factors for dealing with ICT risk management planning in order to mitigate, 
prevent and avoid ICT risks (Figure 7-1).  
 
Figure 7-1: A flowchart of model validation 
 
7.1 Demographic statistics 
The survey included 302 respondents who worked in the field of ICT risk management in 
organisations (Table 7-1). Of the respondents, 44.7% were from banking, 36.1% were 
from telecommunications, and 19.2% were from insurance. The largest proportion of 
position levels were in operations at 59.3%, while the remaining 40.7% were from 
management levels. Staff from IT departments returned the survey at the largest rate of 
34.8%, followed by 22.8% from internal audit departments, 19.2% from finance and 
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accounting departments, and 15.2% from information security departments. 
Surprisingly, staff from risk management departments returned the survey at the lowest 
rate of 7.9%, although risk management was the main responsibilities of their work. The 
next section discusses the response rate of this research 
Table 7-1: Demographic statistics 
Type of Business Frequency Percentage 
Bank 135 44.7 
Telecommunications 109 36.1 
Insurance 58 19.2 
Total 302 100.0 
Position Level   
Management 123 40.7 
Operational 179 59.3 
Total 302 100.0 
Department   
Information Technology 105 34.8 
Internal Audit 69 22.8 
Finance and Accounting 58 19.2 
Information Security 46 15.2 
Risk Management 24 7.9 
Total 302 100.0 
 
7.2 Survey response rate 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (p. 67) stratified random sampling was selected because a 
stratified sample helped the researcher to focus on only those organisations that are 
familiar with managing ICT risks. The population was comprised of 497 organisations 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). The stratified sample exemplars (55 out 
of the total 497 listed organisations) were selected from an analysis of organisational 
structure regarding ICT infrastructure in combination with organisation reports to the 
SET. The sample was stratified by type of business: banking, telecommunications or 
insurance. Eleven banking, 25 telecommunications, and 17 insurance companies were 
included. One thousand surveys were sent out to potential respondents to participate in 
this research, from which 302 surveys were returned. Thus, the response rate is equal 
to: 
   Total response rate = 
000,1
100302
= 30.20% 
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As a result of the stratified random sampling, the sample number was limited to improve 
the response rate, although this data collection was conducted by using survey 
techniques based on subject interest, prepaid postage, multiple mailing and pre-tested 
surveys (Frohlich 2002). 
7.3 Item parcelling 
Conway and Huffcutt (2003), Cook (1981), Fabrigar et al. (1999), Gerbing and Anderson 
(1985), Gorsuch (1983), and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) argue that the number of 
items per dimension should be made up of between three to five indicators. Furthermore, 
the sample size of this research (302) can be considered small in so far as Bentler and 
Chou (1987), and Baumgartner and Homburg (1996, p. 146) suggest in regard to 
samples per indicator that ‗the ratio of sample size to number of free parameters should 
be at least 5:1 to get trustworthy parameter estimates, and they further suggest that 
these ratios should be higher (at least 10:1, say) to obtain appropriate significance 
tests‘. Therefore, a number of indicators were considered in this research to ensure the 
tests were conducted properly.  
This research follows the above suggestion pertaining to the recommended number of 
indicators per dimension (Baumgartner & Homburg 1996). The questions in the survey 
were produced using the proposed indicators as key elements. For example, the 
indicators in Human resource management and Planning (HRMP, Chapter 6, p. 154) and 
Organisational ICT Security (OS, Chapter 6, p. 156) cannot be clearly explained in 
isolation (refer to Appendix B5 and B6). They were expanded into several questions in 
order to facilitate better understanding of the question/item and indicators. However, the 
items in each dimension exceeded the preferred ratio of sample size to number of 
indicators in this research. Therefore, they had to be reduced in order to meet the 
grounded indicator and the dimension based on the proposed indicators from Chapter 6 
(HRMP, p. 154 and OS, p. 156). Moreover, the reduction of the number of indicators 
leads to the small sample size requirement for the study. Three hundred and two 
samples are considered to be a small sample size (Bentler & Chou 1987; Baumgartner & 
Homburg 1996). Item parcelling was then used to reduce the number of indicators in 
order to signify the model in the structural equation modelling (SEM) properly. The main 
reason for having a large sample size is that ‗all methods for the estimation and testing 
of structural equation models are based on asymptotic theory and the sample size has to 
be ―large‖ for the parameter estimates and test statistics to be valid‘ (Baumgartner & 
Homburg 1996, p. 146).  
Nasser and Takahashi (2003, p. 76) assert that ‗item parcelling is used to reduce model 
complexity and to reduce the number of parameters estimated without researchers‘ 
having to pay the price of eliminating items and losing information that may contribute to 
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the meaning of a latent variable‘. Moreover, Little et al. (2002, p. 152) argue that 
‗parcelling is a measurement practice that is used most commonly in multivariate 
approaches to psychometrics, particularly for use with latent-variable analysis techniques 
(e.g. Structural Equation Modelling-SEM)‘.  
Item parcelling in this research was performed to reduce the number of indicators in a 
latent variable in order to meet the small sample size of this research. The reason for the 
use of item parcelling is that some rules of thumb for determining adequate sample size 
are based on the ratio of estimated parameters to respondents (Hall et al. 1999). In 
doing so, some theorists suggest that item parcelling is performed by calculating average 
means of all items to represent the new mean for the new indicator (Cattel & Burdsal 
1975; Bandolos & Finney 2001; Enders & Bandalos 1999; Hall et al. 1999; Yuan et al. 
1997; Marsh et al. 1988; Nasser & Takahashi 2003). This suggestion is considered when 
reducing a number of indicators and is performed only for the indicators among the 
dimensions that exceed five indicators in order to meet the required ratio of sample to 
indicator (Baumgartner & Homburg 1996). 
There were two dimensions (HRMP and OS) that contained items (questions) of more 
than five items per indicator. The HRMP dimension is the first dimension, for which 10 
items needed to be reduced to match the original four indicators (Table 7-2).  Item 
parcelling was carried out using the Transform Menu in the Compute Variable Function in 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS V 16), as shown in the Syntax 
below (Figure 7-2).  
 
Figure 7-2: Syntax of parcelling computation of HRMP 
 
According to Figure 7-2, for example, the average means of items (q13-q16) were 
computed to represent the new mean for the new indicator (hrmp1). The new given 
name of each indicator followed from the dimension name along with a number of 
indicators as hrmp1, hrmp2, hrmp3 and hrmp4, represented in Table 7-2 below. 
COMPUTE hrmp1=mean(q13,q14,q15,q16). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE hrmp2=mean(q17,q18). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE hrmp3=mean(q19,q20)  
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE hrmp4=mean(q21,q22). 
EXECUTE. 
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Table 7-2: Human resource management and planning dimension (repeated from Table 6-6) 
Proposed dimension based on the 
qualitative analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
HRMP 
- Roles and responsibilities (Q13-Q16) 
- Human resources protection (Q17-Q18) 
- Training and education (Q19-Q20) 
- Human resources security (Q21-Q22) 
 
- hrmp1 
- hrmp2 
- hrmp3 
- hrmp4 
 
- Organisational control of people 
- HR access control and protection 
- Educating and training users 
- Human resources security 
 
The Organisational ICT Security (OS) dimension is the second dimension, for which 24 
items needed to be reduced to match with the original five indicators (Table 7-3). Item 
parcelling was carried out using the Transform menu in the compute variable function in 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS V 16), as shown in the Syntax 
below (Figure 7-3).  
 
Figure 7-3: Syntax of parcelling computation of OS 
 
The new given name of each indicator followed from the dimension name along with a 
number of indicators as os1, os2, os3 and os4 and os5, represented in Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3: Organisational information security dimension (repeated from Table 6-7) 
Proposed issue based on the qualitative 
analysis 
Indicator 
Main concern in the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
OS 
- System configuration (Q23-Q26) 
- Access control policy (Q27-Q31) 
- Data and information integrity 
management (Q32-Q41) 
- Security compliance (Q42-Q44) 
- Data protection and privacy (Q45-46) 
- Physical and environmental protection 
(Q47) 
 
- os1 
- os2 
- os3 
 
- os4 
- os5 
- os6 
 
- Organisation of information security 
- Access control 
- Security compliance 
 
- Communications  
- Operations management 
- Physical and environmental 
protection 
 
COMPUTE os1=mean(q23,q24,q25,q26). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE os2=mean(q27,q28,q29,q30,q31). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE os3=mean(q32,q33,q34,q35,q36,q37,q38,q39,q40,q41). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE os4=mean(q42,q43,q44). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE os5=mean(q45,q46). 
EXECUTE. 
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After undertaking item parcelling, the number of items (and the number of questions in 
the questionnaire) was reduced to match with the original indicators in each dimension. 
Each dimension was then ready for validation in the next stage.  
 
7.4 Stage I: Descriptive analysis of the questionnaire 
Based on the questionnaire dimensions, the subsections are discussed dependent upon 
the descriptive analysis (Figure 7-4) of the questionnaire, focusing on each item 
alongside the information. 
 
Figure 7-4: Syntax of the descriptive analysis of all indicators 
 
Organisational policy (POLICY) 
The results of the analysis of the mean of each indicator in the POLICY dimension ranged 
from 5.71 to 5.94 (see Table 7-4). This indicates that respondents generally agreed with 
the statement that the organisation defines ICT policy and Information security policy 
alongside a risk statement and a business continuity plan. All indicators were required to 
deal with ICT risk management. 
Table 7-4: An analysis of the mean of the POLICY dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
Organisational Policy (POLICY) 
IT objectives−policy1 (Q7)  302 5.83 1.197 
IS objectives−policy2 (Q8)  302 5.94 1.197 
Risk statement−policy3 (Q9) 302 5.71 1.367 
Business continuity plan−policy4 (Q10) 302 5.93 1.252 
 policy1 policy2 policy3 policy4 
Chi-Square 280.205 321.232 240.848 3.270E2 
Df 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=policy1 policy2 policy3 policy4 hrmp1 hrmp2 
hrmp3 hrmp4 os1 os2 os3 os4 os5 os6 it1 it2 it3 it4 clp1 clp2 clp3 clp4 
olp1 olp2 olp3 olp4 sictrm1 sictrm2 sictrm3 
/STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV. 
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Human resource management and planning (HRMP) 
Four indicators related to the HRMP dimension, and the results of the analysis of the 
mean ranged from 5.48 to 6.25 (see Table 7-5). This result reflects that respondents 
generally agreed with the statement that the organisation pays attention to HRMP 
especially in terms of human resources security (termination or change of employment). 
Table 7-5: An analysis of the mean of the HRMP dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
Human resource management and Planning (HRMP) 
Roles and responsibilities−hrmp1 (Q13-Q16) 302 5.48 1.332 
Human resources protection−hrmp2 (Q17-Q18) 302 5.95 1.215 
Training and education−hrmp3 (Q19-Q20) 302 5.90 1.225 
Human resources security−hrmp4 (Q21-Q22) 302 6.25 1.077 
 hrmp1 hrmp2 hrmp3 hrmp4 
Chi-Square 511.298 581.656 643.212 686.543 
df 23 12 12 10 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Organisational ICT Security (OS) 
In this dimension, the results of the analysis of the mean ranged from 5.90 to 6.22 (see 
Table 7-6). This illustrates that respondents generally agreed with the statement that the 
organisation pays attention to organisational security, especially during the planning 
stage for physical and environmental protection. 
Table 7-6: An analysis of the mean of the OS dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
Organisational information Security (OS) 
System configuration−os1 (Q23-Q26) 302 5.94 1.098 
Access control policy−os2 (Q27-Q31) 302 6.09 1.009 
Data and information integrity management−os3 
(Q32-Q41) 
302 5.90 1.039 
Security compliance−os4 (Q42-Q44) 302 5.92 1.127 
Data protection and privacy−os5 (Q45-Q46) 302 5.88 1.226 
Physical protection−os6 (Q47) 302 6.22 1.135 
 os1 os2 os3 os4 os5 os6 
Chi-Square 815.550 589.219 622.073 519.205 528.702 513.430 
df 17 21 42 17 11 6 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Management of information and communication technology resources (IT) 
In this dimension, the results of the analysis of the mean ranged from 6.02 to 6.11 (see 
Table 7-7). These findings indicate that respondents generally supported the view that 
the organisation provides sufficient ICT resources to its staff and manages them in a 
proper way.  
Table 7-7: An analysis of the mean of the IT dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
Information and Communication Technology Resources Management (ICT) 
Sufficient networking connection−it1 (Q48) 302 6.02 1.174 
Sufficient personal computer−it2 (Q49) 302 6.11 1.240 
Same file pattern−it3 (Q50) 302 6.03 1.079 
Applications with licensing−it4 (Q51) 302 6.10 1.080 
 it1 it2 it3 it4 
Chi-Square 366.662 447.325 361.470 398.278 
df 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
The corporate level plan (CLP) 
Under this dimension, the results of the analysis of the mean ranged from 5.75 to 5.93 
(see Table 7-8). This reveals that respondents generally supported the views: firstly, that 
the CLP in the organisation includes the details regarding ICT control and audit planning 
in its annual plan; secondly, that the CLP in the organisation includes an overview of ICT 
applications and ICT security in the organisation‘s ICT plan; and lastly, that the CLP in 
the organisation guides ICT risk management methodology through a top-down approach 
(refer to Chapters 4 and 5). 
Table 7-8: An analysis of the mean of the CLP dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
The Corporate Level Plan (CLP) 
Top-down approach−clp1 (Q11) 302 5.75 1.313 
ICT control and audit in the corporate plan−clp2 (Q52) 302 5.90 1.167 
ICT applications and ICT security overview in the ICT 
plan−clp3 (Q53) 
302 5.93 1.192 
ICT risk management methodology−clp4 (Q54) 302 5.88 1.168 
 clp1 clp2 clp3 clp4 
Chi-Square 267.132 219.364 320.397 300.510 
df 6 5 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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The operational level plan (OLP) 
In this dimension, the results of the analysis of the mean ranged from 5.63 and 5.73 
(see Table 7-9). This indicates that respondents generally supported the view that: 
firstly, the OLP in the organisation outlines the details regarding information security 
control and audit; secondly, the OLP guides the outline of the information security plan; 
and lastly, that ICT project risk management methodology is provided in the OLP as part 
of a bottom-up approach in an organisation (refer to Chapters 4 and 5). 
Table 7-9: An analysis of the mean of the OLP dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
The Operational Level Plan (OLP) 
Bottom-up approach−olp1 (Q12) 302 5.63 1.374 
IS control and audit in the action plan−olp2 (Q55) 302 5.73 1.265 
ICT Security plan−olp3 (Q56) 302 5.66 1.335 
ICT project risk management methodology−olp4 
(Q57) 
302 5.67 1.305 
 olp1 olp2 olp3 olp4 
Chi-Square 241.728 256.702 244.417 234.821 
df 6 6 6 6 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) 
The results of the analysis of the mean in indicators of the SICTRM dimension ranged 
between 6.01 and 6.04 (see Table 7-10). These findings show that respondents generally 
agreed with the statement that successful ICT risk management can help an organisation 
mitigate, prevent and avoid ICT risk. 
Table 7-10: An analysis of the mean of the SICTRM dimension 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dimension/Dimension N Mean Std. Deviation 
Successful ICT Risk Management (SICTRM) 
Mitigating ICT risks−sictrm1 (Q58) 302 6.01 1.083 
Preventing ICT risks−sictrm2 (Q59) 302 6.04 .972 
Avoiding ICT risks−sictrm3 (Q60) 302 6.02 1.000 
 sictrm1 sictrm2 sictrm3 
Chi-Square 349.742 274.238 161.079 
df 6 5 4 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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After screening the data, all indicators and dimensions were shown to be significant and 
ready to validate in the next step, prior to carrying out the structural equation modelling.  
 
7.5 Stage II: Reliability testing 
Reliability is referred to as an ‗issue of measurement within a dimension and a statement 
about measurement accuracy‘ (Cronbach 1951 in Straub et al. 2004, p. 36). According to 
Hair et al. (2006), Cronbach‘s Alpha provides internal consistency of the scale that 
measures the reliability of an index of instrument stability. A high value for Cronbach‘s 
Alpha indicates that the reliability of an instrument is also high.  
According to the rule of thumb of Nunnally (1978, 1967), the value of Cronbach‘s Alpha 
is acceptable when it is greater than .60 for internal consistency for exploratory research 
or .70 for internal consistency for confirmatory research (Straub et al. 2004). Thus, 
Cronbach‘s Alpha was used to validate the reliability of a psychometric test score for a 
sample of respondents in this research. The Cronbach‘s Alpha values of all dimensions 
were estimated using SPSS V 16.  
The Cronbach‘s Alpha values are shown in Table 7-11 below. The results show that 
Cronbach‘s Alpha coefficient scores ranged from .904 to .942 across the factors. 
Table 7-11: Reliability of indicators within the instrument 
Factor Indicator Cronbach‘s Alpha 
POLICY policy1 
policy2 
policy3 
policy4 
.924 
HRMP hrmp1 
hrmp2 
hrmp3 
hrmp4 
.904 
OS os1 
os2 
os3 
os4 
os5 
os6 
.942 
IT it1 
it2 
it3 
it4 
.918 
CLP clp1 
clp2 
clp3 
.909 
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clp4 
OLP olp1 
olp2 
olp3 
olp4 
.912 
SICTRM sictrm1 
sictrm2 
sictrm3 
.939 
All .976 
Entire indicators within the dimension are greater than .60 for exploratory research 
(Chapter 3, p. 57). Therefore, the results demonstrate good reliability of internal 
consistency. 
 
7.6 Stage III: Validating the conceptual model 
According to the conceptual model, based on the tenet derived from the case study 
research and existing literature, it is hypothesised that „the conceptual model of 
successful ICT risk management positively influences success factors of ICT risk 
management in Thai businesses‘ (repeated in Chapter 6, p. 163). The hypothesis 
concerns the whole model, rather than only its parts, because this model represents the 
whole system of successful ICT risk management (each key factor affects successful ICT 
risk management) rather than individual paths or relationships in the model.  
The conceptual model estimated the values of indices of Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM). The values of indices were as follows: χ2/df (2054.711/366)=5.614, p=.002, 
TLI=.810, CFI=.829, RMSEA=.124, SRMR=.416, and HOELTER=61 with a confidence 
level of 95%, as shown in Table 7-12 and Figure 7-5. All indices values demonstrate that 
the conceptual model does not present the perception of the sample. 
Table 7-12: Conceptual model of successful ICT risk management in SEM 
Cut-off value 
Model Fit 
Indices Required Value 
χ2/df  (2054.711/366) < 3 5.614 
P-value > .05 .002 
TLI   ≥ .95 .810 
CFI   ≥ .95 .829 
RMSEA  < .06 .124 
SRMR < .08 .416 
HOELTER (P=0.05) ≥ 200 61 
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Figure 7-5: The conceptual model validation 
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Based on the results of the conceptual model, the values of all dimensions were found to 
be non-significant. From there, the other three analytical processes could be carried out. 
Firstly, the factor loading was used to evaluate how items could accurately explain a 
factor. The factor loadings of indicators should be greater than 0.7 (Hair et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the factor loadings of all indicators in all dimensions were statistically 
estimated, the results of which are presented in Table 7-13. The factor loadings of three 
indicators—os6: Physical Protection in Organisational Information Security (OS) 
dimension, clp1: the Managerial View in the Corporate Level Plan (CLP) dimension, and 
olp1: the Operational view in the Operational Level Plan (OLP)—were found to be less 
than 0.7 (see Table 7-13). This demonstrates that these three indicators do not 
sufficiently explain the factors.  
Table 7-13: Standardised regression weights: The conceptual model 
Item Path Item Estimate Item Path Item Estimate 
CLP <--- OLP .444 oc6 <--- OS .659 
CLP <--- POLICY .313 os5 <--- OS .891 
CLP <--- OS .433 os4 <--- OS .926 
CLP <--- IT .136 os3 <--- OS .951 
CLP <--- HRMP -.095 os2 <--- OS .904 
OLP <--- CLP .237 os1 <--- OS .809 
OLP <--- HRMP .047 it4 <--- IT .858 
OLP <--- IT -.011 it3 <--- IT .903 
OLP <--- POLICY -.025 it2 <--- IT .813 
OLP <--- OS .668 it1 <--- IT .867 
SICTRM <--- OLP .059 clp4 <--- CLP .865 
SICTRM <--- CLP .523 clp3 <--- CLP .872 
policy4 <--- POLICY .815 clp2 <--- CLP .803 
policy3 <--- POLICY .849 clp1 <--- CLP .689 
policy2 <--- POLICY .927 olp4 <--- OLP .907 
policy1 <--- POLICY .884 olp3 <--- OLP .942 
hrmp4 <--- HRMP .735 olp2 <--- OLP .911 
hrmp3 <--- HRMP .882 olp1 <--- OLP .628 
hrmp2 <--- HRMP .911 sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .909 
hrmp1 <--- HRMP .831 sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .937 
    sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .873 
 
Secondly, the estimation of the Critical Ratio (C.R.) values in each dimension and each 
indicator was also undertaken to evaluate the significance of the relationships between 
the dimensions. C.R. or path coefficient (see Table 7-14) in each path should be greater 
than 1.96 for a regression weight, and that path is significant at the 95% confidence 
interval (that is, its estimated path parameter is significant) (Garson 2009). Table 7-14 
shows the coefficient or CR values of the four paths which are: Human resource 
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management and Planning (HRMP) and the Operational Level Plan (OLP); Management of 
ICT resources (IT) and the Operational Level Plan (OLP); Organisational Policy (POLICY) 
and the Operational Level Plan (OLP); and the Operational Level Plan (OLP) and 
Successful ICT risk management. The coefficient values of the four paths were less than 
1.96, and the p-values of the four paths were greater than 0.05, indicating that the four 
paths were insignificant at the 95% confidence interval (see Table 7-14).  
Table 7-14: Regression weights: The conceptual model 
   
C.R. P Item Path Item C.R. P 
CLP <--- POLICY 8.244 *** oc6 <--- OS 14.064 *** 
CLP <--- OS 6.404 *** os5 <--- OS 25.891 *** 
CLP <--- IT 4.299 *** os4 <--- OS   
CLP <--- HRMP -3.064 .002 os3 <--- OS 32.157 *** 
CLP <--- OLP 7.955 *** os2 <--- OS 27.074 *** 
OLP <--- CLP 7.955 *** os1 <--- OS 20.393 *** 
OLP <--- HRMP 1.490 .136 it4 <--- IT   
OLP <--- IT -.354 .724 it3 <--- IT 20.752 *** 
OLP <--- POLICY -.748 .454 it2 <--- IT 17.476 *** 
OLP <--- OS 13.143 *** it1 <--- IT 19.463 *** 
SICTRM <--- OLP .492 .623 clp4 <--- CLP 13.884 *** 
SICTRM <--- CLP 4.187 *** clp3 <--- CLP 13.992 *** 
policy4 <--- POLICY 
  
clp2 <--- CLP 12.980 *** 
policy3 <--- POLICY 17.510 *** clp1 <--- CLP   
policy2 <--- POLICY 19.876 *** olp4 <--- OLP   
policy1 <--- POLICY 18.582 *** olp3 <--- OLP 28.265 *** 
hrmp4 <--- HRMP 
  
olp2 <--- OLP 25.722 *** 
hrmp3 <--- HRMP 15.338 *** olp1 <--- OLP 12.780 *** 
hrmp2 <--- HRMP 15.764 *** sictrm1 <--- SICTRM   
hrmp1 <--- HRMP 14.420 *** sictrm2 <--- SICTRM 25.957 *** 
     sictrm3 <--- SICTRM 22.536 *** 
 
Lastly, the modification indices (MIs) were also used to represent the highest covariance 
values, which suggested that the indicators related to misspecification (Byrne 2001; Hair 
et al. 2006) between two variables, as shown in the list of MIs in Table 7-15. All 
dimensions were conceptualised according to the relationships within the conceptual 
model based on the qualitative analysis. Table 7-15 shows the highest covariance values 
between two variables or dimensions (i.e. HRMP <--> OS, POLICY <--> OS, OS <--> IT, 
HRMP <--> IT, POLICY <--> IT and POLICY < HRMP) which related to the 
misspecification of the relationships in the conceptual model.  
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Table 7-15: Covariances: The conceptual model 
   
M.I. 
Parameter 
Change 
HRMP <--> OS 204.373 .719 
POLICY <--> OS 170.365 .839 
OS <--> IT 167.267 .760 
HRMP <--> IT 111.637 .483 
POLICY <--> IT 94.323 .567 
POLICY <--> HRMP 149.610 .611 
 
On the basis of these results, the conceptual model was rejected. Then the structural 
equation modelling was used to modify the successful ICT risk management model. The 
modification stage was aimed at representing the success factors for ICT risk 
management in Thai businesses. The development of the successful ICT risk 
management planning model commenced with validity testing, which is presented in the 
following section. 
  
7.7 Stage IV: Validity testing and model analysis 
Content and construct validity tests were used to represent the degree of accuracy 
between a set of measures and the concept of interest (Cronbach & Meehl 1955; Hair et 
al. 2006). Construct or dimension validity testing was used to evaluate the model fit 
through structural equation modelling (SEM) in this research.  
SEM is a powerful statistical tool that enables the researcher to address a wide range of 
managerial and theoretical questions (Hair et al. 2006). SEM is a widely accepted method 
of evaluating dimension validity and the theoretical relationship among dimensions or 
factors (Hair et al. 2006; Kline 2005). SEM is used to validate multiple dependent 
variables (dimensions or factors) such as multivariate analysis of variance to represent a 
single relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Hair et al. 2006).  
Analysing the data in this research through SEM, a four-step modelling process based on 
Mulaik and Millsap‘s (2000) suggestion was conducted. Firstly, the number of factors 
(latent) is normally established by using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), to validate the 
indicators for each factor. However, in this research EFA was not considered suitable 
because Hair et al. (2006) suggest that EFA is not needed when the dimension is 
conceptualised with the theoretical concept as measurement theory. Moreover, Byrne 
(2001, p. 5) adds that ‗EFA is designed for the situation where links between the 
observed (the measures or items) and latent variables (the dimensions) are unknown or 
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uncertain‘. All dimensions in this research were developed based on the literature, the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard, which are internationally accepted; 
therefore, all dimensions were already known and certain. Hair et al. (2006, p. 799) also 
state that ‗CFA is a special type of factor analysis and is the first part of a complete test 
of a structural model in SEM. Unlike EFA, the researcher must be able to tell the SEM 
program which variables belong with which factor before an analysis can be conducted‘.  
For all dimensions in this research, it was known in advance which variables belonged 
with which factors or dimensions prior to conducting the analysis (refer to discussion of 
the conceptual model in Chapter 6, p. 163). Therefore, EFA was not considered 
necessary in this research. If a pair of dimensions was recommended to combine as one 
dimension because of a lack of discriminant validity, then EFA was used to evaluate that 
all indicators represent the similar intended perspective. In doing so, EFA was used to 
reconfirm that both two constructs really represented the content similarity or the 
construct similarity. Afterward, both two constructs was then combined to represent only 
one construct. 
The second step recommended by Mulaik and Millsap (2000) is confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). CFA was used in this research to confirm the indicators within the factors 
by using factor loadings to justify whether each indicator should be dropped or retained 
for each factor. CFA was used to validate dimension validity which includes convergent, 
discriminant and nomological validities (Campbell & Fiske 1959; Hair et al. 2006). Three 
types of validation known as dimension validity are explained in detail in the next 
section. 
Mulaik and Millsap‘s (2000) third stage entails development of a structural model. A 
structural model was therefore established in this research to confirm the hypothesis and 
the relationship among factors, and then used to propose the success factors of ICT risk 
management.  
The final stage of Mulaik and Millsap‘s (2000) approach is a nested model test. A nested 
models test was not followed because the aim of this research was to propose success 
factors rather than to identify the most parsimonious model.   
 
7.7.1 Content validity 
Prior to launching the survey, the questionnaire was pilot-tested to validate content 
validity and was generated first in an English version and then in Thai. The process for 
pilot testing described at this point in Chapter 3, p.68. Two researchers were engaged to 
validate the items to ensure that sense and meaning were clearly represented. Ten 
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experts (senior management staff from a sample who have performed ICT risk 
management in their organisations) were engaged to confirm understanding of each 
question in the questionnaire. These experts only changed the contents where the clarity 
of meaning needed improvement. For example, question number 50 asked to what 
extent a respondent agreed with the statement: “The organisation manages several 
types of operating software in order to generate data and information in the same file 
pattern‖. The experts recommended that the researcher should provide an example to 
elucidate the meaning of ―same file pattern‖ to make this statement clearer. Therefore, 
the researcher added types of operation system (Oracle, UNIX and SAP): For example, 
―the data and information were treated using SAP software, and must not be treated 
using other software‖ (repeated in Chapter 3, p. 68). After making these final changes of 
a survey question, ten surveys amended by the ten experts were included in the survey. 
  
7.7.2 Construct validity 
Construct validity or dimension validity was used to confirm that the indicators aligned 
with the factors as they are measuring instrument adequacy (Schwab 1980; O‘Leary-
Kelly & Vokurka 1998; Cronbach & Meehl 1955). Dimension validity is based on the tests 
of convergent validity, discriminant validity and nomological validity. 
 
7.7.3 Convergent validity 
In SEM, the researcher is able to use CFA to estimate the values of factor loading 
between the indicators and the factor. The factor loadings indicate the correlation 
between the indicators and the factor. CFA allows the researcher to consider the item 
reliability by looking at squared multiple correlations. The factor loading should exceed 
.70 and the squared multiple correlations should be greater than .50 for each indicator in 
the factor (Hair et al. 2006). In this research, if the indicators within the factor did not 
meet these requirements, they were deleted from the factor to ensure the accuracy of 
information on the factor. Moreover, modification indices were also used in the early 
stage of validity testing, in line with Holmes-Smith‘s (2007 p. 6-3) suggestion that „For a 
one-factor congeneric measurement model to be accepted as a good fitting model, the 
indicator variables contributing to the overall measurement of the latent variable must all 
be of the same kind. That is, they must all represent the same generic true score—they 
must all be valid measures of the one latent trait‟. Thus, this research used CFA in a one-
factor congeneric measurement model as part of the structural model to test item 
reliability (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1989). CFA began with the evaluation of each dimension 
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or construct, as outlined in the next section. The next section also discusses the model 
assessment and modification.   
 
7.8 Stage V: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)  
Maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrapping were used in conjunction with CFA in this 
research (Kaplan 2000; Olsson et al. 2000). Because ML is an estimator, it provides the 
most reliable estimation technique in SEM when dealing with a small sample size (Kaplan 
2000; Olsson et al. 2000). ML is also good for dealing with multivariate normal 
distribution. To test multivariate normal distribution, Mardia‘s coefficient was calculated 
and the results were shown in AMOS. Mardia‘s coefficient measures multivariate kurtosis 
and the critical ratio of all items in multivariate analyses (Mardia, 1970). For example, 
based on the results generated by AMOS, Mardia‘s coefficient value was 32.070 and its 
critical ratio was 40.222 for the POLICY factor (see Table 7-17). The critical ratio value 
indicates that the data in this survey do not follow a multivariate normal distribution, 
thereby being greater than 1.96 (Mardia 1970). Thus, ML would lead to inaccurate results 
in SEM (Olsson 1979).  
To deal with inaccurate results, the bootstrapping technique was selected to boost the 
accuracy of values. Because this resampling technique allows the researcher to test the 
model under conditions of multivariate normal distribution accurate results can be 
obtained (Byrne 2001). Moreover, bootstrapping allows the researcher to resample the 
data from a large sample size as new data based on the actual data of this research. In 
particular, it not only simulates the data as if it was real but also calculates the p-value 
with a Bollen-Stine bootstrap used in this research to test the significance for obtaining 
the 2 value (Bollen 1989). In this regard, the results of the p-value from the Bollen-
Stine bootstrap and from the actual data should exceed .05 to be accepted for model fit.  
To conduct model assessment of the structural model it is necessary to use goodness of 
fit (GOF) tests. GOF is a set of measure indices that indicate the accuracy of a model in 
explaining the data. There are several GOF measures for assessing a structural model but 
it is not recommended to report on them all (Jaccard & Wan 1996; Kline 1998). Thus, 
certain GOF measures were selected to assess the model fit in this research, which are 
discussed in the following paragraph.  
Absolute fit indices and incremental fit indices were used for GOF measures (Tabachnick 
& Fidell 2007) in this research (refer to Chapter 3, p. 71 for further information). 
Accordingly, the structural model is used to evaluate how well the model can explain the 
data gathered from the qualitative analysis. According to Hair et al. (2006), at least one 
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GOF measure from each type of measure should be selected. Jaccard and Wan (1996) 
suggest that at least three GOF measures be selected for the model assessment. While 
Kline (1998) recommends that at least four GOF measures be selected, this research 
uses seven GOF measures5 selected from both absolute fit and incremental fit indices to 
assess the model fit based upon χ2/df or normed chi-square, the p-value, the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the standardised root mean 
square residual (SRMR), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and 
HOELTER‘s critical N (HOELTER) as the requirements. If all GOF measurement 
requirements are not met, model modifications are necessary to ensure the model can 
adequately explain the data.  
The researcher set up four processes for rectifying the model, and set up guidelines for 
model modification to ensure any changes were carefully undertaken. Thus, each step 
was carefully applied to reduce the potential for errors in the model (Byrne 2001; Hair et 
al. 2006), as per the following:  
- Factor loadings are values that indicate how an item can accurately explain a 
factor. The factor loadings of indicators should be greater than 0.7, otherwise 
they will be dropped because they cannot sufficiently explain the factors (Hair 
et al. 2006). 
- The p-value of each observed variable is the value that represents the 
significance of an item in the model. P>.05 for an observed variable means 
that it is not significant, and that it will be deleted excepting unreliable items 
from the model. 
- Modification indices (MI) are values representing the highest covariance 
values, which suggest that the particular indicator relates to misspecification 
(Byrne 2001; Hair et al. 2006) between two variables as illustrated in the list 
of MI (e.g. in Table 7-15), and such values will be subject to deletion after 
careful consideration. Thus, the factor loadings will be used together with MI 
                                                   
5 According to Garson‘s statnotes (2009),  
Normed chi-square refers to the model chi-square which ‗is a badness of fit measure in that a finding of 
significance means the given model‘s covariance structure is significantly different from the observed 
covariance matrix. If model chi-square <.05 [P-value], the researcher‘s model is rejected by this 
criterion‘ (Garson 2009, p. 23).  
CFI is to ‗compare the existing model fit with a null model which assumes the indicator variables (and hence 
also the latent variables) in the model are uncorrelated (the ―independence model‖)‘ (Garson 2009, p. 
29). 
TLI is one of the fit indexes less affected by sample size. ‗To make comparisons between factor models, chi-
squares were compared, with significant reductions in the chi-square indicating a better fit of the data 
than the theoretical model‘ (Gordon 2001, p. 1). 
SRMR is ‗the average difference between the predicted and observed variances and covariances in the model, 
based on standardised residuals‘ (Garson 2009, p. 25).  
RMSEA is the best way to check for the fit of the model because chi-square value based fit indices are 
influenced largely by the sample size and the number of parameters in the model (Garson 2009).  
HOELTER‟s critical N is ‗issued to judge whether or not sample size is adequate‘ (Garson 2009, p. 25). 
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values to justify which particular indicator will be discarded. Having lower 
factor loadings between two variables means they will be deleted. After 
dropping one, the researcher will run the analysis again to measure the factor 
loadings for all indicators and the MI. The process will be repeated until there 
is no significant value.  
- GOF cut-of-values were set at 2/df<3 and p>.05 (Carmines & McIver 1981; 
Ullman 2001), CFI≥.95 (Carlson & Mulaik 1993), TLI≥.95 (Hu & Bentler 
1998), SRMR<.08 (Byrne 1994, 2001; Hair et al. 2006), RMSEA<.06 (Yu 
2002), HOELTER≥200 (Hoelter 1983) and CR>1.96 (Mardia 1970), which 
represent a good model fit and that the model can adequately explain the 
survey data when the requirements for all of these indices have been met (see 
Table 7-16).  
 
Table 7-16: Measurement indices guidelines adapted for this research 
GOF Test Name Cut-off Value References 
2/df  Normed Chi-square < 3 Carmines & Mclver (1981) 
Ullman (2001) 
p Probability value  > .05 
CFI  Comparative fit index ≥ .95 Carlson & Mulaik (1993) 
TLI Tucker-Lewis index ≥ .95 Hu & Bentler (1998) 
SRMR Standardised root mean square residual < .08 Byrne (1994, 2001)  
Hair et al. (2006) 
RMSEA Root mean square error of 
approximation 
< .06 Yu (2002)  
HOELTER  
 
Hoelter‘s critical N 
(at a confidence level of 95%) 
≥ 200 Hoelter (1983) 
CR Critical Ratio  
If it exceeds 1.96, the bootstrapping 
technique can be undertaken. 
>1.96 Mardia (1970) 
 
The model modification process in this research followed the processes and guidelines 
listed above. The model modification was applied through the convergent, discriminant, 
nomological, measurement and structural model validities when the model did not fit 
with the data. An analysis of the application of these processes to each factor follows. 
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7.8.1 Organisational policy (POLICY) 
As shown in Figure 7-6, the factor loadings (λ) of all indicators in POLICY are greater 
than .70 and the squared multiple correlations (R2) of all indicators exceed .50. This 
means that all indicators represent a good fit for POLICY.  
POLICY
.85
IS Objectives er2.92
.72
Risk Statement er3
.85
.66
BCP er4
.81
.79
IT Objectives er1
.89
 
Figure 7-6: POLICY congeneric measurement model 
However, the initial output values of the POLICY dimension as a one-dimension 
congeneric measurement model revealed that the model did not meet the cut-off value 
requirements regarding GOF indices: 2/df (13.749/2)=6.874, p=.076, TLI=.963, 
CFI=.988, RMSEA=.140, SRMR=.018, and HOELTER=132 with a confidence level of 95%, 
as shown in Table 7-17.  
Table 7-17: POLICY congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
Standardised 
Regression 
Weights (λ) 
Squared Multiple 
Correlations (R2) Model Fit 
Cut-off Value 
Requirement 
Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
Policy1 <--- POLICY .878 .892 .771 .796 2/df 6.874 .688 <3 
Policy2 <--- POLICY .913 .936 .833 .876 P-value .076 .461 >.05 
Policy3 <--- POLICY .854 .830 .730 .688 TLI .963 1.002 ≥.95 
Policy4 <--- POLICY .812 .788 .659 .622 CFI .988 1.000 ≥.95 
       RMSEA .140 .000 <.06 
       SRMR .018 .003 <.08 
       
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
132 1680 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 32.070 32.070  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis 
40.222 40.222 >1.96 
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Therefore, this initial model was rejected and model modifications were applied. Only MIs 
were considered to modify the model because the squared multiple correlations of all 
indicators were met and all indicators were found to be significant (see Table 7-18). MI 
suggested that there was covariance between er3 and er4. 
Table 7-18: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
policy1 <--- POLICY  1.062 .055 19.381 *** 
policy2 <--- POLICY 1.104 .053 20.703 *** 
policy3 <--- POLICY 1.159 .064 18.024 *** 
policy4 <--- POLICY 1.014 .060 16.809 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
er3 <--> er4 10.678 .115 
 
Figure 7-7 shows the POLICY congeneric model modification that was then generated in 
order to rectify the model fit. This revealed that the model was a good fit with the new 
values of 2/df (.688/1) = .688, p= .461, TLI= 1.002, CFI= 1.000, RMSEA= .000, 
SRMR= .003, and HOELTER=1680 with a confidence level of 95%, as shown in Table 
7-17.  
POLICY
.80
IT Objectives er1
.89
.88
IS Objectives er2.94
.69
Risk Statement er3
.83
.62
BCP er4
.79
.25
 
Figure 7-7: POLICY congeneric measurement model modifications 
 
Having a 2/df value of .688 and a p-value of .461 indicates that this model fits well, but 
the squared multiple correlations suggest that although the dimension POLICY explained 
over 62% of the variance in four indicator variables, the covariance term between er3 
and er4 (see Figure 7-7) suggests that there is a correlation between policy6 (risk 
statement) and policy4 (business continuity plan) that was not explained by POLICY 
alone7. However, the variance in policy3 and policy4 then represented that both 
                                                   
6 Small letter represents the indicators in each dimension.  
7 Capital letter represents the dimension. 
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indicators were explained by over 62% in POLICY. Thus, the POLICY dimension was 
accepted to be a latent variable in the structural model.  
 
7.8.2 Human resource management and planning (HRMP) 
As shown in Figure 7-8, the factor loadings of all indicators in HRMP are greater than .70 
and the squared multiple correlations of all indicators exceed .50. This means that all 
indicators represented a good fit for HRMP.  
HRMP
.69
Role and Responsibility er1
.83 .83
Human Resource Protection er2.91
.78
Training and Education er3
.88
.54
Human Resource Security er4
.74
 
Figure 7-8: HRMP congeneric measurement model 
However, the initial output values of the HRMP dimension revealed that the model was 
not fitted with the requirements regarding GOF indices: 2/df (8.777/2)=4.389, p=.114, 
TLI=.975, CFI=.992, RMSEA=.106, SRMR=.017, and HOELTER=206 with a confidence 
level of 95%, as shown in Table 7-19.  
Table 7-19: HRMP congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit 
Cut-off value 
Requirement Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
hrmp1 <--- HRMP .831 .836 .691 .698 2/df  4.389 .000 <3 
hrmp2 <--- HRMP .908 .924 .825 .855 P-value .114 .990 >.05 
hrmp3 <--- HRMP .884 .863 .781 .745 TLI   .975 1.007 ≥.95 
hrmp4 <--- HRMP .737 .706 .544 .498 CFI   .992 1.000 ≥.95 
       RMSEA  .106 .000 <.06 
       SRMR .017 .000 <.08 
     
HOELTER
P=0.05 
206 2774030 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test    
     Kurtosis 29.614 29.614  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis   
37.141 37.141 >1.96 
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Therefore, this initial model was rejected and model modifications were applied. Only MIs 
were considered to modify the model because the squared multiple correlations of all 
indicators were met and all indicators were significant (see Table 7-20). MI suggested 
that there was covariance between er3 and er4.  
Table 7-20: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
hrmp1 <--- HRMP 1.000    
hrmp2 <--- HRMP .997 .051 19.484 *** 
hrmp3 <--- HRMP .978 .052 18.836 *** 
hrmp4 <--- HRMP .717 .050 14.466 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
er3 <--> er4 6.280 .073 
 
Figure 7-9 demonstrates the HRMP congeneric measurement model modification that was 
then generated in order to rectify the model fit. This model was seen to be a good fit with 
the new values of 2/df(.000/1)=.000, p=.990, TLI=1.007, CFI=1.000, RMSEA=.000, 
SRMR=.001, and HOELTER=2774030 with a confidence level of 95%, as shown in Table 
7-19.  
HRMP
.70
Role and Responsibility er1
.84 .85
Human Resource Protection er2.92
.75
Training and Education er3
.86
.50
Human Resource Security er4
.71
.22
 
Figure 7-9: HRMP congeneric measurement model modifications 
With a 2/df value of .000 and a p-value of .990, this model fits well, but the squared 
multiple correlations suggest that although the dimension HRMP explains over 50% of 
the variance in four indicator variables, the covariance term between er3 and er4 
indicates (see Figure 7-9) that there is a correlation between hrmp3 (training and 
education) and hrmp4 (human resources security) that is not explained by HRMP alone. 
However, the variance in hrmp3 and hrmp4 is explained by over 50% in HRMP. Thus, the 
HRMP dimension was accepted as a latent variable in the structural model.  
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7.8.3 Organisational information security (OS) 
As summarised in Figure 7-10, the factor loadings for all indicators in OS are greater 
than .70 and the squared multiple correlations of all indicators exceed .50, excepting os6 
(physical protection), which was therefore dropped. Moreover, os1 (system 
configuration) was discarded as it was duplicated with it1 and it2 (networking and 
personal computers respectively) in the IT dimension (see p. 191). The remaining 
indicators were accepted as a good fit for OS.  
OS .86
Security Compliance er4
.92
.91
Data and Information
Integrity Management
er3.95
.82
Access Control Policy er2
.91
.65
System Configuration er1
.81
.79
Data Protection and Privacy er5
.89
.44
Physical Protection er6
.66
 
Figure 7-10: OS congeneric measurement model 
However, the initial output values of the OS dimension revealed that the model was not 
fitted with the requirements regarding GOF indices: 2/df (40.123/9)=4.458, p=.030, 
TLI=.971, CFI=.983, RMSEA=.003, SRMR=.023, and HOELTER=127 with a confidence 
level of 95%, as shown in Table 7-21.  
Table 7-21: OS congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit 
Cut-off value 
Requirement Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
os1 <--- OS .803 - .645 - 2/df  4.458 .030 <3 
os2 <--- OS .907 .914 .815 .835 P-value .030 .904 >.05 
os3 <--- OS .951 .943 .908 .890 TLI   .971 1.004 ≥.95 
os4 <--- OS .925 .944 .862 .891 CFI   .983 1.000 ≥.95 
os5 <--- OS .888 .888 .788 .788 RMSEA  .003 .000 <.06 
os6 <--- OS .663 - .440 - SRMR .023 .001 <.08 
     
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
127 38997 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 40.432 22.010  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis 
35.856 27.604 >1.96 
[190] 
 
 
Not all of the requirements of these indices were met, which led to this initial model 
being rejected and model modifications being applied. Only MIs were considered to 
modify the model because the squared multiple correlations of all indicators were met 
and all indicators were significant (Table 7-22). MI suggested that there was covariance 
between er2 and er4.  
Table 7-22: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
os2 <--- OS .904 .045 19.938 *** 
os3 <--- OS .991 .045 22.243 *** 
os4 <--- OS 1.046 .049 21.200 *** 
os5 <--- OS 1.090 .055 19.700 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
er2 <--> er4 5.531 -.031 
 
Figure 7-11 shows the OS congeneric measurement model modification that was then 
generated in order to rectify the model fit. This indicated that the model was a good fit 
with the new values of 2/df (.030/1)=.030, p=.904, TLI=1.004, CFI=1.000, 
RMSEA=.000, SRMR=.001, and HOELTER=38997 with a confidence level of 95%, as 
shown in Table 7-21.  
OS
.84
Access Control Policy er2
.91 .89
Data and Information
Integrity Management
er3.94
.89
Security Compliance er4
.94
.79
Data Protection and Privacy er5
.89
-.35
 
Figure 7-11: OS congeneric measurement model modifications 
With a 2/df value of .030 and a p-value of .904 this model fits well, but the squared 
multiple correlations suggest that although the dimension OS explains over 79% of the 
variance in four indicator variables, the covariance term between er2 and er4 (see Figure 
7-11) implies that there is a correlation between os2 (access control policy) and os4 
(security compliance) that is not explained by OS alone. However, the variance in policy2 
and policy4 shows that both indicators were explained by over 84% in OS. As a result, 
the OS dimension was accepted as a latent variable in the structural model. 
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7.8.4 Management of ICT resources (IT) 
As outlined in Figure 7-12, the factor loadings of all indicators in IT are greater than .70 
and the squared multiple correlations of all indicators exceed .50. This means that all 
indicators were accepted as a good fit for IT.  
IT
.76
Sufficient Netw orking Connection er1
.87 .67
Sufficient Personal Computer er2.82
.81
Same File Pattern er3
.90
.73
Applications w ith Legal of Use er4
.86
 
Figure 7-12: IT congeneric measurement model 
However, the initial output values of the IT dimension did not meet the requirements 
regarding GOF indices: 2/df (61.404/2)=30.702, p=.002, TLI=.809, CFI=.936, 
RMSEA=.314, SRMR=.039, and HOELTER=30 with a confidence level of 95%, as shown 
in Table 7-23.  
Table 7-23: IT congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit 
Cut-off value 
Requirement Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
it1 <--- IT .870 .810 .757 .657 2/df  30.702 .303 <3 
it2 <--- IT .818 .745 .669 .556 P-value .002 .782 >.05 
it3 <--- IT .899 .939 .802 .882 TLI   .809 1.004 ≥.95 
it4 <--- IT .855 .874 .732 .764 CFI   .936 1.000 ≥.95 
       RMSEA  .314 .000 <.06 
       SRMR .039 .002 <.08 
     
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
30 3820 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 40.746 40.746  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis 
51.102 51.102 >1.96 
 
[192] 
 
 
Consequently, this initial model was rejected and model modifications were applied. Only 
MIs were considered to modify the model because the squared multiple correlations of all 
indicators were met and all indicators were significant (see Table 7-24). MI suggested 
that there was covariance between er1 and er2.  
Table 7-24: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
it1 <--- IT 1.000    
it2 <--- IT .993 .055 17.984 *** 
it3 <--- IT .950 .045 21.129 *** 
it4 <--- IT .904 .047 19.429 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
er1 <--> er2 42.348 .187 
 
Figure 7-13 shows the IT congeneric measurement model modification that was 
generated in order to rectify the model fit. It was demonstrated that this model was a 
good fit with the new values of 2/df(.303/1)=.303, p=.782, TLI=1.004, CFI=1.000, 
RMSEA=.000, SRMR=.002, and HOELTER=3820 with a confidence level of 95%, as 
shown in Table 7-23.  
IT
.66
Sufficient Netw orking Connection er1
.81 .56
Sufficient Personal Computer er2.75
.88
Same File Pattern er3
.94
.76
Applications w ith Legal of Use er4
.87
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Figure 7-13: IT congeneric measurement model modifications 
With a 2/df value of .303 and a p-value of .782, this model fits well, but the squared 
multiple correlations suggest that although the dimension IT explains over 56% of the 
variance in the four indicator variables, the covariance term between er1 and er2 (see 
Figure 7-13) indicates that there is a correlation between it1 (sufficient networking 
connection) and it2 (sufficient personal computers) that is not explained by IT alone. 
However, the variance in it1 and it2 revealed that both indicators were explained by over 
56% in IT. As a result, the IT dimension was accepted as a latent variable in the 
structural model.  
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7.8.5 The corporate level plan (CLP) 
As shown in Figure 7-14, the factor loadings of all indicators in CLP are greater than .70 
and the squared multiple correlations of all indicators exceed .50. This means that all 
indicators were accepted as a good fit for CLP.  
CLP
.50
Managerial View er1
.71 .83
The Annual Plan er2.91
.87
IT Application and IT security
Overview in The IT plan
er3
.93
.84
ICT Risk Management
Methodology
er4
.92
 
Figure 7-14: CLP congeneric measurement model 
However, the initial output values of the CLP dimension revealed that the model did not 
fit the requirements regarding GOF indices: 2/df(5.747/2)=2.873, p=.503, TLI=.989, 
CFI=.996, RMSEA=.079, SRMR=.012, and HOELTER=314 with a confidence level of 95%, 
as shown in Table 7-25.  
Table 7-25: CLP congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit Cut-off value 
Requirement Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
clp1 <--- CLP .709 .695 .503 .482 2/df  2.873 1.288 <3 
clp2 <--- CLP .908 .902 .825 .814 P-value .503 .609 >.05 
clp3 <--- CLP .933 .936 .870 .875 TLI   .989 .998 ≥.95 
clp4 <--- CLP .917 .920 .840 .846 CFI   .996 1.000 ≥.95 
       RMSEA  .079 .031 <.06 
       SRMR .012 .005 <.08 
     
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
314 898 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 33.045 33.045  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis   
41.443 41.443 >1.96 
 
Only the RMSEA index did not meet the requirements. Therefore this initial model was 
rejected and model modifications were applied. Only MIs were considered to modify the 
model because the squared multiple correlations of all indicators were met and all 
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indicators were significant (see Table 7-26). MI suggested that there was covariance 
between er1 and er2. 
Table 7-26: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
clp1 <--- CLP 1.000    
clp2 <--- CLP 1.052 .075 13.944 *** 
clp3 <--- CLP 1.186 .078 15.272 *** 
clp4 <--- CLP 1.166 .076 15.312 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
er1 <--> er2 6.449 .096 
 
Figure 7-15 depicts the CLP congeneric measurement model modification that was 
generated in order to make the model fit. This demonstrated that the model was a good 
fit with the new values of 2/df(1.288/1)=1.288, p=.609, TLI=.998, CFI=1.000, 
RMSEA=.031, SRMR=.005, and HOELTER=898 with a confidence level of 95%, as shown 
in Table 7-25.  
CLP
.48
Managerial View er1
.69 .81
The Annual Plan er2.90
.88
IT Application and IT security
Overview in The IT plan
er3
.94
.85
ICT Risk Management
Methodology
er4
.92
.15
 
Figure 7-15: CLP congeneric measurement model modifications 
With a 2/df value of 1.288 and a p-value of .609 this model fits well, but the squared 
multiple correlations suggest that although the dimension CLP explained over 48% of the 
variance in four indicator variables, the covariance term between er1 and er2 (see Figure 
7-15) implies that there is a correlation between clp1 (managerial view as top-down 
approach) and clp2 (the corporate plan) that is not explained by CLP alone. However, the 
variance in clp1 and clp2 revealed that both indicators were explained by over 48% in 
CLP. As a result, the CLP dimension was accepted as a latent variable in the structural 
model.  
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7.8.6 The operational level plan (OLP) 
As shown in Figure 7-16, the factor loadings of three indicators are greater than .70 and 
the squared multiple correlations of three indicators exceed .50, but the olp1 (operational 
view as bottom-up approach) indicator was lower than .70 and .50 in these measures 
respectively.  
OLP
.40
Operational View er1
.63 .87
The Action Plan er2.93
.92
IS in Security Direction er3
.96
.84
ICT Risk Project
Management Methodology
er4
.92
 
Figure 7-16: OLP congeneric measurement model 
All indicators were significant (see Table 7-27). Moreover, the MIs did not suggest a need 
to rectify the model, thereby having no covariance among indicators. 
Table 7-27: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
olp1 <--- OLP 1.000    
olp2 <--- OLP 1.326 .101 13.114 *** 
olp3 <--- OLP 1.481 .111 13.370 *** 
olp4 <--- OLP 1.380 .106 12.980 *** 
   M.I. Par Change 
- - - - - 
 
The output values of the OLP dimension revealed that the model fitted well with the 
requirements regarding GOF indices: 2/df (3.406/2)=1.703, p=.353, TLI=.996, 
CFI=.999, RMSEA=.048, SRMR=.010, and HOELTER=530 with a confidence level of 95%, 
as shown in Table 7-28.  
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Table 7-28: OLP congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor λ R2 
Model Fit 
Cut-off value 
Requirement Indices Cut-off Value 
olp1 <--- OLP .630 .397 2/df  1.703 <3 
olp2 <--- OLP .930 .866 P-value .353 >.05 
olp3 <--- OLP .961 .924 TLI   .996 ≥.95 
olp4 <--- OLP .916 .839 CFI   .999 ≥.95 
       RMSEA  .048 <.06 
       SRMR .010 <.08 
     
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
530 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 23.869  
     
Critical ratio of 
kurtosis  
29.935 >1.96 
 
Although olp1 (operational view as bottom-up approach) is a less reliable measure of 
OLP, it did not affect the model fit. As a result, the OLP dimension was accepted as a 
latent variable in the structural model with a greater value of indices.  
 
7.8.7 Successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) 
As outlined in Figure 7-17, the number of parameters to be estimated is equal to the 
number of sample moments; this then leads to the model being ‗just-identified‘ (Byrne 
2001). As a result, this model was fixed with constraint to be ‗over-identified‘ in order to 
estimate the value of indices (Byrne 2001).  
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Figure 7-17: SICTRM congeneric measurement model 
The values of indices were as follows: 2/df =3.716, TLI=.990, CFI=.993, RMSEA=.095, 
SRMR=.008, p=.146 and HOELTER=243 with a confidence level of 95%, as shown in 
Table 7-29.  
Table 7-29: SICTRM congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit Cut-off value 
Requirement 
Before After Before After Indices Before  After  
sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .916 .897 .840 .805 2/df  - 3.716 <3 
sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .943 .948 .890 .899 P-value - .146 >.05 
sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .891 .899 .793 .809 TLI   - .990 ≥.95 
       CFI   1.000 .993 ≥.95 
       RMSEA  .949 .095 <.06 
       SRMR - .008 <.08 
     
HOELTER 
P=0.05 
- 243 ≥200 
     Multivariate normal distribution test 
     Kurtosis 19.143 19.143  
     
Critical ratio 
of kurtosis   
30.368 30.368 >1.96 
 
Although all of these indices did not meet the goodness of fit (GOF), the model can be 
accepted as a fitted model because the factor loadings for all indicators are greater than 
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.70 and the squared multiple correlations of all indicators exceed .50. All indicators were 
significant (see Table 7-30). Moreover, this model was fixed to only estimate the value 
indices to explain the data in the model; thus, all indicators were accepted as a good fit 
for SICTRM and this model was accepted. 
Table 7-30: The p-value of each indicator and modification indices in covariance 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .928 .040 23.157 *** 
sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .928 .040 23.157 *** 
sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .928 .040 23.157 *** 
 
After evaluating convergent validity, all indicators were correlated to their own 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-31.  
Table 7-31: Summary of factor loadings and squared multiple correlations 
Indicator  λ R2 Dimension Indicator  λ R2 Dimension 
policy1 <--- .892 .796 
Organisational Policy 
(POLICY) 
clp1 <--- .695 .482 
The Corporate Level 
Plan (CLP) 
policy2 <--- .936 .876 clp2 <--- .902 .814 
policy3 <--- .830 .688 clp3 <--- .936 .875 
policy4 <--- .788 .622 clp4 <--- .920 .846 
hrmp1 <--- .836 .698 
Human resource 
management and 
Planning (HRMP) 
olp1 <--- .630 .397 
The Operational 
Level Plan (OLP) 
hrmp2 <--- .924 .855 olp2 <--- .930 .866 
hrmp3 <--- .863 .745 olp3 <--- .961 .924 
hrmp4 <--- .706 .498 olp4 <--- .916 .839 
os2 <--- .914 .835 
Organisational 
Information Security 
(OS) 
sictrm1 <--- .897 .805 
Successful ICT Risk 
Management 
(SICTRM) 
os3 <--- .943 .890 sictrm2 <--- .948 .899 
os4 <--- .944 .891 sictrm3 <--- .899 .809 
os5 <--- .888 .788 
it1 <--- .810 .657 
Management of ICT 
resources (IT) 
it2 <--- .745 .556 
it3 <--- .939 .882 
it4 <--- .874 .764 
 
It can be concluded that all indicators were found to measure their intended concept 
(Hair et al. 2006). Therefore, all dimensions were then ready to be evaluated in 
discriminant validity. 
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7.9 Stage VI: Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity can be estimated through SEM (Anderson & Gerbing 1988). It 
should reflect the difference among dimensions in a model. The importance of 
discriminant validity assessment is in indicating how dimensions in a model are 
interrelated (Holmes-Smith 2007). If the values of correlations between factors (latent 
dimensions) exceed .80 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), .85 (Kline 1998; 2005) or one 
between .9 and 1.0 (Anderson & Garbing 1988; Hair et al. 2006), this can suggest a lack 
of discriminant validity. For example, the average variance extracted (AVE) for two 
dimensions must be greater than the square of the correlation between the dimensions in 
order to satisfy the requirements of discriminant validity (Holmes-Smith 2007).  
In this section, the researcher uses discriminant validity to test among the dimensions in 
the model that have a correlation of less than .80 (as the requirement in this research) in 
order to confirm whether those dimensions should represent the data in a different way. 
However, the modification indices were not used to rectify the model except when the 
particular dimensions were indifferent. Discriminant validity testing was performed 
between one dimension and another dimension. 
 
7.9.1 Organisational policy and human resource management 
and planning (POLICY and HRMP) 
As depicted in Figure 7-18, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and HRMP. It was found that the correlation (.76) between POLICY and HRMP 
was less than .80.  
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Figure 7-18: Discriminant validity of POLICY and HRMP 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with 
the HRMP dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-32: POLICY and HRMP for discriminant validity test 
POLICY HRMP  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.888 0.789 0.301  hrmp1 0.849 0.721 0.494    
policy2 0.925 0.856 0.207  hrmp2 0.908 0.824 0.260    
policy3 0.842 0.709 0.543  hrmp3 0.864 0.746 0.378    
policy4 0.810 0.656 0.537  hrmp4 0.727 0.529 0.546    
sum  3.009 1.59 0.655   2.820 1.678 0.627 0.581 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and HRMP are greater than the squared correlation between 
the dimensions, as shown in Table 7-32. Thus, both the POLICY and HRMP dimensions 
held discriminant validity. 
 
7.9.2 Organisational policy and organisational information 
security (POLICY and OS) 
As shown in Figure 7-19, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and OS. It was found that the correlation (.78) between POLICY and OS was less 
than .80.  
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Figure 7-19: Discriminant validity of POLICY and OS 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with 
the OS dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-33: POLICY and OS for discriminant validity test 
POLICY OS  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.883 0.780 0.314  os2 0.919 0.844 0.158    
policy2 0.922 0.851 0.213  os3 0.940 0.884 0.125    
policy3 0.848 0.719 0.523  os4 0.946 0.895 0.132    
policy4 0.815 0.665 0.524  os5 0.886 0.785 0.322    
sum  3.015 1.574 0.657   3.408 0.737 0.822 0.613 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and OS are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-33. Thus, both the POLICY and OS dimensions held 
discriminant validity. 
7.9.3 Organisational policy and management of ICT resources 
(POLICY and IT) 
As shown in Figure 7-20, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and IT. This test found that the correlation (.61) between POLICY and IT was less 
than .80.  
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Figure 7-20: Discriminant validity of POLICY and IT 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with 
the OS dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-34: POLICY and IT for discriminant validity test 
POLICY IT  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.890 0.791 0.298   it1 0.815 0.665 0.460     
policy2 0.932 0.868 0.188   it2 0.742 0.550 0.689     
policy3 0.834 0.696 0.567   it3 0.932 0.869 0.152     
policy4 0.800 0.640 0.562   it4 0.88 0.775 0.262     
sum   2.995 1.615 0.650     2.859 1.563 0.647 0.370 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and OS are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-34. Thus, both the POLICY and OS dimensions held 
discriminant validity.  
 
7.9.4 Organisational policy and the corporate level plan (POLICY 
and CLP) 
As Figure 7-21 depicts, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and CLP. It was found that the correlation (.80) between POLICY and CLP was 
equal to .80.  
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Figure 7-21: Discriminant validity of POLICY and CLP  
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However, these dimensions still held discriminant validity. According to the assessment 
of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with the CLP dimension to confirm 
that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-35: POLICY and CLP for discriminant validity test 
POLICY CLP  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.877 0.769 0.330   clp1 0.734 0.539 0.792    
policy2 0.928 0.860 0.199   clp2 0.913 0.834 0.204    
policy3 0.848 0.720 0.522   clp3 0.925 0.855 0.205    
policy4 0.815 0.661 0.524   clp4 0.911 0.830 0.231    
sum   3.010 1.575 0.656     3.058 1.432 0.681 0.645 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and CLP are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-35. Thus, both the POLICY and CLP dimensions held 
discriminant validity. 
 
7.9.5 Organisational policy and the operational level plan 
(POLICY and OLP) 
As shown in Figure 7-22, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and OLP. It was found that the correlation (.69) between POLICY and OLP was 
less than .80.  
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Figure 7-22: Discriminant validity of POLICY and OLP 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with 
the OLP dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-36: POLICY and OLP for discriminant validity test 
POLICY OLP  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.882 0.778 0.317   olp1 0.637 0.406 1.118    
policy2 0.926 0.857 0.204   olp2 0.934 0.873 0.194     
policy3 0.849 0.722 0.518   olp3 0.957 0.915 0.151     
policy4 0.808 0.653 0.541   olp4 0.916 0.839 0.273     
sum   3.010 1.580 0.656     3.033 1.736 0.636 0.475 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and OLP are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-36. Thus, both the POLICY and OLP dimensions held 
discriminant validity. 
 
7.9.6 Organisational policy and successful ICT risk management 
(POLICY and SICTRM) 
As revealed in Figure 7-23, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
POLICY and SICTRM. It was found that the correlation (.51) between POLICY and SICTRM 
was less than .80.  
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Figure 7-23: Discriminant validity of POLICY and SICTRM 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the POLICY dimension was tested with 
the SICTRM dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-37: POLICY and SICTRM for discriminant validity test 
POLICY SICTRM  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
policy1 0.893 0.797 0.290   sictrm1 0.92 0.846 0.180    
policy2 0.932 0.868 0.188   sictrm2 0.942 0.888 0.105     
policy3 0.831 0.691 0.575   sictrm3 0.887 0.788 0.212     
policy4 0.797 0.635 0.570               
sum   2.991 1.623 0.648     2.522 0.497 0.835 0.260 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and SICTRM are greater than the squared correlation between 
the dimensions, as shown in Table 7-37. Thus, both the POLICY and SICTRM dimensions 
held discriminant validity. 
 
7.9.7 Human resource management and planning, and 
organisational information security (HRMP and OS) 
As outlined in Figure 7-24, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
HRMP and OS. The test found that the correlation (.87) between HRMP and OS was over 
.80.  
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Figure 7-24: Discriminant validity of HRMP and OS 
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According to the assessment of the dimensions, the HRMP dimension was tested with the 
OS dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other. The AVE 
value of HRMP did not meet the requirement to be lower than the squared correlation 
between the dimensions, as shown in Table 7-38.  
Table 7-38: HRMP and OS for discriminant validity test 
HRMP OS  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
hrmp1 0.844 0.712 0.510   os2 0.922 0.850 0.153    
hrmp2 0.893 0.797 0.299   os3 0.945 0.893 0.116     
hrmp3 0.872 0.761 0.385   os4 0.933 0.870 0.165     
hrmp4 0.759 0.576 0.490   os5 0.891 0.793 0.31     
sum   2.846 1.684 0.628     3.406 0.744 0.821 0.762 
 
This indicated that both dimensions related to one and only one dimension as an example 
of unidimensionality (O‘Leary-Kelly & Vokurta 1998). Thus, the researcher combined the 
two dimensions HRMP and OS to form a new factor called organisation information 
security management (OSM) (ISO/IEC 2005). Before combining them, they had to be 
retested using EFA, Cronbach‘s Alpha and CFA sequentially in order to confirm OSM as 
the new factor.  
EFA was used to combine HRMP with OS to form OSM as a new factor. Table 7-39 depicts 
that entire indicators were extracted to only one factor, OSM, with high Cronbach‘s Alpha 
of .953 indicating good internal consistency. Moreover, the factor loadings were greater 
than .60 as exploratory research. However, this EFA was also used to confirm the new 
factor with CFA. 
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Table 7-39: EFA to combine HRMP and OS dimensions to form OSM 
Total Variance Explained Factor Matrixa Communalities 
Cronbach‘s 
Alpha 
(8 items) 
Indicator 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Factor Loading 
(with and without 
rotation)  
Initial Extraction 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
hrmp1 6.103 76.282 76.282 5.802 72.528 72.528 .787 .671 .619 .953 
hrmp2 .587 7.336 83.617    .800 .739 .640 
hrmp3 .425 5.316 88.934    .794 .713 .630 
hrmp4 .256 3.203 92.137    .768 .610 .589 
os2 .206 2.575 94.712    .917 .811 .840 
os3 .174 2.174 96.886    .936 .862 .876 
os4 .152 1.903 98.789    .902 .825 .814 
os5 .097 1.211 100.000    .891 .775 .794 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood 
a. One factor extracted. Four iterations required. 
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As depicted in Figure 7-25, the OSM congeneric measurement model represented each 
reliable indicator. The indicators of OS were more reliable than the indicators of HRMP, as 
shown in Table 7-40.  
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Figure 7-25: OSM congeneric measurement model  
Table 7-40: Comparison of the squared multiple correlations for all indicators of OSM 
Indicator  
Former Factor 
Name 
Standardised 
Regression Weights 
Squared Multiple 
Correlations 
OSM Cronbach‘s 
Alpha 
(4 items) OS HRMP OS HRMP 
osm1 hrmp1 <- OS HRMP .917 .787 .840 .619 9.53 
osm2 hrmp2 <- OS HRMP .936 .800 .876 .640 
osm3 hrmp3 <- OS HRMP .902 .794 .814 .630 
osm4 hrmp4 <- OS HRMP .891 .768 .794 .589 
 
Therefore, the researcher dropped the indicators of HRMP and retained only the 
indicators of OS, which represented the same meaning of the factor, as illustrated in 
Figure 7-26. As Figure 7-26 shows, the OSM congeneric measurement model 
modification indicates that the squared multiple correlations for the four indicators of OS 
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were greater than .79, which suggests that OSM accounts for over 79% of the variance 
in each of the indicators. This means that they are good measures of the dimension OSM. 
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Figure 7-26: OSM congeneric measurement model modifications 
With regard to the squared multiple correlations of OSM between OS and HRMP, all four 
indicators of OS represent better values than those of HRMP. The four OS indicators also 
demonstrate good reliability of OSM. Thus, OSM was a new factor generated from HRMP 
and OS to be a latent variable in this research. This can also be accepted to revalidate 
discriminant validity with other dimensions again in order to ensure that all dimensions 
hold discriminant validity. This is outlined in the following section. 
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7.9.8 The corporate level plan and the operational level plan 
(CLP and OLP) 
According to Figure 7-27, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
CLP and OLP. It was found that the correlation between CLP and OCLP was over .90.  
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Figure 7-27: CLP and OLP for discriminant validity test 
According to the assessment of the dimensions, the CLP dimension was tested with the 
OLP dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other. The AVE 
values of CLP and OLP did not meet the requirements to be lower than the squared 
correlation between the dimensions, as shown in Table 7-41. Thus, both the CLP and OLP 
dimensions were merged to create a new factor, ELP, or the enterprise level plan.  
Table 7-41: CLP and OLP for discriminant validity test 
CLP OLP  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
clp1 0.719 0.520 0.825   olp1 0.642 0.412 1.107   
clp2 0.913 0.833 0.204   olp2 0.936 0.875 0.190     
clp3 0.931 0.866 0.189   olp3 0.953 0.909 0.162     
clp4 0.910 0.828 0.234   olp4 0.918 0.843 0.267     
sum   3.047 1.452 0.677     3.039 1.726 0.638 0.808 
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This indicated that the two dimensions related to one and only one dimension as a form 
of unidimensionality (O‘Leary-Kelly & Vokurta 1998). Before combining the dimensions, 
they needed to be retested using EFA, Cronbach‘s Alpha and CFA sequentially in order to 
confirm ELP as the new factor. Organisation theory was used to name the enterprise level 
plan (ELP), based on the claim of Christensen et al. (2007, p. 27) that ‗reforming public 
organizations through restructuring does not necessarily lead to either centralization (or 
the corporate level plan) or decentralization (or the operational plan), but may involve 
both simultaneously‘. 
Table 7-42 reveals that entire indicators were extracted to only one factor, namely ELP, 
with a high Cronbach‘s Alpha of .951 indicating good internal consistency. The factor 
loadings are greater than .60 as exploratory research. However, this EFA was also used 
to confirm the new factor with CFA. 
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Table 7-42: EFA to combine CLP and OLP dimensions to form ELP 
Total Variance Explained Factor Matrixa Communalities 
Cronbach‘s 
Alpha 
(8 items) 
Indicator 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Factor Loading 
(with and without 
rotation)  
Initial Extraction 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
clp1 6.054 75.676 75.676 5.777 72.213 72.213 .724 .611 .525 .951 
clp2 .673 8.412 84.088    .879 .792 .772 
clp3 .429 5.362 89.450    .888 .813 .789 
clp4 .302 3.773 93.223    .864 .790 .746 
olp1 .177 2.215 95.439    .658 .537 .433 
olp2 .141 1.768 97.206    .919 .835 .845 
olp3 .127 1.583 98.789    .925 .861 .855 
olp4 .097 1.211 100.000    .900 .812 .811 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. One factor extracted. Four iterations required. 
[213] 
 
 
As depicted in Figure 7-28, the ELP congeneric measurement model represented each 
reliable indicator.  
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Figure 7-28: ELP congeneric measurement model  
The researcher dropped four indicators (clp1=Managerial View, clp2=The corporate plan, 
clp4=ICT Risk Management Methodology and olp1=Operational View) for which the factor 
loadings were less than .70 and due to problematic issues in the modification indices 
(MI), and retained only those indicators that explained ELP by over 70%, as shown in 
Figure 7-29.  
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Figure 7-29: ELP congeneric measurement model modifications 
With regard to the squared multiple correlations of ELP between CLP and OLP, all four 
indicators represent good reliability of ELP, as shown in Table 7-43. Thus, ELP was the 
new factor generated from CLP and OLP to be a latent variable in this research.  
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Table 7-43: ELP congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor λ R2 
Model Fit Cronbach‘s 
Alpha  
(4 items) 
Indices After Rectifying 
elp1 <--- ELP .830 .689 χ2/df (2.934/2) 1.467 .950 
elp2 <--- ELP .932 .869 P-value .661 
elp3 <--- ELP .957 .915 TLI   .998 
elp4 <--- ELP .920 .846 CFI   .999 
     RMSEA  .039 
     SRMR .005 
     HOELTER  
     0.05 615 
     Multivariate   
     Kurtosis 28.919 
     Critical Ratio   36.269 
 
The ELP congeneric measurement model modifications indicated that the squared 
multiple correlations are greater than .69, which suggests that ELP accounts for over 
69% of the variance in each of the indicators. This means that they are good measure of 
the dimension ELP. 
 
7.9.9 Organisational information security management and the 
enterprise level plan (OSM and ELP) 
As shown in Figure 7-30, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
OSM and ELP. It was found that the correlation between OSM and ELP was .88.  
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Figure 7-30: OSM and ELP for discriminant validity test 
According to the assessment of the dimensions above, the OSM dimension was tested 
with the ELP dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other. 
The AVE value of ELP did not meet the requirement to be lower than the squared 
correlation between the dimensions, as shown in Table 7-44. Thus, OSM was used to 
form a new factor, ESP, because of its high AVE value.  
Table 7-44: OSM and ELP for discriminant validity test 
OSM ELP  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
osm1 0.897 0.81 0.198   elp1 0.844 0.713 0.407    
osm2 0.955 0.91 0.094   elp2 0.935 0.875 0.190     
osm3 0.927 0.86 0.178   elp3 0.949 0.901 0.175     
osm4 0.892 0.8 0.307   elp4 0.918 0.843 0.267     
sum   3.373 0.777 0.813     3.332 1.039 0.762 0.781 
 
This suggested that both dimensions related to one and only one dimension as an 
example of unidimensionality (O‘Leary-Kelly & Vokurta 1998). Thus, the researcher 
combined the two dimensions OSM and ELP to form the enterprise information security 
plan (ESP) as a new factor. The combination of organisational security management and 
the enterprise level plan implies that the samples manage ICT risks by using information 
security at both the corporate level (i.e. a top-down approach) and the operational level 
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(i.e. a bottom-up approach) (Solms 2005a). Consequently, the new name ESP represents 
the data more clearly. Before combining the dimensions, it was necessary that they be 
retested using EFA, Cronbach‘s Alpha and CFA sequentially in order to confirm ESP as the 
new factor. 
Table 7-45 indicates that only one factor was extracted to only one factor, ELP, with a 
high Cronbach‘s Alpha of .966, demonstrating good internal consistency. The factor 
loadings were greater than .60 as exploratory research. However, this EFA was also used 
to confirm the new factor using CFA. 
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Table 7-45: EFA to combine OSM and ELP dimensions to form ESP 
Total Variance Explained Factor Matrixa Communalities 
Cronbach‘s Alpha 
(8 items) Indicator 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Factor Loading 
(with and without 
rotation)  
Initial Extraction 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative % 
osm1 6.512 81.396 81.396 6.300 78.749 78.749 .876 .777 .767 .966 
osm2 .519 6.490 87.886    .927 .870 .859 
osm3 .275 3.443 91.329    .902 .842 .813 
osm4 .202 2.519 93.848    .878 .784 .771 
elp1 .176 2.196 96.044    .855 .726 .731 
elp2 .128 1.602 97.646    .893 .840 .798 
elp3 .106 1.330 98.976    .895 .861 .801 
elp4 .082 1.024 100.000    .872 .821 .761 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
a. One factor extracted. Four iterations required. 
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As shown in Figure 7-31, the ESP congeneric measurement model represents each 
reliable indicator. Over 73% of the variance in each of the indicators is explained by the 
ESP congeneric measurement model. However, the MIs revealed that the model did not 
fit.  
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Figure 7-31: ESP congeneric measurement model  
Thus, this congeneric measurement model had to be rectified in order to confirm the 
indicators for this ESP as a new factor, as depicted in Figure 7-32. The researcher 
dropped three indicators (elp1=IT Applications and IT Security Overview in the IT plan, 
elp2=The Action Plan, and elp4=ICT Project Risk Management Methodology) based on a 
problematic issue with the modification indices. As a result, the ESP congeneric 
measurement model depicted the squared multiple correlations to be over .68, which 
suggests that ELP accounts for over 68% of the variance in each of the indicators. This 
means they are a good measure of the dimension ESP. 
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Figure 7-32: ESP congeneric measurement model modifications 
With regard to the squared multiple correlations of ESP between OSM and ELP, five 
indicators represented good reliability of ESP, as shown in Table 7-46. Thus, ESP was the 
new factor generated from OSM and ELP to be a latent variable in this research.  
Table 7-46: ESP congeneric measurement model with indices 
Indicator  Factor λ R2 
Model Fit Cronbach‘s 
Alpha  
(5 items) 
Indices After 
Rectifying 
esp1 <--- ESP .823 .678 χ2/df(10.966/5) 2.193 .950 
esp2 <--- ESP .898 .806 P-value .423 
esp3 <--- ESP .954 .910 Multivariate   
esp4 <--- ESP .928 .862 Kurtosis 31.006 
esp5 <--- ESP .892 .795 Critical Ratio   32.201 
     TLI   .993 
     CFI   .996 
     RMSEA  .063 
     SRMR .007 
     HOELTER  
     0.05 304 
 
Through the combination of HRMP, OS, CLP and OLP, ESP was generated as a new factor 
to be tested for discriminant validity with the other dimensions in order to ensure that all 
dimensions hold discriminant validity. This process is outlined in the following sections. 
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7.9.10 The enterprise information security plan and 
organisational policy (ESP to POLICY) 
As revealed in Figure 7-33, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
ESP and POLICY. It was found that the correlation (.78) between ESP and POLICY was 
less than .80. 
.80
Data Protection and Privacy er5
.86
Security Compliance er4
.90
Data and Information
Integrity Management
er3
.81
Access Control Policy er2
ESP
.68
IS in Security Direction er1
.82
.90
.95
.93
.89
.67
BCP er9
.72
Risk Statement er8
.85
IS Objectives er7
POLICY
.78
IT Objectives er6
.88
.92
.85
.82
.78
.15
 
Figure 7-33: Discriminant validity between ESP and POLICY 
According to the assessment of the dimensions, the ESP dimension was tested with the 
POLICY dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-47: ESP and POLICY for discriminant validity test 
ESP POLICY  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
esp1 0.823 0.678 0.573   policy1 0.882 0.778 0.316    
esp2 0.901 0.811 0.192   policy2 0.922 0.850 0.214     
esp3 0.951 0.904 0.103   policy3 0.849 0.721 0.519     
esp4 0.930 0.864 0.172   policy4 0.816 0.666 0.521     
esp5 0.892 0.797 0.305               
sum   4.054 1.345 0.751     3.015 1.570 0.658 0.612 
 
The AVE values of POLICY and ESP are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-47. Thus, both the ESP and POLICY dimensions held 
discriminant validity.  
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7.9.11 The enterprise information security plan and management 
of ICT resources (ESP and IT) 
As shown in Figure 7-34, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
ESP and IT. The test found that the correlation (.80) between ESP and IT was equal to 
.80. 
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Figure 7-34: Discriminant validity between ESP and IT 
According to the assessment of the dimensions above, the ESP dimension was tested 
with the IT dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other.  
Table 7-48: ESP and IT for discriminant validity test 
ESP IT  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
esp1 0.823 0.677 0.574   it1 0.816 0.666 0.459    
esp2 0.897 0.805 0.198   it2 0.741 0.550 0.690     
esp3 0.955 0.912 0.095   it3 0.925 0.855 0.168     
esp4 0.929 0.863 0.174   it4 0.888 0.788 0.246     
esp5 0.890 0.792 0.312               
sum   4.049 1.353 0.750     2.859 1.563 0.647 0.632 
 
The AVE values of ESP and IT are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-48. Thus, both the ESP and IT dimensions held 
discriminant validity.  
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7.9.12 The enterprise information security plan and successful 
ICT risk management (ESP and SICTRM) 
As outlined in Figure 7-35, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
ESP and SICTRM. It was found that the correlation (.66) between ESP and SICTRM was 
less than .80. 
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Figure 7-35: Discriminant validity between ESP and SICTRM 
According to the assessment of the dimensions above, the ESP dimension was tested 
with the SICTRM dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each 
other.  
Table 7-49: ESP and SICTRM for discriminant validity test 
ESP SICTRM  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
esp1 0.825 0.681 0.566   sictrm1 0.917 0.841 0.186    
esp2 0.899 0.809 0.194   sictrm2 0.947 0.896 0.098     
esp3 0.952 0.906 0.102   sictrm3 0.885 0.783 0.216     
esp4 0.929 0.863 0.174               
esp5 0.892 0.796 0.306               
sum   4.055 1.342 0.751     2.520 0.500 0.834 0.432 
 
The AVE values of ESP and SICTRM are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-49. Thus, both the ESP and SICTRM dimensions held 
discriminant validity. 
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7.9.13 Management of ICT resources and successful ICT risk 
management (IT and SICTRM) 
As depicted in Figure 7-36, discriminant validity was used to test the correlation between 
IT and SICTRM. It was found that the correlation (.65) between IT and SICTRM was less 
than .80. 
IT
.68
Sufficient Networking Connection er1
.83
.57
Sufficient Personal Computer er2
.75
.87
Same File Pattern er3
.93
.76
Applications with Legal of Use er4
.87
SICTRM
.84
Mitigating ICT Risks er5
.92
.89
Preventing ICT Risks er6
.94
.79
Avoiding ICT Risks er7
.89
.65
.48
 
Figure 7-36: Discriminant validity between IT and SICTRM 
According to the assessment of the dimensions above, the IT dimension was tested with 
the SICTRM dimension to confirm that both dimensions are different from each other. 
The AVE values of IT and SICTRM are greater than the squared correlation between the 
dimensions, as shown in Table 7-50. Thus, both the IT and SICTRM dimensions held 
discriminant validity.  
Table 7-50: IT and SICTRM for discriminant validity test 
IT SICTRM  
Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE Indicator λ λ2 ε AVE ρ2 
it1 0.826 0.683 0.436   sictrm1 0.919 0.845 0.182    
it2 0.755 0.570 0.659   sictrm2 0.941 0.885 0.108     
it3 0.931 0.866 0.156   sictrm3 0.890 0.793 0.207     
it4 0.872 0.760 0.279               
sum   2.879 1.530 0.653     2.523 0.497 0.835 0.420 
 
As seen in Table 7-51, the AVE summary lists the discriminant validity among the factors 
(latent variables) in this model.  
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Table 7-51: AVE measures summary 
Factor AVE ρ2 
POLICY <---> IT 0.650 <---> 0.647 0.370 
POLICY <---> ESP 0.658 <---> 0.751 0.612 
POLICY <---> SICTRM 0.648 <---> 0.835 0.260 
IT <---> ESP 0.647 <---> 0.750 0.632 
IT <---> SICTRM 0.653 <---> 0.835 0.420 
ESP <---> SICTRM 0.751 <---> 0.834 0.432 
 
After evaluating discriminant validity, it was found that all AVE measures were higher 
than ρ2 for all factors. Thus, all dimensions were found to hold discriminant validity and 
were ready to be evaluated in the measurement model.  
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7.10 Stage VII: The measurement model (dimension validity) 
Figure 7-37 represents the new modified measurement model that was used to 
determine the reliability of the instrument along with its indicators. 
 
Figure 7-37: The measurement model of successful ICT risk management 
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The results indicate that the model was not a good fit, with the values of 
2/df(304.948/98)=3.112, p=.004, TLI=.950, CFI=.959, RMSEA=.084, SRMR=.040, and 
HOELTER=121 with a confidence level of 95% (see Table 7-52).  
Table 7-52: The measurement model indices before rectifying 
Indicator  Factor 
λ R2 Model Fit 
Cut-off value 
Requirement Indices Before  
esp1 <--- ESP .801 .642 χ2/df (304.948/98) 3.112 <3 
esp2 <--- ESP .902 .813 P-value .004 >.05 
esp3 <--- ESP .952 .907 TLI   .950 ≥.95 
esp4 <--- ESP .927 .858 CFI   .959 ≥.95 
esp5 <--- ESP .892 .796 RMSEA  .084 <.06 
it1 <--- IT .865 .748 SRMR .040 <.08 
it2 <--- IT .798 .637 HOELTER   
it3 <--- IT .907 .822 P=0.05 121 ≥200 
it4 <--- IT .866 .751 Multivariate normal distribution test 
policy1 <--- POLICY .876 .768 Kurtosis 214.038  
policy2 <--- POLICY .913 .834 Critical ratio of kurtosis 77.491 >1.96 
policy3 <--- POLICY .861 .741    
policy4 <--- POLICY .831 .691    
sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .919 .844    
sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .887 .891    
sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .892 .786    
Hair et al. (2006) suggest that the reliability of an instrument is indicated by the factor 
loading of all indicators, the standardised residual, the critical ratio (CR) and the 
modification indices. Three measures were applied in this research to modify the 
measurement model to ensure it is a good fit. The measurement model modification 
firstly determined that the factor loadings should be greater than .7; the factor loadings 
of all indicators were indeed greater than .7. Next the standardised residuals and critical 
ratio (CR) were the focus of the analysis.  
Table 7-53 shows that all standardised residuals were less than 2.58. This indicates that 
the mean of standard errors in the sample data shows no discrepancy from the mean of 
standard errors in the population. Therefore, the measurement model replicates the 
sample data of this research; as a result, statistical values are estimated accurately. 
Moreover, as presented in Table 7-54, the critical ratio (CR) or path coefficient (e.g. ESP 
--> esp1) in each path is greater than 1.96 for a regression weight, and that path is 
significant at 95% confidence interval (that is, its estimated path parameter is 
significant) (Garson 2009). Therefore, all paths in the measurement model are 
statistically significant. 
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Table 7-53: Standardised residual covariances  
 esp5 sictrm3 sictrm2 sictrm1 policy4 policy3 policy2 policy1 it4 it3 it2 it1 esp4 esp3 esp2 esp1 
esp5 .000                
sictrm3 -.806 .000               
sictrm2 .156 .042 .000              
sictrm1 .140 .019 -.038 .000             
policy4 .803 .628 1.139 1.498 .000            
policy3 -.098 -1.183 -.244 -.130 .336 .000           
policy2 -.133 -.920 -.211 .274 -.355 -.096 .000          
policy1 -.513 -.805 -.276 .573 -.249 -.270 .470 .000         
it4 .276 -.444 -.855 -.360 1.807 .338 .401 -.162 .000        
it3 -.135 -.263 -.278 .018 .914 .037 .042 -.278 .483 .000       
it2 -1.035 .049 .189 -.344 -.305 -1.241 -1.800 -1.609 -.491 -.366 .000      
it1 -.507 .616 .785 1.256 1.563 -.176 -.198 .139 -.604 -.297 1.562 .000     
esp4 .166 -.488 .299 .292 .709 .539 -.005 -.349 .465 .315 -1.089 .031 .000    
esp3 -.158 -.756 -.115 -.144 .871 .287 -.621 -.864 .784 .162 -1.174 -.214 .102 .000   
esp2 .074 -.417 .555 .694 1.428 .538 .053 -.024 .513 -.165 -.433 .135 -.270 .054 .000  
esp1 .356 -.832 .440 .416 .680 .878 -.360 -1.142 .955 .746 -1.052 -.879 -.445 .142 -.045 .000 
Table 7-54: Critical ratio (t-value) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P    Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
esp1 <--- ESP 1.044 .062 16.708 *** it4 <--- IT .934 .050 18.623 *** 
esp2 <--- ESP .909 .045 20.171 *** policy1 <--- POLICY 1.047 .055 18.995 *** 
esp3 <--- ESP .988 .044 22.214 *** policy2 <--- POLICY 1.091 .054 20.369 *** 
esp4 <--- ESP 1.043 .049 21.141 *** policy3 <--- POLICY 1.175 .064 18.466 *** 
esp5 <--- ESP 1.093 .055 19.806 *** policy4 <--- POLICY 1.039 .059 17.466 *** 
it1 <--- IT 1.013 .055 18.562 *** sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .993 .048 20.629 *** 
it2 <--- IT .988 .060 16.390 *** sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .916 .042 21.611 *** 
it3 <--- IT .977 .049 20.080 *** sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .885 .046 19.448 *** 
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Only modification indices were statistically performed to drop those indicators showing 
poor performance. It was determined that esp1 (IS in security direction), it2 (sufficient 
personal computer) and policy4 (BCP) should be discarded, thereby eradicating the 
problematic issue in MI. The final measurement model resulting from these changes is 
shown in Figure 7-38. 
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Figure 7-38: The measurement model modifications 
The rectified measurement model revealed that all indicators displayed good reliability 
and all indicators represented their own dimension well. The squared multiple 
correlations for all indicator variables were greater than .68 (see Table 7-55). This 
suggested that the latent dimensions account for more than 68% of the variance in each 
of the indicators—thus, they are good measures of the dimensions. In other words, four 
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dimensions out of the seven which were originally based on the qualitative analysis were 
confirmed as factors for successful ICT risk management.  
Table 7-55: The measurement model indices after rectifying 
Indicator  Factor λ R2 
Coefficient Model Fit Cut-off value 
Requirement Alpha H Indices After 
esp2 <--- ESP .900 .810 
0.953 0.959 
χ2/df (113.762/59) 1.928 <3 
esp3 <--- ESP .950 .903 P-value .218 >.05 
esp4 <--- ESP .932 .869 TLI .982 ≥.95 
esp5 <--- ESP .890 .792 CFI .987 ≥.95 
it1 <--- IT .826 .682 
0.905 0.918 
RMSEA .056 <.06 
it3 <--- IT .922 .849 SRMR .029 <.08 
it4 <--- IT .881 .777 HOELTER   
policy1 <--- POLICY .885 .783 
0.912 0.927 
P=0.05 207 ≥200 
policy2 <--- POLICY .933 .871 Multivariate normal distribution test 
policy3 <--- POLICY .843 .711 Kurtosis 151.610  
sictrm1 <--- SICTRM .919 .845 
0.939 0.944 
Critical ratio of kurtosis 66.707 >1.96 
sictrm2 <--- SICTRM .943 .890    
sictrm3 <--- SICTRM .887 .787    
All indicators 0.950 0.984 
 
However, each dimension was tested again using SEM in order to ensure that the four 
dimensions have a relationship with, and are significant for establishing, successful ICT 
risk management. 
 
7.11 Stage VIII: Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
The structural model was used to show that all factors represented their relevant 
dimensions. An analysis of SEM was performed with the maximum likelihood estimation 
method (MLE) in combination with the bootstrapping method (refer to pp. 181-182) to 
measure the relationship among the dimensions, in order to confirm or reject the 
research hypothesis, as presented in Figure 7-39.  
The structural model indicates that (1) organisational policy has high impact on the 
management of ICT resources [.60] and (2) the enterprise information security plan 
[.44] when establishing (3) successful ICT risk management through the enterprise 
information security plan [.37] and through the management of ICT resources [.35]. In 
this regard, the impact of organisational policy on both the management of ICT resources 
and the enterprise information security plan is supported by strategic management 
theory (Wheelen & Hunger 2004). Organisational policy is defined as ‗strategic 
formulation‘ at the level of the Board of Directors (Wheelen & Hunger 2004, P. 25). On 
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this account, organisational policy is driven by senior management as ‗strategy 
implementation‘ to set the planning and management guidelines of organisations 
(Wheelen & Hunger 2004, p. 25). Therefore, this model reflects significant similarity to 
the theoretical concepts of organisational strategic management.   
 
Figure 7-39: The structural model of successful ICT risk management 
The outputs of the SEM indicated an overall good fit, with the values of 
χ2/df(113.762/60)= 1.896, p=.251, TLI=.983 CFI=.987, RMSEA=.055, SRMR= .029 and 
HOELTER (210) (see Table 7-56).  
Table 7-56: The successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) model in SEM 
Cut-off Value 
Model Fit 
Cut-off Value 
Model Fit 
Indices  Required Value Indices Required Value 
χ2/df  (113.762/60) < 3 1.896 RMSEA  < .06 .055 
P-value > .05 .251 SRMR < .08 .029 
TLI   ≥ .90 .983 HOELTER   
CFI   ≥ .90 .987 P=0.05 ≥ 200 210 
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All indices met the requirements, suggesting that the structural model explains the data 
well. Moreover, the squared multiple correlations (R2) for the structural model, which 
represent the amount of variance in each endogenous variable predicted by exogenous 
variables, were estimated. The R2 of the enterprise information security plan (ESP) is .77, 
which indicates that one exogenous variable (organisational policy-POLICY) and one 
endogenous variable (management of ICT resources-IT) explained 77% of the variance 
in the ESP (see Figure 7-39). Likewise, the R2 of the model was .47, which indicates that 
three latent variables (organisational policy-POLICY, management of ICT resources-ICT 
and the enterprise information security plan-ESP) explained 47% of the variance in 
successful ICT risk management (SICTRM). However, 53% of unexplained variance in the 
successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) model is also considered in terms of the 
optimisation of the model. Unexplained variances might result from the types of sample 
adopted in the qualitative and quantitative methods. The types of sample in the 
qualitative method include the banking and software development sectors, which may 
affect the validation in the quantitative method. For example, both the banking and 
software development sectors might consider service management as other success 
factors, related to other standards (i.e. the ITIL framework and the Basel II accord), 
when dealing with ICT risk management (ITGI 2007; Basel 2005). 
The estimation values of the structural model are χ2=113.762, df=60, χ2/df=1.896 and 
p=0.251. These measures indicate that the structural model has a good fit, which then 
leads to the initial model grounded on the qualitative findings being rejected, as 
supported by the research of Bentler and Bonett (1980). This researcher therefore 
proposes that the success factors for ICT risk management in an organisation are more 
likely to be organisational policy (POLICY), management of ICT resources (IT), and the 
enterprise level plan (ESP). Three success factors were therefore validated in the SEM in 
order to confirm the relationship and significance among the factors for establishing 
successful ICT risk management in an organisation.  
SEM was further utilised along with maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and 
bootstrapping (due to the small sample size and to boost accurate data) to further 
analyse the data. In bootstrapping, both the biased-corrected p-value and the percentile 
p-value were used with a 95% confidence level, as recommended by Byrne (2001), to 
ensure that results would not occur by chance. 
The two p-values for the relationships between organisational policy (POLICY) and the 
enterprise information security plan (ESP) to establish successful ICT risk management 
(SICTRM) are 0.002 (pbc) and 0.004 (ppc) respectively (see Table 7-57). It can therefore 
be argued that organisational policy has a positive effect (.441) on the enterprise 
information security plan (ESP) in establishing successful ICT risk management (see 
Table 7-58). Furthermore, organisational policy (POLICY) has an indirect effect (0.323) 
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through management of ICT resources (IT) on the enterprise information security plan 
(ESP) (see Table 7-58) with the p-values of 0.000 (pbc) and 0.000 (ppc) respectively (see 
Table 7-59).  
An indirect effect implies that organisational policy is driven to the operational level to 
effectively plan enterprise information security in order to achieve successful ICT risk 
management (Stoneburner et al. 2002). As a result, it supported the theoretical concept 
of strategic management (Wheelen & Hunger 2004). Organisational policy was defined at 
the board of director (the strategic level) and then was driven to the senior management 
and operational levels (the management level) in order to plan information security 
control together to achieve successful ICT risk management. 
To apply this latent variable (POLICY), information security (IS) objectives must be 
clearly defined in dealing with ICT risk management. In addition, it is necessary to 
formulate a risk statement to scope information security definitions so that Thai business 
organisations focus on the policy regarding information security management. These 
relationships then indicate that Thai organisations delineate organisational policy in terms 
of an enterprise information security plan (ESP) in IS strategy within their policy 
statements. This approach will enable an organisation to achieve its goals in dealing with 
ICT risks in both directions.   
Table 7-57: Standardised regression weights: P-values at a 95% confidence interval  
Parameter pbc ppc 
IT <--- POLICY .004 .004 
ESP <--- IT .006 .004 
ESP <--- POLICY .002 .004 
SICTRM <--- ESP .026 .024 
SICTRM <--- IT .004 .005 
 
Table 7-58: Standardised effects of successful ICT risk management 
 
POLICY IT ESP 
Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
IT .604 - .604 - - - - - - 
ESP .441 .323 .764 .535 - .535 - - - 
SICTRM .000 .496 .496 .354 .197 .552 .369 - .369 
 
Table 7-59: Standardised indirect effects: P-values at a 95% confidence interval 
 
pbc ppc 
 
POLICY IT ESP SICTRM POLICY IT ESP SICTRM 
IT ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
ESP .000 ... ... ... .000 ... ... ... 
SICTRM .000 .018 ... ... .000 .015 ... ... 
 
The two p-values for the relationships between organisational policy (POLICY) and 
management of ICT resources (IT) to establish the enterprise information security plan 
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(ESP) and successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) are 0.004 (pbc) and 0.004 (ppc) 
respectively (see Table 7-57). It can be argued then that organisational policy has a 
positive effect (.604) on the management of ICT resources in establishing the enterprise 
information security plan and successful ICT risk management (see Table 7-58). 
Moreover, organisational policy also has an indirect effect (.496) through the 
management of ICT resources and the enterprise information security plan on successful 
ICT risk management (see Table 7-58) with p-values of 0.000 (pbc) and 0.000 (ppc) 
respectively (see Table 7-59).  
An indirect effect implies that organisational policy is driven to the operational level to 
effectively manage ICT resources and to effectively plan enterprise information security 
in order to achieve successful ICT risk management (Stoneburner et al. 2002). As a 
result, this indirect effect supported the theoretical concept of strategic management 
(Wheelen & Hunger 2004). Organisational policy was defined at the board of director (the 
strategic level) and then was driven to the senior management and operational levels 
(the management level) in order to plan information security control together to achieve 
successful ICT risk management. 
To apply this latent variable (organisational policy), information and communication 
technology objectives must be clearly defined in dealing with ICT risk management. In 
addition, it is necessary to formulate a risk statement to scope ICT resources definitions 
so that Thai organisations focus on the policy regarding the management of ICT 
resources. These relationships then indicate that Thai organisations should delineate ICT 
strategy as ICT objectives within their policy statements. This approach will enable Thai 
organisations to better achieve their goals when dealing with ICT risks in both directions.  
The two p-values for the relationships between management of ICT resources (IT) and 
the enterprise information security plan (ESP) to establish successful ICT risk 
management (SICTRM) are 0.006 (pbc) and 0.004 (ppc) respectively (see Table 7-57). 
This indicates that the management of ICT resources has a positive effect (0.535) on the 
enterprise information security plan in achieving successful ICT risk management (see 
Table 7-58). When reflecting on the management of ICT resources, Thai organisations 
appear to ensure that the same data and information patterns are considered when 
planning ICT risk management. Software licensing or applications with licensing can also 
assist Thai organisations to mitigate, prevent and avoid ICT risks. These relationships 
show that the management of ICT resources and information security are distinct from 
each other. The management of ICT resources focuses on providing ICT facilities to all 
staff in Thai organisations. In contrast, the enterprise information security plan focuses 
on information security control and audit instead.  
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The relationships between the management of ICT resources (IT) and successful ICT risk 
management (SICTRM) are revealed by the p-values of 0.004 (pbc) and 0.005 (ppc) 
respectively (see Table 7-57). This signifies that the management of ICT resources has a 
positive effect (0.354) on successful ICT risk management in organisations (see Table 
7-58). Furthermore, the management of ICT resources also has an indirect effect (0.197) 
through the enterprise information security plan on successful ICT risk management (see 
Table 7-58) with p-values of 0.018 (pbc) and 0.015 (ppc) respectively (see Table 7-59).  
An indirect effect implies that enterprise information security plan helps the effective 
management of ICT resources improve successful ICT risk management. The indirect 
effect was supported by the theoretical concept of information security management 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002). Managing ICT resources with information security control can 
help achieve the mitigation, the avoidance and the prevention of ICT risks. 
This indicates that the management of ICT resources (i.e. sufficient networking 
connection, maintaining the same data and information patterns, and software licensing 
or applications with licensing) is significant for enabling Thai organisations to mitigate, 
prevent and avoid ICT risks. Thus, focusing only on the management of ICT resources, 
an organisation can achieve successful ICT risk management.   
Lastly, the relationships between the enterprise information security plan (ESP) and 
successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) are revealed by the p-values of 0.026 (pbc) 
and 0.024 (ppc) respectively (see Table 7-57). This signifies that the enterprise 
information security plan has a positive effect (0.369) on successful ICT risk 
management in organisations (see Table 7-58), although this factor is generated from 
the combination of human resource management and planning, organisational security, 
corporate level planning and operational level planning. However, this does not mean 
that the indicators among the four factors are similar in content, but they are in 
structure. In other words, all indicators are considered as one factor by combining two 
plans (at the corporate and the operational levels) into one plan, as per organisation 
theory (Christensen et al. 2007). Furthermore, this combination of four factors is 
supported by the suggestion of Solms (2005a), who claims that information security 
governance as in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (including human resources protection and 
management, and organisational security) needs to be considered at both the corporate 
and the operational levels. Consequently, the enterprise information security plan plays a 
vital role in successfully dealing with ICT risk management.  
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7.12 Conclusion 
The quantitative results were scrutinised to demonstrate the survey analysis. The survey 
analysis carefully examined the data in detail, utilising descriptive statistics, reliability, 
coefficient values, univariate and multivariate normality tests, content validity, 
convergent validity, discriminant validity and nomological validity, in order to ensure that 
the data conformed to the requirements of EFA, CFA and SEM. Furthermore, non-normal 
data distribution did not affect the analysis, although the data in this research are not 
normally distributed. The reason was because this research used bootstrapping to deal 
with inaccurate results statistically estimated from non-normal data distribution. This 
resampling technique allows the researcher to test the model under conditions of 
multivariate normal distribution accurate results can be obtained (Byrne 2001). 
The survey analysis started with the demographic statistics of the sample. This survey 
included three types of business (banking, telecommunications and insurance). The 
number of respondents was 302 from the 1,000 survey questionnaires sent out. This is 
equal to a 30.20% response rate. Once analysing the demographic statistics, data 
cleaning was undertaken to reduce the number of indicators. The rationale for this is 
because the ratio of sample size to the number of free parameters should be at least 5:1 
to obtain trustworthy parameter estimates and at least 10:1 to obtain appropriate 
significance tests.  
The questions in the survey were produced using the proposed indicators as key 
elements formulated in Chapter 6. In particular, the indicators in Human resource 
management and Planning (HRMP), and Organisational Information Security (OS) were 
expanded into several questions in order to facilitate better understanding of the 
question/item and indicators. Therefore, they had to be reduced to meet the original 
indicators grounded in the proposed dimensions from Chapter 6 (HRMP on p. 154 and OS 
on p. 156). By doing so, the ratio of sample size to the number of free parameters was 
not only met but also the original indicators were maintained. To undertake this process, 
item parcelling was performed to reduce the number of indicators by using their average 
means to represent the new mean for the new indicator (the original indicator grounded 
in the proposed dimensions). Each dimension is then ready for validation in the eight 
stages of the quantitative analysis. Each stage is discussed next. 
Stage I 
Each indicator in the survey was firstly validated for its significance by using the Chi-
square test in SPSS. After screening the data, all indicators and dimensions were shown 
to be significant and ready for validation in the next stage. 
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Stage II 
Reliability testing was used to evaluate the internal consistency of the scale that 
measures the reliability of instrument stability. This reliability testing was Cronbach‘s 
Alpha performed in SPSS. The results show that the Cronbach‘s Alpha coefficient scores 
ranged from 0.904 to 0.942 across the factors, which are greater than 0.6 for 
exploratory research. Therefore, the results demonstrate good reliability of internal 
consistency. The data was then ready to validate in the next stage. 
Stage III 
Conceptual model validation was used to evaluate the model generated from the 
qualitative analysis. This validation was conducted using structural equation modelling in 
combination with consideration of the factor loadings, the p-values and the critical ratio 
(CR), the modification indices (MI) and the goodness-of-fit (GOF) values. As a result, the 
conceptual model based on the qualitative analysis was rejected on the basis of several 
problematic issues such as the insignificance of each path, the insignificance of the model 
and the low factor loadings. The conceptual model was then rectified to develop the 
model using SEM. The next stage involved the processes of validation in SEM. 
Stage IV 
Validity testing and model analysis involved content and construct validity tests. Prior to 
launching the survey, the questionnaire was pilot-tested to validate content validity. Two 
researchers were engaged to validate the items to ensure that sense and meaning were 
clearly represented. Ten experts were also engaged to confirm the contents where the 
clarity of meaning needed improvement. Once sense, meaning and the clarity of meaning 
were achieved, construct validity testing was undertaken.  
In this regards, this research followed a four-step modelling process based on Mulaik and 
Millsap‘s (2000) approach to performing construct validity. Construct validity based on 
the tests of convergent validity, discriminant validity and nomological validity was used 
to confirm that the indicators align with the factors in multiple processes of measuring 
instrument adequacy. Construct validity started with convergent validity by using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in the next stage. 
Stage V 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to estimate the value of the factor loadings 
between the indicators and the factor. The factor loading indicates the correlation 
between the indicators and the factor. Maximum likelihood (ML) and bootstrapping were 
used in conjunction with CFA because this survey has a small sample size. ML helps deal 
with a small sample size but is good for dealing with multivariate normally distributed 
data. However, the data in this research were not multivariate normally distributed. 
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Therefore, bootstrapping was used to boost the accuracy of values from the ML estimator 
(MLE). MLE used together with the bootstrapping technique in CFA provides p-values with 
a Bollen-Stine bootstrap to test the significance by obtaining the 2 value for the model 
and the indicators.  
Before undertaking CFA validation, the researcher set up four processes for rectifying the 
model, and provided the following guidelines for model modification to ensure any 
changes were appropriately scrutinised:  
- Factor loadings must be greater than 0.7; otherwise they will be dropped. 
- The p-value of each item or observed variable must be less than 0.05; otherwise 
it will be deleted. 
- Modification indices were considered to rectify and delete any problematic issues 
after careful consideration, if there are the highest covariance values between 
indicators which mean that both indicators relate to misspecification. 
- Goodness-of-fit (GOF) cut-off values were set at 2/df<3 and p-value>.05 (the 
model); CFI and TLI ≥.95; SRMR <.08; RMSEA <.06; and HOELTER ≥200, which 
represent a good model fit. Moreover, if the critical ratio of kurtosis value 
generated in AMOS is greater than 1.96 this means that the data do not display 
multivariate normal distribution. In this case, the bootstrapping technique is 
undertaken with ML at every stage of the ongoing process of model modification.  
After validating the indicators and the dimensions through CFA, one indicator 
(os6−physical protection) in the organisational information security (OS) dimension was 
dropped for having a low factor loading (0.66). Another indicator (os1−system 
configuration) in the same dimension was duplicated with two other indicators 
(it1−providing sufficient networking connection and it2−providing personnel computers) 
in the management of ICT resources (IT) dimension. Therefore, the results of factor 
loadings for all indicators were greater than 0.7, except for the indicator (clp1−the 
managerial view) for the corporate level plan (CLP) and the indicator (olp1-the 
operational view) for the operational level plan (OLP). However, both indicators did not 
affect the model fit in each dimension; therefore, it is acceptable that they remain in 
each dimension. Once convergent validity was met, discriminant validity testing was next 
undertaken. 
Stage VI 
Discriminant validity was used to evaluate the difference among dimensions in the 
model. This test ensures that each dimension is unidimensional such that each dimension 
in the model represents a different construct but in the same direction. Therefore, the 
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values of correlation between factors should be less than .85. In addition, the average 
variance extracted (AVE) for two dimensions must be greater than the square of the 
correlation between the dimensions in order to satisfy the requirements of discriminant 
validity.  
Testing for discriminant validity revealed that there were three pairs of dimensions that 
did not hold discriminant validity. The first pair included human resource management 
and planning (HRMP) and organisational information security (OS). The results suggested 
that these dimensions should be combined as one dimension, renamed as organisational 
security management (OSM). The second pair included the corporate level plan (CLP) and 
the operational level plan (OLP), for which it was statistically suggested that they also be 
combined into one dimension, which was renamed the enterprise level plan (ELP). The 
last pair included organisational security management (OSM) and the enterprise level 
plan (ELP), which similarly were combined into one dimension, the enterprise information 
security plan (ESP).  
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was first used to confirm whether or not both 
dimensions represented content similarity and/or structural similarity. Once the first 
method was performed, CFA was repeated to reconfirm the results, and drop the 
insignificant indicator in the new construct by following the four processes for rectifying 
the model, until all dimensions were found to hold discriminant validity. The 
measurement model or dimension validity is discussed in the following. 
Stage VII 
The measurement model or dimension validity was used to determine the reliability of 
the instrument along with its indicators. In so doing, all factors along with their indicators 
were statistically analysed by determining that: (1) the factor loadings must be greater 
than 0.7; (2) the standardised residuals must be less than 2.5; and (3) the critical ratio 
must be greater than 1.96. As a result, these three criteria were met, and the following 
three indicators were discarded, thereby resolving the problematic issue in the 
modification indices (MI):  
- policy4 (Business Continuity Plan) in the Organisational Policy dimension; 
- esp1 (IS in security direction) in the Enterprise Information Security Plan 
dimension; and  
- it2 (providing sufficient personal computer) in the Management of ICT Resources 
dimension. 
As a result, the latent dimensions account for more than 68% of the variance in each of 
the indicators; thus, they are good measures of the dimensions. In other words, four 
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dimensions out of the original seven explored in the qualitative analysis were confirmed 
as indicators of success to establish ICT risk management. The next stage is the final 
stage of the quantitative analysis. 
Stage VIII 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to show that the four factors derived from 
stages VI and VII represented relevant dimensions. The structural model indicates that 
organisational policy has the greatest impact on the management of ICT resources and 
the enterprise information security plan to establish successful ICT risk management. In 
this regard, the impact of organisational policy on the management of ICT resources and 
the enterprise information security plan is supported by the theoretical concepts of 
strategic management in organisations (Wheelen & Hunger 2004). The results of SEM 
reveal that the R2 of the model is 0.47 (see Figure 7-40), which indicates that 
organisational policy (POLICY), management of ICT resources (IT) and the enterprise 
information security plan (ESP) explained 47% of the variance in successful ICT risk 
management (SICTRM). 
 
Figure 7-40: The structural model of successful ICT risk management (repeated from Figure 7-39) 
[240] 
 
 
However, 53% of unexplained variance in the successful ICT risk management (SICTRM) 
model might result from the types of sample used in the qualitative and quantitative 
methods. The types of sample included the banking and software development sectors, 
which might consider service management as a success factor, related to other standards 
(i.e. the ITIL framework and the Basel II accord) when dealing with ICT risk management 
(ITGI 2007; Basel 2005). 
At each stage of the SEM analysis, CFA was performed carefully to maintain the reliability 
and validity of the data, during construct validity testing in particular. The errors and 
biases in the model were also minimised during the eight stages. As a result, three 
success factors for dealing with ICT risk management in Thai business organisations were 
identified. Organisational policy, the management of ICT resources and the enterprise 
information security plan (combined with organisational security, human resource 
management and planning, the corporate level plan and the operational level plan) were 
confirmed to drive successful ICT risk management planning. The next chapter will 
discuss the contributions and the conclusions of this research. 
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Chapter 8  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discusses the major findings of the research and concludes with 
consideration of its implications. The research limitations and suggestions for future 
research are also discussed in the final section of this chapter.  
The purpose of this research was to understand success factors for ICT risk management 
practices in Thai business organisations. The research objectives of this research were: 
- To investigate the current profile of ICT risk management in organisational 
practices in a sample of Thai businesses,  
- To identify and then model the success elements of ICT risk management in Thai 
businesses. 
The research question developed from these objectives was:  
- What factors determine successful ICT risk management in a business 
organisation in the Thai business context? 
Three subsidiary questions are developed to support this major question, as follows: 
- What are the current profiles of ICT risk management in Thai businesses? 
- How are ICT risk management concepts applied in those Thai businesses?  and, 
- What success factors can be identified for successful ICT risk management derived 
from the adoption of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard? 
 
8.1 Success factors in ICT Risk Management in Thai Business 
This research achieved validation of the nature of the success factors in Thai business by 
comparing ICT risk management in practice with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard to propose one single management framework for dealing with 
operational, technical and strategic risk related to ICT. Moreover, this research supported 
the conclusions of Solms (2005b), that integrating control processes of the COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard work best through a two-way approach to 
ICT risk management. While the COBIT framework lays the foundation of a top-down 
approach to risk management, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard supports a bottom-up 
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approach. The three success factors shown in this study, creating organisational policy 
(drawn from both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard), managing 
reliable ICT resources (drawn from the COBIT framework), and effectively planning 
enterprise information security (drawn from both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard), were found to positively contribute to successful ICT risk management.  
It was found that three success factors were commonly accepted as vital for successful 
ICT risk management in Thai business organisations. 
This study of ICT risk management in Thai organisations revealed that the development 
of organisational structure, organisational process, organisational control and 
organisational ICT strategies were considered essential to deal with ICT risk 
management. Firstly, the Thai business organisations clarified their organisational 
structure in determining the roles and responsibilities of employees in all staff levels, 
developed organisational policies about the objectives of their use of ICT and information 
systems, and introduced a culture of ICT risk management treatment and the 
components of ICT risk management processes. Secondly, the Thai business 
organisations developed their organisational processes to deal with ICT risks through the 
development of ICT risk management instruments and the processes of ICT risk 
management. Thirdly, the Thai business organisations controlled people, processes, 
technology and systems simultaneously in order to prevent, avoid and mitigate 
operational, technical and strategic risks related to ICT, as both a proactive and a 
reactive process. Lastly, their ICT risk management strategy entailed collaboration 
between senior management and operational level staff aimed at establishing both 
corporate and operational plans for dealing successfully with ICT risk.  
Success factors derived from the control processes in the COBIT framework and the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard were identified in the processes adopted in the Thai 
organisations.  
The outcomes of this research revealed that the effective creation of organisational 
policy, the effective management of ICT resources and the effective planning of 
enterprise information security were the key success factors positively affecting 
successful ICT risk management in Thai organisations. These conclusions are outlined in 
Table 8-1 comparing the findings with existing research about ICT risk management 
success: 
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Table 8-1: Summary of the research findings 
Results of this study Comparison to previous studies 
Organisational policy 
 
The results from multiple case studies have shown that 
organisational policy used in the Thai organisations for ICT 
risk management consisted of a combination of ICT policy, 
information security policy, a risk statement and a 
statement about business continuity management. 
The results from the survey confirmed that the effective 
creation of organisational policy required creating ICT 
policy, creating ICT security policy and documenting 
organisational policy in a risk statement. 
This was shown to have a positive direct effect on 
effective management of ICT resources 
(POLICYICT=.604, p≤0.05) and the effective planning of 
enterprise information security (POLICYESP=.441, 
p≤0.05) as well as an indirect effect on the effective 
planning of enterprise information security 
(POLICYESP=.323, p≤0.05) and successful ICT risk 
management (POLICYSICTRM=.496 p≤0.05). 
This study concluded that the effective creation of 
organisational policy was a key success factor for 
developing an ICT risk management plan to mitigate, 
avoid and prevent operational, technical and strategic 
risks related to ICT in Thai businesses. 
 
 
 
From both results, this research revealed that 
effective organisational policy was required to 
create ICT, security and business directions to 
direct the effective planning of enterprise 
information security and the effective 
management of ICT resources for succeeding 
an ICT risk management plan. These results 
were consistent with the previous research of 
Badenhorst and Eloff (1994), Benaroach et al. 
(2006), Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008), 
Buckby et al. (2009), Iijima and Curtis (2004), 
McEvoy and Whitcombe (2002), Smith and Eloff 
(2002), Straub et al (2008) and Straub and 
Welke (1998). They suggested that ICT policy, 
ICT security policy and  documentation of policy 
were considered when creating organisational 
policy in organisations to deal with strategic 
risks related to ICT.  
 
Management of ICT resources 
 
The results from this research have shown that the 
process of managing ICT resources in Thai businesses 
consisted of a number of actions: the configuration of 
networking and personal computers; software licensing; 
and managing data and information patterns. 
The research confirmed that the effective management of 
ICT resources required providing sufficient networking 
connection, providing proper or complete software licence, 
and managing database systems. 
These actions were shown to have a positive direct effect 
on the effective planning of enterprise information 
security (ICTESP=.535, p≤0.05) and successful ICT risk 
management (ICTSICTRM=.354, p≤0.05) as well as an 
indirect effect on successful ICT risk management 
(ICTSICTRM=.197, p≤0.05).  
This study concluded that managing reliable ICT resources 
 
 
This study confirmed the study results of Byrd 
et al. (1995), Coles & Moulton (2003), 
Flowerday & Solms 2005, Hermanson et al. 
(2000), Longstaff et al. (2000), Moeller 2005, 
Saint-Germain (2005), Smith & Eloff 2002, 
Straub and Welke (1998) and Theoharidou et al 
(2005). They argued that maintaining data and 
information integrity helped organisations deal 
with operational risk in ICT risk management. 
In addition, this study also supported the 
assertions of Luftman et al. (1993), McLeod and 
Schell (2007), McNurlin and Sprague (2006), 
O‘Brien and Marakas (2009), and Whitman and 
Mattord (2009). They argued that the provision 
of adequate technology and facilities enable the 
processing of software and workflow 
[244] 
 
 
helped maintain data and information integrity. In 
addition, this research showed that the effective 
management of ICT resources affected the effective 
planning of enterprise information security for establishing 
successful ICT risk management plans. 
applications through the ICT infrastructure in 
order to achieve successful ICT risk 
management.  
The enterprise security plan 
 
The results from this research have demonstrated that 
managing people and their behaviour in the Thai 
organisations consisted of a number of actions: 
understanding and clarifying the control roles and 
responsibilities of staff, protecting information security 
from inappropriate behaviour of staff, securing 
information security from inappropriate behaviour of staff 
and providing training and education programs for staff.   
Managing information security in ICT infrastructure in the 
Thai businesses was shown to relate to protecting physical 
and logical access control, managing data and information 
integrity, applying security rules and complying with 
regulations and laws, both internal and external to the 
organisation, and protecting data and privacy.  
Planning ICT risk management at the Thai corporate level 
consisted of actions such as defining ICT control and 
audit, defining ICT processes to cover overall ICT 
functions fitting with ICT policy, and providing overall ICT 
risk management process.   
Planning ICT risk management at the operational level 
was shown to deal with defining information security (IS) 
control and audit, defining IS processes to technical 
functions fitting with information security policy and 
providing specific ICT project risk management process 
for each project or for each department in the 
organisation. 
The results from the research have showed that four of 
the key factors relating to ICT risk management success, 
that emerged from the case studies, merged into one key 
factors statistically, the effective planning of enterprise 
information security. This success factor was shown to 
require organisations to manage and document access 
control policy, manage data and information integrity, 
comply with enterprise information security rules and 
regulation, both internal and external, and protect data 
and privacy. The analysis of the data showed that the 
factor effective planning of enterprise information security 
had a positive and direct effect on successful ICT risk 
management (ESPSICTRM=.369, p≤0.05). 
 
 
This research confirmed the conclusions of Allen 
(2005), Buchanan & Gibb (2007), Caralli et al. 
(2004), Capuder (2004), Eloff and Eloff (2003), 
Grove (2003), Jordan and Silcock (2005), 
Robinson (2005), Mena (2002) and Solms 
(2005a). They argued that an information 
security plan needed to be the focus at both the 
corporate level and the operational level 
together in the creation of an the enterprise-
wide plan. In addition, Mena (2002) further 
argued that the close cooperation between 
senior management and the operational team 
was able to attain the optimal goals in ICT risk 
management. This study extended the work of 
Solms (2005a) that in that study it showed that 
the information security plan needed in the Thai 
organisations was a dual policy, set first at the 
enterprise and then at the organisational level. 
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8.1.1 Organisational policy  
The results of the analysis of data from the case studies showed that the Thai 
organisations identified two key ICT risk elements that needed to be addressed for 
success in their management of ICT risk, one related to information and communication 
technology (ICT) risk and the other to information security (IS) risk. The ICT risk 
emerged from poor ICT risk management processes in various departments in each of 
the case studies. The case studies revealed that ICT risk resulted from uncontrolled 
practices including the use of pirated applications and software, from improper or 
incomplete software licence, from poor protection of intellectual property and from 
incomplete software maintenance and updating. On the other hand, the case studies 
showed that IS risk, related to technical security, resulted from poorly managed or 
constructed databases, poorly managed servers, old operating systems, poor networking 
management and maintenance, poor setting configurations and penetration testing 
breaches. The case studies revealed that the objective of each organisation in managing 
technology for risk was to define the appropriate control mechanisms for management of 
existing ICT resources and of information security, which related, they revealed, to 
having a complete understanding of people, processes, technology and systems in their 
organisation. The respondents in the case studies said that their objective was to control 
the processes, technology and systems appropriately by delegating the responsibilities to 
people within their organisations in order to achieve business objectives and goals. The 
Thai organisations objectives were to focus on security issues that involved developing a 
systematic process to protect organisational technology and systems from a variety of 
problems related to operational, strategic and technical risks of corporate data loss, or 
business continuity. To achieve this, the Thai organisations all noted that ICT and IS 
objectives were best addressed by adoption of and clarity in various organisational 
policies. 
The findings from previous research (Badenhorst and Eloff 1994; McEvoy and Whitcombe 
2002; Bojance and Jerman-Blažič 2008; Smith and Eloff 2002; and Iijima and Curtis 
2004) showed that when dealing with ICT risk management, information technology and 
information security policies needed to be defined separately by setting information 
technology and information security objectives to direct information technology policy 
and information security policy respectively. The data collected from the case studies in 
Thailand supported this conclusion that the setting of information technology objectives 
were built into information technology policy and information security objectives were 
built into information security policy. These policies were used in the Thai organisations 
to deal with ICT risk management. 
The respondents in the case studies mentioned that an organisational policy for ICT risk 
management had to deal with risk definition, the responsibility for risk management at all 
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management levels, outline a risk management methodology, determine and make 
explicit, risk control and auditable areas. The policy statement (i.e. a risk statement) in 
the Thai interviews was most often derived from their adoption of either or both COBIT 
framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. This practice confirmed the determinations 
of the COBIT framework that an organisational policy document must exist for successful 
ICT risk management and provide the general and specific responsibilities for ICT risk 
management and be related to the organisation‘s business (ITGI 2007; ISO/IEC 2005). 
The respondents in the case studies noted that the organisational policies for ICT risk 
management needed to be communicated to staff and that staff roles and responsibilities 
were clear when risks occurred. These practices align with the determinations in both 
COBIT and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (ITGI 2007; ISO/IEC 2005).  
In the Thai case studies, business continuity planning was also considered as a key 
element of organisational policy in each company to maintain a contingency plan for 
successfully dealing with strategic, operational and technical risks in the organisation. 
The focus on the business continuity plans in the Thai interviews confirmed the work of 
Calderson and Dishovska (2005) and Cha et al. (2008), that for successful ICT risk 
management technology planning, security assessment, risk statements and business 
continuity plans need to be incorporated in organisational policy, and that these 
positively affect planning at both the corporate level and the operational level when 
undertaking ICT risk management.  
Creating both an ICT policy and information security policy were confirmed in the survey 
analysis as being key indicators of success in ICT risk management (Chapter 7, p. 231). 
Creating ICT and IS policies were shown to be significant indicators because clear ICT 
and IS directions are required to define and then manage ICT risks at the senior 
management level. By creating both policies, the organisation can determine a clear 
direction of dealing with ICT risk management. The organisational policy enabled the 
organisation to clarify both ICT and IS objectives, and was the key indicator of success in 
the organisational policy, to cover both management of ICT resources and management 
of information security simultaneously, when the organisation was planning to deal with 
ICT risk management. From this point of view, the planning and organising of ICT was 
showed in this research to enable Thai organisations to follow the control objectives of 
defining a strategic ICT plan, determining a technological direction and ensuring 
continuous services in the same way it was defined in COBIT (ITGI 2007).  
The document of organisational policy (i.e. the risk statement) was confirmed in the 
survey analysis (Chapter 7, p. 231) as another indicator of success from the 
determinations in organisational policy. Policy was identified in the Thai organisations as 
essential to direct the risk management processes in each organisation.  The document 
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of organisational policy was used to outline a brief risk definition, the responsibility for 
risk management, risk management methodology, risk control and auditable areas. The 
focus of the document of organisational policy in Thai organisations was to ensure that 
ICT risk management was clear at all staff levels in order to perform organisational 
planning appropriately at both the corporate and the operational levels in ways similar to 
that prescribed in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (ISO/IEC 2005). Only business continuity 
planning was showed to be insignificant as an indicator of successful ICT risk 
management relating to the use of organisational policy.  
Organisational policy in the Thai businesses studied required senior management to 
create a document of both ICT and IS policies to enable them to achieve successful ICT 
risk management (Table 8-2). Creating organisational policy was showed in both parts of 
this research to be a clear success factor for establishing successful ICT risk management 
in Thai businesses. The statistical results in this research revealed that organisational 
policy was a significant factor for successful ICT risk management. This research also 
showed that the relationships between organisational policy and the enterprise security 
plan were significant to establish successful ICT risk management with both the biased-
corrected p-value (0.003−pbc) and the percentile p-value (0.004−ppc) at a 95% 
confidence level. Moreover, this research also showed that the relationships between 
organisational policy and management of ICT resources ware also significant to establish 
the enterprise security plan and successful ICT risk management with both the biased-
corrected p-value (0.004−pbc) and the percentile p-value (0.004−ppc) at a 95% 
confidence level.  
Table 8-2: Organisational policy 
Parameter 
λ R2 P-value Significance Factor Indicator 
Organisational policy ICT policy .885 .783 *** Yes 
Information 
security policy 
.933 .871 
*** 
Yes 
A risk statement .843 .711 *** Yes 
  
Furthermore, the survey also revealed that the effective creation of organisational policy 
has an indirect effect (.496) through the effective management of ICT resources and the 
effective planning of enterprise information security, on successful ICT risk management 
with both the biased-corrected p-value (0.000−pbc) and the percentile p-value 
(0.000−ppc) at a 95% confidence level. In addition, the survey revealed that the effective 
creation of organisational policy has an indirect effect (.323) through the effective 
management of ICT resources on the effective planning of enterprise information security 
with both the biased-corrected p-value (0.000−pbc) and the percentile p-value 
(0.000−ppc) at a 95% confidence level. Both indirect effects imply that the effective 
creation of organisational policy at the senior management level requires the operational 
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managers to control ICT resources and to plan enterprise information security in order to 
achieve successful ICT risk management, confirming the previous conclusion of 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002).  The effects of the adoption and implementation of clear 
organisational policy on ICT risk was shown then to be a clear indicator of ICT risk 
management success in Thai business organisations. 
 
8.1.2 Management of ICT resources  
The results of the analysis of data from the case studies showed that the implementation 
of control mechanisms to maintain data and information integrity were the focus to 
manage ICT resources in organisations. Control mechanisms were implemented to 
manage ICT resources which were a key factor that they identified affected control 
planning at both the corporate and operational levels in successful ICT risk management. 
The respondents in the case studies argued that ICT resources had to be managed 
properly in order to meet each organisation‘s ICT objectives and ensure avoidance of 
operational risk. They also revealed that managing proper licence and proprietary of ICT 
resources was necessary for successful ICT risk management. This included secure 
management of facilities, networking, personal computers, database management 
systems and software. The respondents in the case studies argued that ICT control and 
audit plan was used to manage ICT resources in order to maintain data and information 
integrity including effectiveness, efficiency, confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
reliability of data and information. Most respondents recognised that this was undertaken 
seriously in their organisations. ICT control and audit plan are use in these organisations 
to identify and maintain reliable ICT infrastructure. Reliable ICT infrastructure they 
defined as the requirement of having sufficient networking connection, having efficient 
database systems, and providing proper or complete software and applications licence. 
The respondents in the case studies believed that management of reliable ICT resources 
directly affected successful ICT risk management. The findings from previous research of 
Luftman et al. (1993); McLeod and Schell (2007); McNurlin and Sprague (2002); O‘Brien 
and Marakas (2006); and Whitman and Mattord (2009) showed that management of 
reliable ICT resources enabled organisations to prevent, avoid and mitigate operational 
risk. As a result, it was seen in the case studies that the effective management of ICT 
resources required providing sufficient networking connection, managing database 
system, and providing proper or complete software licence to avoid, mitigate and prevent 
operational risk in ICT risk management.    
Providing sufficient networking connection was argued as the key factor that determined 
effective management of ICT resources in the case studies. The respondents suggested 
that effective management of the network connections derived from providing sufficient 
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networking connection to all staff in order to facilitate automated business applications. 
Their organisations were able to ensure that data and information processed in reliable 
ICT resources maintained data and information integrity in order to avoid, prevent and 
mitigate operational risks. Providing sufficient networking connection was then confirmed 
in the survey analysis (Chapter 7, p. 233) as a key indicator of the effective management 
of ICT resources. The reason was that providing sufficient networking enabled the 
processing of software and workflow applications through the ICT infrastructure in order 
to achieve successful ICT risk management. 
The respondents in the case studies also argued that database systems management 
affected maintaining data and information integrity. Database systems management was 
required to effectively managing ICT resources, and they believed, that influenced 
successful ICT risk management. The reason given was that operational risks related to 
ICT can be mitigated, avoided and prevented by their adoption. The findings from the 
previous research of Ousterhout et al. (1985) and Straub and Welke (1998) had showed 
that managing database systems helped organisations maintain data and information 
integrity to achieve the effective management of ICT resources. The indicator, managing 
database systems, was then confirmed as having an impact on the effective management 
of ICT resources in the survey analysis (Chapter 7, p. 233). The reason given by the 
interviewees was that database systems management enabled maintaining data and 
information integrity while effectively managing ICT resources to achieve successful ICT 
risk management.   
The respondents in the case studies revealed that software licence was a major concern 
among Thai business organisations. Providing proper or complete software licensing was 
also a concern of the respondents in the case studies as they believed that it had an 
important influence on their effective management of ICT resources. They noted that 
software piracy caused obstruction of their commercial licence agreements which led to 
operational risk directly affecting successful ICT risk management in their organisations.. 
Risk management in the Thai organisations related not only to software used in the 
organisation but also to software installed on the personal computers of staff, both of 
which impacted on the ICT operations in their organisations. Lloyds (2000) argued in 
previous research that all intellectual property must be used under property rights. In 
addition, Rife (1994, p. 364) mentioned that software piracy ‗is the single greatest threat 
to the continued success of the industry‘. Rife (1994, p. 364) further added that ‗the 
piracy rate in Thailand (where there is no effective copyright protection for software) is 
estimated to be 99%‘. The Thai business organisations have now started to become more 
concerned about software licensing. Since 2007 the Royal Thai Government has passed a 
new law on computer-related offences, the Computer Crimes Act, which all Thai business 
organisations are forced to follow (AHRC 2007). The case studies highlighted the 
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importance of managing software licensing as integral to ICT risk management. Providing 
proper or complete software licensing was also then confirmed as a determinant of 
effective management of ICT resources in the survey analysis (Chapter 7, p. 233). The 
reason given by the interviewees was that providing proper or complete software 
licensing enabled their organisations to avoid operational risk emerging from software 
piracy.  
The effective management of ICT resources in the Thai businesses studied required 
providing sufficient networking connection, effectively managing database systems and 
providing proper or complete software licensing to achieve successful ICT risk 
management (Table 8-3). The effective management of ICT resources was showed in 
both part of the research to be a clear indicator of success for achieving successful ICT 
risk management in the Thai business organisations. The statistical analysis results 
showed that the management of ICT resources was a significant factor for successful ICT 
risk management. This research also showed that the relationships between the effective 
management of ICT resources and effective planning of enterprise information security 
were significant to establish successful ICT risk management with both the biased-
corrected p-value (0.006−pbc) and the percentile p-value (0.004−ppc) at a 95% 
confidence level. Moreover, the effective management of ICT resources directly affected 
successful ICT risk management with both the biased-corrected p-value (0.004−pbc) and 
the percentile p-value (0.005−ppc) at a 95% confidence level.  
Table 8-3: The effective management of ICT resources 
Parameter 
λ R2 P-value Significance Factor Indicator 
Management of ICT 
resources 
Sufficient Networking Connection .826 .682 *** Yes 
Database systems management .922 .849 *** Yes 
Software and applications licensing .881 .777 *** Yes 
 
Furthermore, the survey also revealed that the management of ICT resources has an 
indirect effect (.197), through the effective planning of enterprise information security, 
on successful ICT risk management with both the biased-corrected p-value (0.018−pbc) 
and the percentile p-value (0.015−ppc) at a 95% confidence level. It implies that 
enterprise information security mediates the effective management of ICT resources to 
achieve successful ICT risk management. Managing ICT resources with information 
security control can help achieve the mitigation, avoidance and prevention of ICT risks. 
The adoption and implementation of the effective management of ICT resources was 
shown then to also be a factor in ICT risk management success in Thai business 
organisations. 
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8.1.3 The enterprise information security plan 
The third factor that emerged as having an impact on ICT risk management in the Thai 
organisations related to the various components of the enterprise information security 
plan. In the analysis of the survey, consistent management and planning of people and 
their behaviour in an organisation, the control mechanisms of implementing 
organisational information security, the development of both corporate and operational 
plans were shown to combine to impact on ICT risk management as the factor enterprise 
information security.  
Consistent management and planning of people and their behaviour in an 
organisation 
The interviewees argued that the effective management of staff and their behaviour in 
their organisations included four areas of focus: defining the responsibility of employees, 
securing and protecting information security with regard to employees‘ behaviour in the 
organisation, and providing training and education programs for staff. By addressing all 
four areas, they believed, would ensure that operational risk related to ICT could be 
mitigated, risk avoided and prevented in order to achieve successful ICT risk 
management.  
The respondents in the case studies noted that the effective management of people in 
the organisation affected the planning of control responsibilities of employees at both the 
corporate and the operational levels in ICT risk management. In the case studies, it was 
clear that the planning of control responsibilities of employees at the corporate level was 
used to balance the bottom-up control aspects developed at the operational level. Senior 
management at the corporate level set up committees to take responsibility for 
addressing all identified risks (e.g. business risks, ICT risks and IS risks). On the other 
hand, in addition managers at the operational level established practices for the 
operational team to account for specific risks (e.g. operational, technical and strategic 
risks). They then reported the results back to the committees in order to obtain a review 
and gain advice from the committees for further treatment of particular risks. The 
respondents in the case studies argued that the control responsibilities of employees 
were evident in three specific areas: business, technological and security directions and 
each had to be addressed to deal with operational risks. The control responsibilities of 
employees was previously discussed in research by AIRMIC, ALARM and IRM (2002), 
Straub and Welke (1998), Levine (2004), Hughes (2006), Willcocks and Griffiths (1994), 
and Willcocks et al. (2006). The findings of AIRMIC, ALARM and IRM (2002) were that 
the role of staff members (e.g. the board and all management levels) was to define how 
to achieve the objectives of risk management which included prevention, mitigation and 
avoidance of operational risks in ICT risk management. Defining clear roles and 
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responsibility of people in organisation, they believed, directly influenced the effective 
management of staff and their behaviour to achieve successful ICT risk management  
The implementation of information security policy with regard to the behaviour of staff in 
organisations, the respondents revealed, was required to effectively manage people and 
their behaviour in organisations. The research of Ward (2005), Straub and Welke (1998), 
Hayat (2007), Smith and Eloff (2002), Calder and Watkins (2005, 2008), and ISO/IEC 
(2005) identified that the safety of information, related to confidentiality of organisational 
information, was an important concern for organisations and their risk management. 
They argued that securing information was used to prevent and protect organisational 
assets including information, information technology and systems. Securing 
organisational information in relation to employees‘ behaviour was shown in the case 
studies to be related to the control of the level of personnel access, or to the access 
rights of employees to information (e.g. specified information related to staff‘s job 
descriptions), to information technology (e.g. specified software and applications related 
to staff‘s job descriptions) and to systems (e.g. a specified module related to staff‘s job 
descriptions). Furthermore, the respondents in the case studies revealed that securing 
information security in employees‘ behaviour was mostly concerned with the control 
process governing employees during employment (e.g. training and educating program), 
at termination of employment (e.g. transferring to new position and quitting the position) 
and at change of employment (e.g. transferring to new position). Securing information in 
the organisation from employees‘ behaviour, they believed, directly influenced the 
effective management of people and their behaviour in their organisations. 
The protection and security of information with regard to employees‘ behaviour (i.e. an 
insider threats) was revealed in the case studies thereby influencing the effective 
management of people and their behaviour in their organisations. The respondents 
argued that protection was best assured through employment agreements. They further 
explained that new staff were required to understand organisational regulations, rules 
and about access to confidential information prior to employment (i.e. through 
orientation programs as well as training and educating programs). Protecting information 
from inappropriate employees‘ behaviour was, they revealed, a control process to 
prevent operational risks occurring as a result of human abuse and/or error, whether or 
not intentional. In addition, employment agreements were used in the Thai business 
organisations to prevent the disclosure of sensitive organisational information. The Thai 
business organisations identified that they followed either/ or both the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard and the COBIT framework in order to manage operational risk in achieving 
successful ICT risk management. The Thai business organisations considered that 
protecting information security when employing new staff was achieved by requiring 
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hiring staff to communicate to all new employees to follow the standards in use (ISO/IEC 
2005; ITGI 2007).  
Training and education programs were used for the effective management of employees 
and their behaviour in each of the case study organisations. These programs were used 
to raise awareness of ICT and ICT security. Interviewees in the case studies 
demonstrated that a training and education program was an imperative process to 
improve the understanding of staff about both ICT and ICT security risks. For example, 
organisational e-learning was introduced in one case study to inform employees in the 
organisation about the procedures related to staff producing organisational information in 
a secure way and the potential disasters, such as installed pirate software, that can 
result from ICT abuses and misuse of ICT.  
Training and education programs were also raised with new employees to inform them of 
all organisational rules and regulations, and were also raised with current employees in 
order to prevent operational risk related to the use or misuse of ICT. These ICT abuses 
and instances of misuse of ICT were identified by the interviewees and included playing 
games online (e.g. a cause of computer viruses) and installing pirated software (e.g. 
direct effect on operational risk). In the Thai organisations ICT abuses and misuse of ICT 
were monitored and controlled by the operational manager in each department. The need 
for such education was also identified previously in research by Levine (2004), Hughes 
(2006b), Anderson and Choobined (2008), Byrd and Sankar (1995), McAdams (2004), 
and the ITGI (2007). In addition, the findings from Straub and Welke (1998); Hughes 
(2006) showed that human resources must be trained and educated in order to gain a 
thorough understanding of organisational vulnerability and of the resources required to 
secure organisational information and systems. In all of the Thai case studies, the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard was the framework used to manage human resources. This 
standard enabled the Thai business organisations to define training and educational 
programs in the specific section on the employment process to ensure that ‗all employees 
of the organisation must receive appropriate awareness training and other training, as 
well as regular updates and communications‘ (Calder and Watkins 2005, p. 135).  
The implementation of the effective management of employees and their behaviour then 
required controlling roles and responsibilities, securing and protecting information 
security regarding staff‘s behaviour, and providing training and educating programs to 
prevent, avoid, and mitigate operational risk. Therefore, the effective management of 
people and their behaviour in this research supported the previous research (Willcocks et 
al 2006). Willcoks and Griffiths (1994), and Willcocks et al. (2006) which argued that the 
skills and abilities of human resources contribute to help the organisation boost business 
performance to deal with operational risks for succeeding ICT risk management. The 
[254] 
 
 
effective management of people and their behaviour in the case studies was seen to 
positively influence both the corporate level and operational plans when seeking to 
achieve successful ICT risk management in the Thai organisations. However, the survey 
analysis in this research indicated that the effective management of employees and their 
behaviour combined with the effective management of organisational information 
security thereby having structure similarity.  
The control mechanisms of implementing organisational information security 
The interviewees in the case studies revealed that information security was implemented 
to control both information and information systems. The control mechanisms of 
information security were used to protect and secure both data and information integrity. 
The respondents in the case studies revealed that the control mechanisms included the 
determinations of protecting and securing both data and information integrity. The 
determinations used were the setting of system configurations, defining access control 
policy, managing data and information integrity, complying with security rules and 
regulations, both internal and external, protecting data and privacy, and protecting the 
physical environment. They believed that those determinations positively influenced the 
effective management of organisational information security to mitigate, prevent and 
avoid technical or security risks in successful ICT risk management in their respective 
organisations.  
The respondents further argued that the setting of system configurations was required to 
effectively manage information security and achieve successful ICT risk management.. 
Configuration setting was undertaken in operating systems (e.g. Windows server, Linux 
and UNIX), in networking operating systems (e.g. Netware and Cisco), in business 
software (e.g. SAP and business solution software) and in hardware systems and 
operations (A/S 400, Hubs, Switches and Routers). The case study interviewees believed 
that information security operations that caused technical risk were prevented, avoided 
and mitigated because a malfunction of ICT or systems could not occur. The 
organisations studied adopted both the ISO/IEC 17799 standard and the COBIT 
framework to deal with the issue because they provided frameworks, either at the senior 
management or operational levels, to enable them to institute processes for managing 
technical or security risk associated with the use of ICT (ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI 2007).  
The respondents in the case studies revealed that another control mechanism of the 
effective management of organisational information security was development and 
implementation of an access control policy. This supported the findings in previous 
research from Calder and Watkins (2005) and Milenkovic (2008) who claimed that access 
control must be defined for all business participants (e.g. users, administrators, ICT 
persons and internal auditors). In the case studies, access control policy was focused on 
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the level of access rights to network systems and personal computers. Each of the 
organisations revealed that the need for official documentation of access control policy 
was required to maintain and review access control rights on a regular basis. The official 
document of access control policy in the Thai organisations included defining only 
authorised persons to have access to network services, using both user allocation and 
password management systems to limit the level of access to computers and systems 
and monitoring access of log files to prevent unauthorised access. In the Thai case 
studies, logical access controls were used to protect and secure sensitive organisational 
assets such as raw data, information, information technology and systems. Again the 
case studies adopted both the ISO/IEC 17799 standard and the COBIT framework to 
enable the effectiveness of access control policy (ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI 2007).  
The respondents in the case studies revealed that management of data and information 
integrity was important because these organisations were using information security to 
monitor and secure the processes of producing data (i.e. input process), storing data (i.e. 
processing process) and disseminating information (i.e. output process) throughout the 
organisation and with stakeholders. Smith and Eloff (2002); Hawkins et al. (2003); Hayat 
et al. (2007); Flowerday and Solms (2005); ISO/IEC (2005); ITGI (2007) had previously 
shown in their research that maintaining data and information integrity were important in 
the organisation when dealing with technical or security risks.  The respondents in the 
Thai organisations noted that validation check applications were used to maintain data 
and information integrity. Validation check applications were used to validate data 
appropriateness before putting data into applications and systems, to detect any 
corruption of information through processing errors and deliberate acts and to validate 
output data from applications systems for its correctness and appropriateness before 
being distributed. These processes were controlled and monitored in the Thai 
organisations to ensure that their data and information had integrity. For example, one 
organisation adopted penetration tests and security scanning tools to monitor and control 
all organisational transactions in order to ensure that all business transactions were 
performed properly and correctly. 
Data protection and privacy were another element of the effective management of 
organisational information security. Anderson and Choobineh (2008), and Księżopolski 
and Kotulski (2007) had previously shown in their research that protection of information 
assets on every staff level in organisations must be secured. Data protection and privacy 
for the Thai organisations related to the protection from both external and internal 
threats to personal privacy such as malware, viruses, and worms from staff email and 
personal files (e.g. songs, movies and animated pictures) brought in from outside the 
organisation. The internal threats problem, they noted, could be controlled, by using 
software-scanning tools that automatically detected threats posed by staff misuse. For 
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example, pirated software installed on personal computers in the organisation could be 
detected, after which software scanning tools would automatically remove unwanted 
software from the computers in order to prevent, protect against and avoid any harm 
related to technical or security risks. Only one of the Thai organisations took action to 
include this in their ICT risk management processes. 
Security compliance was another critical element in the effective management of 
information security that emerged from the case studies, in part as a result of the Royal 
Thai Government having enacted the Computer Crime Act regarding computer abuse 
(AHRC 2007). McEvoy and Whitcombe (2002) had argued that security compliance 
entailed clarifying the details of organisational information security. Organisational 
information security covered prevention, mitigation and avoidance of threats, and 
vulnerability of organisational assets including internal and external impacts. Moreover, 
organisational rules and regulations were also involved because the respondents in the 
case studies argued that their organisations needed to ensure that all ICT and ICT 
security procedures and processes were performed appropriately and correctly. The 
respondents revealed that ensuring security compliance was elaborated in their ICT risk 
management process and to do this they adopted the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (ISO/IEC 
2005) and part of the COBIT framework (ITGI 2007).  
The setting of system configuration, managing and documenting access control policy, 
managing data and information integrity, protecting both data and privacy and regularly 
reviewing and updating security compliance were required to effectively manage 
organisational information security. The effective management of organisational 
information security was seen to positively influence the planning at the corporate and at 
the operational levels when seeking to establish successful ICT risk management in the 
Thai organisations interviewed. 
In the survey analysis in this research, the statistical results suggested that merger of 
the effective management of employees, and of organisational information security 
reflected that the effective management of information security was required to secure 
and protect information security regarding employees and their behaviour, information, 
applications and systems (Table 8-4).  
Table 8-4: The first merger  
The effective management of 
employees (HRMP) 
Organisational information 
security (OS) 
ρ2 Implication 
 R2 ε AVE  R
2 ε AVE  The AVE value of HRMP is 
not greater than the 
squared correlation 
between both factors (ρ2). 
As a result, the merger of 
both factors was 
undertaken in discriminant 
validity test. 
sum 2.846 1.684 0.628 sum 3.406 0.744 0.821 0.762 
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Based on this combination, the effective management of organisational information 
security was proposed as a new construct in the model analysis. The statistical results 
showed that the correlation between both key factors was .87 in the discriminant validity 
test; as a result, it indicated structure similarity (Chapter 7, p. 205). The combination 
supported the recommendations of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard because managing 
people and their behaviour in an organisation and managing information security were 
included and recommended in its standard as information security management (ISO/IEC 
2005).   
The corporate plan 
ICT risk management was always planned at the corporate level in the Thai 
organisations. A corporate plan represented the procedures used for ICT risk 
management as the overall plan for the organisation. This research did not, however, 
focus on the degree of control used (i.e. strategic level, operational level and tactical 
level) (Segar & Grover 1996; Shortreed et al. 2000; Anderson & Choobined 2008), but 
rather on the level of management, because these approaches (i.e. the top-down 
approach and the bottom-up approach) can help the organisation strengthen the 
effectiveness and efficiency of its plan at both the corporate level and the operational 
level (Earl 1989; Bandyopadhyay et al. 1999; Schultz 2007). To strengthen a plan at the 
corporate level, the respondents in the case studies argued that ICT risk management 
planning was needed and then used to set the process of treatment of ICT risk problems 
as the scope of ICT risk management which would then drive the operational plan. The 
value of the corporate level plan was also supported by Martin (2003, p. 3) who 
described how an organisation ‗adopted a management perspective that seeks to identify 
the integrated set of broad factors, both strategic and operational, that influence the 
current practice of configuring the architecture, resources and methodology elements in 
organisational ICT risk management.‘ The respondents in the Thai organisations revealed 
that the effectiveness of a corporate plan included defining the details of ICT processes, 
the details of ICT control and audit plan and classification of information technology for 
dealing with ICT risk management successfully.  
ICT control and audit plans were also identified as important in the case studies as 
helping the organisation to provide the guidelines for ICT control, particularly in regard to 
ICT processes included in a corporate plan. ICT control and audit plan was seen by the 
respondents to directly influence the effectiveness of a corporate plan to achieve 
successful ICT risk management. ICT control and audit covered technological functions 
that fitted organisational policies. A corporate plan was also considered in the COBIT 
framework, which explicitly showed that the aim of ICT control at the corporate level in 
an organisation is to achieve effective ICT management of the risk in business processes 
(ITGI 2007). In addition, assessing and managing ICT risks in the COBIT framework were 
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the preliminary focus to plan a brief overview of ICT applications control and ICT security 
control. Solms (2005a) suggested that the COBIT framework also helped the organisation 
develop guidelines for ICT risk management at the senior management level by providing 
a framework for control processes.  
Classification of ICT in ICT risk management was also considered as important by the 
respondents in the case studies because ICT applications and ICT security were distinct 
from each other. This determination was seen in the Thai organisations to directly affect 
the effectiveness of a corporate plan when dealing with successful ICT risk management. 
This classification of ICT was mainly a focus when considering how to deal with ICT risk. 
Classification of ICT helped the Thai organisations distinguish between the degree of 
control of ICT itself and control of ICT security. Therefore, identifying the scope of ICT 
applications and ICT security needs, at the corporate level through a corporate plan, 
provided an overview of the appropriate treatment of ICT and ICT security in the 
organisation. This classification of ICT is also a key element in both the COBIT framework 
and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (ITGI 2007; ISO/IEC 2005), adopted by the 
organisations studied. According to ITGT (2007), the COBIT framework explicitly shows 
the difference between application controls and ICT general controls in order to simplify 
their difference to the organisation  As a result of their adoption by the Thai 
organisations, general controls were embedded in their ICT processes and services 
including systems development, change management, security and computer operations 
(ITGI 2007). Application control also was embedded in business process applications to 
ensure completeness, accuracy, validity, authorisation and segregation of duties defined 
as data and information integrity (ITGI 2007). Moreover, ICT control processes within the 
COBIT framework are defined by a complete set of high-level requirements at the 
executive level and these too were clearly adopted in the Thai organisations studied. 
The effectiveness of the corporate plan was essential, the respondents in the case studies 
believed, and that the senior management directly influenced the planning of ICT risk 
management in the Thai business organisations. In providing an ICT risk management 
plan, the survey analysis showed that a corporate plan positively affected an operational 
planning at the operational level when seeking to achieve successful ICT risk 
management.  
The operational plan 
The respondents Thai organisations studied argued that operational managers also 
planned for successful ICT risk management at the operational level. They further 
elaborated that an operational plan was used to define the procedures and methodology 
to deal with ICT risk at all of the operational levels. An operational plan outlined the 
details of ICT risk management for each of the departments in Thai business 
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organisations. Moreover, an operational plan was produced based on the corporate plan 
to expand the details of the realisation of a corporate plan throughout the organisation. 
The respondents revealed that the effectiveness of an operational plan derived from a 
number of actions including defining and implementing information security control and 
audit processes, defining a clear outline of technical security measures and managing ICT 
project risks in each department. These determinations, the interview data showed, 
positively affected the success of ICT risk management planning in the corporate plan.  
Defining and implementing information security control and audit processes regarding 
ICT risk management was the key element of the operational plans in the Thai 
organisations. It was important to align with organisational policy and plan with the 
corporate plan and the principles in the two standards use in order to outline the 
procedures of the ICT risk management methodology in detail for each department in the 
Thai business organisations, confirming the research conclusions of (Haworth & Pietron 
2006) and Solms (2005a)  
Defining clear details of technical security measures in an operational plan was the other 
element that the respondents in the Thai case studies revealed in relation to establishing 
a plan for dealing with ICT risks at the operational level. The details of technical security 
required clarity to determine appropriate technical controls in each department. The 
outline of technical security measures emerged in each organisation from the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard, which stated that the details of control objectives in particular functions 
were required to be followed and adapted in the organisation (ISO/IEC 2005). In this 
regard, risk analysis and management in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard were the focus to 
plan the details of technical security in the Thai organisations studied. 
Lastly, managing ICT projects was also highlighted as an important element of an 
operational plan, in so far as software development treated ICT risk management on a 
project-by-project basis. Therefore, managing ICT project risk was also considered in this 
research in terms of raising awareness in the organisation of ICT infrastructure changes 
or ICT project changes. The focus on ICT project risk management was to provide a 
methodology for dealing with ICT projects in order to manage ICT risks as they occurred 
in each new project. The important of managing ICT projects well was noted by Martin 
(2003, p. 6), who stated that ‗ICT risk management is not only a prerequisite for 
successful project configuration, but it is a marketable competency‘. Martin (2003) 
further argued that the methodology of ICT project risk management was not only used 
to manage an ICT project itself but also to manage operational and strategic risk 
embedded within the ICT project. The adoption of these processes in the Thai 
organisations confirmed this.  
[260] 
 
 
In the analysis of the survey data the initially separate factors, a corporate plan and an 
operational plan, were merged to a single factor, ‗The Enterprise Level Plan‘ (Chapter 7, 
p. 210). The main justification for the combination was that Thai business organisations 
believe that managing organisational information security was considered at both the 
corporate and the operational levels and that this was a key element in ICT risk 
management success (Table 8-5).  
Table 8-5: The second merger  
The corporate level plan (CLP) The operational level plan (OLP) ρ2 Implication 
 R2 ε AVE  R
2 ε AVE  The AVE values of both 
factors are not greater 
than the squared 
correlation between 
both factors (ρ2). As a 
result, the merger of 
both factors was 
undertaken in 
discriminant validity 
test. 
sum 3.047 1.452 0.677 sum 3.039 1.726 0.638 0.808 
 
This conclusion supported previous research by Weill and Ross (2004) and Brown and 
Nasuti (2005) and Caralli (2004, p. 14), who argued that managing enterprise 
information security ‗is intended to impart the need for active planning, controlling and 
coordination of activities across an enterprise so that security goals can be reached‘.  
The effective management of staff and their behaviour, the effective management of 
organisational information security, and the effective planning of both the corporate and 
the operational levels, were shown in this research (Chapter 7, p. 214), both in the 
interviews and as a result of analysis of survey data of Thai organisations to be best 
viewed as a single success factor, ‗Enterprise Information Security Plan‘ (Table 8-6). The 
effective planning of enterprise information security was shown to be required at both the 
corporate and the operational levels to set the organisations‘ ICT risk management plan 
for information security at an enterprise-wide level.  
Table 8-6: The third merger  
Organisational security management 
(OSM) 
The enterprise level plan (ELP) ρ2 Implication 
 R2 ε AVE  R
2 ε AVE  The AVE value of the 
enterprise level plan is 
not greater than the 
squared correlation 
between both factors 
(ρ2). As a result, the 
merger of both factors 
was undertaken in 
discriminant validity 
test. 
sum 3.373 0.777 0.813 sum 3.332 1.039 0.762 0.781 
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At this enterprise level, the research demonstrated that defining access control policy, 
managing data and information integrity, complying with security rules and regulation 
and protecting data and privacy were a number of key elements affected success (Table 
8-7).  
Table 8-7: The effective planning of enterprise information security 
Parameter 
λ R2 P-value Significance Factor Indicator 
Enterprise 
information 
security plan 
Access control policy .900 .810 *** Yes 
Data and information integrity management .950 .903 *** Yes 
Security compliance .932 .869 *** Yes 
Data protection and privacy .890 .792 *** Yes 
 
Defining access control policy was the first key element in the effective planning of 
enterprise information security by the Thai business organisations. Access control policy 
defined the protective process that monitors and controls physical and logical 
organisational assets. Physical access control was previously highlighted as important in 
the study of Badenhorst and Eloff (1994), who mentioned that physical access security 
must be monitored to prevent theft of an organisation‘s information, information 
resources and assets. In addition, logical access control was supported by the research of 
Hayat et al. (2007) and Milenkovic (2008) who revealed that logical access controls were 
needed to secure ICT infrastructure.  
Managing data and information integrity was the second critical element in the effective 
planning of enterprise security. Thai organisations believed that managing data and 
information integrity involved monitoring control processes with regards to preventive, 
and corrective processes within input, processing and output (IPO) confirming what had 
been shown elsewhere (Moeller 2005). Managing data and information integrity in the 
Thai organisations focused on protecting data by a secure means during the input (raw 
data) through the processing (correcting, storing and preventing information) through to 
disseminating the information to the stakeholders. The importance of this element of 
managing data and information integrity supported conclusions in previous studies by 
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008), Flowerday and Solms (2005), Coles and Moulton 
(2003), and Smith and Eloff (2002) who all argued that confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of organisational information assets must be maintained. In addition, in 
terms of managing data and information integrity, the COBIT framework, used in the 
Thai organisations, covered the control process of information integrity focusing on 
completeness, accuracy and validity (Boritz 2005). Conversely, managing data and 
information integrity was more thoroughly considered in and supported by the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard, which thus supplemented timeliness, authorisation and security omitted 
in the COBIT framework (ISO/IEC 2005).  Since the majority of Thai organisations used 
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both standards, all areas of need for risk management in the enterprise plan were 
covered. 
Complying with security rules and regulations in Thai organisations was another key 
element in the effective planning of enterprise security. The reason given was that all 
security rules and regulations both internal and external to the organisation were needed 
to be considered when dealing with ICT risk management. Complying with organisational 
security rules and regulations was required in the Thai organisations to regularly check 
ICT facilities to ensure maintenance of security implementation standards and to 
regularly review the effective planning of enterprise security to ensure compliance with 
organisational security policy and standards. Complying with security rules and 
regulations in the organisation and external regulators were shown to be significant and 
to be supported by the adoption of the ISO/IEC 17799 standard which elaborated the 
details of security compliance (ISO/IEC 2005). In addition, national regulations and laws 
generated by external regulators such as the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), the 
Security Exchange of Thailand (SEC), the Bank of Thailand (BOT) and the Royal Thai 
Government were also considered in each organisation in order to help the Thai business 
organisations prevent and avoid the operational, strategic and technical risks related to 
ICT risk management.  
Protecting data and privacy was the last element identified in this research critical to the 
effective planning of enterprise security when dealing with ICT risk management 
successfully in Thai business organisations. Data protection and privacy involved the 
monitoring process that maintained data protection and privacy in the Thai business 
organisations.  The significance of protecting data and privacy for the Thai organisations 
corresponds with similar conclusions in research by Hughes (2006b); Hilton (2009); 
Kenny (2004) and Martínez et al. (2010), who each suggested that data protection and 
privacy must be implemented in order to facilitate advances in risk management 
technology. 
This research then proposes that the effective planning of enterprise information security 
is a key success factor for planning ICT risk management in Thai business organisations. 
The statistical results in this research indicated that the effective planning of enterprise 
information security was important in dealing with ICT risk management. This research 
showed that relationships between enterprise security plan and successful ICT risk 
management were significant with both the biased-corrected p-value (0.026−pbc) and 
the percentile p-value (0.024−ppc) in a 95% confidence level (Chapter 7, p. 233). 
Enterprise information security planning together with organisational policy and the 
management of IT resources emerged as the three key factors in Thai organisations 
efforts to achieve successful ICT risk management.  
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8.2 Key factors in successful ICT risk management 
In summary, the extant literature, and both of the standards uses in ICT risk 
management from a governance perspective, have highlighted separate and sometime 
overlapping factors that have a significant influence on organisations being successful 
with ICT risk management. These are summarised in Table 8-8. 
Table 8-8: A summary of key factors of successful ICT risk management in previous research, in the COBIT 
framework and in the ISO/IEC 17799 standard (Repeated from Table 2-7) 
Research Literature 
The COBIT framework (focused on 
at the highest appropriate 
organisational level) 
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard 
(focused on at the operational level) 
Relevant policy in place 
(Benaroch et al 2006; Buckby 
et al. 2009; Capuder 2004; 
Cha et al. 2008; Colbert & 
Bowen 1996; Fletcher 2006; 
Gallegos et al. 2004; Khan 
2006; MyEvoy & Whitcombe 
2002; Segars & Grover 1996; 
Smith & McKeen 2006; Solms 
2005a)  
Creating ICT policy to define a 
strategic ICT plan and to determine 
technological direction 
Creating information security policy 
to document information security 
policy and to review of the 
information security policy. 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to protect ICT resources 
such as information assets, 
ICT infrastructures and ICT 
architecture 
(Benaroach et al 2006; 
Bodnar 2006; Buckby et al. 
2009; Byrd et al. 1995; 
Fletcher 2006; Longstaff et al. 
2000; Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Stoneburner et al. 2002; 
Straub & Welke 1998)  
Effective ICT resource management 
with regard to ICT infrastructure, 
ICT performance, ICT project,   
Not clearly defined 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage human 
resources and defining roles 
and responsibilities 
(Badenhorst & Eloff 1994; 
Ciborra 2006; Figg 1999; 
Hughes 2006a; Moulton 2003; 
Van Grembergen & De Haes 
2008; Willcocks & Griffiths 
1994; Willcocks et al. 2006)  
Constant management of human 
resource including training and 
educating programs.  
Constant human resource security 
for employees during employment 
and termination or change of 
employment 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage access 
control in physical and logical 
systems 
(Badenhorst & Eloff 1994; 
Hayat et al 2007; Levine 
2004; Milenkovic 2008; 
Schultz 2007)  
Creating a process for managing 
the physical environment  
Creating a process for secure areas, 
equipment security, user access 
management, user responsibilities, 
network access control, operating 
system access control and 
application and information access 
control. 
Policy and mechanisms in 
place to manage business 
continuity planning 
Creating a continuous services plan Creating business continuity 
management and information 
security incident planning and 
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(Cha et al. 2008; Groves 
2003; ISO/IEC 2005; ITGI 
2007; Posthumusa & Solms 
2005)  
management 
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to secure 
information, information 
systems and assets 
(Bodnar 2006; Byrd et al. 
1995; Karabacak & 
Sogukpinar 2006; Lainhart 
2001a; Longstaff et al. 2000; 
Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Stoneburner et al 2002)  
Implementation of an ICT plan 
(e.g. defining ICT processes) 
regarding the ICT infrastructure 
and for developing of a security 
culture 
Implementation of the organisation 
of information security and asset 
management to create an ICT 
security plan (e.g. defining 
information security processes) 
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to protect 
information integrity such as 
input, processing and output 
(IPO) processes 
(Bojanc & Jerman-Blazic 
2008; Coles & Moulton 2003; 
Flowerday & Solms 2005; 
Hermanson et al 2000; 
Moeller 2005; Saint-Germain 
2005; Smith & Eloff 2002; 
Theoharidou et al. 2005) 
Implementation of ICT processes, 
technology infrastructure, and data 
management  
Implementation of information 
systems development and 
maintenance 
Implementation of control 
mechanisms to protect threats 
and vulnerabilities of assets 
(Anderson & Choobineh 2008; 
Hawkins et al. 2003; 
Karabacak & Sogukpinar 
2006; Ksiezopoliski & Kotulski 
2007; Smith & Eloff 2002)  
Not clearly defined Implementation of organisation of 
information security; internal 
organisation focusing on vulnerability 
of assets and external environment 
focusing on threats. 
Operationalisation of ICT 
management control 
(Elieson 2006; Eloff & Eloff 
2003; Finne 2000; Flowerday 
& Solms 2005; Gerke & Ridley 
2006; Khan 2006; Liu & 
Ridley 2005; Ridley et al. 
2004; Robinson 2005; Smith 
& Eloff 2002; Smith & McKeen 
2006; Van Grembergent et al. 
2004)  
Implementation of ICT processes to 
control ICT management  
Not clearly defined 
Operationalisation of 
information security control 
(Capuder 2004; Eloff & Eloff 
2003; Fletcher 2006; 
Flowerday & Solms 2005; 
Hayat et al. 2007; Kenning 
2001; Khan 2006; Robinson 
2005; Smith & McKeen 2006; 
Solms & Solms 2005, 2006; 
Solms 2005a; Straub et al. 
2008)  
Not clearly defined Implementation of information 
security processes to control 
information security management 
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In the extant research literature there are a number of themes that emerge as factors 
impacting on successful ICT risk management in organisations. Ciborra (2006) argued 
that risk management emerged from people in an organisation having a lack of 
knowledge, from the role of biased data when assessing risk in organisations and from 
the influence of internal politics. Levine (2004) and Hughes (2006a) added that a lack of 
clarity of the roles and responsibilities of people impacted on successful risk 
management. Straub et al (1998) argued that human resource management is 
considered significant whilst dealing with ICT risk management. The reason is that the 
organisation needs senior management support in order to gain a thorough 
understanding of organisational vulnerability and of the resources required in securing 
organisational systems. It is necessary that senior management understand the security 
actions required and for them to integrate security planning into information security 
policy through adoption of organisational standards, and that users are trained and 
educated about security awareness in order that organisational standards can be 
reviewed and updated. Staff at all levels can help reduce operational and technical risks; 
therefore, training programs, clarification of roles and responsibilities, and the 
identification of specific authority for specific roles must be provided for all staff (Hughes 
2006a) to ensure success risk management. 
Smith and Eloff (2002) argued for a different emphasis, that ICT risk management was 
defined in terms of information and communication technology (ICT) and information 
security (IS) components. Specifically the ICT component is used to describe the scope of 
the ICT domain where ICT produces data throughout input, processing and output (IPO) 
and disseminates information to internal and external parties (Smith & Eloff 2002). This 
is used to control the ability of ICT used in IPO processes particularly in relation to ICT 
risks. Byrd et al. (1995) further suggested that effective ICT related architecture helped 
an organisation define the strategy to drive, shape and control its architecture when 
dealing with ICT risk management. ICT architectures are specified by what types of 
hardware and software are employed; where personnel, equipment, data and facilities 
are located; the levels of applications, data and procedural compatibility that exist across 
locations (e.g. department to department, business unit to business unit); and how 
locations are connected, coordinated, and controlled (e.g. telecommunications 
networking) (Byrd et al. 1995).  
Smith and Eloff (2002) also argued that another component of ICT risk management was 
information security (IS). Schultz (2007) provided guidance on how to mitigate ICT risks 
with regard to information security through proper management of physical security 
systems such as devices, process control systems and ICT infrastructure. Schultz (2007) 
further explained that for successful ICT risk management in organisations that senior 
management are responsible for understanding the configuration of networks, systems 
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and ICT infrastructure, use of penetration tests, for supporting to management and audit 
functions, and for developing organisational information security policies (e.g. a 
corporate plan and an operational plan−a technical means). However, ‗many senior 
managers are unaware that ICT security in their organizations is inadequate what the 
consequences of vulnerability may be‘ (Byrd et al. 1995, p41). Information security is 
used to describe the security domain where data and information is protected and 
rendered with ‗identification and authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation‘ (Smith & Eloff 2002, p. 268). 
This research built of those previously identified factors with reference to the most 
commonly accepted and used standards. From a different perspective the two standards 
addressing governance of ICT in business organisations focus on other factors as being 
more influential on successful ICT risk management. The COBIT framework is recognised 
as a top-down or high-level framework for governance and control over ICT risk (Khan 
2006; Smith & McKeen 2006). The main purpose of the COBIT framework is to clarify 
business-focused, process-oriented, control-based and measurement-driven objectives 
and requirements through business process and ICT systems in an organisation (ITGI 
2007). The COBIT framework was established as ICT control practices to help senior 
management direct their responsibility with regard to an organisation‘s assets by aligning 
the requirements in terms of business risk, control needs, and technical issues (Bodnar 
2006). The COBIT framework also describes the information process requirements that 
match the broader classes of ICT control used by an organisation to achieve its 
objectives and goals (Bae et al. 2003). 
The COBIT framework assists senior management to build ICT processes and controls 
which are appropriate for implementing and developing ICT governance and 
management for dealing with strategic and operational risks in ICT risk management 
(Smith & McKeen 2006). The COBIT framework provides senior management with 
management strategies for ICT resources in four domains: planning and organising; 
acquiring and implementing; delivery of services and support; and monitoring and 
evaluating (ITGI 2007). Within these four domains, the framework defines how ICT 
infrastructure and systems can be managed and controlled to support ICT functions for 
users and how ICT infrastructure and systems can be maintained to ensure that ICT 
performance meets business objectives and goals (ITGI 2007). As a result, the COBIT 
framework emphasises the policy for and management of ICT infrastructure and systems 
when dealing with ICT risk management (ITGI 2007). Policy is considered in the COBIT 
framework to provide the clear direction of the role and responsibility of executives and 
the Board of Directors to manage ICT related risks (ITGI 2007). In addition, management 
of ICT risk management is considered in the COBIT framework to assure that ICT 
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processes and controls can maintain the value of ICT, and ensure that the enterprise‘s 
ICT supports business objectives.  
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard provides a focus on the details of organisational information 
security practices (ISO/IEC 2005). This standard is used more as a set of lower-level 
guideline that details the specifics of how information security must be done for dealing 
with strategic, operational and technical risks in ICT risk management (Solms 2005a). 
Furthermore, this standard is the focus of information security control at the operational 
level and helps the operational manager define precisely how control objectives can be 
used to achieve business objectives and goals in terms of their technical directions 
(Solms 2005a).  
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard helps an organisation manage information security in 
defining asset management, physical security mechanisms and access control; in 
documenting information security policy and operational procedures; in reporting security 
incidents and in business continuity management (Myler & Broadbent 2006). Information 
systems security refers to the protection of all information system elements and the 
safeguarding of information integrity; that is, confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(Theoharidou et al 2005).   
The ISO/IEC 17799 standard helps the operational manager assign information security 
roles and responsibilities (Groves 2003).  By doing so, staff at different levels are 
responsible for different perspectives of the standard. For example, senior management 
is concerned with creating information security guidelines, the organisation of information 
security, human resource security, business continuity management and for compliance. 
Furthermore, at the operational level managers are concerned with taking action on 
technical matters such as setting access control policy, data and information integrity 
management, data protection and for dealing with privacy. Theoharidou et al. (2005) 
mentioned that implementing the ISO/IEC 17799 standard can help an organisation deal 
with insider threats by providing the control objectives regarding job descriptions of 
security staff, personnel screening, confidentiality agreements, security responsibility in 
the terms and condition of employment, and information security and training. Therefore, 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard mainly focuses on technical or security policy, information 
security management and human resource management as supporting successful ICT 
risk management. Technical or security policy is considered to supplement the setting of 
ICT policy for the executives and the Board of Directors in the organisation to deal with 
ICT risk management. Human resource management is considered important in the 
ISO/IEC 17799 standard to provide information security during employment and for 
associated ICT risk management.   
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8.3 Successful model for ICT risk management 
The sets of factors (creating policy, management of ICT resources, management of 
information security, constant management of human resource issues, implementation of 
a corporate plan and an operational plan) were tested in this research initially in a 
number of business cases in Thailand.  From the analysis of the case studies, a set of 
factors were identified; that affect successful ICT risk management: 
- creating ICT policy (e.g. defining a strategic ICT plan and determining 
technological direction), Information security policy (e.g. documenting a brief of 
information security policy and reviewing information security policy) and a 
continuous service plan (e.g. planning and managing business continuity 
management and information security incident),  
- effective management of ICT resources (e.g. a process for managing ICT 
infrastructure, ICT performance and ICT project, 
- effective management of information security (e.g. a process for securing and 
managing the physical environment and logical systems such as equipment 
security, user access management, user responsibilities, network access control, 
operating network access control, operating system access control and 
application, and information access control), 
- constant management of human resource issues (e.g. training and educating 
programs and defining roles and responsibilities), and 
- implementing both a corporate plan and an operational plan (e.g. controlling ICT 
processes for maintaining information integrity and controlling IS processes for 
securing information, information systems and assets  
These factors were then used together with the principles in the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard to define relationships in the development of successful ICT 
risk management (SICTRM). These factors were: 
- effective creation of organisational policy (POLICY),  
- effective management of ICT resources (IT),  
- effective management of information security (OS),  
- effective management of people and their behaviour (HRMP),  
- effective planning of ICT risk management at both the corporate level (CLP) and 
at the operational (OLP) level.  
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These were then built into a model of success in ICT risk management (Figure 8-1)  
 
Figure 8-1: A conceptual model for successful ICT risk management (Repeated from Figure 6-1) 
 
The model was then tested as a whole to determine the strength of the relationships 
hypothesised in the model to impact on successful ICT management. The outcomes of 
the survey analysis showed that the following factors were more influential:  
- implementation of organisational policy,  
- effective management of ICT resources and  
- planning of enterprise security.  
A discussion of the findings from both the case studies and the survey of this research 
were compared those findings with previous research and to draw implications for what 
the research has added to what we already know. 
 
Figure 8-2: A successful ICT risk management model  
 
The objectives of this study were to understand the key factors that are indicative of 
success in ICT Risk Management in Thai businesses. Results from both the case studies 
and the survey analysis indicated that effectively creating organisational policy, 
managing reliable ICT resources and planning enterprise information security were clear 
success factors for ICT risk management when dealing with operational, technical and 
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strategic risks related to ICT (Figure 8-2). Therefore, this research proposed new 
relationships among the success factors in the model. In the model, creating 
organisational policy directly affected managing ICT resources and planning enterprise 
information security that succeeded ICT risk management. In addition, the effective 
management of ICT resources directly affected both the effective planning of enterprise 
information security and successful ICT risk management. Lastly, the effective planning 
of enterprise information security was shown to directly affect successful ICT risk 
management.  
 
8.4 Summary and Contribution 
The research outcomes have confirmed the suggestion of Solms (2005a) that information 
security must be considered at both the corporate level (e.g. by senior management) and 
at the operational level (e.g. by the operations manager) through the development of 
clear policy. The effective creation of organisational policy was the focus of Thai 
organisations to force all staff to recognise awareness of business direction when dealing 
with ICT risk management. ICT policy and Information security policy were required in 
the Thai organisations to plan ICT and IS use and to support that use with effective risk 
management processes. A policy document of organisational policy for ICT risk 
management was created in the Thai organisations to cover documenting risk, the roles 
and responsibilities for risk management, risk management methodology, risk control 
and auditable areas.  
Firstly, roles and responsibilities for risk management was the focus on the control of 
people and their behaviour in organisations. This control was considered as one of risk 
management component that was the determination of the organisation when dealing 
with ICT risks. Roles and responsibilities were defined at the Board of Director by 
separating the committee to take responsible for different actions in dealing with ICT 
risks to achieve the organisation‘s objectives and goals. They were also defined at the 
operational staff to be accountable for their own task to cooperate with the senior 
management level in achieving organisation‘s objectives and goals for dealing with ICT 
risks. Secondly, risk management methodology was also defined by both the senior 
management and the operational level in order to put risk under control. ICT processes, 
IS processes and ICT projects were elaborated the details of their own actions in the 
control and audit plans. The planning of the control and audit processes was separately 
determined each auditable area by both the senior management and the operational 
managers as a consensus enterprise plan. Lastly, risk management control was the focus 
on technology and facilities, and information security in both people and their behaviour 
and systems in organisations. This risk management control was required to secure the 
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both ICT and IS processes in order to maintain data and information integrity. The 
effectiveness of ICT and IS processes ensured that sensitive and confidential information 
in organisations was undertaken through IPO processes in a secure manner. 
This research has identified and then confirmed a number of key elements affect ICT risk 
management success in Thai organisations. These are shown in Figure 8-3. This model 
proposes that for successful ICT risk management an organisation should begin with the 
planning of ICT risk management. Senior management need to consider policy 
development as the first phase of planning. This clarifies ICT use objectives, IS objectives 
and assists in development of a document of organisational policy (e.g. risk statements) 
as elements of the overall plan. The effective management of ICT resources is then 
necessary to follow in order to achieve an ICT risk management plan for an organisation. 
The planning of enterprise information security is also necessary to obtain support from 
both senior management and operational managers to build up consensus agreement on 
information security. Based on the research findings, an organisation can succeed in its 
ICT risk management planning through realisation of each of these operational and 
strategic areas. As a result, it can be argued, this model can be used as a successful ICT 
risk management framework for dealing with operational, technical and strategic risks 
related to ICT in an organisation. 
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Figure 8-3: A success model for ICT Risk Management in Thai business 
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The first major contribution of this research was to suggest to the practitioner that an 
organisation is required to define its own policy and objectives to achieve successful ICT 
risk management. Although, the research recommendation of defining ICT risk policy is 
not new, it extends the understanding of substantial previous research and illustrates the 
advantages of managing risk through the adoption of governance standards such as the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard.  This research has also extended 
that understanding by showing that effective and successful ICT risk management must 
work at both the strategic and operation management levels in an organisation. There is 
a clear role and responsibility for ICT risk management at both the senior management 
and the operational staff levels to be required to define action for preventing, avoiding 
and mitigating strategic risk related to ICT.  This research also extends this 
understanding of ICT risk management embedded in the governance standards in 
showing that planning at an enterprise-wide level, and integrating human resources 
management and managing of ICT resources together have a clear impact on the 
outcomes of ICT risk management.  
The second major contribution of this research was to provide evidence of the value of 
the integration approach of using both the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard.  This research has shown that ICT governance (i.e. the COBIT framework) and 
IS governance (i.e. the ISO/IEC 17799 standard) can be integrated as one single 
management framework for dealing with ICT risk management. The integration of the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as the two-way approach to ICT risk 
management works well. While the COBIT framework lays the foundation of the top-
down approach to risk management; the ISO/IEC 17799 standard supports bottom-up 
risk management. By doing so, this research firstly compared the profile of ICT risk 
management practice of Thai business organisations with the control objectives in the 
COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard. The results of the case studies 
showed that using either the COBIT framework or the ISO/IEC 17799 standard alone did 
not entirely cover the practice of ICT risk management in Thai organisations. 
Furthermore, the results of the survey analysis confirmed that the corporate level plan 
and the operational level plan were combined due to having structure similarity. As a 
result, the COBIT framework as top-down process can be used to state the corporate 
plan for ICT risk management to the operational manager.  The operational managers 
then develop the operational plan for ICT risk management to confirm the strategic plan 
developing them together as a consensus enterprise plan. An enterprise plan is 
supported by organisation theory in that neither centralisation nor decentralisation can 
help achieve successful ICT risk management. In contrast, both centralisation and 
decentralisation together can assist in achieving successful ICT risk management.   
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The third contribution of this research has also shown that the development and 
implementation of organisational policy, the effective management of ICT resources and 
the planning of enterprise information security together emerged as success factors to 
help achieve successful ICT risk management in an organisation. This research proposes 
that effective ICT security and ICT use policies are required for successful ICT risk 
management and that the control processes of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard can be used to facilitate an organisation creating their own policy. The 
research also showed that the control processes of the COBIT framework can be used to 
facilitate organisations to manage ICT resources appropriately. Lastly, the research has 
also shown that both the control processes of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard can be used together to facilitate organisational planning of enterprise 
information security. These three success factors contribute to the existing literature in 
terms of providing a broader understanding of what is specifically involved in successful 
ICT risk management planning. However there are limitations to these conclusions. The 
next section discusses limitations of this research. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the research 
According to 53% of unexplained variance reported in Chapter 7, p. 235, unexplained 
variances might result from the types of sample adopted in the qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The types of sample in the qualitative method include the banking 
and software development sectors, which may affect the validation in the quantitative 
method. For example, both the banking and software development sectors might 
consider service management as other success factors, related to other standards (i.e. 
the ITIL framework, the Basel II accord, and the ISO/IEC 38500:2008), when dealing 
with ICT risk management (ITGI 2007; Basel 2005; ISO/IEC 2008). As a result, 
limitations of the research are: 
First, according to the recommendations of the IT governance institute (ITGI, 2005a), 
the information technology infrastructure library (ITIL) should be applied together with 
the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard when dealing with ICT risks. ITIL 
is considered best practice for ICT service management and it helps organisations to 
handle ICT risks relating external threat and ICT service management. However, this 
research focused on the internal organisational setting rather than the external 
environment (i.e. third party) which is addressed by ITIL. 
Second, with regard to risk management in banking institutions, adherence to the Basel 
II accord is compulsory for banks around the world. Although, banking institutions in 
Thailand were studied in this research, the Basel II accord was not discussed because it 
was out of the scope of this research. The researcher therefore notes that in future the 
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Basel II accord should be considered and included in the process of data collection in 
order to enhance understanding of whether banks focus on the Basel II accord alongside 
the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard when formulating ICT risk 
management. Furthermore, the Basel II accord provides operational process to 
specifically manage operational risk. As a result, future studies can utilise this standard 
to enhance managing operational risk along with the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 
17799 standard.   
Third, the research findings from both the case studies and the survey were based on the 
direction of organisational communication which included the top-down (the corporate 
level) and the bottom-up approaches (the operational level). In addition, the scope of the 
research  focused on only the directional level of communication rather than the 
structure of the control level (strategic, operational or tactical level). The reason is that 
this research focused on the stipulations of the management buy-in and the operation 
buy-in when developing the planning regarding ICT risk management in an organisation. 
The structure of the control level was then not explored.  The structure of the control 
level helps provide clear role and responsibilities of all staff levels to control and manage 
ICT risk. Therefore, the structure of the control level in an organisation also needs to 
consider when exploring successful ICT risk management.  
Fourth, this research empirically explored success factors of ICT risk management based 
on ICT governance and IS governance. However, corporate governance of ICT (ISO/IEC 
38500 standard) was not a focus in this research because the new ISO/IEC 38500 
standard for ICT corporate governance was only recently released in June 2008 by which 
time this research was near completion. Thus, it was important to recognise the omission 
of this standard as a limitation of this research. The reason is that the ISO/IEC 38500 
standard is a major focus for dealing with ICT risk management in organisations. This 
standard is targeted at the highest level of ICT governance and IS governance when 
planning the ICT risk management process.  
Fifth, this research empirically explored success factors of ICT risk management based on 
the COBIT framework. However, The Risk IT Practitioner Guide (the Risk Management 
Standard of ISACA using COBIT and Val IT standard) was not a focus in this research 
because this standard was also recently released in 2009 by which time this research was 
near completion. Thus, it was important to recognise the omission of this standard as a 
limitation of this research. The reason is that the Risk IT Practitioner Guide is a major 
focus for dealing with ICT risk management in organisations. Additionally, this standard 
provides the Risk IT framework that describes a detailed process model for the 
management of IT-related risk.  
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Sixth, the validation of the relationships amongst six dimensions (organisational policy, 
human resources management planning, organisational security, management of ICT 
resources, the corporate level plan and the operational level plan) in the conceptual 
model generated from multiple case studies was not validated. The reason was because 
the statistical results in the survey indicated that the effective management of staff and 
their behaviour, the effective management of information security and the effective 
planning of ICT risk management at both the corporate and the operational levels were 
merged as they shared structural similarities. Therefore, the combination of four 
dimensions in this research limited the ability to validate the relationships amongst them. 
The research then focused on validating the overall model rather than the individual 
pathways. 
Finally, since the COBIT framework (i.e. ICT governance) and the ISO/IEC 17799 
standard (i.e. IS management) cover different areas, the question might be raised as to 
why the researcher used both to supplement the organisational plan at the governance 
level. In response, the primary aim of this research necessitated that focusing on the 
governance aspect alone would be insufficient; an organisation should consider the 
information security factor at the governance level or in governing bodies. 
 
8.6 Suggestions for future research 
This research explored several factors regarding successful ICT risk management. 
However, detailed consideration of other factors that might influence successful ICT risk 
management were beyond the scope of this research. The COSO8 framework was 
recommended for an investigation of corporate governance planning in relation to setting 
ICT direction as ICT governance. Therefore, future research might explore how corporate 
governance based on the COSO framework can help organisations deal with internal 
control and audits in order to prevent and avoid the occurrence of risk, particularly 
regarding business risk in ICT processes.  
 
                                                   
8 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commissions (COSO) (1992) has published an 
internal control framework as a method of corporate governance to provide guidance on the internal control 
elements required by organisations. Internal control components consist of the control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information, and communication and monitoring (COSO 1992).Internal control is 
defined as the mechanisms used by organisational directors, management and other personnel to provide 
reasonable assurance for achieving organisational strategies and objectives (COSO 1992; Pathak 2005). Pathak 
(2005) further adds that having proper internal control risk management is needed to support work effectively, 
while IIA (2004, p. 6) argues that ‗internal controls are one way of treating a risk‘. 
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Second, the COSO-ERM9 framework was suggested as a useful tool for preparing the 
fundamental risk management plan to deal with both business and ICT risks. Future 
research should consider business risk management as the primary framework before 
focusing on specific areas such as ICT management.  
Third, the ISO/IEC 38500 standard (ISO/IEC 2008) was recommended when considering 
supplementing ICT risk management in governing bodies at the corporate level. A 
researcher or a practitioner can use this new standard to explore success factors in order 
to optimise ICT control and audit for an organisation when dealing with internal control 
and audit, risk management and ICT risk management at the board and executive 
management levels. 
Fourth, the ITIL framework as ICT service management was proposed to consider third 
parties and managing ICT service as factors for inclusion in the model of this research, in 
order to cover all details of ICT risk management planning. Future research should 
explore success factors based on this framework in order to supplement this research 
when investigating successful ICT risk management (thus focusing on both the internal 
and external environments).  
Fifth, The Risk IT Practitioner Guide was proposed to assist organisations to set up an IT 
risk management framework in the enterprise, as well as to enhance existing IT risk 
management practices. Therefore, this standard is imperative to be investigated along 
with this research to enhance ICT risk management planning in future research. 
Sixth, the findings from the qualitative analysis suggested that the ICT department was 
required to restructure such that it will take care of both general ICT and ICT security 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the ICT security function was normally embedded in the 
ICT department. However, this may not be appropriate because these functions must be 
responsible for different duties and tasks, and should be able to directly report on their 
responsibilities to the board and executive management. Therefore, future research 
should consider the impact of organisational structure in terms of the ICT department 
and IS department on ICT risk management in organisations.  
Lastly, the findings from the quantitative analysis indicated that the effective 
management and planning of people and their behaviour, the effective management of 
organisational information security, the effective planning of a corporate plan and the 
effective planning of a operational plan were of a similar structure statistically. The four 
constructs were then combined as the statistical analysis suggests. In fact, the four 
                                                   
9 COSO-ERM is a process affected by an entity‘s Board of Directors, management and other personnel, applied 
in a strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, 
to manage risk to be within its risk appetite, and to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives (COSO 2004, p. 2). However, COSO-ERM focuses only on business process instead of 
information technology and/or information security processes. 
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constructs consisted of two key areas: information security (e.g. managing and planning 
staff and their behaviour and managing information security), and an enterprise plan 
(e.g. a corporate plan and an operational plan). Therefore, future research should 
consider exploring each of these constructs in order to evaluate their impact 
independently on successful ICT risk management in an organisation. The next section 
concludes this thesis.   
 
8.7 Conclusion 
Over the past decade, it has become increasingly imperative that we explore and seek to 
understand ICT risk management in organisations. ICT risks persist and threaten to 
become uncontrollable, according to published reports from the US, UK and Asia on the 
impact of ICT risk in both the public and private sector organisations. Furthermore, 
digital communication and processes have assumed critical roles within modern 
organisations. Especially in Thailand, organisations lack awareness of the potential for 
ICT risks resulting from the proliferation of digital communication and virtual office 
automation in recent years. Therefore, this research sought to develop a framework to 
assist Thai organisations in paying more attention to these negative trends, and to utilise 
ICT in order to prevent, avoid and mitigate ICT risk as a proactive process.  
The subject of ICT risk management in organisations has been introduced in frameworks 
and standards in the past few years in order to help organisations deal with ICT risk. 
However, success factors of each framework and standard have been little communicated 
to organisations. Therefore, this research derived what organisations in Thailand believe 
contributed to success in ICT risk management for organisations to incorporate into their 
ICT risk management planning. This research contributed to the field by testing these 
success factors for to prevent, avoid and mitigate operational, technical and strategic 
risks related to ICT in organisations through a large scale survey. This research 
supported the suggestion of Solms (2005a) that information security must be considered 
at both the corporate and the operational levels. Moreover, this research confirmed the 
recommendation of the ITGI (2007) that the COBIT framework should be used together 
with the ISO/IEC 17799 standard to supplement the control objectives of ICT risk 
management in an organisation. The achievement of this research laid in the integration 
of the COBIT framework and the ISO/IEC 17799 standard as a two-way approach to 
successful ICT risk management. While the COBIT framework laid the foundation of the 
top-down approach to risk management, the ISO/IEC 17799 standard supported bottom-
up risk management. 
This research failed to reveal the specific relationships amongst dimensions in the 
conceptual model (organisational policy, human resource management planning, 
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organisational security, management of ICT resources, the corporate level plan and the 
operational level plan) derived from the multiple case studies of Thai organisations. In 
addition, the results indicated that human resource management planning, organisational 
security, the corporate level plan and the operational level plan must be combined 
statistically to better explain success in ICT risk management. Nevertheless, the 
combination of the four dimensions confirmed the suggestion of Solms (2005a) that 
information security must be monitored and planned at both the corporate level (e.g. 
senior management) and the operational level (e.g. unit manager or operational 
manager). This research proposed that new relationships amongst the success factors in 
the ICT risk management model (SICTRM) be re-examined by practitioners and 
academics in future research.  
This research sought to investigate the current profile of ICT risk management to identify 
and then model the success elements of ICT risk management in a sample of Thai 
business organisations. This research supported and confirmed previous research that 
argues that policy must be structured, first at the board of directors and then at the 
levels of senior management and operational management, who together must delineate 
the procedures and practices for dealing with ICT risk management. In dealing with ICT 
risks, several frameworks and standards have been introduced but ICT risks still persist, 
therefore, the implication of this research was that we can learn from the Thai 
organisations that organisations needed to consider the success factors when managing 
ICT risk. This research proposed that three main success factors affect ICT risk 
management in Thai organisations. Firstly, the effective organisational policy helped the 
Thai organisations to plan the effective management of ICT resources and the effective 
planning of enterprise information security. Secondly, the effective management of ICT 
resources facilitated the planning of enterprise information security to achieve successful 
ICT risk management planning. In addition, the survey results have shown that effective 
organisational policy was the main influence on the management of ICT resources and 
the planning of enterprise information security. All three success factors complement 
each other and were significant together in terms of strategic development (i.e. policy) 
and strategic implementation (i.e. management direction). Lastly, the effective planning 
of enterprise information security was shown to be a critical factor that helped an 
organisation mitigate, prevent and avoid operational, technical and strategic risks related 
to ICT. All three success factors were initially drawn from both the COBIT framework and 
the ISO/IEC 17799 standard and were found to positively contribute to successful ICT 
risk management.  
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A1. Letter of invitation for the interview 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I write to invite you to participate in my research project on the investigation of 
structured approaches to ICT risk management in organisations. I am a PhD student at 
the School of Business Information Technology, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. 
My supervisors are Associate Professor Hepu Deng and Professor Brian Corbitt. 
ICT risk management is widely used for identifying and managing the risks associated 
with the adoption of various ICT applications in organisations. It is usually reflected in 
terms of various organisational strategies and policies developed and implemented across 
an organisation. This project aims to investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
structured approaches to ICT risk management in Thailand. The research findings would 
contribute to a better understanding of ICT risk management theory and practice that 
may lead to more effective and efficient ICT risk management planning and processes in 
organisations in Thailand and result in better organisational performance in today‘s 
dynamic and competitive environment.  
Your participation in this project is to attend an interview conducted by me. The interview 
will be digitally recorded, subject to your consent, to ensure the accuracy of the 
transcription of the interviews. Your participation in the interview is completely voluntary, 
and you can withdraw from the interview at any point of time. Should you agree to 
participate, I can assure you that any data or information supplied will be treated in 
complete confidence, although the research findings may be written up in the PhD thesis 
or in relevant academic journals. In any event, neither individuals nor their organisations 
will be identified without their express permission. The data will only be retained within 
secure files in the School of Business IT at RMIT University for 5 years upon completion 
of the project (2014). Access must be given by application to the Head of School, School 
of Business Information Technology. 
This research project is subject to the Ethics policy of RMIT. If you have any enquiries at 
any time about the interview or the procedures in your participation in the project, you 
can contact Siridech Kumsuprom by email: Siridech.kumsuprom@rmit.edu.au, or directly 
contact the Secretary, Portfolio Human Research Ethics Sub-committee, Business 
Portfolio, RMIT on telephone: (61-3) 9925 5594 or email: rdu@rmit.edu.au. 
Thank you very much for your support of my research project. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Siridech Kumsuprom 
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A2. Interview question 
 
Part I Demographic information  
1. What is your position in this organisation?  
2. What is your job responsibility in this organisation? 
Part II The current practical ICT risk management in your organisation 
3. Do you have an audit committee in your organisation? 
4. In the action plan or annual plan or business plan or operational plan, does it cover IT 
audit and control detail? 
5. What are IT audit and control details about? 
6. Does it cover ICT risk management? 
7. What is ICT risk management process about in that agenda? 
8. In the action plan, has senior management mentioned ICT risk management? 
9. What are the main concerns regarding the ICT risk management process?  
10. How is ICT risk management applied in your organisation? 
Part III Perception of ICT risk management in your organisation 
11. Do you think each of these important? (Referred to Q 9) 
12. Why do you think that each particular process is important? 
13. As you mentioned before, which main process concern is the most important and why 
is it important? 
14. Could you please rank this following process in respect to ICT risk management and 
give the reason why it is important for each particular process? 
 Security Policy 
 Planning and Organising 
 Organisation of Information Security 
 Asset Management 
 Access Control 
 Delivery and Support 
 Human Resource Security 
 Physical and Environment Security 
 Monitoring 
 Communication and Operation Management 
 Information System Acquisition and Development and Maintenance 
 Business Continuity Management 
 Compliance 
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B1. Plain language statement (English) 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
PROJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
Project Title: 
o Structured Approaches to ICT Risk Management in Thailand: An Empirical Analysis 
 
Investigators: 
o Mr Siridech Kumsuprom (Ph.D. Candidate, Business Portfolio, RMIT University, 
siridech.kumsuprom@rmit.edu.au, (61 3) 9925 1301)   
o Professor Brian Corbitt (Senior Supervisor, Head of School, School of Business 
Information Technology, RMIT University, brian.corbitt@rmit.edu.au, (61 3) 9925 
5808) 
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B2. Plain language statement (Thai) 
ข้อช้ีแจงทัว่ไปเกี่ยวกบัโครงการวจัิย 
 
หัวข้อวจัิย การศึกษาเก่ียวกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จ 
ในประเทศไทย 
 
สถานทิว่จัิย School of Business Information Technology, RMIT University, Australia 
 
บุคลากร นายศิริเดช  ค าสุพรหม (นกัศึกษาระดบัปริญญาเอก  ) ผูด้  าเนินการวิจยั 
  Siridech Kumsuprom  E-mail: e66941@rmit.edu.au 
      Tel:  +66 080 595 1550 
Tel:  +61 4 1253 6763 
 
ศาสตราจารย ์Brian Corbitt อาจารยท่ี์ปรึกษา  
      E-mail: brian.corbitt@rmit.edu.au 
Tel:  +61 3 9925 5808 
 
โครงการวจิยั เป็นไปตามท่ีก าหนดในหลกัสูตร Doctor of Philosophy ซ่ึงไดรั้บความเห็นชอบให้
ด าเนินการวจิยัได ้ และแบบสอบถามไดรั้บการรับรองใหใ้ชไ้ด ้ จากคณะกรรมการจริยธรรมการวจิยัท่ี
เก่ียวขอ้งกบัมนุษย ์(Human Research Ethics Committee—HREC) ณ ส านกังาน RMIT 
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B3. Letter of invitation for the survey (English) 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I write to invite you to participate in my research project on the investigation of 
structured approaches to ICT risk management in organisations in Thailand. I am a PhD 
candidate at the School of Business Information Technology, RMIT University, Melbourne, 
Australia. My supervisor is Professor Brian Corbitt. 
ICT risk management is widely used for identifying and managing the risks associated 
with the adoption of various ICT applications in organisations. It is usually reflected in 
various organisational strategies and policies developed and implemented across an 
organization. This project aims to investigate the success of structured approaches to ICT 
risk management in Thailand. The research findings would contribute to a better 
understanding of ICT risk management theory and practice that may lead to successful 
ICT risk management in organisations in Thailand and result in better organisational 
performance in today‘s dynamic and competitive environment.  
Your participation in this project is to fill in an included survey. Your participation in the 
survey is completely voluntary, and has no perceivable risk or disadvantages as we seek 
only your comments and opinions regarding your understanding and practical 
experiences in your organisation. There is no direct benefit to you as a result of your 
participation. You have the rights: (a) to withdraw from the participation at any point of 
time; (b) to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can be 
reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk for the 
participant; and (c) to have any questions answered at any time. Should you agree to 
participate, I can assure you that any data or information supplied will be treated in 
complete confidence, although the research findings may be written up in the PhD thesis 
or in relevant academic journals. In any event, neither individuals nor their organisations 
will be identified without their express permission.  
This research project is subject to the Ethics policy of RMIT University. If you have any 
enquiries at any time about the interview or the procedures in your participation of the 
project, you can contact Siridech Kumsuprom by email: 
siridech.kumsuprom@rmit.edu.au, or directly contact the Secretary, Portfolio Human 
Research Ethics Sub-committee, Business Portfolio, RMIT on telephone: (61-3) 9925 
5594 or email: rdu@rmit.edu.au. 
Thank you very much for your support of my research project. 
Yours faithfully, 
Siridech Kumsuprom 
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B4. Letter of invitation for the survey (Thai) 
 
เรียน   ท่านผู้ตอบแบบสอบถามทีเ่คารพ 
 
กระผมนายศิริเดช  ค าสุพรหม นกัศึกษาระดบัปริญญาเอกของมหาวทิยาลยั RMIT ณ นครเมลเบอร์น ประเทศ
ออสเตรเลีย ใคร่ขอเรียนเชิญท่านไดโ้ปรดใหค้วามอนุเคราะห์ตอบแบบสอบถามเพ่ือโครงการวจิยั หวัขอ้ การศึกษาเก่ียวกบั
การบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จ ในประเทศไทย 
 ท่านไดรั้บการเรียนเชิญเขา้ร่วมโครงการวจิยัน้ี เน่ืองจากท่านมีความคุน้เคยกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้น
เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศในองคก์ร และไดรั้บการเห็นชอบจากคณะกรรมการ HREC และมหาวทิยาลยั RMIT เป็นท่ีเรียบร้อย
แลว้ 
โครงการวจิยัน้ีเป็นการส ารวจและคน้ควา้หาเหตุผลวา่ปัจจยัอะไรท่ีท าใหอ้งคก์รบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้น
เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จ ในประเทศไทย 
ค าช้ีแจงการกระจายแบบสอบถาม 
 จดหมายเรียนเชิญจะถูกจดัส่งไปยงัผู้บริหารระดบัสูงของแต่ละฝ่ายงานทีเ่กีย่วข้องกบัโครงการวจิยันี้  ขอความ
อนุเคราะห์รบกวนผู้บริหารฝ่ายงานโปรดส่งผ่านแบบสอบถามนี้ไปยงับุคลากรของท่านใน 2 ระดบั  
 ระดบั 1 ระดบัผู้บริหาร  แบบสอบถามจะท าการสอบถามท่านเอง 1 แบบสอบถาม และบุคคลากรทีท่่านเลอืกที่
อยู่ในต าแหน่งรองลงไปจากท่าน 2 แบบสอบถาม แต่ยงัคงอยู่ในระดบัผู้บริหาร โดยรวมทัง้ส้ิน 3 แบบสอบถาม  
 ระดบั 2 ระดบัปฏิบัตกิาร แบบสอบถามจะถูกส่งผ่านไปยงัพนักงานในหน่วยงานของท่าน โดยท าการสุ่มเลอืก
บุคลากรคนใดกไ็ด้ในผ่ายของท่าน รวมทัง้ส้ิน 3 แบบสอบถาม 
ค าช้ีแจงเกีย่วกบัแบบสอบถาม 
ถา้ท่านตดัสินใจจะตอบแบบสอบถาม ท่านตอ้งใชว้ธีิตอบแบบสอบถามลงในแบบสอบถามท่ีไดก้ าหนดไวใ้ห ้การ
ตอบแบบสอบถามน้ีจะใชเ้วลาของท่านประมาณไม่เกิน 10 นาที โดยขอ้ความหน่ึง ๆ จะมีการถามอยูส่องส่วน 
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ส่วนท่ี 1 ค าถามเก่ียวกบัระดบัการน ามาตรฐาน และแม่บทมาประยกุต์ใช้เพือ่การบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้น
เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
1. ไม่น ำมำประยกุต์ใช้เลย < --------------------------> 7. น ำมำประยกุต์ใช้ครบถ้วน 
 
ส่วนท่ี ๒ ค าถามเก่ียวกบัระดบัความคดิเหน็ของท่านท่ีคิดวา่บริษทัของท่านควรปฏิบติั 
1. ไม่เห็นด้วยอย่ำงย่ิง  <------------------------> 7. เห็นด้วยอย่ำงย่ิง  
 การใชข้อ้มูลจากแบบสอบถามน้ีจะไม่มีการจดัเก็บรายละเอียดเก่ียวกบัขอ้มูลส่วนตวั และขอ้มูลทั้งหมดใน
แบบสอบถามจะถูกเก็บเป็นความลบั ซ่ึงมีระบบรักษาความปลอดภยัส าหรับขอ้มูลภายในเคร่ืองคอมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคลของ
ผูว้จิยัเอง ณ มหาวทิยาลยั RMIT ผูด้  าเนินการวจิยัและอาจารยท่ี์ปรึกษาเท่านั้น ท่ีมีสิทธิในการเขา้ถึงขอ้มูลดงักล่าว และ
ผูด้  าเนินการวจิยัใชข้อ้มูลบนแบบสอบถามเพื่อการวเิคราะห์และรวบรวมเพื่อท าวทิยานิพนธ์เท่านั้น ขอ้มูลท่ีท่านไดใ้หไ้วน้ั้น
จะปราศจากความเส่ียงใด ๆ 
 ความเห็นของท่านท่ีตอบในแบบสอบถามจะเป็นประโยชน์ต่อการวเิคราะห์ในโครงการวจิยัน้ี ซ่ึงจะเป็นประโยชน์
อยา่งยิง่ต่อการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ ส าหรับองคก์รในประเทศไทยโดยตรง 
การน าข้อมูลจากแบบสอบถามไปใช้ในโครงการวจิยั 
 ขอใหท่้านมัน่ใจไดว้า่ขอ้มูลในแบบสอบถามทั้งหมดจะถูกเก็บเป็นความลบัอยา่งเคร่งครัด ขอ้มูลจะปรากฏเห็นได้
เฉพาะผูด้  าเนินการวจิยั และอาจารยท่ี์ปรึกษาเท่านั้น 
 ขอ้มูลของท่านจะถูกเปิดเผยในกรณีท่ีตอ้งการปกป้องคุณจากความเส่ียงท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งเท่านั้น หรืออยูใ่นค าสัง่ของศาล
ใหเ้ปิดเผย หรือท่านอนุญาตโดยการเขียนเป็นลายลกัษณ์อกัษรใหน้กัวจิยัท่านอ่ืน ๆ ไดใ้ชข้อ้มูล 
 ขอ้มูลในแบบสอบถามทั้งหมดจะถูกน ามาวเิคราะห์ร่วมกนัตามหลกัการทางสถิติวเิคราะห์ และผลลพัธ์ในภาพรวม
ท่ีไดจ้ะถูกน าไปเผยแพร่ในท่ีต่าง ๆ เช่น การประชุม ลงบทความในหนงัสือพิมพ/์วารสาร และวทิยานิพนธ์ 
 ขอ้มูลทั้งหมดในแบบสอบถามของทุกท่านจะเก็บไวด้ว้ยการรักษาความปลอดภยัขอ้มูลข่าวสาร ณ  มหาวทิยาลยั 
RMIT เป็นเวลา 5 ปี  หลงัจากการด าเนินการโครงการวจิยัแลว้เสร็จ 
สิทธิของท่านต่อการตอบแบบสอบถาม 
 ท่านมีสิทธิเพิกถอนท่ีจะไม่ร่วมตอบแบบสอบถามไดทุ้กเวลา โดยปราศจากอคติ 
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 ท่านมีสิทธิท่ีจะเพิกถอนไดทุ้กเวลา กรณีท่ีมีหลกัฐานวา่ท่านมีความเส่ียงในการใหข้อ้มูล 
 ท่านมีสิทธิท่ีจะไดรั้บค าตอบทุกเวลาเม่ือท่านมีขอ้สงสยั 
หากท่านมข้ีอสงสัยโปรดตดิต่อ 
 ติดต่อโดยตรงท่ี นายศิริเดช  ค  าสุพรหม (080-595-1550) หรืออาจารยท่ี์ปรึกษาตามอีเมลลแ์ละโทรศพัทท่ี์ปรากฏ
ขา้งตน้ 
 
ขอแสดงความนบัถือ 
 
นายศิริเดช  ค าสุพรหม 
Siridech Kumsuprom 
PhD Candidate (M.Inf.Sys, MBA, BAcc.) 
School of Business Information Technology 
Business Portfolio 
RMIT University 
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B5. Questionnaire for ICT risk management (English) 
 
Section A: demographics (Check only one.) 
1. What is the type of your company? 
 Banking     
 Information & communication technology    
 Insurance 
2. Which position level are you in? 
 The management level   
 The operational level 
3. Which department you are responsible for?  
 Accounting department   
 Internal audit department   
 Information technology department 
 Information technology security department 
  Risk management department   
 
Section B: Standard and Framework implementation 
Please mark one option from the scale to what extent does your organisation implement 
COBIT and/or ISO/IEC 17799 in ICT risk management planning? 
Statement: 
The response scale is according to the following:  
 
1. Never implemented  <-----------> 7. Fully implemented 
 
Statement 
Actual Implementation 
N
e
v
e
r 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
 
     
F
u
ll
y
 I
m
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.  Our organisation implements COBIT to deal with ICT 
risk management planning. 
       
5.  Our organisation implements ISO/IEC 17799 to deal 
with ICT risk management planning. 
       
 
6. What other standards and/or frameworks does your organisation implement to deal 
with ICT risk management planning? Please 
specify………………………………..…………………………………… 
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Section C: Successful ICT risk management in the organisation 
Please  mark one option from the scale to show to what extent you agree or disagree 
with each statement when you are dealing with ICT risk management in your 
organisation.  
 
Statement: For the statements below, there are two types of question on each item to 
be asked about: 
 
A: To what extent do you think your organisation should implement COBIT and 
ISO/IEC 17799 in ICT risk management planning?  Level of agreement with the 
statements is represented by a scale of 1-7 as per the following: 
1. Strongly disagree   <---------------> 7. Strongly agree  
 
Policy 
How does the organisational policy affect the corporate level plan (the corporate plan) 
and the operational level plan (the action plan) in respect to successful ICT risk 
management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. The organisation defines technological direction in the 
organisational policy. 
       
8. The organisation defines security direction in the 
organisational policy. 
       
9. The organisation establishes risk context to define 
the definition of ICT risks. 
       
10. The organisation has a business continuity plan to 
face the uncertain circumstance regarding the loss 
of information asset. 
       
 
Strategy direction 
How does the organisational strategy affect the corporate level plan (the corporate plan) 
and the operational level plan (the action plan) in respect to successful ICT risk 
management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. The organisational strategies in ICT risk 
management are generated by management. 
       
12. The organisational strategies in ICT risk 
management are generated by the operational 
level. 
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Human resource management and planning 
How do human resource management and planning affect the corporate plan (corporate 
level) and the action plan (operational level) in respect to successful ICT risk 
management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. The organisation defines employees‘ roles regarding 
information governance policy. 
       
14. The organisation defines employees‘ responsibilities 
regarding information governance policy. 
       
15. The organisation defines employees‘ roles regarding 
information security governance policy. 
       
16. The organisation defines employees‘ responsibilities 
regarding information security governance policy. 
       
17. The organisation declares terms and conditions of 
employment regarding confidentiality of 
information. 
       
18. The organisation informs employees not to disclose 
the organisation‘s important information. 
       
19. The organisation provides a training program to 
improve staff‘s IT awareness. 
       
20. The organisation provides a training program to 
improve staff‘s IT security awareness. 
       
21. The organisation changes access rights of employees 
upon change of employment. 
       
22. The organisation removes access rights of 
employees upon termination of employment. 
       
 
Security 
How does information technology security affect the corporate plan (corporate level) and 
the action plan (operational level) in respect to successful ICT risk management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. The organisation correctly configures its operating 
systems (e.g. Windows, Linux and Unix). 
       
24. The organisation correctly configures its networking 
operating systems (e.g. NetWare and Cisco). 
       
25. The organisation correctly configures its business 
software (e.g. SAP and business solution). 
       
26. The organisation correctly configures its hardware 
(e.g. AS 400, hubs, switches, routers). 
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27. The organisation documents access control following 
business requirements for system access. 
       
28. The organisation allows only authorised persons to 
have access to network services. 
       
29. The organisation strictly limits access to computer 
use by user allocation. 
       
30. The organisation strictly limits access to computers 
by using a password management system. 
       
31. The organisation monitors log files to prevent 
unauthorised access. 
       
32. The organisation monitors computer use to prevent 
computer abuse. 
       
33. The organisation monitors computer use in order to 
prevent any type of damage to information asset. 
       
34. The organisation validates input data from 
applications systems for its correctness before 
putting data into the input process. 
       
35. The organisation validates input data from 
applications systems for its appropriateness before 
putting data into the input process. 
       
36. The organisation has validation check applications to 
detect any corruption of information through 
processing errors.  
       
37.  The organisation has validation check applications 
to detect any corruption of information through 
deliberate acts. 
       
38. The organisation validates output data from 
applications systems for its correctness before 
being distributed. 
       
39. The organisation validates output data from 
applications systems for its appropriateness before 
being distributed. 
       
40. The organisation controls application system files in 
a secure manner (control of operational software). 
       
41. The organisation controls application system files in 
a secure manner (protection of system test). 
       
42. The organisation regularly checks IT facilities for 
compliance with security implementation standards. 
       
43. All departments within the organisation have regular 
review plans to ensure compliance with security 
policy and standards.                   
       
44. The organisation identifies compliance with legal 
requirements (e.g. Thailand‘s Computer Crime Act). 
       
45. The organisation monitors data protection and 
privacy. 
       
46. The organisation prevents data protection and 
privacy. 
       
47. The organisation prevents unauthorised physical 
access, damage and interference to the 
organisation‘s premises and information systems. 
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Technology 
How does technology affect the corporate plan (corporate level) and the action plan 
(operational level) in respect to successful ICT risk management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48. The organisation provides a sufficient networking 
connection to employees. 
       
49. The organisation provides sufficient personal access 
to computers for employees. 
       
50. The organisation manages several types of operating 
software in order to generate data and information 
in the same file pattern. 
       
51. The organisation provides all applications with legal 
of use. 
       
 
Corporate level 
How does the corporate level affect successful ICT risk management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. The organisation has established IT control and 
audit in the corporate plan regarding the 
organisation objectives. 
       
53. The organisation provides an overview of IT 
applications and IT security in the IT plan. 
       
54. The organisation provides an overview of ICT risk 
management methodology. 
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Operational level 
How does the operational level affect successful ICT risk management?   
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
55. The organisation has established information 
security control and audit in the action plan for the 
specific department. 
       
56. The organisation provides information security in 
security direction. 
       
57. The organisation provides IT risk project 
management methodology for a specific project. 
       
 
Successful ICT risk management  
How does successful ICT risk management affect ICT risks? 
Statement 
Attitude 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
     
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
58. Successful ICT risk management helps the 
organisation mitigate ICT risks to risk appetites 
(acceptable level). 
       
59. Successful ICT risk management helps the 
organisation prevent ICT risks appropriately. 
       
60. Successful ICT risk management helps the 
organisation avoid ICT risks appropriately. 
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B6. Questionnaire for ICT risk management (Thai) 
แบบสอบถาม การบริหารความเส่ียงทางด้านเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
หมวด ๑ ลกัษณะทัว่ไปของผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ (โปรดกากบาท X เพยีงค าตอบเดียวเท่าน้ัน) 
๑.  องคก์รท่ีท่านท างานอยูใ่นปัจจุบนัด าเนินธุรกิจประเภทใด 
   ธนาคาร 
   เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ และการส่ือสาร 
   การประกนัภยั 
๒. ท่านมีต าแหน่งหนา้ท่ีในองคก์รอยูใ่นระดบัใด 
   ระดบัผูบ้ริหาร 
  ระดบัปฏิบติัการ 
๓. ท่านมีความรับผิดชอบต่อองคก์รในแผนกใด 
   ฝ่ายบญัชีและการเงิน 
   ฝ่ายตรวจสอบภายใน 
   ฝ่ายเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ  
   ฝ่ายบริหารความปลอดภยัเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ  
  ฝ่ายบริหารความเส่ียง 
 
หมวด ๒ มาตรฐาน (Standard) และแม่บท (Framework) เกีย่วกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางด้านเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ 
โปรดกากบาท (X) ลงในระดบัการน ามาตรฐาน และแม่บทมาช่วยการวางแผนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ 
ค าช้ีแจง   ระดับการน ามาตรฐาน และแม่บทมาช่วยการวางแผนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางด้านเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ 
๑. ไม่น ามาใช้เลย < --------------------------> ๗. น ามาใช้ครบถ้วน 
รายละเอยีด 
การน ามาประยุกต์ใช้ในองค์กร 
ไม
่ น า
มา
ใช
เ้ลย
      
น า
มา
ใช
ค้ร
บถ
ว้น
 
๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๔. บริษทัน า แม่บทการก ากบัดูแลกิจการดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ COBIT (IT 
Governance) มาช่วยในการวางแผนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ 
       
๕. บริษทัน า มาตรฐานก ากบัดูแลกิจการดา้นความปลอดภยัเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ ISO/IEC 17799 / BS 7799 ( Information Security Governance) มา
ช่วยในการวางแผนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
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๖. บริษทัน ามาตรฐาน และแม่บทอ่ืน ๆ มาช่วยการวางแผนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ อะไรบา้ง 
โปรดระบุ................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................................................... 
 
หมวด ๓ การบริหารความเส่ียงทางด้านเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศทีป่ระสบผลส าเร็จในองค์กร 
โปรดกากบาท (X)  ลงในระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นของท่านเก่ียวกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้น
เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จในองคก์ร เม่ือท่านก าลงับริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศภายใน
องคก์ร ตามขอ้ความขา้งล่างน้ี และโปรดอ่านค าช้ีแจงใหล้ะเอียด 
 
ค าช้ีแจง  ส าหรับข้อความข้างล่าง มีค าถามอยู่ ๒ ลกัษณะ 
ก. ค าถามเก่ียวกบัระดบัความคดิเห็นของท่านท่ีคิดวา่บริษทัของท่านควรปฏิบติั 
๑. ไม่เห็นด้วยอย่ำงย่ิง  <------------------------>๗. เห็นด้วยอย่ำงย่ิง  
 
นโยบาย (Policy) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นนโยบายขององคก์รมีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การก าหนดแผนงาน
ประจ าปีขององคก์ร (The corporate plan/Corporate Level) และ แผนงานปฏิบติัการขององคก์ร (The action plan/ 
Operational Level) ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
ไม
่ เห็
นด
ว้ย
อย
า่ง
ยิง่
 
     
เห็
นด
ว้ย
อย
า่ง
ยิง่
 
๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๗. องคก์รก าหนดแนวทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศภายในนโยบายหลกัของ
องคก์ร 
       
๘. องคก์รก าหนดแนวทางดา้นความปลอดภยัทางเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ ภายใน
นโยบายหลกัขององคก์ร 
       
๙. องคก์รก าหนดการบริหารความเส่ียง โดยอธิบายความหมายของความเส่ียงท่ี
เก่ียวขอ้งกบัเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศขององคก์รไวช้ดัเจนโดยละเอียด (Risk 
Statement) 
       
๑๐. องคก์รก าหนดแผนการท างานอยา่งต่อเน่ือง (Business continuity plan) เม่ือ
องคก์รเผชิญปัญหาท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัสถานการณ์ท่ีไม่แน่นอน ในเร่ืองการ
สูญเสียสารสนเทศ (Information) ขององคก์ร 
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แนวทางกลยุทธ์ขององค์กร (Strategy direction) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นแนวทางกลยทุธ์ขององคก์รมีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การก าหนด
แผนงานประจ าปีขององคก์ร (The corporate plan/Corporate Level) และ แผนงานปฏิบติัการขององคก์ร (The action plan/ 
Operational Level) ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
ไม
่ เห็
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ว้ย
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า่ง
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๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๑๑. ผูบ้ริหารระดบัสูงก าหนดกลยทุธ์ขององคก์รท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความ
เส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
       
๑๒. ผูบ้ริหารระดบัปฏิบติัการก าหนดกลยทุธ์ขององคก์รท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการ
บริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
       
 
การจัดการทรัพยากรมนุษย์ และการวางแผนทรัพยากรมนุษย์ (Human resource management and 
planning) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นการจดัการทรัพยากรมนุษย ์และการวางแผนทรัพยากรมนุษยข์อง
องคก์รมีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การก าหนดแผนงานประจ าปีขององคก์ร (The corporate plan/Corporate Level) และ แผนงาน
ปฏิบติัการขององคก์ร (The action plan/ Operational Level) ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
ไม
่ เห็
นด
ว้ย
อย
า่ง
ยิง่
 
     
เห็
นด
ว้ย
อย
า่ง
ยิง่
 
๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๑๓. พนกังานเขา้ใจบทบาทของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวกบันโยบายเทคโนโลยธีรรมาภิ
บาล (Information governance policy) 
       
๑๔. พนกังานเขา้ใจหนา้ท่ีความรับผิดชอบของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวกบันโยบาย
เทคโนโลยธีรรมาภิบาล (Information governance policy) 
       
๑๕. พนกังานเขา้ใจบทบาทของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวกบันโยบายความปลอดภยัของ
ขอ้มูลธรรมาภิบาล (Information Security policy) 
       
๑๖. พนกังานเขา้ใจหนา้ท่ีความรับผิดชอบของตนเองท่ีเก่ียวกบันโยบายความ
ปลอดภยัของขอ้มูลธรรมาภิบาล (Information Security policy) 
       
๑๗. พนกังานเขา้ใจเง่ือนไขในสญัญาในการจา้งงานท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการเก็บ
ความลบัขอ้มูลท่ีส าคญัขององคก์ร 
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๑๘. พนกังานไม่เปิดเผยขอ้มูลท่ีส าคญัขององคก์รต่อบุคคลภายนอก        
๑๙. การฝึกอบรมและการเรียนรู้ในองคก์รช่วยให้พนกังานเพ่ิมความระมดัระวงั
ในการปฏิบติังานท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (Staff’s IT 
awareness) 
       
๒๐. การฝึกอบรมและการเรียนรู้ในองคก์รช่วยให้พนกังานเพ่ิมความระมดัระวงั
ในความปลอดภยัทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (Staff’s security 
awareness) 
       
๒๑. องคก์รยกเลิกสิทธิการเขา้ถึงขอ้มูลของพนกังาน จากแผนกเดิมเม่ือมีการ
เปล่ียนแปลงต าแหน่งงาน หรือยา้ยงาน และให้ไดรั้บสิทธิในแผนกใหม ่
       
๒๒. องคก์รยกเลิกสิทธ์ิในการเขา้ถึงขอ้มูลของพนกังานเม่ือลาออก หรือส้ินสุด
การท างาน 
       
 
ความปลอดภัยทางด้านเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (Information Technology Security) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นความปลอดภยัทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศขององคก์รมี
ความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การก าหนดแผนงานประจ าปีขององคก์ร (The corporate plan/Corporate Level) และ แผนงานปฏิบติัการ
ขององคก์ร (The action plan/ Operational Level) ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศเป็น
อยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
ไม
่ เห็
นด
ว้ย
อย
า่ง
ยิง่
 
     
เห็
นด
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า่ง
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๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๒๓. ซอฟแวร์ในระบบปฏิบติัการ (Operation system) เช่น Windows server, 
Linux และ Unix มีการก าหนดค่าคุณสมบติั (Configuration) ไดถู้กตอ้ง 
       
๒๔. ซอฟแวร์ในระบบเครือข่าย (Networking operating systems) เช่น Netware 
และ Cisco มีการก าหนดค่าคุณสมบติั (Configuration) ไดถู้กตอ้ง    
       
๒๕. ซอฟแวร์ทางธุรกิจ (Business software) เช่น SAP และ Business solution 
มีการก าหนดค่าคุณสมบติั (Configuration) ไดถู้กตอ้ง 
       
๒๖. อุปกรณ์ทางเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (Hardware) เช่น AS/400, Hubs, 
Switches และ Routers มีการก าหนดค่าคุณสมบติั (Configuration) ได้
ถูกตอ้ง 
       
๒๗. การควบคุมเก่ียวกบัการเขา้ถึงขอ้มูลมีการก าหนดเป็นลายลกัษณ์อกัษร
เพ่ือให้สอดคลอ้งกบัความตอ้งการทางธุรกิจท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัระบบการ
เขา้ถึงขอ้มูล 
       
๒๘. องคก์รควบคุมการเขา้ถึงระบบเครือข่าย (Network) โดยอนุญาตให้เฉพาะผู ้
ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการท างานในระบบเครือข่ายเท่านั้น 
       
๒๙. องคก์รควบคุมการใชค้อมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคล (Personal Computer) โดย
ระบุผูใ้ชข้องเคร่ืองคอมพิวเตอร์ 
       
๓๐. องคก์รควบคุมการใชค้อมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคล (Personal Computer) โดย        
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การก าหนดรหสัผา่นของเคร่ืองคอมพิวเตอร์ 
๓๑. องคก์รตรวจสอบ log file ของการเขา้ระบบ เพ่ือดูการเขา้มาใชร้ะบบท่ีไม่
ถูกตอ้ง 
       
๓๒. องคก์รตรวจสอบ การใชค้อมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคลของพนกังาน เพ่ือป้องกนั
การใชค้อมพิวเตอร์ผิดวตัถุประสงค ์และป้องกนัความเสียหายต่าง ๆ 
       
๓๓. องคก์รตรวจสอบ การใชค้อมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคลของพนกังาน เพ่ือป้องกนั
ความเสียหายต่าง ๆ 
       
๓๔. องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบขอ้มูลอยา่งถูกตอ้ง ก่อนท่ีจะท าการน าเขา้ขอ้มูล 
(Input data) 
       
๓๕. องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบขอ้มูลอยา่งเหมาะสม ก่อนท่ีจะท าการน าเขา้ขอ้มูล 
(Input data) 
       
๓๖.องคก์รมีโปรแกรมท่ีใชใ้นการตรวจสอบระหว่างการประมวลผลขอ้มูลเพ่ือ
ตรวจจบัความผิดพลาดของขอ้มูล 
       
๓๗. องคก์รมีโปรแกรมท่ีใชใ้นการตรวจสอบระหวา่งการประมวลผลขอ้มูลเพ่ือ
ตรวจจบัวิธีปฏิบติัการประมวลผลขอ้มูลท่ีผิดพลาด 
       
๓๘.  องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบขอ้มูลผลลพัธ์ดว้ยความถูกตอ้งก่อนท่ีจะน าเสนอ 
(Output data) 
       
๓๙. องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบขอ้มูลผลลพัธ์ดว้ยความเหมาะสมก่อนท่ีจะน าเสนอ 
(Output data) 
       
๔๐. องคก์รมีการควบคุมโปรแกรมท่ีใชง้านการปฏิบติังาน        
๔๑. องคก์รมีการควบคุมระบบทดสอบการป้องกนัทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศภายในองคก์ร 
       
๔๒. องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบความสามารถของเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (IT 
Facilities) เป็นประจ าเพ่ือให้สอดคลอ้งกบัการประยกุตใ์ชม้าตรฐานความ
ปลอดภยัทางเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
       
๔๓. ทุกแผนกในองคก์รมีแผนงานตรวจสอบ (Audit plan) อยูเ่ป็นประจ า เพ่ือ
มัน่ใจไดว้า่ทุกขั้นตอนการปฏิบติังานไดเ้ป็นไปตามนโยบายความ
ปลอดภยัของเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ 
       
๔๔. องคก์รระบุระเบียบปฎิบติัทางดา้นความปลอดภยัเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศให้
สอดคลอ้งกบัความตอ้งการของกฎหมาย (พ.ร.บ. วา่ดว้ยการกระท าผิด
เก่ียวกบัคอมพิวเตอร์ พ.ศ. ๒๕๕๐) 
       
๔๕. องคก์รมีการตรวจสอบความปลอดภยัของขอ้มูลและขอ้มูลส่วนบุคคล        
๔๖. องคก์รมีการป้องกนัความปลอดภยัของขอ้มูลและขอ้มูลส่วนบุคคล        
๔๗. องคก์รป้องกนัการเขา้-ออกของบุคคลท่ีไม่ไดรั้บอนุญาตซ่ึงอาจก่อให้เกิด
ความเสียหายต่อทรัพยสิ์น และสารสนเทศขององคก์ร 
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เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ (Information Technology) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศขององคก์รมีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การก าหนด
แผนงานประจ าปีขององคก์ร (The corporate plan/Corporate Level) และ แผนงานปฏิบติัการขององคก์ร (The action plan/ 
Operational Level) ท่ีเก่ียวขอ้งกบัการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
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่ เห็
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๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๔๘. องคก์รมีการตระเตรียมจุดเช่ือมต่อเครือข่าย (Hub) เพียงพอส าหรับ
พนกังาน 
       
๔๙. องคก์รมีการตระเตรียมเคร่ืองคอมพิวเตอร์ส่วนบุคคล (PC) เพียงพอส าหรับ
พนกังาน 
       
๕๐. องคก์รจดัการขอ้มูล และสารสนเทศ จากโปรแกรมปฏิบติังานต่าง ๆ ใหอ้ยู่
ในลกัษณะท่ีน ามาใชร่้วมกนัได ้
       
๕๑. องคก์รตระเตรียมโปรแกรมท่ีใชใ้นการปฏิบติังานทุกโปรแกรมภายใต้
ลิขสิทธ์ินั้น ๆ 
       
 
แผนงานประจ าปี (Corporate level plan) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นแผนงานประจ าปีในระดบั Corporate มีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การ
บริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จในองคก์รเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
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่ เห็
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ว้ย
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า่ง
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๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๕๒. องคก์รก าหนดหวัขอ้การตรวจสอบและควบคุมทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศในแผนงานประจ าปีภายใตว้ตัถุประสงคข์ององคก์ร 
       
๕๓. องคก์รวางแผนภาพรวมของ IT application และ IT security หรือ General 
IT และ IT security ในแผนงานประจ าปี 
       
๕๔. องคก์รก าหนดขั้นตอนกระบวนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศ (ICT risk management methodology) 
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แผนงานปฏิบัติการ (Operational level plan) 
ระดบัการน ามาประยกุตใ์ช ้และระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นแผนงานปฏิบติัการในระดบั Operation มีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อ การ
บริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบผลส าเร็จในองคก์รเป็นอยา่งไร 
 
รายละเอยีด 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
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่ เห็
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า่ง
ยิง่
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๑ ๒ ๓ ๔ ๕ ๖ ๗ 
๕๕. องคก์รก าหนดหวัขอ้การตรวจสอบและควบคุมทางดา้น Technical 
security ชดัเจนในแผนงานปฏิบติัการ ส าหรับแต่ละแผนก 
       
๕๖. องคก์รก าหนดรายละเอียดของการควบคุมทางดา้น Technical security 
ชดัเจนในแผนงานปฏิบติัการส าหรับแต่ละแผนก 
       
๕๗. องคก์รก าหนดขั้นตอนกระบวนการบริหารความเส่ียงทางเทคโนโลยี
สารสนเทศส าหรับเฉพาะโครงการ (ICT risk project management 
methodology) 
       
 
การบริหารความเส่ียงทางด้านเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศที่ประสบผลส าเร็จ (Successful ICT risk 
management) 
ระดบัความคิดเห็นทางดา้นการบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศ มีความสมัพนัธ์ต่อความเส่ียงทางดา้น
เทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศอยา่งไร 
รายละเอยีด 
ก. 
ระดบัความคดิเห็น 
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า่ง
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
๕๘. ท่านคิดวา่การบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบ
ผลส าเร็จช่วยให้องคก์รลดความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศในระดบัท่ี
ยอมรับได ้(Risk appetite) 
       
๕๙. ท่านคิดวา่การบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบ
ผลส าเร็จช่วยให้องคก์รป้องกนัความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศไดด้ว้ย
ความเหมาะสม 
       
๖๐. ท่านคิดวา่การบริหารความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศท่ีประสบ
ผลส าเร็จช่วยให้องคก์รหลีกเล่ียงความเส่ียงทางดา้นเทคโนโลยสีารสนเทศได้
ดว้ยความเหมาะสม 
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SAMPLE COVARIANCE MATRIX 
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C1. Sample covariances matrix (Successful ICT risk management) 
 
it4 policy3 esp5 esp4 esp3 esp2 sictrm3 sictrm2 sictrm1 policy1 policy2 it3 it1 
ict4 1.162 
            
policy3 .701 1.862 
           
esp5 .829 1.001 1.499 
          
esp4 .807 1.023 1.157 1.268 
         
esp3 .788 .944 1.065 1.040 1.077 
        
esp2 .707 .892 1.000 .925 .903 1.015 
       
sictrm3 .515 .439 .568 .567 .520 .498 .996 
      
sictrm2 .506 .537 .666 .646 .584 .580 .814 .942 
     
sictrm1 .585 .592 .721 .701 .631 .639 .881 .907 1.169 
    
policy1 .583 1.198 .851 .829 .742 .748 .420 .476 .584 1.427 
   
policy2 .655 1.271 .927 .897 .797 .787 .431 .502 .583 1.192 1.427 
  
ict3 .954 .704 .830 .830 .774 .688 .552 .572 .642 .601 .654 1.161 
 
ict1 .892 .709 .824 .836 .772 .737 .639 .671 .768 .660 .657 .963 1.374 
 
